You are cordially invited to attend a special meeting of the shareholders of Taubman Centers, Inc. (“Taubman” or the “Company”), which will be held at [•], Eastern Time, on [•]. Due to public health concerns regarding the coronavirus, or COVID-19, pandemic and to prioritize the health and wellbeing of our employees, shareholders and other community members, the Company will hold the special meeting in a virtual meeting format only on [•] (the “virtual meeting website”). You will not be able to attend the special meeting physically in person. For purposes of attendance at the special meeting, all references in this proxy statement to “present in person” or “in person” shall mean virtually present at the special meeting. We encourage you to vote by proxy—over the Internet, by telephone or by mail—well in advance of the special meeting, to ensure your shares are represented whether or not you decide to attend.

At the special meeting, holders of our common stock, par value $0.01 per share (“Taubman common stock”), and our Series B Non-Participating Convertible Preferred Stock, par value $0.001 per share (“Taubman Series B preferred stock” and, together with the Taubman common stock, the “Taubman voting stock”), will be asked to consider and vote upon a proposal to adopt and approve an Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of November 14, 2020 (as it may be amended from time to time, the “merger agreement”), by and among Simon Property Group, Inc. (“Simon”), Simon Property Group, L.P. (the “Simon operating partnership”), Silver Merger Sub 1, LLC (“Merger Sub 1”), Silver Merger Sub 2, LLC (“Merger Sub 2” and together with Simon, the Simon operating partnership and Merger Sub 1, the “Simon parties”), the Company and The Taubman Realty Group Limited Partnership (the “Taubman operating partnership” and together with the Company the “Taubman parties”), which amended and restated the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of February 9, 2020 (the “original merger agreement”) by and among the Simon parties and the Taubman parties, and the transactions contemplated by the merger agreement (the “Transactions”) (such proposal, the “Merger Agreement Proposal”).

Pursuant to the merger agreement, subject to the satisfaction or waiver of certain conditions, Merger Sub 2 will be merged with and into the Taubman operating partnership (the “Partnership Merger”) and the Company will be merged with and into Merger Sub 1 (the “REIT Merger” and, together with the Partnership Merger, the “Mergers”). Upon completion of the Partnership Merger, the Taubman operating partnership will survive (the “Surviving Taubman operating partnership”) and the separate existence of Merger Sub 2 will cease. Upon completion of the REIT Merger, Merger Sub 1 will survive (“Surviving TCO”) and the separate existence of the Company will cease. Immediately following the Partnership Merger, the Surviving Taubman operating partnership will be converted (the “LLC Conversion”) into a Delaware limited liability company (the “Joint Venture”). The Mergers, the LLC Conversion and the other Transactions are described further in the accompanying proxy statement.

If the REIT Merger is completed, holders of Taubman common stock will be entitled to receive $43.00 in cash for each share of Taubman common stock held (the “common stock merger consideration”) and holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock will be entitled to receive, for each share of Taubman Series B preferred stock held, an amount in cash equal to the common stock merger consideration, divided by 14,000 (the “Series B preferred stock merger consideration”). If the Partnership Merger is completed, holders of units of partnership interest in the Taubman operating partnership (each, a “Taubman OP unit”) who are not one of the Taubman family members (as defined below) will be entitled to receive, for each Taubman OP unit held, at their election, the common stock merger consideration or 0.5703 limited partnership units in the Simon operating partnership (each, a “Simon OP unit”), certain Taubman OP units held by the Taubman family members will remain outstanding as units of partnership interest in the Surviving Taubman operating partnership, and all other Taubman OP units held by the Taubman family members will be converted into the right to receive the common stock merger consideration. Following the Mergers and the LLC Conversion, the Simon operating partnership will own 100% of the outstanding equity of Surviving TCO, Surviving TCO will own 80% of the limited liability company interests of the Joint Venture and the Taubman family members will own the remaining 20% of the limited liability company interests of the Joint Venture (assuming, for purposes of this calculation, that Taubman OP units issuable under the Option Deferral Agreement are outstanding interests of the Joint Venture).

The proposed Transactions constitute a “going-private transaction” under the rules of the SEC. As of November 13, 2020, Robert S. Taubman (“R. Taubman”), the Company’s Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, William S. Taubman (“W. Taubman”), the Company’s Chief Operating Officer, and certain entities and trusts affiliated with R. Taubman, with W. Taubman, or with other members of their immediate family (collectively, the “Taubman family members”) in the aggregate, have the power to vote approximately 30% of the outstanding shares of Taubman voting stock.

The board of directors of the Company (the “Taubman Board”) formed a special committee (the “Special Committee”) consisting solely of independent and disinterested directors of the Company to, among other things, review, evaluate and negotiate the Transactions, including the Mergers, and other alternatives available to the Company. The Special Committee unanimously determined that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman common shareholders, and unanimously recommended that the Taubman Board, among other things: (i) determine that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman common shareholders; (ii) adopt and approve the merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the merger agreement, resolve to recommend that the Taubman common shareholders adopt and approve the merger agreement; and (iv) direct that the merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman common shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock for their adoption and approval. The Taubman Board, acting upon the unanimous recommendation of the Special Committee: (i) determined that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman common shareholders; (ii) adopted and approved the merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the merger agreement, resolved to recommend that the Taubman common shareholders adopt and approve the merger agreement; and (iv) directed that the merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman common shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock for their adoption and approval. The Taubman Board unanimously recommends that you vote “FOR” the Merger Agreement Proposal.

The Taubman family members and Simon entered into a voting agreement in connection with the execution of the merger agreement. Under the voting agreement, subject to certain exceptions, the Taubman family members have covenanted to, among other things, vote any shares of Taubman voting stock owned by them in favor of the Merger Agreement Proposal and the Adjournment Proposal (as defined in the accompanying proxy statement) at the special meeting.

Pursuant to rules of the SEC, you also will be asked to vote at the special meeting on a non-binding, advisory proposal to approve compensation that may become payable to the Company’s named executive officers in connection with the REIT Merger and the other Transactions (the “Advisory Compensation Proposal”), as described in the accompanying proxy statement. However, approval of the Advisory Compensation Proposal is not required to complete the REIT Merger or the other Transactions. The Taubman Board also unanimously recommends that you vote “FOR” the Advisory Compensation Proposal.

The accompanying proxy statement describes the merger agreement, the Transactions and related agreements and provides specific information concerning the special meeting. In addition, you may obtain information about us from documents filed with the SEC. We urge you to read the entire proxy statement, including the annexes, carefully, as they set forth the details of the merger agreement and other important information related to the Transactions.

In considering the recommendation of the Taubman Board, you should be aware that certain of the Company’s directors and executive officers may have interests in the Transactions that may be different from, or in addition to, those of the other Taubman shareholders, as further described in the accompanying proxy statement.

Your vote is very important, regardless of the number of shares of Taubman common stock or Taubman Series B preferred stock you own.

The consummation of the Transactions is subject to the approval of the Merger Agreement Proposal by (i) the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of Taubman common stock and Taubman Series B preferred stock entitled to vote thereon (voting together as a single class), (ii) the holders of at least a majority of Taubman Series B preferred stock entitled to vote thereon and (iii) the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of Taubman common stock and Taubman Series B preferred stock entitled to vote thereon (voting together as a single class), but excluding the outstanding shares of Taubman common stock and Taubman Series B preferred stock owned of record or beneficially by the Taubman family members. If you fail to vote on the Merger Agreement Proposal, the effect will be the same as a vote against the Merger Agreement Proposal.

If you own shares of record, you will find enclosed one or more proxy cards with instructions about how to vote over the Internet or by telephone. Whether or not you plan to attend the special meeting, we encourage you to vote over the Internet, or by telephone, as soon as possible so that your shares can be voted at the special

meeting in accordance with your instructions. If you do not have access to the Internet or a touch-tone telephone, you may also sign, date and return your enclosed proxy card(s) in the envelope provided. You can revoke your proxy before the special meeting and issue a new proxy as you deem appropriate. The accompanying proxy statement describes the procedures to follow if you wish to revoke your proxy.

If your shares are held by a bank, broker or other nominee on your behalf in “street name,” you should follow the directions provided by your bank, broker or other nominee regarding how to instruct your bank, broker or other nominee to vote your shares. If you do not follow those instructions, your shares will not be voted, which will have the same effect as voting against the Merger Agreement Proposal.

If you have any questions or need assistance voting your shares, please contact Innisfree M&A Incorporated, which is acting as Taubman’s proxy solicitation agent and information agent in connection with the Transactions:

If your shares are held by a bank, broker or other nominee on your behalf in “street name,” you should also call your bank, broker or other nominee for additional information.

Neither the SEC nor any state securities commission has: approved or disapproved of the Mergers or the other Transactions; passed upon the merits or fairness of the Mergers or the other Transactions; or passed upon the adequacy or accuracy of the disclosure in the accompanying proxy statement. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offense.

The obligations of parties to the merger agreement to complete the Mergers and the other Transactions are subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set forth in the merger agreement, a copy of which is included as part of the accompanying proxy statement.

The accompanying proxy statement is dated [•], 2020 and, together with the enclosed form of proxy, is first being mailed to the Company’s shareholders on or about [•], 2020.

Taubman Series B preferred stock entitled to vote thereon (voting together as a single class), (ii) the holders of at least a majority of Taubman Series B preferred stock entitled to vote thereon and (iii) the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of Taubman common stock and Taubman Series B preferred stock entitled to vote thereon (voting together as a single class), but excluding the outstanding shares of Taubman common stock and Taubman Series B preferred stock owned of record or beneficially by the Taubman family members. If you fail to vote on the Merger Agreement Proposal, the effect will be the same as a vote against the Merger Agreement Proposal.

Approval, on a non-binding, advisory basis, of the Advisory Compensation Proposal requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of Taubman voting stock entitled to vote thereon (voting as a single class). The Adjournment Proposal will be approved if the votes cast in favor of such proposal exceed the votes cast against such proposal by the holders of shares of Taubman voting stock entitled to vote thereon. Approval of the Advisory Compensation Proposal and the Adjournment Proposal are not conditions to the completion of the Mergers.

Whether or not you plan to attend the special meeting in person, please submit your proxy electronically over the Internet or by telephone as promptly as possible. If you do not have access to the Internet or a touch-tone telephone, please sign, date, and return, as promptly as possible, the enclosed proxy card in the accompanying prepaid reply envelope. If you attend the special meeting you may revoke any prior proxy by voting by ballot virtually.

If your shares are held by a bank, broker or other nominee on your behalf in “street name,” you should instruct your bank, broker or other nominee regarding how to vote your shares in accordance with the voting instruction form that you will receive from your bank, broker or other nominee. Your bank, broker or other nominee cannot vote on any of the proposals, including the Merger Agreement Proposal, without your instructions.

You may revoke your proxy at any time before the vote at the special meeting by following the procedures outlined in the accompanying proxy statement.

The Transactions, including the REIT Merger, are described in the accompanying proxy statement, which we urge you to read carefully. A copy of the merger agreement is attached as Annex A to the accompanying proxy statement.

By Order of the Board of Directors of Taubman Centers, Inc.

Dated:[•], 2020

The following terms are used throughout this proxy statement. Unless stated otherwise, the terms set forth below, whenever used in this proxy statement, have the following meanings:

The following questions and answers address briefly some questions you may have regarding the special meeting, the merger agreement and the Transactions, including the Mergers. These questions and answers may not address all questions that may be important to you as a shareholder of the Company. Please refer to the more detailed information contained elsewhere in this proxy statement, the annexes to this proxy statement and the documents referred to or incorporated by reference in this proxy statement.

The following, together with the summary of the merger agreement set forth under “The Merger Agreement,” is a description of the material aspects of the REIT Merger. While we believe that the following description covers the material aspects of the REIT Merger, the description may not contain all of the information that is important to you. We encourage you to read carefully this entire document, including the merger agreement attached to this proxy statement as Annex A, for a more complete understanding of the REIT Merger. The following description is subject to, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to, the merger agreement. You may obtain additional information without charge as described in the section “Where You Can Find Additional Information.”

The Taubman Board, with the assistance of Taubman’s management and Taubman’s advisors, regularly evaluates Taubman’s strategic direction, potential operational changes and ongoing business plans and opportunities, including in light of Taubman’s performance, competitive dynamics, macroeconomic developments and industry trends, all with a view toward maximizing shareholder value. As part of these evaluations, the Taubman Board has considered a variety of strategic alternatives for Taubman, including the continuation of Taubman as an independent public company, the sale of Taubman, a combination of Taubman with other companies, joint ventures and partnerships, the sale of selected assets, a spin-off of a subset of its portfolio, private placements and various other alternatives to enhance shareholder value. These evaluations also included an assessment of Taubman’s shareholder base, the rights and ownership percentage of members of the Taubman family, Taubman’s share price performance and the challenges facing the mall industry, including as a result of the growth of online retail, continued competition from shopping through alternative means and channels, weakening department store sales and mall tenant bankruptcies (including the bankruptcy of Forever 21 in September 2019).

Among the broad strategic initiatives considered by the Taubman Board in 2019 was a potential joint venture with respect to certain assets of Taubman and Simon, which the Taubman Board believed could help reduce leverage, strengthen Taubman’s balance sheet and reduce Taubman’s overall risk in a challenging retail environment. Accordingly, at the direction of the Taubman Board, on October 24, 2019, Robert S. Taubman (“Mr. R. Taubman”), Chairman of the Taubman Board and President and Chief Executive Officer of Taubman, met for dinner with David Simon, Chairman of the Simon Board and President and Chief Executive Officer of Simon, to explore the possibility of such a joint venture. During this meeting, Mr. Simon indicated that he would be interested in assisting Taubman go private. Mr. R. Taubman responded that he would need to consider such a transaction with the Taubman Board. After the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman consulted with Mr. Myron E. Ullman, III, Taubman’s independent Lead Director, over the course of several days, regarding a potential acquisition of Taubman and the numerous issues that would need to be considered by the Taubman Board, as well as by members of the Taubman family, in any such transaction, if the Taubman Board were to authorize exploring such a transaction. Following discussions between Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Ullman over the course of several days, Mr. Ullman advised Mr. R. Taubman that he was supportive of exploring such a potential transaction with Simon, and that he understood the various complicated issues for all parties that would need to be evaluated and negotiated, including that both the members of the Taubman family and the unaffiliated shareholders of Taubman would have to approve the transaction, and recommended that Mr. R. Taubman speak with Mr. Simon again to determine Mr. Simon’s willingness to proceed in the framework of a transaction that would address these many complicated issues in a satisfactory manner before bringing this possibility to the full Taubman Board for consideration.

On October 28, 2019, Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon spoke by telephone. Mr. R. Taubman noted various elements of a potential transaction that he expected would be required for him and members of the Taubman family to support such a transaction, as well as emphasizing that any such transaction, and moving forward to consider any such transaction, would also be entirely subject to discussion and approval by the Taubman Board and the independent members of the Taubman Board. Among the terms that Mr. R. Taubman noted were that members of the Taubman family would need to retain a substantial position in the Taubman operating partnership (potentially around two-thirds of their current position), that members of the Taubman family would need to be protected on minimum distributions and the annual budget approval process, that the transaction would not be a deferred sale and therefore Simon would not have any call right with respect to the interests retained by the members of the Taubman family, and that the members of the Taubman family would need an ability to voluntarily exit the Taubman operating partnership at some future point. Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon also discussed the industrial logic of a transaction, and Mr. R. Taubman asked whether the consideration for the unaffiliated public shareholders would consist of all cash or a combination of cash and shares. Mr. Simon stated that he would need to consider that issue, but that his initial

reaction was that the consideration would be paid 75% in cash and 25% in Simon shares. Mr. R. Taubman noted his expectation that the Taubman family members must not receive any differential consideration in respect of shares or units being sold, as compared to unaffiliated shareholders and unitholders, and that any transaction would be subject to review, recommendation and approval not only of independent directors of Taubman, but of a majority of the voting power not held by members of the Taubman family. Mr. R. Taubman also indicated that he would expect that the Taubman Board would require a “go-shop” as part of any transaction. Following these discussions, Mr. Simon confirmed that he was interested in pursuing a potential transaction and that it would be helpful for Simon to have certain limited, nonpublic information about Taubman in order to further evaluate Simon’s interest. Mr. R. Taubman stated that before Taubman could provide nonpublic information he would need to discuss the matter with the independent members of the Taubman Board, and, if the independent members of the Taubman Board were to approve further engagement, that Taubman and Simon would need to enter into a customary confidentiality and standstill agreement.

On November 1, 2019, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by members of Taubman senior management. Mr. R. Taubman updated the other members of the Taubman Board on his October 24, 2019 and October 28, 2019 conversations with Mr. Simon, his discussions with Mr. Ullman and the preliminary transaction parameters that Messrs. Simon and R. Taubman had discussed to date. Mr. R. Taubman explained his preliminary views regarding a transaction with Mr. Simon, including the industrial logic of such a transaction and his initial thoughts on the potential post-closing governance and liquidity framework. Mr. R. Taubman further stated that he believed it would be productive for Taubman to provide to Simon, subject to signing an appropriate confidentiality and standstill agreement, certain limited nonpublic information about Taubman to allow the parties to determine whether a transaction acceptable to the Taubman Board might be achievable. Following an executive session of the Taubman Board (with Mr. R. Taubman and members of Taubman senior management recused), the members of the Taubman Board discussed the industrial logic of a potential transaction with Simon, the potential benefits to Taubman shareholders of a potential transaction and the appropriate process for evaluating such a transaction. Following discussion, it was the consensus of such members of the Taubman Board that further consideration of a potential transaction with Simon would be in the best interests of Taubman and its shareholders, and the Taubman Board authorized Mr. R. Taubman and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (“Wachtell Lipton”) and Honigman LLP (“Honigman”), each counsel to Taubman, to negotiate and execute a confidentiality and standstill agreement with Simon and to provide nonpublic information to Simon in order to facilitate the making of an acquisition proposal by Simon.

On November 3, 2019, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland & Ellis LLP (“Kirkland”), at the invitation of the independent directors, to discuss the potential transaction with Simon. Mr. R. Taubman recused himself from this meeting. The members of the Taubman Board discussed the appropriate process for evaluating such a transaction, including the formation of a properly empowered committee of the Taubman Board consisting solely of independent and disinterested directors for the purpose of reviewing, evaluating and negotiating any potential transaction with Simon and other alternatives that may be available to Taubman. At the meeting, a representative of Kirkland discussed the formation of such a committee. The Taubman Board formed the Special Committee, with Mayree C. Clark, Michael J. Embler, Cia Buckley Marakovits and Myron Ullman III as its members, and appointed Mr. Ullman as its chairman. The Special Committee was delegated the full power and authority of the Taubman Board to review, evaluate and negotiate a potential sale of Taubman and any alternatives that may be available to Taubman, including remaining an independent company, to engage its own advisors and to make a recommendation to the Taubman Board regarding any such transaction. The Taubman Board’s delegation also provided that the Taubman Board would not recommend a potential sale of Taubman to Simon without a prior favorable recommendation by the Special Committee. The Taubman Board also approved the selection of Kirkland as counsel to the Special Committee and Taubman’s other independent directors. The representative of Kirkland reviewed the fiduciary duties of the directors.

Between November 3, 2019 and November 8, 2019, Taubman and Simon negotiated the terms of a confidentiality and standstill agreement, with Wachtell Lipton and Kirkland participating in such negotiations. On November 8, 2019, Taubman and Simon executed the agreement, which included mutual confidentiality terms, as well as reciprocal standstill provisions. Simon thereafter conducted due diligence on Taubman subject to the confidentiality and standstill agreement.

On November 4, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland, to discuss the process for selecting a financial advisor to the Special Committee as well as other organizational matters to facilitate the Special Committee’s process.

Between November 4, 2019 and November 11, 2019, the Special Committee evaluated and discussed the potential engagement of multiple potential financial advisors, including Lazard. In connection with the potential engagement of Lazard, Lazard provided to the Special Committee information regarding its relationships with the Taubman family members, Taubman and Simon. On November 11, 2019, the Special Committee selected Lazard to act as its financial advisor. The Special Committee selected Lazard in light of Lazard’s extensive experience in M&A transactions in the REIT industry, its experience representing special committees in acquisitions and its lack of material relationships with the Taubman family members, Taubman and Simon.

On November 15, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland, to discuss structural aspects of a potential transaction with Simon and the respective roles and responsibilities of advisors in the Special Committee’s process for evaluating a potential transaction.

Also on November 15, 2019, Mr. Simon contacted Mr. R. Taubman and submitted an oral indication of interest (the “November 15 Proposal”) on behalf of Simon to acquire Taubman at a price of $53.00 per Taubman common share, comprised of a to-be-determined mix of cash and shares of Simon common stock. This proposal represented a 51.3% premium over the $35.03 closing price of Taubman’s common shares on November 14, 2019, the day prior to their conversation. Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon discussed a proposed transaction that would provide for Simon’s acquisition of an 80% interest in the Taubman operating partnership, by way of the acquisition of Taubman itself, with members of the Taubman family (i) retaining two-thirds of their interest in the Taubman operating partnership (thus maintaining ownership of a 20% interest in the Taubman operating partnership) and selling one-third of their interest in the Taubman operating partnership to Simon in exchange for the same consideration as the unaffiliated holders of Taubman operating partnership units would receive in the transaction and (ii) selling their shares of Taubman common stock in exchange for the same consideration as the unaffiliated Taubman shareholders would receive in the transaction. Mr. R. Taubman informed Mr. Simon that although he was disappointed with the price proposed by Mr. Simon, the Special Committee would need to review the November 15 Proposal and that Mr. R. Taubman would respond to Mr. Simon following such review.

Later on November 15, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Mr. R. Taubman. Mr. R. Taubman provided the Special Committee with an overview of discussions with Mr. Simon to date regarding a potential transaction with Simon, including his November 15, 2019 conversation with Mr. Simon and the November 15 Proposal.

On November 17, 2019, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Taubman’s senior management and Kirkland, Lazard, Wachtell Lipton, Honigman and Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”), Taubman’s financial advisor. Mr. R. Taubman provided the Taubman Board with an overview of discussions with Mr. Simon to date regarding a potential transaction with Simon, including his November 15, 2019 conversation with Mr. Simon and the November 15 Proposal. The Taubman Board discussed various aspects of the November 15 Proposal and instructed Mr. R. Taubman to continue discussions with Mr. Simon in order to first negotiate to maximize price for the unaffiliated Taubman shareholders, with further discussions of potential post-closing governance terms to follow.

Following the November 17, 2019 meeting of the Taubman Board, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by all of Taubman’s other independent directors as well as representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. The Special Committee discussed the November 15 Proposal, including structural, financial and governance aspects. The independent directors (other than members of the Special Committee) then left the meeting and the Special Committee discussed potential next steps for the Special Committee’s evaluation process as well as the role of the Special Committee in future interactions between Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon. It was the consensus of the Special Committee that Mr. R. Taubman should continue to discuss the potential transaction with Mr. Simon directly in order to maintain a productive negotiating dynamic, but that Mr. R. Taubman’s next discussion with Mr. Simon should be conducted under the oversight of, and in accordance with appropriate guidelines from, the Special Committee (the “Initial Process Guidelines”), and that the framework for engagement would be revisited on an ongoing basis. The Special Committee instructed the representatives of Kirkland to prepare a draft of the Initial Process Guidelines for the Special Committee’s review, which would be conveyed to Mr. R. Taubman in advance of his next discussion with Mr. Simon.

On November 18, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland and Lazard, to further discuss the November 15 Proposal and the process for evaluating and negotiating a potential transaction with Simon. At the meeting, the members of the Special Committee provided input on the Initial Process Guidelines, to be reflected by Kirkland in a written draft of the Initial Process Guidelines.

On November 19, 2019, Kirkland provided a draft of the Initial Process Guidelines to the Special Committee. Later that day, the Special Committee held a meeting to discuss the Initial Process Guidelines. Following the meeting, on November 19, 2019, the Special Committee provided comments on the written draft of the Initial Process Guidelines to Kirkland.

On November 20, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by several of Taubman’s other independent directors as well as representatives of Kirkland. At the meeting, the representatives of Kirkland reviewed the corporate and governance structure of Taubman and the Taubman operating partnership. The directors discussed the impact of the corporate and governance structure on a potential transaction, including with respect to the treatment of Taubman’s common stock, Taubman’s preferred stock, the Taubman operating partnership’s partnership units and the contractual relationships between Taubman and its subsidiaries and the Taubman family members. The directors also discussed that certain Taubman family members had consent rights over the sale of a number of properties owned by the Taubman operating partnership. The representatives of Kirkland also discussed options for conducting a “market check,” as well as evaluating other strategic and financial alternatives to the potential transaction with Simon, including Taubman continuing to operate as a standalone public company. The Special Committee also discussed the circumstances in which Mr. R. Taubman could be obligated to vote in favor of an alternative proposal and, following discussion, it was the consensus of the Special Committee that they would further discuss this matter and make a proposal to Mr. R. Taubman at the appropriate time. The independent directors (other than members of the Special Committee) then left the meeting and the representatives of Kirkland discussed the draft Initial Process Guidelines as revised after November 19, 2019 to reflect the comments provided by the Special Committee. The revised draft Initial Process Guidelines emphasized, among other things, that the Special Committee must be centrally involved in the evaluation and negotiation processes for any transaction with Simon and provided parameters for discussions with Mr. Simon.

Later on November 20, 2019, members of the Special Committee spoke with Mr. R. Taubman and conveyed the Initial Process Guidelines to Mr. R. Taubman that would govern Mr. R. Taubman’s next discussion with Mr. Simon, which had been scheduled for November 21.

On November 21, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard present. The members of the Special Committee discussed the November 20, 2019 conversation with Mr. R. Taubman, noting that Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon intended to have dinner together that evening. Representatives of Lazard then reviewed with the Special Committee preliminary financial analyses relating to the November 15 Proposal, Taubman’s share price performance and past communications from Taubman’s shareholders (including from Land & Buildings Investment Management, LLC, which had communicated from time to time that there were actions the Taubman Board could potentially take to increase shareholder value, including a sale or spin-off of certain Taubman assets, none of which specifically referenced a transaction with Simon). The Special Committee concluded that it should reconvene after Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon spoke that evening.

Later on November 21, 2019, Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon had dinner to discuss the potential transaction. At the dinner, in accordance with the Initial Process Guidelines, Mr. R. Taubman noted that, while he and the Special Committee believed that the November 15 Proposal undervalued Taubman, the Special Committee was prepared to continue engaging to explore a transaction with Simon.

On November 22, 2019, Ms. Marakovits and Ms. Clark spoke telephonically with Mr. R. Taubman, who provided them with an update regarding his November 21 dinner with Mr. Simon.

On November 23, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Mr. R. Taubman. At the meeting Mr. R. Taubman provided an update to the Special Committee regarding his November 21 dinner with Mr. Simon, and the Special Committee discussed potential next steps.

On November 25, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland and Lazard, as well as Mr. R. Taubman. At the meeting Mr. R. Taubman again discussed with the members of the Special Committee his November 21 dinner with Mr. Simon, and they discussed potential next steps.

On December 1, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard present, to discuss drafts of the term sheet for the original merger agreement and original voting agreement that would require, among other things, the Taubman family members to vote in favor of the contemplated transaction with Simon (the “Transaction Term Sheet”) and the JV agreement (the “JV Term Sheet”), the sequencing of Mr. R. Taubman’s further interactions with Mr. Simon regarding price, transaction terms and post-closing governance, including whether and when to send the Transaction Term Sheet and/or the JV Term Sheet to Simon, and the role of the Special Committee in interactions between Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon. During the meeting, the Special Committee discussed with the representatives of Kirkland and Lazard the potential sequencing of sending the term sheets to Simon and the merits and potential risks of the Special Committee having direct participation in negotiations with Mr. Simon at that time. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Special Committee determined that it would further discuss these matters with Mr. R. Taubman.

On December 2, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Mr. R. Taubman and representatives of Kirkland, Lazard, Wachtell Lipton and Goldman. The Special Committee discussed the November 15 Proposal and potential next steps for responding to Simon. Following discussion, the Special Committee instructed Mr. R. Taubman that, before any term sheets were sent to Simon, Mr. R. Taubman should meet with Mr. Simon again to seek to improve Simon’s proposed purchase price. In particular, the Special Committee instructed Mr. R. Taubman that he should not commit to a purchase price less than $63.00 per share, based on the Special Committee’s views on a price they believed at the time could be the maximum amount reasonably attainable from Simon, and indicated that the Special Committee could be flexible regarding the mix of cash and shares of Simon common stock in order to achieve the highest possible price (including potentially accepting all cash). The Special Committee concluded that, subject to Mr. R. Taubman’s adherence to these negotiating instructions, in order to avoid disrupting the negotiating dynamic at that time, Mr. R. Taubman would next meet with Mr. Simon without representatives of the Special Committee or Lazard present.

Later on December 2, 2019, Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon had dinner to further discuss the terms of a potential transaction. During the course of these discussions, Mr. Simon made an oral proposal for Simon to acquire Taubman at a price of $58.00 per common share in cash. This proposal represented an 81.3% premium over the $31.99 closing price of Taubman’s common shares on December 2, 2019. Mr. R. Taubman conveyed to Mr. Simon that, based on direction from the Special Committee, he did not believe that the Special Committee would accept Simon’s revised proposal, but that a purchase price of $63.00 per share might be viewed by the Special Committee as acceptable and the committee could be flexible regarding the mix of cash and shares of Simon common stock in order to achieve the highest possible price (including potentially accepting all cash).

On December 3, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Mr. R. Taubman and representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. At the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman updated the Special Committee on his discussions with Mr. Simon during their December 2, 2019 dinner and noted that he expected to speak with Mr. Simon again later that week. After discussion, the Special Committee determined that it would meet with Mr. R. Taubman again before his next discussion with Mr. Simon in order to discuss guidelines and the appropriate participants for such discussion.

On December 4, 2019, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Honigman. During the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman provided an update on discussions with Simon to date. Mr. R. Taubman discussed with the Taubman Board the Green Street Advisors (“Green Street”) report that was issued on December 3, 2019 regarding regional mall REITs. Mr. R. Taubman described that while Green Street’s NAV analysis did not change in the report, Green Street had reduced Taubman’s intrinsic value and increased Simon’s intrinsic value, primarily related to Simon’s balance sheet strength. Members of the Taubman Board thereafter discussed the recent discussions with Simon and the Green Street report.

On December 5, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard in attendance. At the meeting, the members of the Special Committee considered the merits and potential risks of the Special Committee having direct participation in the upcoming discussion between Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon. Following discussion, it was the consensus of the Special Committee that in light of the risk that adding participants to the discussions between Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon could disrupt the negotiating dynamic and potentially impair the outcome for the unaffiliated Taubman common shareholders in a transaction with Simon, Mr. R. Taubman would attend the upcoming discussion with Mr. Simon without representatives of the Special Committee or Lazard attending, subject to Mr. R. Taubman’s adherence to guidelines from the Special Committee regarding the matters to

be discussed (the “Additional Process Guidelines”). Representatives of Lazard then reviewed with the Special Committee preliminary financial analyses relating to a potential transaction with Simon, and the members of Special Committee discussed with Lazard the Special Committee’s views on price and Simon’s ability to pay, including the impact of leverage, accretion and consideration mix.

On December 6, 2019, members of the Special Committee spoke with Mr. R. Taubman by telephone to convey the Additional Process Guidelines. The Additional Process Guidelines emphasized, among other things, that Mr. R. Taubman should not commit to a purchase price less than $60.00 per share, based on the Special Committee’s views on a price they believed at the time could be the maximum amount reasonably attainable from Simon, and should not agree to any final post-closing governance or other non-price terms with potential implications on the value to be received by unaffiliated Taubman common shareholders in a transaction with Simon prior to an initial agreement on price.

Also on December 6, 2019, Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon met for lunch and discussed the potential transaction. During the meeting, Mr. Simon made a revised oral proposal to Mr. R. Taubman for Simon to acquire Taubman for $57.00 per share, in a mix of cash and shares of Simon common stock (which Mr. Simon indicated may likely be 75% in cash and 25% in shares). Mr. R. Taubman conveyed to Mr. Simon that, based on prior feedback from the Special Committee, he did not believe that the Special Committee would accept the proposal. Mr. Simon then made a further revised oral proposal to Mr. R. Taubman for Simon to acquire Taubman for $60.00 per share, again in a mix of cash and shares of Simon common stock (the “Updated December 6 Proposal”). Mr. Simon again indicated that, while he was not yet sure of the cash and stock mix, Simon was leaning toward paying 75% in cash and 25% in Simon shares. This proposal represented a 92.7% premium over the $31.13 closing price of Taubman’s common shares on December 5, 2019, the most recent completed trading day before their discussion. Mr. Simon also asked that Simon receive term sheets outlining the key terms of the original merger agreement and the original JV agreement. Mr. R. Taubman stated that he would communicate the revised proposal and request for term sheets to the Special Committee.

Later on December 6, 2019, members of the Special Committee spoke with Mr. R. Taubman by telephone. During the discussion, Mr. R. Taubman provided members of the Special Committee with an update regarding his lunch with Mr. Simon and the Updated December 6 Proposal. The members of the Special Committee indicated that the Special Committee would discuss the Updated December 6 Proposal later on December 6, 2019.

Later on December 6, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting to discuss the Updated December 6 Proposal, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard in attendance. The members of the Special Committee discussed the telephone call with Mr. R. Taubman earlier that day, the Updated December 6 Proposal and potential responses, including possible outreach to other parties that may potentially be interested in a transaction involving Taubman. Following discussion, the Special Committee determined that Mr. R. Taubman should continue discussions with Simon regarding a potential transaction on the basis of the Updated December 6 Proposal and that the Special Committee should further consider whether to solicit potential interest from additional parties, taking into account the potential benefits and risks of doing so, as well as the likelihood of another party having the scale and strategic focus, the liquidity, balance sheet, and leverage (in particular, during the present challenging environment), the potential synergies, the knowledge of the business, and the understanding of Taubman’s assets and their value, to enable it to present a proposal that could be competitive with the Updated December 6 Proposal. The Special Committee also discussed the potential impact of Taubman’s corporate and governance structure on any potential transaction involving Taubman, including in light of certain Taubman family members having a consent right over the sale of a number of properties of the Taubman operating partnership. At the meeting, representatives of Kirkland also reviewed with the Special Committee drafts of the Transaction Term Sheet and the JV Term Sheet, with the members of the Special Committee providing direction on provisions of the term sheets. The Special Committee then authorized the submission of the term sheets to Simon following the implementation of the feedback provided by the Special Committee at the meeting.

Later on December 6, 2019, Taubman sent drafts of the JV Term Sheet and the Transaction Term Sheet to Simon. The draft of the Transaction Term Sheet contemplated, among other things: (i) a 45-day “open” go-shop period that would permit Taubman to pay a lower termination fee in connection with any alternative proposal that was initially received during the go-shop period, even if the original merger agreement was terminated after the go-shop period; (ii) a “fiduciary out” provision that would allow Taubman to terminate the original merger agreement to accept a superior proposal during and following the go-shop period; and (iii) a requirement that holders of a majority of the outstanding Taubman common shares and Series B preferred shares, other than the Taubman family members,

approve the transaction. The draft of the JV Term Sheet, among other things: (i) contemplated that Mr. R. Taubman would be the chief executive officer of the Joint Venture, with general authority to operate the Joint Venture’s business, subject to various consent rights that Simon would have on material transactions and decisions, and the mechanisms for resolving any deadlocks, (ii) provided that starting two years from the closing, subject to certain limitations and procedures, the Taubman family members would be entitled to exchange their equity interests in the Joint Venture for, at the option of the Taubman family members, units in the Simon operating partnership or cash, based on the greater of three alternative valuation mechanisms and (iii) set forth a process for establishing an annual budget, operating plan and distribution policy and provided rules on what would happen if an annual budget, operating plan or distribution policy were not approved.

On December 7, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Mr. R. Taubman, members of Taubman senior management and representatives of Kirkland, Lazard, Wachtell Lipton, Honigman and Goldman. At the meeting, the Special Committee discussed with Mr. R. Taubman, among other things, certain aspects of the term sheets, including termination fees and antitrust efforts and structure matters, as well as potential timing for negotiating a transaction with Simon. During the discussion, the members of the Special Committee provided their views on various transaction terms, with representatives of Kirkland providing perspectives on these topics, and the members of the Special Committee provided direction to Mr. R. Taubman regarding such terms. Mr. R. Taubman noted that he planned to speak with Mr. Simon regarding the term sheets the following day and would reflect the feedback of the Special Committee in his discussions and provide an update to the Special Committee following such discussion.

On December 8, 2019, Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon met to discuss, among other things, the JV Term Sheet and the Transaction Term Sheet, focusing in particular on the JV Term Sheet. At the conclusion of the meeting, Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon agreed that it would be beneficial to hold a meeting on December 9, 2019 to further discuss these matters.

Later on December 8, 2019, the Taubman Board held a meeting, with members of Taubman senior management and representatives of Honigman in attendance. During the meeting, members of the Special Committee and Mr. R. Taubman provided the other members of the Taubman Board with an update on discussions with Simon, including the Updated December 6 Proposal and the distribution of the JV Term Sheet and Transaction Term Sheet to Simon. Mr. R. Taubman also provided an overview of his meeting with Mr. Simon earlier in the day on December 8, 2019. Following discussion, the Taubman Board indicated its support for the Updated December 6 Proposal and Taubman’s continued exploration of a potential transaction with Simon.

On December 9, 2019, Taubman and Simon held a meeting at the offices of Wachtell Lipton in which representatives of Taubman senior management, Simon senior management, Wachtell Lipton, Kirkland, Honigman, Latham & Watkins, LLP, counsel to Simon (“Latham”), and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, counsel to Simon (“Paul Weiss”), participated. The parties discussed, among other things, the JV Term Sheet and the Transaction Term Sheet.

Later on December 9, 2019, Simon sent revised drafts of the Transaction Term Sheet and the JV Term Sheet to Taubman. The draft of the Transaction Term Sheet contemplated, among other things: (i) a “force the vote” provision that would prevent Taubman from terminating the original merger agreement to accept a superior proposal following the go-shop period unless and until the Taubman shareholders voted against the Simon transaction at a meeting of Taubman shareholders; (ii) a 45-day “closed” go-shop period that would not permit Taubman to pay a lower termination fee if the original merger agreement was terminated after the expiration of the go-shop period in connection with any alternative proposal that was initially received during the go-shop period; (iii) recurring matching rights for Simon with respect to any alternative proposal received by Taubman; (iv) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 4% of the aggregate equity value of Taubman in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal following the go-shop period; (v) a termination fee of 2% of the aggregate equity value of Taubman in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal during the go-shop period; (vi) a “naked no vote” expense reimbursement amount payable by Taubman to Simon of up to 1% of the aggregate equity value of Taubman if the original merger agreement is terminated because Taubman’s shareholders do not approve the original merger agreement; and (vii) a “tail” provision in the original voting agreement that would require the Taubman family members to vote against any alternative proposal submitted to Taubman’s shareholders during the 12-month period following any termination of the original merger agreement (other than a superior proposal accepted by Taubman during the go-shop period). The draft of the JV Term Sheet, among other things: (i) provided that the period during which Mr. R. Taubman would have

operational control over the Joint Venture would be time limited and added certain other events that would shift operational control to Simon, (ii) deleted the proposed valuation mechanisms if the Taubman family members exercised their sale rights and indicated that the valuation mechanisms would be discussed at a later stage, (iii) added additional consent rights for Simon during the period in which Mr. R. Taubman would have operational control of the Joint Venture and modified the deadlock dispute procedures and items that could be capable of being resolved through arbitration, (iv) indicated that the Taubman family members would be subject to a non-compete, (v) added various parameters and limitations on annual distributions and the annual budget process and (vi) provided that the Joint Venture would be responsible for any preferred equity or debt of Taubman that is repaid by Simon and for any transaction expenses incurred by Taubman in connection with the transaction.

On December 10, 2019, Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon met to discuss, among other things, the timing for the potential transaction and various issues in the revised JV Term Sheet.

On December 12, 2019, the Taubman Board held a regularly scheduled meeting, with members of Taubman senior management in attendance. At the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman provided the other members of the Taubman Board with an update on the potential transaction with Simon, including Mr. R. Taubman’s discussions with Mr. Simon to date.

On December 13, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. The representatives of Kirkland reviewed with the Special Committee the December 9 draft of the Transaction Term Sheet, including the fiduciary and termination provisions and the ability of the Special Committee to solicit and negotiate alternative proposals, as well as the December 9 draft of the JV Term Sheet. The Special Committee provided the representatives of Kirkland with its views and direction on such matters, and authorized the submission of a draft original merger agreement to Simon reflecting the Special Committee’s feedback. The Special Committee also discussed the circumstances in which Mr. R. Taubman and other Taubman family members could be obligated to vote in favor of an alternative proposal and, following discussion, it was the consensus of the Special Committee that the Special Committee would further discuss this matter and make a proposal to Mr. R. Taubman at the appropriate time.

Between December 13, 2019 and December 16, 2019, Wachtell Lipton and Paul Weiss exchanged several drafts of the JV Term Sheet, negotiating, among other items, the liquidity mechanics and valuation mechanisms, consent rights for each party when the other party would have operational control of the Joint Venture, the dispute resolution mechanism, the time period during which Mr. R. Taubman would have operational control of the Joint Venture, the minimum distribution requirements and annual budget matters.

On December 16, 2019, representatives of Kirkland, Wachtell Lipton and Latham discussed by telephone the various issues that were unresolved in the Transaction Term Sheet, including the “force the vote” provision, the “closed” go-shop provision, the “tail” provision of the original voting agreement, the size of the termination fees and the inclusion of the “naked no vote” expense reimbursement provision.

On December 17, 2019, representatives of Kirkland sent an initial draft of the original merger agreement to Latham. The draft original merger agreement contemplated, among other things: (i) a “fiduciary out” termination provision that would allow Taubman to terminate the original merger agreement to accept a superior proposal before and after the go-shop period; (ii) a 45-day “open” go-shop provision; (iii) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 1% of the value of Taubman’s equity to be acquired by Simon in the proposed transaction in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal during the go-shop period or with any party that has submitted an acquisition proposal during the go-shop period that the Special Committee has determined in good faith constitutes or could reasonably be expected to lead to a superior proposal; (iv) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 2% of the equity value of Taubman to be acquired by Simon in the proposed transaction in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal in other circumstances following the go-shop period; (v) a regulatory efforts provision that required Simon to do all things necessary, proper and advisable to obtain regulatory approvals, except as would have a material adverse effect on the combined business of Simon and Taubman; and (vi) no closing conditions related to the receipt of contractual consents from third parties and no mandated delay period to complete the proposed transaction if any third-party consents have not been obtained when all other closing conditions have been satisfied. Thereafter, until execution of the original merger agreement on February 9, 2020, Taubman and Simon and their representatives exchanged multiple drafts of the original merger agreement and engaged in related negotiations.

On December 20, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Taubman’s senior management, Kirkland, Lazard and Goldman. At the meeting, Taubman’s senior management reviewed with the Special Committee a set of preliminary financial projections that the Special Committee had instructed management to prepare in the context of evaluating a transaction with Simon, with management noting that such projections remained incomplete pending additional details that management was still preparing. The Special Committee reviewed with management the key drivers and rationale behind the preliminary financial projections, including the shifting retail landscape, and views on the achievability of such projections. During an executive session of the Special Committee, the Special Committee concluded that it should receive and review the additional portions of such projections prior to making any final determination with respect to such projections.

On December 23, 2019, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard in attendance. At the meeting, the representatives of Kirkland reviewed with the Special Committee the directors’ fiduciary duties, both generally and in the context of the potential transaction with Simon, and various other legal matters, including process considerations. The representatives of Lazard discussed with the Special Committee the potential merits and risks of conducting a pre-signing market check, and they identified certain third parties that could potentially be interested in a transaction involving Taubman. After discussion and consideration of various factors, including the fact that any original merger agreement with Simon would contain a “go-shop” provision, the risk that Simon would terminate negotiations with Taubman should Taubman explore strategic options with other parties, the view of the Special Committee that it would be unlikely that another counterparty would be in a position to make a proposal that would be superior to the proposed transaction with Simon, the fact that the Taubman family members had a consent right over the sale of a number of properties of the Taubman operating partnership and the risk of a leak and the resulting management distraction that could occur if the Special Committee engaged in outreach efforts at that time, the Special Committee determined that it would not be in the best interests of Taubman and its shareholders to engage in a market check before signing an agreement with Simon, but that Taubman should conduct a post-signing market check if it were to proceed with a transaction with Simon.

On December 24, 2019, Taubman sent an initial draft of the original JV agreement and a revised draft of the JV Term Sheet to Simon, with terms generally consistent with prior versions of the JV Term Sheet that had been circulated to Simon. Thereafter, until execution of the original merger agreement and finalization of the form of the original JV agreement on February 9, 2020, Taubman and Simon and their representatives exchanged multiple drafts of the original JV agreement and engaged in related negotiations, including negotiating various provisions regarding governance and consent rights, deadlock and dispute resolution procedures, liquidity options (both for Simon and for the Taubman family members) and related valuation mechanisms, annual budgets and minimum distribution requirements.

On January 5, 2020, Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon discussed the timing of the contemplated transaction and potential next steps.

On January 6, 2020, Simon sent revised drafts of the original merger agreement and the original JV agreement to Taubman. The draft original merger agreement contemplated, among other things: (i) a “force the vote” provision that would prevent Taubman from terminating the original merger agreement to accept a superior proposal following the go-shop period; (ii) a 45-day “closed” go-shop provision that would not permit Taubman to pay a lower termination fee if the original merger agreement was terminated after the expiration of the go-shop period in connection with any alternative proposal that was initially received during the go-shop period; (iii) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 2% of the value of Taubman’s equity to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal during the go-shop period; (iv) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 4% of the equity value of Taubman to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal following the go-shop period; (v) a regulatory efforts provision that required Simon to do all things necessary, proper and advisable to obtain regulatory approvals, except that Simon would not be required to commit to or make any regulatory concession with respect to properties of Taubman or Simon that satisfied certain materiality criteria; and (vi) a closing condition related to the receipt of certain required contractual consents from third parties. The draft original JV agreement continued to include the open issues that the parties had been discussing, including the liquidity mechanics and valuation mechanisms, consent rights for each party when the other party would have operational control of the Joint Venture, the dispute resolution mechanism, the time period during which Mr. R. Taubman would have operational control of the Joint Venture, and distribution policy and annual budget matters.

Later on January 6, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Taubman’s senior management, Wachtell Lipton, Kirkland, Lazard and Goldman in attendance. At the meeting, members of Taubman’s senior management reviewed with the Special Committee the January 2020 Projections (as described in “–Certain Unaudited Prospective Financial Information”), which reflected updates to the preliminary financial projections presented to the Special Committee on December 20, 2019. The January 2020 Projections reflected the inclusion of the portions of the projections that had not been included in the projections reviewed by the Special Committee on December 20, 2019 and took into account, among other things, continuing developments in Taubman’s business, including the continuing uncertainty and headwinds in the retail environment, the rise of e-commerce and slower than expected rent growth. The Special Committee approved the January 2020 Projections and authorized Lazard to use the January 2020 Projections for purposes of Lazard’s valuation analyses in connection with a potential transaction involving Simon.

On January 8, 2020, Taubman and Simon held a meeting at the offices of Paul Weiss in which representatives of Taubman senior management, Simon senior management, Kirkland, Wachtell Lipton, Honigman and Paul Weiss participated. At the meeting, the parties continued to discuss various open issues in the original JV agreement.

On January 9, 2020, Taubman and Simon held a meeting at the offices of Kirkland in which representatives of Taubman senior management, Simon senior management, Kirkland, Latham and Wachtell Lipton participated. At the meeting, the parties discussed open issues in the original merger agreement, including, among other things, provisions regarding termination rights, termination fees, the go-shop period and third-party consents.

Also on January 9, 2020, Mr. Simon and Mr. R. Taubman met to continue discussing the proposed transaction and the current market environment. During this discussion, Mr. Simon communicated that, in light of, among other things, the uncertain and deteriorating retail environment, the critical situation with Forever 21, and the recent performance of Simon’s stock, Simon was no longer willing to pursue a transaction on the terms of the Updated December 6 Proposal, and Simon instead submitted a revised verbal proposal for Simon to acquire Taubman for $57.00 per share in cash (as opposed to cash and stock, as previously proposed). Further, Mr. Simon indicated that Simon wanted the Taubman family members to retain their full ownership stake in the Taubman operating partnership rather than selling one-third of their interest as part of the transaction as previously proposed (the “January 9 Proposal”). This proposal represented a 78.2% premium over the $31.99 closing price of Taubman’s common shares on January 8, 2020, the most recent completed trading day before their discussion. In response, Mr. R. Taubman informed Mr. Simon that the Special Committee would need to review the January 9 Proposal. Mr. R. Taubman also noted to Mr. Simon that he expected that the Taubman family members would be willing to retain their full ownership interest in the Taubman operating partnership if Simon would agree to certain liquidity terms (which ultimately were not agreed). Mr. R. Taubman also expressed his disappointment with the reduced price reflected in the January 9 Proposal, but Mr. Simon did not change his position following extensive further discussion. After their meeting and as previously scheduled, Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon proceeded to meet with other representatives of Taubman senior management, Simon senior management, Wachtell Lipton and Paul Weiss to continue discussing the open issues in the original JV agreement, including the liquidity mechanics and valuation mechanisms, consent rights for each party when the other party would have operational control of the Joint Venture, the dispute resolution mechanism, the minimum distribution requirements and annual budget matters.

On January 10, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard present. During the meeting, and in advance of a meeting of the Special Committee scheduled for later that day at which Mr. R. Taubman would be providing an update on recent interactions with Simon (including an overview of the January 9 Proposal), the representatives of Kirkland provided the Special Committee with an update on recent negotiations between the parties on the original merger agreement and the original JV agreement. The Special Committee also discussed with the representatives of Kirkland certain open issues in the original merger agreement, including, among other things, provisions regarding termination rights, termination fees, the go-shop period and third party consents. Following discussion, the Special Committee determined that it would reconvene after the scheduled call with Mr. R. Taubman to discuss the January 9 Proposal.

Later on January 10, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with Mr. R. Taubman and representatives of Kirkland, Lazard and Wachtell Lipton present. The Special Committee discussed with Mr. R. Taubman the January 8, 2020 and January 9, 2020 meetings between the parties described above, and Mr. R. Taubman provided the Special Committee with an overview of his January 9, 2020 conversation with Mr. Simon and the January 9 Proposal. Mr. R. Taubman indicated that, in light of, among other things, the uncertain and deteriorating retail environment, he was supportive of continuing to explore a transaction with Simon on the terms set forth in the January 9 Proposal, but

noted that the Special Committee had been delegated the full power and authority of the Taubman Board to review, evaluate and negotiate a potential transaction with Simon. Following discussion, the members of the Special Committee concluded that the Special Committee would hold an additional meeting with the representatives of Kirkland and Lazard later that day to further consider these matters and the January 9 Proposal.

Later on January 10, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard present. At the meeting, the Special Committee discussed the January 9 Proposal, including with respect to price, consideration mix and post-closing governance as it related to these matters, and potential next steps. Following deliberation, the Special Committee concluded that Ms. Marakovits, on behalf of the Special Committee, should directly participate in the next meeting between Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon, which had been scheduled for January 12, 2020.

Later on January 10, 2020, Ms. Marakovits and Mr. Embler held a telephone conversation with Mr. R. Taubman to discuss potential next steps, indicating, among other things, the Special Committee’s determination that Ms. Marakovits should participate in the January 12, 2020 discussion between Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon. Ms. Marakovits and Mr. Embler asked Mr. R. Taubman whether the Taubman family would be interested in potentially selling all of their interests in the Taubman operating partnership to Simon in the proposed transaction, and Mr. R. Taubman said that the Taubman family would not be interested in doing so.

Later on January 10, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard present. Ms. Marakovits provided an update on the conversation that she and Mr. Embler had earlier that day with Mr. R. Taubman. The Special Committee discussed with the representatives of Kirkland open issues in the original merger agreement and the original JV agreement. The representatives of Lazard reviewed with the Special Committee Lazard’s preliminary analysis of the January 9 Proposal, including relative to the Updated December 6 Proposal. The Special Committee then discussed next steps for responding to the January 9 Proposal, including views on the best way to increase Simon’s proposed price and the appropriate sequencing of discussions regarding price and governance terms to obtain the best outcome for the unaffiliated Taubman common shareholders. The Special Committee also discussed a framework for obligating the Taubman family members to facilitate the making of a superior proposal (the “Taubman Family Commitments”) and instructed Kirkland to propose to Mr. R. Taubman a draft of the Taubman Family Commitments that would require the Taubman family members to vote all of their ownership interests in favor of a superior proposal that provided for (i) (x) aggregate sale proceeds to the Taubman family members that are at least equal to the proceeds to be received in a transaction with Simon and (y) other terms with respect to the Taubman family members’ investment that are at least as favorable as a whole to those provided in a transaction with Simon or (ii) the sale of all of the Taubman family members’ ownership interests at a price that would provide per share net sale proceeds to the Taubman family members that are at least equal to the proceeds they would receive in a transaction with Simon. The draft Taubman Family Commitments also required the Taubman family members to negotiate in good faith with the Special Committee any superior proposal that did not initially satisfy these criteria.

On January 11, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Kirkland and Lazard present. At the meeting, the Special Committee and its advisors further discussed next steps for responding to the January 9 Proposal, including views on the best way to increase Simon’s proposed price and the appropriate sequencing of discussions regarding price and governance terms to obtain the best outcome for the unaffiliated Taubman shareholders. Following discussion, it was the consensus of the Special Committee that the parties should agree on price prior to further negotiating governance terms.

Later on January 11, 2020, Ms. Marakovits contacted Mr. R. Taubman and informed him that the Special Committee had concluded that at the upcoming January 12 meeting with Mr. Simon, the parties should agree on price prior to further negotiating governance terms.

On January 12, 2020, Lazard provided Ms. Marakovits with preliminary financial analyses relating to the January 9 Proposal, to assist Ms. Marakovits in her discussion with Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon scheduled for later that day.

On January 12, 2020, Ms. Marakovits, Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon met to discuss the January 9 Proposal. The parties discussed the financial aspects of the January 9 Proposal, including in light of Taubman’s prospects, potential accretion to Simon in light of the shift in consideration mix to all-cash and Simon’s ability to pay, among other aspects. During this conversation, Mr. Simon communicated to Ms. Marakovits and Mr. R. Taubman that, in light of a variety of factors, including the deteriorating retail environment, the pending bankruptcy of Forever 21 and

Simon’s recent stock performance, the per share price of $57.00 represented Simon’s best and final price and that, should the parties fail to agree on price and move forward with the transaction at that time, Simon would need to put the transaction on hold, for a period of four to six weeks, while it focused on a potential transaction involving Forever 21. At the meeting, Ms. Marakovits agreed on behalf of the Special Committee to proceed with the potential transaction on the basis of a per share price of $57.00 in cash and, on behalf of the Special Committee, she then authorized Mr. R. Taubman to further discuss governance terms with Mr. Simon. Mr. R. Taubman also indicated that he was in favor of proceeding with the potential transaction on the basis of a per share price of $57.00 in cash. Mr. R. Taubman and Mr. Simon then discussed, among other terms, that the Taubman family members would sell approximately one-third of their interests in the Taubman operating partnership for cash at the same price to be received by the unaffiliated holders of Taubman operating partnership units, the terms of a one-time put right for the Taubman family members to sell all of their interests in the Taubman operating partnership to Simon during the third year following the closing of the transaction, and certain other aspects of the draft original JV agreement, including minimum distribution requirements, consent rights and the valuation mechanisms in the case of sales by the Taubman family members of their interests in the Joint Venture.

Later on January 12, 2020, and again on January 13, 2020, representatives of Taubman senior management, Simon senior management, Wachtell Lipton and Paul Weiss met to discuss the open issues in the original JV agreement, including the Taubman family members’ desire to have the right to sell to Simon, following the closing of the acquisition of Taubman, all of their interests in the Taubman operating partnership at a fixed price equal to the price paid to the unaffiliated holders of Taubman operating partnership units in the acquisition of Taubman. In the course of these discussions, Mr. R. Taubman ultimately agreed, among other things, that the Taubman family members would not have the right under the original JV agreement to sell to Simon, following the closing of the acquisition of Taubman, all of their remaining interests in the Taubman operating partnership at a fixed price equal to the price paid to the unaffiliated Taubman shareholders in the acquisition of Taubman.

On January 14, 2020, members of Simon senior management and Taubman senior management met for a due diligence session to discuss, among other things, Taubman’s 2020 budget.

Also on January 14, 2020, a draft of the original voting agreement was sent to Simon. The draft of the original voting agreement did not include a “tail” provision requiring the Taubman family members to vote against any alternative proposal submitted to Taubman’s shareholders during the 12-month period following any termination of the original merger agreement. Between January 14, 2020 and February 9, 2020, the parties negotiated the provisions of the original voting agreement, including the circumstances under which the original voting agreement would terminate.

Also on January 14, 2020, Kirkland sent the draft Taubman Family Commitments to Wachtell Lipton for review by Mr. R. Taubman.

On January 15, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with Mr. R. Taubman and representatives of Kirkland and Lazard present. At the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman provided the members of the Special Committee with an update on his discussions with Mr. Simon regarding the original JV agreement to date, including the January 12 meeting with Mr. Simon and subsequent discussions. The Special Committee discussed these matters and potential next steps, and it was the consensus of the Special Committee that the parties should proceed to execute a transaction subject to finalizing all open issues in the agreements in a satisfactory manner.

On January 16, 2020, representatives of Kirkland and Wachtell Lipton sent revised drafts of the original merger agreement and original JV agreement to Simon. The draft original merger agreement contemplated, among other things: (i) a “fiduciary out” termination provision that would allow Taubman to terminate the original merger agreement to accept a superior proposal before and after the go-shop period; (ii) a 45-day “open” go-shop provision; (iii) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 1.25% of the value of Taubman’s equity to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal during the go-shop period or with any party that has submitted an acquisition proposal during the go-shop period that the Special Committee has determined in good faith constitutes or could reasonably be expected to lead to a superior proposal; (iv) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 2.5% of the equity value of Taubman to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal in other circumstances following the go-shop period; (v) a regulatory efforts provision that required Simon to do all things necessary, proper and advisable to obtain regulatory approvals, except that Simon would not be required to commit to or make any regulatory concession with respect to specified properties of

Taubman; and (vi) no closing conditions related to the receipt of contractual consents from third parties and no mandated delay period to complete the proposed transaction if any third-party consents have not been obtained when all other closing conditions have been satisfied. The revised draft of the original JV agreement continued to have open points regarding, among other items, minimum distribution requirements, the process to approve the annual budget and consequences if an annual budget was not approved, consent rights regarding the operation of the Joint Venture following the closing, the dispute resolution process if a consent from the other party on operational matters was not obtained, the right of the Taubman family members to exchange all of their interests in the Joint Venture between the second and third anniversaries of the closing and other liquidity mechanics and valuation mechanisms.

Later on January 16, 2020, Wachtell Lipton sent a revised draft of the Taubman Family Commitments to Kirkland reflecting the positions of the Taubman family members. The draft provided, among other things, that the Taubman family members would reasonably cooperate with the go-shop process, but only with respect to transactions that provide a structure similar to that of the transaction with Simon, including an ongoing partnership arrangement with respect to the Taubman operating partnership.

On January 19, 2020, representatives of Taubman and Simon met to discuss the original merger agreement, with representatives of Kirkland, Wachtell Lipton and Latham present. At the meeting, the parties discussed open issues in the draft original merger agreement, including, among other things, provisions regarding termination rights, termination fees, the go-shop period and third-party consents.

On January 20, 2020, Simon sent a revised draft of the original merger agreement to Taubman. The draft original merger agreement contemplated, among other things: (i) a 45-day “closed” go-shop provision that would not permit Taubman to pay a lower termination fee if the original merger agreement was terminated after the expiration of the go-shop period in connection with any alternative proposal that was initially received during the go-shop period; (ii) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 1.9% of the value of Taubman’s equity to be acquired by Simon in the proposed transaction in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal during the go-shop period; (iii) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 3.8% of the equity value of Taubman to be acquired by Simon in the proposed transaction in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal following the go-shop period; and (iv) closing conditions related to the receipt of certain contractual consents from third parties. The revised draft of the original merger agreement did not change the regulatory efforts covenant that was in Taubman’s previous draft, but noted that the regulatory efforts provision was subject to review and comment by Simon’s counsel.

On January 21, 2020, Messrs. R. Taubman and Simon and representatives of Wachtell Lipton and Paul Weiss met to discuss the open issues in the original JV agreement, including required minimum distributions and the liquidity provisions. After the meeting, Taubman sent a draft of the original JV agreement to Simon reflecting these discussions. Thereafter, the parties continued to exchange and negotiate drafts of the original JV agreement.

Later on January 21, 2020, representatives of Taubman and Simon met to discuss the original merger agreement, with representatives of Kirkland, Wachtell Lipton and Latham present. At the meeting, the parties discussed open issues in the draft original merger agreement, including, among other things, the provisions regarding termination fees, the go-shop period and third party consents.

On January 22, 2020, Kirkland sent a revised draft of the Taubman Family Commitments to Wachtell Lipton. The draft provided, among other things, that (i) any Taubman family member that is a director or officer of Taubman will cooperate with the Special Committee and its advisors to facilitate the go-shop process, (ii) Mr. R. Taubman will negotiate in good faith (on behalf of the Taubman family members) with a competing bidder that has made a proposal which the Special Committee determines is a superior proposal, or is reasonably likely to lead to a superior proposal, and that has a structure similar to the transactions with Simon and (iii) Mr. R. Taubman will discuss in good faith with the Special Committee terms on which the Taubman family members might be willing to agree to an alternative transaction that does not have a structure similar to the transaction with Simon.

Later on January 22, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by certain of the Company’s other independent directors and representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. During the meeting, the representatives of Kirkland again reviewed the fiduciary duties of the directors, and the representatives of Lazard reviewed with the Special Committee Lazard’s financial analyses relating to a potential transaction with Simon. The representatives of Lazard also reviewed with the Special Committee various strategic alternatives that could potentially be available to Taubman, including executing on its strategic plan, engaging in joint ventures with respect to various assets, spinning-off a portfolio of various assets and selling Taubman to an alternative strategic or financial

buyer. In connection with this discussion, the representatives of Kirkland provided the Special Committee with an update on the status of the Taubman Family Commitments and the other draft transaction documents, including the original merger agreement and the original JV agreement. Between January 22, 2020 and January 25, 2020, representatives of Kirkland and Wachtell Lipton finalized the terms of the Taubman Family Commitments.

On January 23, 2020, representatives of Kirkland sent a revised draft of the original merger agreement to Simon. The draft original merger agreement contemplated, among other things: (i) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 1.25% of the value of Taubman’s equity to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal during the go-shop period or within two full “match” right periods following the expiration of the go-shop period with any third party that has submitted an acquisition proposal during the go-shop period that the Special Committee has determined in good faith constitutes or could reasonably be expected to lead to a superior proposal; (ii) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 3.0% of the equity value of Taubman to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal in other circumstances following the go-shop period; (iii) a regulatory efforts provision that required Simon to do all things necessary, proper and advisable to obtain regulatory approvals, except that Simon would not be required to commit to or make any regulatory concession with respect to specified properties of Simon; and (iv) no closing conditions related to the receipt of contractual consents from third parties and no mandated delay period to complete the proposed transaction if any third party consents have not been obtained when all other closing conditions have been satisfied.

Later on January 23, 2020, representatives of Taubman and Simon held a telephone conversation to discuss the draft original merger agreement, with representatives of Kirkland, Wachtell Lipton and Latham present. The parties discussed, among other things, the regulatory commitments applicable to Taubman and Simon and the provisions regarding termination fees, the go-shop period and third party consents.

On January 24, 2020, Simon sent a revised draft of the original merger agreement to Taubman. The draft original merger agreement contemplated, among other things: (i) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 1.25% of the value of Taubman’s equity to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions (which amount was bracketed in the draft original merger agreement, and subsequently accepted by Simon) in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal during the go-shop period or within 10 business days following the expiration of a single “match” period beginning prior to the expiration of the go-shop period and ending following the expiration of the go-shop period with any party that has submitted an acquisition proposal during the go-shop period that the Special Committee has determined in good faith constitutes a superior proposal (which was subsequently accepted by Taubman); (ii) a termination fee payable by Taubman to Simon of 3.0% of the equity value of Taubman to be acquired by Simon in the Transactions (which amount was bracketed in the draft original merger agreement, and subsequently accepted by Simon) in the event that Taubman terminates the original merger agreement to enter into a superior proposal in other circumstances following the go-shop period; (iii) a regulatory efforts provision that required Simon to do all things necessary, proper and advisable to obtain regulatory approvals, except that Simon would not be required to commit to or make any regulatory concession with respect to specified properties of Taubman or Simon; (iv) no closing condition related to the receipt of contractual consents from third parties; and (v) a provision allowing Simon to delay the closing of the Transactions until six months after the date of the original merger agreement if certain contractual consents from third parties have not been obtained.

From January 24, 2020 through January 26, 2020, the parties continued to exchange drafts of, and negotiate the provisions of, the original merger agreement and the original JV agreement and related transaction documents and schedules.

On January 26, 2020, Mr. Simon contacted Mr. R. Taubman and communicated that while Simon was still interested in pursuing a transaction with Taubman, it would need to assess market conditions further and would not continue to engage in negotiations of the transaction agreements until Simon had made such an assessment.

Later on January 26, 2020, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by members of senior management and representatives of Wachtell Lipton, Honigman and Kirkland. During the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman updated the Taubman Board regarding the latest discussions with Mr. Simon and Mr. Simon’s position on transaction timing and the open issues in the transaction documents.

Later on January 26, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. During the meeting, the representatives of Kirkland provided an update on the status of the transaction documents and the representatives of Lazard reviewed with the Special Committee Lazard’s financial analyses of the potential transaction with Simon.

Following January 26, 2020 and until February 5, 2020, Mr. Simon and Mr. R. Taubman remained in contact and discussed market developments and whether to reengage in discussions regarding a potential transaction. Mr. R. Taubman regularly informed members of the Special Committee regarding such discussions.

On January 28, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. During the meeting, the Special Committee discussed the status of discussions with Simon regarding a potential transaction.

Between the close of trading on January 23, 2020 and January 31, 2020, Taubman’s stock price declined by 16.4% (from $31.59 to $26.42) and Simon’s stock price declined by 9.6% (from $147.25 to $133.15).

On January 31, 2020, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by members of senior management and representatives of Wachtell Lipton and Honigman. During the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman informed members of the Taubman Board regarding the latest discussions with Mr. Simon and the status of the proposed transaction.

On February 3, 2020, market rumors emerged that Simon was engaging in discussions to acquire Taubman. On February 4, 2020, Bloomberg published an article reporting that Taubman and Simon had been engaged in discussions regarding a potential transaction.

On February 5, 2020, Mr. Simon contacted Mr. R. Taubman and communicated that Simon was prepared to reengage in transaction discussions, but that Simon would not pay more than $52.00 per share. Following Mr. R. Taubman’s objection to the revised proposal, Mr. Simon offered to increase the purchase price to $52.50 per share in cash (the “February 5 Proposal”), but stated that this was Simon’s best and final offer, and that the February 5 Proposal was conditioned on the agreement of the Taubman family members to certain points that had not previously been requested, namely to (i) further explore the ability of Simon to obtain potential synergies in the context of the Taubman operating partnership post-closing ownership structure, (ii) provide Simon with the ability to delay payment for one year on its acquisition of one-half of the Taubman family members’ equity interests in the Joint Venture if the Taubman family members exercise their one-time exchange right to sell 100% of their equity in the Joint Venture in the third year following the closing of the transactions as permitted by the original JV agreement and (iii) provide Simon with a right to call all of the Taubman family members’ equity interests in the Joint Venture in certain circumstances. Mr. R. Taubman indicated to Mr. Simon that while the Special Committee would need to determine the acceptability of the price being proposed, Mr. R. Taubman would be willing to consider the proposed changes to the governance provisions in the context of the overall transaction.

On February 5, 2020, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by members of senior management and representatives of Wachtell Lipton and Honigman. At the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman provided an update on his recent discussions with Mr. Simon and the February 5 Proposal. The Taubman Board discussed the February 5 Proposal and potential responses to Simon.

Later on February 5, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Mr. R. Taubman and representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. During the meeting, Mr. R. Taubman further discussed the February 5 Proposal and his perspectives on the terms proposed by Simon, noting his willingness to agree to post-closing governance provisions proposed by Simon and that Mr. Simon had characterized the February 5 Proposal as Simon’s best and final offer, in the context of a transaction that provided significant value to the unaffiliated Taubman common shareholders, subject to negotiating the specific terms and conditions of such provisions. Mr. R. Taubman further noted that since the publication of the February 4 Bloomberg article regarding a potential acquisition of Taubman, Taubman had received many calls from investors and other parties, but that no party had called to inquire about acquiring Taubman. After Mr. R. Taubman left the meeting, the Special Committee discussed the possibility of again requesting that the Taubman family members sell all of their interests to Simon or concede additional post-closing governance rights if doing so could lead Simon to pay additional consideration to the unaffiliated Taubman common shareholders. Following discussion, the Special Committee concluded that pursuing such an approach was unlikely to generate additional value for the unaffiliated Taubman common shareholders from Simon and would likely instead jeopardize a transaction that the members of the Special Committee viewed as compelling,

particularly in light of the significant market risk and Simon’s concerns about the market and retail environment. The Special Committee further discussed Mr. R. Taubman’s report that Mr. Simon had characterized the February 5 Proposal as Simon’s best and final offer. Following discussion, it was the consensus of the Special Committee that the parties should work expeditiously to finalize and execute the transaction agreements.

That same day, on February 5, 2020, Mr. Embler contacted Mr. R. Taubman to convey the Special Committee’s views.

Later on February 5, 2020, Simon sent revised drafts of the original merger agreement, the original JV agreement, the original voting agreement and other various transaction documents and schedules to Taubman. From February 5, 2020 through the execution of the original merger agreement on February 9, 2020, the parties and their representatives negotiated the provisions of the original merger agreement, the original JV agreement, the original voting agreement and other various transaction documents and schedules.

On February 6, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. At the meeting, the representatives of Kirkland provided an update on the status of the transaction agreements and the representatives of Lazard reviewed with the Special Committee Lazard’s financial analyses of the February 5 Proposal.

Between the close of trading on January 31, 2020 and February 7, 2020, Taubman’s stock price increased by 31.2% (from $26.42 to $34.67).

On February 9, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Taubman’s other independent directors and representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. At the meeting, the representatives of Kirkland again reviewed the fiduciary duties of the directors and provided a summary of the final terms of the transaction agreements. The representatives of Lazard reviewed Lazard’s financial analysis of the Transactions and rendered its oral opinion, confirmed by delivery of a written opinion dated February 9, 2020, to the Special Committee to the effect that, as of that date and based upon and subject to the qualifications, limitations and assumptions stated in such opinion, the consideration to be paid by Simon to the holders of Taubman common stock (other than the Taubman family members) in the REIT Merger was fair, from a financial point of view, to such holders. The representatives of Lazard also reviewed with the Special Committee the proposed go-shop process. The Special Committee unanimously determined that the original merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman shareholders, and the Special Committee unanimously recommended that the Taubman Board: (i) determine that the original merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman shareholders; (ii) adopt and approve the original merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the original merger agreement, resolve to recommend that the Taubman shareholders adopt and approve the original merger agreement; and (iv) direct that the original merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B Preferred Stock for their adoption and approval.

Immediately following the meeting of the Special Committee on February 9, 2020, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by Taubman senior management and representatives of Wachtell Lipton, Honigman, Kirkland and Lazard. At the meeting, the Taubman Board, acting upon the unanimous recommendation of the Special Committee: (i) unanimously determined that the original merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman shareholders; (ii) adopted and approved the original merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the original merger agreement, resolved to recommend that the Taubman shareholders adopt and approve the original merger agreement; and (iv) directed that the original merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock for their adoption and approval.

Later in the evening on February 9, 2020, the parties executed and delivered the original merger agreement and the original voting agreement.

On the morning of February 10, 2020, Taubman and Simon issued a joint press release announcing the proposed transaction and the go-shop period commenced. Later that same day, in connection with the go-shop period, at the direction of the Special Committee, representatives of Lazard began contacting potential counterparties to actively solicit their interest in making an acquisition proposal with respect to Taubman.

During the go-shop period, Lazard contacted 18 potential counterparties, consisting of 4 strategic parties and 14 financial sponsor parties. None of these parties entered into a confidentiality agreement with Taubman or received

non-public due diligence information about Taubman. In addition, none of these parties made an acquisition proposal with respect to Taubman. During the go-shop period, the Special Committee regularly held meetings with representatives of Lazard and Kirkland to discuss updates regarding the go-shop process.

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization designated the COVID-19 outbreak as a global pandemic. On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States declared COVID-19 a national emergency and announced a ban on non-U.S. citizens traveling from Europe to the United States. On March 18, 2020, Simon announced the temporary closure of all of its U.S. retail properties. On March 19, 2020, Taubman announced the temporary closure of all but two of its U.S. shopping centers. In the months that followed Simon and Taubman gradually reopened their properties using enhanced safety protocols, in compliance with all local, state and federal laws.

The go-shop period expired at 11:59 p.m., New York City time, on March 25, 2020.

Taubman filed a preliminary proxy statement on April 28, 2020 and a definitive proxy statement on May 29, 2020 in advance of the special meeting of Taubman shareholders held on June 25, 2020, at which holders of Taubman voting stock voted to approve the adoption of the original merger agreement. Additionally, on April 28, 2020, Taubman, the Simon parties and the Taubman family members filed a joint Transaction Statement on Schedule 13E-3 with respect to the Transactions, which Transaction Statement was amended on May 27, 2020 and May 29, 2020.

On June 10, 2020, Simon delivered to the Taubman parties a notice stating that it was terminating the original merger agreement. In that notice, Simon claimed that the Taubman parties had suffered a Material Adverse Effect (as defined in the original merger agreement) and had also breached their covenant in the original merger agreement to use commercially reasonable efforts to operate in the ordinary course of business.

Also on June 10, 2020, the Simon parties filed a Complaint against the Taubman parties (the “merger litigation”) in the State of Michigan Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit (Oakland County) (the “Court”), seeking a declaratory judgment that, among other things, Taubman had suffered a “Material Adverse Effect” (as defined in the original merger agreement) and the Taubman parties had breached their covenant in the original merger agreement to use commercially reasonable efforts to operate in the ordinary course of business, and, as a result, Simon’s termination of the original merger agreement was valid. On June 17, 2020, the Taubman parties filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, denying the allegations in the Simon parties’ Complaint and seeking, among other things, that the Court enter a judgment of specific performance requiring the Simon parties to perform their obligations under the original merger agreement.

On June 23, 2020, the Court ordered that the case be referred to facilitative mediation to be completed by July 31, 2020. Discovery was ordered to commence immediately, and the case was ordered to be trial ready by mid-November 2020. The Honorable Gerald E. Rosen (Retired) (“Judge Rosen”) was appointed as the facilitative mediator.

Between June 23 and July 31, 2020, there were numerous mediation sessions, including six separate all-day, in-person mediation sessions in New York City, involving, among others, Judge Rosen, Mr. R. Taubman, Mr. Embler, Mr. Simon and representatives of each of Wachtell Lipton, Kirkland, Honigman and Paul Weiss. These mediation sessions did not result in a resolution to the merger litigation during that period.

On July 31, 2020, the Court held a case management conference, at which time it adopted a detailed scheduling order setting forth various deadlines for pre-trial activity and scheduled a five-day trial from November 16 – November 20, 2020. The Court also appointed Judge Rosen as a discovery facilitator as provided under the Michigan Court Rules.

On August 7, 2020, the Taubman operating partnership amended the terms of its revolving credit facilities and term loans under which the lenders thereunder waived the Taubman operating partnership’s compliance with its existing debt covenants through the second quarter of 2021 in exchange for certain new temporary covenants during this time.

On August 27, 2020, the Simon parties filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement their Complaint. The Taubman parties did not oppose such motion, and the Simon parties filed a Supplemental Complaint. On September 16, 2020, the Taubman parties filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim in response to the Supplemental Complaint in which the Taubman parties denied the claims made by the Simon parties in the Supplemental Complaint.

On October 12, 2020, the Taubman parties filed a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition Under Michigan Court Rules 2.116(C)(8) and (10) (the “Taubman Motion for Summary Disposition”). On October 26, 2020, Simon filed a Response to Taubman’s Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and for Summary Disposition in Favor of SPG (the “Simon Response”). In the Simon Response, Simon maintained that the Taubman parties’ arguments were legally unsupported and raise disputed issues of fact that must be addressed at trial. Simon further requested the Court to enter summary disposition in its favor.

From July 31, 2020 through November 14, 2020, Judge Rosen continued to communicate and meet telephonically with representatives of Wachtell Lipton, Honigman, Kirkland, Mr. R. Taubman, the Special Committee, Mr. Simon and Paul Weiss as he attempted to mediate a resolution of the merger litigation. During this period, Judge Rosen and representatives of Wachtell Lipton, Honigman, Kirkland, Mr. R. Taubman, the Special Committee, Mr. Simon and Paul Weiss and certain subgroups of the foregoing parties also met in person from time to time to discuss a variety of settlement proposals, but no settlement had been reached as of the last in-person mediation session on November 5, 2020.

On November 8, 2020, the Simon parties, the Taubman parties and a representative of the Special Committee informed Judge Rosen that, subject to the approval of the Special Committee, the Taubman Board and the Simon board of directors, they would be willing to dismiss their respective claims in the merger litigation if the parties were to (i) amend the original merger agreement on mutually agreeable terms pursuant to which Simon would pay $43.00 in cash for each share of Taubman common stock, rather than $52.50, and (ii) amend the original JV agreement to provide for the Series B funding request (which was initially proposed by representatives of Simon), and (iii) enter into a settlement agreement on mutually agreeable terms pursuant to which the parties would agree to resolve the merger litigation (collectively, the “Settlement Proposal”). The Taubman parties informed Judge Rosen that their agreement to this proposal was contingent on the negotiation of a merger agreement that significantly reduced any conditionality or other factors that could excuse the Simon parties from consummating the Transactions, apart from obtaining the Taubman shareholder approval.

On November 9, 2020, Paul Weiss sent a draft amendment to the original merger agreement to Kirkland and Wachtell Lipton. From November 9, 2020 until the execution of the merger agreement on November 14, 2020, the parties and their respective legal advisors exchanged numerous drafts of, and engaged in multiple discussions and negotiations (including discussions and negotiations involving Judge Rosen) concerning the terms of, the potential amendments to the original merger agreement. These discussions were focused on the scope of the interim operating covenants, the conditions to closing, changing the governing law of the merger agreement to the laws of the State of Delaware and the exclusive forum for disputes related to the merger agreement to the Delaware Court of Chancery, and other provisions related to the conditionality of the transactions contemplated by the original merger agreement. During this period of time the parties also negotiated the potential amendments to the original JV agreement and the settlement agreement. The terms of the voting agreement are identical to those of the original voting agreement. From November 9, 2020 until the execution of the merger agreement on November 14, 2020, Kirkland engaged in numerous conversations with members of the Special Committee regarding the terms of the potential amendments to the original merger agreement.

On November 9, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, with representatives of Taubman’s senior management, Kirkland and Lazard in attendance. At the meeting, members of Taubman’s senior management reviewed with the Special Committee the November 2020 Projections (as defined and discussed in “–Certain Unaudited Prospective Financial Information”). During the meeting, the members of the Special Committee provided their perspectives on the November 2020 Projections, taking into account the inherent uncertainty relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic recovery as well as the shifting retail landscape. Following the meeting, the members of the Special Committee approved the November 2020 Projections and authorized Lazard to use the November 2020 Projections for purposes of Lazard’s valuation analyses in connection with the terms of the proposed amendments to the original merger agreement.

Additionally, on each of November 11, 2020 and November 13, 2020, the Special Committee held meetings, which were attended by representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. At each of the meetings, the representatives of Kirkland provided an update on the status of the settlement negotiations and the representatives of Lazard reviewed with the Special Committee Lazard’s updated financial analyses of the Settlement Proposal.

On November 13, 2020, the Taubman Motion for Summary Disposition came on for hearing before the Court, at which time the Court dispensed with oral argument and deferred ruling until a later date.

On November 14, 2020, the Special Committee held a meeting, which was attended by Taubman’s other independent directors and representatives of Kirkland and Lazard. At the meeting, the representatives of Kirkland reviewed the fiduciary duties of the directors and provided a summary of the final terms of the transaction agreements and the settlement agreement. The representatives of Lazard reviewed Lazard’s updated financial analysis of the Transactions and rendered its oral opinion, confirmed by delivery of a written opinion dated November 14, 2020, to the Special Committee to the effect that, as of that date and based upon and subject to the qualifications, limitations and assumptions stated in such opinion, the consideration to be paid by Simon to the holders of Taubman common stock (other than the Taubman family members) pursuant to the merger agreement in the REIT Merger was fair, from a financial point of view, to such holders. The Special Committee unanimously determined that the settlement agreement, the merger agreement, and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman shareholders, and the Special Committee unanimously recommended that the Taubman Board: (i) determine that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman shareholders; (ii) adopt and approve the merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the merger agreement, resolve to recommend that the Taubman shareholders adopt and approve the merger agreement; and (iv) direct that the merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B Preferred Stock for their adoption and approval. The Special Committee also recommended that the Taubman Board approve the settlement agreement.

Immediately following the meeting of the Special Committee on November 14, 2020, the Taubman Board held a meeting, which was attended by Taubman senior management and representatives of Wachtell Lipton, Honigman, Kirkland and Lazard. At the meeting, the Taubman Board, acting upon the unanimous recommendation of the Special Committee: (i) unanimously determined that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman shareholders; (ii) adopted and approved the merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the original merger agreement, resolved to recommend that the Taubman shareholders adopt and approve the merger agreement; and (iv) directed that the merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock for their adoption and approval.

Later in the day on November 14, 2020, the parties executed and delivered the merger agreement and the voting agreement, and the Simon parties and the Taubman parties concurrently entered into the settlement agreement, pursuant to which, among other things, each party was required to dismiss all claims that it brought in the merger litigation with prejudice and agree to a stipulated order of dismissal that dismisses all claims asserted by the parties with prejudice.

The following evening on November 15, 2020, Simon and Taubman issued a joint press release announcing the execution of the merger agreement and the settlement agreement.

On November 16, 2020, the Court entered a Stipulated Order of Dismissal, which was filed on November 17, 2020, that dismissed with prejudice and without costs or fees to any party all claims in the Simon parties’ Complaint and Supplemental Complaint and all claims in Taubman’s Counterclaim. The order closed the case.

As described above under the section entitled “—Background of the Transactions,” the Taubman Board established the Special Committee and delegated to it the Taubman Board’s power and authority to, among other things: (i) review and evaluate the possible sale of Taubman; (ii) identify, review and evaluate alternatives to the possible sale of Taubman that may be available to Taubman, including remaining an independent company; (iii) if the Special Committee considers it advisable or appropriate, negotiate the price, structure, form, terms and conditions of a sale of Taubman or any alternative thereto and the form, terms and conditions of any definitive agreements in connection therewith; (iv) determine whether a sale of Taubman or any alternative thereto is fair to, advisable and in the best interests of Taubman and its shareholders; (v) engage, and obtain any necessary or desirable advice, assistance and opinions from, financial advisors or other advisors, consultants and agents; and (vi) recommend to the full Taubman Board what action, if any, should be taken by Taubman with respect to a sale of Taubman or any alternative thereto.

With the assistance of its legal and financial advisors, the Special Committee evaluated the merger agreement and the Transactions and, on November 14, 2020, the Special Committee unanimously determined that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman common shareholders, and unanimously recommended that the Taubman Board, among other things: (i) determine that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and

the Taubman common shareholders; (ii) adopt and approve the merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the merger agreement, resolve to recommend that the Taubman common shareholders adopt and approve the merger agreement; and (iv) direct that the merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman common shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock for their adoption and approval.

On November 14, 2020, the Taubman Board, acting upon the unanimous recommendation of the Special Committee: (i) determined that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman common shareholders; (ii) adopted and approved the merger agreement and the Transactions; (iii) subject to the terms of the merger agreement, resolved to recommend that the Taubman common shareholders adopt and approve the merger agreement; and (iv) directed that the merger agreement be submitted to the Taubman common shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock for their adoption and approval. Accordingly, the Taubman Board unanimously recommends that you vote “FOR” the Merger Agreement Proposal, “FOR” the Advisory Compensation Proposal and “FOR” the Adjournment Proposal.

When you consider the Special Committee and the Taubman Board’s recommendation, you should be aware that certain Taubman directors and executive officers may have interests in the Transactions that may be different from, or in addition to, those of the other Taubman shareholders. The Special Committee, consisting entirely of independent directors, was aware of and considered these interests, among other matters, in evaluating the merger agreement and the Transactions and in making its decision to recommend that the Taubman Board adopt and approve the merger agreement and the Transactions. For more information about these interests, refer to the section entitled “—Interests of Taubman’s Directors and Executive Officers in the Transactions.” The Special Committee and the Taubman Board believe that the Transactions, including the REIT Merger, are fair to Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders.

The Special Committee engaged its own legal and financial advisors and received advice throughout the negotiations from such advisors. Since the members of the Special Committee are disinterested with respect to the Transactions, independent of and not affiliated with Simon, the Taubman family members or any of their respective affiliates, the Special Committee believed that it could effectively represent the interests of the unaffiliated Taubman shareholders in negotiating the terms of the Transactions. In evaluating the merger agreement and the Transactions, including the REIT Merger, and in the course of reaching their determinations and decisions described above, and making the recommendations described above, the Special Committee and the Taubman Board considered, among other things, the following factors and potential benefits of the Transactions (not necessarily in order of relative importance), each of which they believed supported their respective decisions:

In the course of reaching its determinations and decisions described above and making the recommendation described above, the Special Committee and the Taubman Board also considered a number of factors relating to the procedural safeguards that the Special Committee and the Taubman Board both believe were and are present to ensure the fairness of the Transactions and to permit the Special Committee to effectively represent the interests of the unaffiliated Taubman shareholders, which procedural safeguards the Taubman Board and the Special Committee each believed supported the Special Committee’s decision and provided assurance of the fairness of the Transactions to such holders. These procedural safeguards, which are not intended to be exhaustive and are not necessarily listed in any relative order of importance, are discussed below:

The Special Committee and the Taubman Board also considered and balanced against the potential benefits of the Transactions a number of uncertainties and risks concerning the Transactions, including the following (not necessarily in the order of relative importance):

In reaching their determinations and making their recommendations, the Special Committee and the Taubman Board did not consider estimates of NAV of Taubman to be a reliable valuation method because, among other things: (i) they considered the impracticability of determining a liquidation value given the significant execution risk involved in any breakup of Taubman and lack of relevant comparable A-rated mall and lifestyle center assets and/or portfolios that have traded in the marketplace, (ii) a liquidation process would likely involve additional and potentially significant legal fees, taxes, costs of sale and other expenses that would reduce any amounts that shareholders might receive upon liquidation, (iii) NAV does not account for overhead and other similar costs and (iv) the Taubman family members have a consent right over the sale of a number of Taubman properties.

While the Special Committee and the Taubman Board considered potentially positive and potentially negative factors, the Special Committee and the Taubman Board concluded that, overall, the potentially positive factors outweighed the potentially negative factors. Accordingly, the Special Committee and the Taubman Board both unanimously determined that the merger agreement and the Transactions are advisable and fair to, and in the best interests of, Taubman and the Taubman common shareholders.

The foregoing discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive list of the information and factors considered by the Special Committee and the Taubman Board in their consideration of the Transactions, but includes the material positive factors and material negative factors considered by the Special Committee and the Taubman Board in that regard. In view of the number and variety of factors and the amount of information considered, the Special Committee and the Taubman Board did not find it practicable to, and did not, make specific assessments of, quantify, or otherwise assign relative weights to the specific factors considered in reaching its determination. In addition, individual members of the Special Committee and the Taubman Board may have given different weights to different factors. Based on the totality of the information presented, the Special Committee collectively reached the unanimous decision to recommend that the Taubman Board submit the merger agreement to the Taubman shareholders and the holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock for their adoption and approval, and the Taubman Board did so, in each case, in light of the factors described above and other factors that the members of the Special Committee and the Taubman Board felt were appropriate.

The Special Committee unanimously recommends and the Taubman Board also unanimously recommends (after having received the unanimous recommendation of the Special Committee) that the Company’s shareholders vote “FOR” the Merger Agreement Proposal, “FOR” the Advisory Compensation Proposal, and “FOR” the Adjournment Proposal.

The Special Committee retained Lazard as financial advisor in connection with the Transactions. On November 14, 2020, Lazard rendered its written opinion, consistent with its oral opinion rendered on the same date, to the Special Committee that, as of such date, and based upon and subject to the assumptions, procedures, factors, qualifications and limitations set forth therein, the common stock merger consideration to be paid to holders of Taubman common stock (other than holders of shares of excluded Taubman common stock and the Taubman family members) pursuant to the merger agreement was fair, from a financial point of view, to such holders of Taubman common stock.

The full text of Lazard’s written opinion, dated November 14, 2020, which sets forth the assumptions made, procedures followed, factors considered and qualifications and limitations on the review undertaken by Lazard in connection with its opinion, is attached to this proxy statement as Annex B and is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety. The following summary of Lazard’s opinion is qualified in its entirety by reference to the full text of the opinion. You are encouraged to read Lazard’s opinion and this section carefully and in their entirety.

Lazard’s engagement and its opinion were for the benefit of the Special Committee (in its capacity as such) and Taubman’s other independent directors (in their capacities as such), and Lazard’s opinion was rendered to the Special

Committee in connection with its evaluation of the REIT Merger and addressed only the fairness as of the date of the opinion, from a financial point of view, to the holders of Taubman common stock (other than holders of shares of excluded Taubman common stock and the Taubman family members) of the common stock merger consideration to be paid to such holders pursuant to the merger agreement. Lazard’s opinion was not intended to, and does not, constitute a recommendation to any shareholder as to how such shareholder should vote or act with respect to the Transactions or any matter relating thereto. Lazard’s opinion was necessarily based on economic, monetary, market and other conditions as in effect on, and the information made available to Lazard, as of the date of the opinion. Lazard assumed no responsibility for updating or revising its opinion based on circumstances or events occurring after the date of the opinion. Lazard did not express any opinion as to the price at which shares of Taubman common stock may trade at any time subsequent to the announcement of the Transactions. In addition, Lazard’s opinion did not address the relative merits of the REIT Merger as compared to any other transaction or business strategy in which Taubman might have engaged or the merits (including the original merger agreement or the pursuit of litigation in respect thereof) of the underlying decision by Taubman to engage in the REIT Merger.

In connection with its opinion, Lazard:

Lazard assumed and relied upon the accuracy and completeness of the foregoing information, without independent verification of such information. Lazard did not conduct any independent valuation or appraisal of any of the assets or liabilities (contingent or otherwise) of Taubman or concerning the solvency or fair value of Taubman, and Lazard was not furnished with any such valuation or appraisal. With respect to the financial forecasts (including the Projections) utilized in Lazard’s analyses, Lazard assumed, with the consent of the Special Committee, that they were reasonably prepared on bases reflecting the best currently available estimates and judgments as to the future financial performance of Taubman. Lazard assumed no responsibility for and expressed no view as to any such forecasts or the assumptions on which they were based.

In rendering its opinion, Lazard assumed, with the consent of the Special Committee, that the REIT Merger would be consummated on the terms described in the merger agreement, without any waiver or modification of any material terms or conditions. Lazard also assumed, with the consent of the Special Committee, that obtaining the necessary governmental, regulatory or third party approvals and consents for the REIT Merger would not have an adverse effect on Taubman or the REIT Merger. Lazard did not express any opinion as to any tax or other consequences that might result from the REIT Merger, nor did Lazard’s opinion address any legal, tax, regulatory or accounting matters, as to which Lazard understood that Taubman had obtained such advice as it deemed necessary from qualified professionals. Lazard expressed no view or opinion as to any terms or other aspects (other than the common stock merger consideration to the extent expressly specified in the opinion) of the Transactions, including, without limitation, the form or structure of the REIT Merger, the Series B preferred stock merger consideration, the voting agreement, the Partnership Merger (including the option of the minority partners to elect to receive the common stock merger consideration or Simon OP units), the LLC Conversion, or any other agreements or arrangements entered into in connection with, or contemplated by, the REIT Merger. In addition, Lazard expressed no view or opinion as to the fairness of the amount or nature of, or any other aspects relating to, the compensation to any officers, directors or employees of any parties to the REIT Merger, or class of such persons, relative to the common stock merger consideration or otherwise.

In connection with rendering its opinion, Lazard performed certain financial analyses and reviews of certain information that Lazard deemed appropriate in connection with rendering its opinion as summarized below. The

summary of the analyses and reviews provided below is not a complete description of the analyses and reviews underlying Lazard’s opinion. The preparation of a fairness opinion is a complex process involving various determinations as to the most appropriate and relevant methods of financial analysis and review and the application of those methods to particular circumstances, and, therefore, is not readily susceptible to partial analysis or summary description. Considering selected portions of these analyses and reviews or the summary set forth below without considering the analyses and reviews as a whole, could create an incomplete or misleading view of the analyses and reviews underlying Lazard’s opinion. In arriving at its opinion, Lazard considered the results of all of its analyses and reviews and did not attribute any particular weight to any particular analysis or review or application thereof considered by it; rather, Lazard made its determination as to fairness on the basis of its experience and professional judgment after considering the results of all of its analyses and reviews.

For purposes of its analyses and reviews, Lazard considered industry performance, general business, economic, market and financial conditions and other matters, many of which are beyond the control of Taubman. No company, business or transaction used in Lazard’s analyses and reviews, as a comparison, is identical to Taubman, its business or the REIT Merger, and an evaluation of the results of those analyses and reviews is not entirely mathematical. Rather, the analyses and reviews involve complex considerations and judgments concerning financial and operating characteristics and other factors that could affect the acquisition, public trading or other values of the companies, businesses or transactions used in Lazard’s analyses and reviews. The estimates contained in Lazard’s analyses and reviews and the ranges of valuations resulting from any particular analysis or review are not necessarily indicative of actual results or values or predictive of future results or values, which may be significantly more or less favorable than those suggested by Lazard’s analyses and reviews. In addition, analyses and reviews relating to the value of companies, businesses or securities do not purport to be appraisals or to reflect the prices at which companies, businesses or securities actually may be sold. Accordingly, the estimates used in, and the results derived from, Lazard’s analyses and reviews are inherently subject to substantial uncertainty.

The summary of the analyses and reviews provided below includes information presented in tabular format. In order to fully understand Lazard’s analyses and reviews, the tables must be read together with the full text of each summary. The tables alone do not constitute a complete description of Lazard’s analyses and reviews. Considering the data in the tables below without considering the full description of the analyses and reviews, including the methodologies and assumptions underlying the analyses and reviews, could create a misleading or incomplete view of Lazard’s analyses and reviews.

Except as otherwise noted, the following quantitative information, to the extent that it is based on market data, is based on market data as it existed on or before November 12, 2020, the last trading day before the financial presentation of Lazard dated November 13, 2020, and is not necessarily indicative of current market conditions. Lazard has been instructed by the Special Committee to use the Projections as a basis for its analyses.

Lazard performed a discounted cash flow analysis of Taubman. A discounted cash flow analysis is a valuation methodology used to derive an intrinsic valuation of a company by calculating the present value of its estimated future cash flows. “Future cash flows” refers to projected unlevered free cash flows of a company (calculated by beginning with EBITDA and adjusting for certain other income and expenses, and subtracting capital expenditures). “Present value” refers to the current value of future cash flows or amounts and is obtained by discounting the future cash flows or amounts by a discount rate that takes into account macroeconomic assumptions and estimates of risk, the opportunity cost of capital, capital structure, expected returns and other appropriate factors. Lazard calculated the discounted cash flow value for Taubman as the sum of the net present value, as of November 13, 2020, of each of:

The estimated future cash flows of Taubman were calculated by Lazard based on the Projections.

Lazard then calculated the implied capitalization rates of the select comparable companies, using the same methodology for calculating the average of the financial multiples and ratios described under “Comparable Companies Public Trading Analysis” below. The following table summarizes the results of this review for the select comparable companies:

Lazard then selected and applied a range of capitalization rates of 6.00% to 7.50% to estimated share of 2025 property net operating income of $571 million as set forth in the Projections, to calculate the terminal value of Taubman. Lazard selected the range of capitalization rates applied to the terminal year property net operating income based on Lazard’s analysis of the implied historical capitalization rates of the select comparable companies (as defined below), as adjusted based on its professional judgment and experience, and further informed by Taubman’s observed historical implied capitalization rates as compared to those of the select comparable companies.

For its discounted cash flow calculations, Lazard applied discount rates ranging from 6.00% to 8.00% to the estimated share of future cash flows. Such discount rates were based on Lazard’s estimated range of Taubman’s weighted average cost of capital, derived from a number of factors using the Capital Asset Pricing Model, taking into account certain metrics, including, among others, the applicable risk free rate of return, unlevered risk profile, cost of long-term debt and leverage ratio of Taubman and the select comparable companies, informed by Lazard’s professional judgment and experience.

Lazard then calculated an enterprise value range for a valuation date of December 31, 2020 by taking the sum of the estimated discounted cash flows (including the net present value of the implied terminal value) adjusted for an amount in respect of net tangible other assets and liabilities (negative $41 million, as provided by Taubman management) and plus the book value of peripheral land ($17 million, as provided by Taubman management), with such adjustment based on values as of September 30, 2020 (being the last date for which such information was available), in each case as provided by Taubman management.

Lazard then calculated an equity value range for Taubman by taking the implied enterprise value range and subtracting (i) the outstanding principal amount of Taubman’s share of consolidated secured debt ($2.2 billion, as provided by Taubman management), subtracting (ii) the outstanding principal amount of Taubman’s share of unconsolidated secured debt ($1.63 billion, as provided by Taubman management), subtracting (iii) the outstanding principal amount of Taubman’s other credit facilities and term loans ($1.385 billion, as provided by Taubman management), subtracting (iv) the outstanding principal amount due to the holders of Taubman Series J Preferred Stock and Taubman Series K Preferred Stock (having a liquidation preference value of $363 million, as provided by Taubman management), and adding (v) Taubman’s cash and cash equivalents ($315 million, as provided by Taubman management), in each case as provided by Taubman management as of December 31, 2020. Lazard divided the resulting equity value range by 88.8 million, the fully diluted shares of Taubman common stock outstanding as of November 12, 2020 as provided by Taubman management, to estimate an implied range per share of Taubman common stock, and compared it to the common stock merger consideration to be paid to holders of Taubman common stock (other than holders of shares of excluded Taubman common stock and the Taubman family members) pursuant to the merger agreement:

Lazard applied comparable company multiples to perform a valuation analysis of Taubman to determine an implied per share value for the Taubman common stock.

Lazard reviewed various financial multiples and ratios of selected publicly traded companies that Lazard believed, based on its experience with companies operating in the high quality mall REIT industry and its professional judgment, to be relevant for purposes of this analysis, considered such companies’ operations, lines of business, markets, sizes and geographies, and applied such multiples to the applicable estimated Adjusted FFO for 2021 for Taubman as set forth in the Projections.

The selected group of companies Lazard reviewed, referred to as the “select comparable companies,” were (i) Simon and (ii) The Macerich Company (“Macerich”).

Lazard selected the companies reviewed in this analysis because, among other things, the select comparable companies operate businesses similar to the business of Taubman. However, no selected company is identical to Taubman and certain of these companies may have characteristics that are materially different from those of Taubman. Accordingly, Lazard believes that purely quantitative analyses are not, in isolation, determinative in the context of the REIT Merger and that qualitative judgments concerning differences between the businesses, financial and operating characteristics and prospects of Taubman and the select comparable companies are also relevant.

For each of the select comparable companies, Lazard calculated the ratio of such company’s closing trading price, as of (i) for reference only, November 12, 2020 (the last trading day before the presentation of Lazard dated November 13, 2020) and (ii) January 31, 2020 (the last trading day prior to market rumors emerging that Simon was engaging in discussions to acquire Taubman) to each company’s estimated funds from operations, or “FFO,” for the next 12-month period, or the “2020 FFO.” The 2020 FFO estimates for the select comparable companies used by Lazard in its analysis were based on publicly available Wall Street equity research estimates. Lazard also calculated the same ratio on an average basis as observed over the historical one-year, three-year and, for reference only, five-year basis.

Lazard then observed the average of these ratios for the select comparable companies. The following table summarizes the results of this review for the select comparable companies:

Lazard then selected and applied a range of FFO multiples of (i) 3.3x to 7.3x for the 2021 FFO as of November 12, 2020, (ii) 4.0x to 8.0x for the 1-year average and (iii) 8.6x to 12.6x for the 3-year average, to Taubman’s estimated 2021 Adjusted FFO as set forth in the Projections. Lazard selected the range of FFO multiples applied to Taubman based on Lazard’s analysis of the average FFO multiple of the select comparable companies as of November 12, 2020, the last trading day prior financial presentation of Lazard dated November 13, 2020, as adjusted based on its professional judgment and experience, and further informed by Taubman’s observed FFO multiple trading premium to the average of the select comparable companies over the last five years.

From this analysis, Lazard estimated an implied range per share of Taubman common stock and compared it to the common stock merger consideration to be paid to holders of Taubman common stock (other than holders of shares of excluded Taubman common stock and the Taubman family members) pursuant to the merger agreement:

Lazard reviewed and analyzed, to the extent publicly available, financial information for selected precedent transactions in the high quality mall REIT industry that Lazard believed, based on its professional judgement and experience, to be relevant for purposes of this analysis, which are collectively referred to as the Lazard precedent transactions. Although none of the Lazard precedent transactions or the companies party to such transactions is directly comparable to the REIT Merger or to Taubman, the Lazard precedent transactions were chosen because certain aspects of the Lazard precedent transactions, for purposes of this analysis and based on the professional judgment and experience of Lazard, may be considered similar to the REIT Merger. The analyses necessarily involve complex considerations and judgments concerning differences in financial and operational characteristics of the companies involved and other factors that could affect the Lazard precedent transactions differently than they would affect the REIT Merger. The Lazard precedent transactions reviewed, and the implied capitalization rate of each, as of the time of the announcement of the applicable Lazard precedent transaction, were:

Based on its professional judgment and experience, and taking into consideration the observed implied capitalization rates for the Lazard precedent transactions, Lazard then applied a selected a range of capitalization rates of 5.8% ± 50 basis points, based on Lazard’s professional judgment and experience, to Taubman’s estimated share of 2021 property net operating income of $530 million and subtracted $5.4 million related to a non-stabilized Asian JV asset for which the value is included in the book value of development to derive an implied enterprise value range for Taubman. Lazard then calculated an equity value range using the same methodology for calculating the equity value based on enterprise value described under “Discounted Cash Flow Analysis” above. Financial data of the Lazard precedent transactions were based on public filings and other public information.

This precedent transactions valuation analysis indicated the following implied range per share of Taubman common stock equity value reference range for Taubman, as compared to the common stock merger consideration to be paid to holders of Taubman common stock (other than holders of shares of excluded Taubman common stock and the Taubman family members) pursuant to the merger agreement:

The analyses and data described below were presented to the Special Committee for informational purposes only and did not provide the basis for the rendering of Lazard’s opinion.

Lazard reviewed the discount to net asset value per share of Taubman common stock based on published, publicly available Wall Street equity research reports, which indicated a discount range of 32% for Simon and 35%

for Macerich for the selected comparable companies, as of November 12, 2020, the last trading day before the financial presentation of Lazard dated November 13, 2020. Lazard applied this discount range to the Wall Street consensus estimate of Net Asset Value for Taubman, as of November 12, 2020, of $39.20.

This analysis implied a price per share range for shares of Taubman common stock of $25.34 per share to $26.56 per share, as compared to the common stock merger consideration to be paid to holders of Taubman common stock (other than holders of shares of excluded Taubman common stock and the Taubman family members) pursuant to the merger agreement.

Lazard performed an illustrative premiums paid analysis based on the premiums paid, where applicable, in selected transactions involving a U.S. acquirer and a U.S. REIT target with a transaction value greater than $1.0 billion and at least 50% of the total consideration consisted of common stock merger consideration announced in the five years prior to November 12, 2020, the last trading day before the financial presentation of Lazard dated November 13, 2020.

The following table summarizes the results of this analysis:

Lazard calculated the 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile premia by comparing, to the extent publicly available, the per share acquisition price to the relevant target company’s closing share price on the date prior to the announcement of the transaction, or other relevant date as referenced in public filings for the respective transaction, referred to as the “undisturbed date.”

Using a 13.1% to 23.4% premia range based on the 25th percentile and 75th percentile one-day premia paid in the transactions referenced above and Taubman closing price per share as of January 31, 2020, the last trading day prior to market rumors emerging that Simon was engaging in discussions to acquire Taubman, Lazard estimated an implied price per share range for shares of Taubman common stock of $29.88 to $32.35, as compared to the common stock merger consideration to be paid to holders of Taubman common stock (other than holders of shares of excluded Taubman common stock and the Taubman family members) pursuant to the merger agreement.

In connection with Lazard’s services as financial advisor to the Special Committee with respect to the Transactions, Taubman agreed to pay Lazard the following fees: (i) a fee of $3 million payable upon the earlier of the date on which Lazard renders any fairness opinion or Lazard informs the Special Committee that it is prepared to deliver a fairness opinion, in either case following a request therefor by the Special Committee and regardless of the conclusion reached or to be reached in such fairness opinion, and (ii) $13.5 million, to be paid upon the completion of the REIT Merger, which may be increased by $1.5 million if (and only if), following the announcement of the Transactions, a shareholder engages in an activist campaign in connection with the REIT Merger or a potential alternative purchaser makes or delivers a bona fide written offer or proposal for a potential alternative transaction that could lead to greater consideration for Taubman’s shareholders and, in either case, Lazard or another financial advisor or investment bank has rendered material assistance in connection therewith. Taubman also agreed to reimburse Lazard for certain expenses incurred in connection with Lazard’s engagement and to indemnify Lazard and certain related persons under certain circumstances against various liabilities that may arise from or be related to Lazard’s engagement, including certain liabilities under United States federal securities laws.

Lazard has not received any other fees for providing financial advisory services to Simon or Taubman or an entity known by Lazard to be an affiliate of Simon or Taubman during the last two years.

Lazard, as part of its investment banking business, is continually engaged in the valuation of businesses and their securities in connection with mergers and acquisitions, negotiated underwritings, secondary distributions of listed and unlisted securities, private placements, leveraged buyouts, and valuations for estate, corporate and other purposes. In addition, in the ordinary course, Lazard and its affiliates and employees may trade securities of Taubman, Simon and certain of their respective affiliates for their own accounts and for the accounts of their customers, may at any time hold a long or short position in such securities, and may also trade and hold securities on behalf of Taubman, Simon and certain of their respective affiliates. The issuance of Lazard’s opinion was approved by the opinion committee of Lazard.

Lazard is an internationally recognized investment banking firm providing a full range of financial advisory and other services. Lazard was selected to act as investment banker to the Special Committee because of its qualifications, expertise and reputation in investment banking and mergers and acquisitions generally and in the real estate industry specifically, as well as its familiarity with the business of Taubman.

In addition to the presentation made to the Special Committee on November 13, 2020, which has been filed with the SEC as an exhibit to the Schedule 13E-3 of which this proxy statement forms a part and as described in “Special Factors—Opinion and Materials of Financial Advisor to the Special Committee (Lazard),” copies of preliminary illustrative presentations presented or delivered by Lazard to the Special Committee on November 21, 2019, December 5, 2019, January 10, 2020, January 12, 2020, January 22, 2020, January 26, 2020, February 6, 2020, February 9, 2020 and November 11, 2020 containing preliminary illustrative financial analyses also are attached as exhibits to such Schedule 13E-3. None of these other preliminary illustrative presentations by Lazard, alone or together, constitute, or form the basis of, an opinion of Lazard with respect to the common stock merger consideration, and the preliminary illustrative financial analyses therein were based on economic, monetary, market and other conditions as in effect on, and the information made available to Lazard as of, the dates of the respective presentations.

Under the SEC rules governing “going private” transactions, each of the Simon parties is an affiliate of Taubman for purposes of the proposed transaction under such rules and, therefore, is required to express its purposes and reasons for the Transactions to Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders. Each of the Simon parties is making the

statements included in this section solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements of Rule 13e-3 and related rules and regulations under the Exchange Act. The views of each of the Simon parties should not be construed as a recommendation to any Taubman shareholder as to how that shareholder should vote on the Merger Agreement Proposal.

For the Simon parties, the purpose of the Transactions is to enable the Simon parties to form the Joint Venture and enter into the JV agreement in transactions in which the holders of Taubman common stock will be cashed out, such that the Simon parties will bear the rewards and risks of such ownership after the Transactions are completed and the Taubman common stock ceases to be publicly traded.

At the time they decided to execute the merger agreement, the Simon parties considered what then appeared to be potential benefits of the Transactions, including the following:

In the course of considering the going-private transaction, the Simon parties did not consider alternative structures because the Simon parties believed the Transactions were the most direct and effective way to enable the Simon parties to form the Joint Venture and enter into the JV agreement.

Under the SEC rules governing “going private” transactions, each of the Taubman filing persons is an affiliate of the Company for purposes of the proposed transaction under such rules and, therefore, is required to express its purposes and reasons for the Transactions to the Company’s unaffiliated security holders. Each Taubman filing person is making the statements included in this section solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements of Rule 13e-3 and related rules under the Exchange Act. The views of each Taubman filing person should not be construed as a recommendation to any Taubman shareholder as to how that shareholder should vote on the Merger Agreement Proposal.

If the Transactions are completed, Taubman will become an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Simon, and the Taubman common stock will cease to be publicly traded. Additionally, following the consummation of the Transactions, the Simon parties will own 80% of the limited liability company interests in the Joint Venture and the Taubman family members will own the remaining 20% of the limited liability company interests in the Joint Venture (assuming, for purposes of this calculation, that Taubman OP units issuable under the Option Deferral Agreement are outstanding interests of the Joint Venture). For the Taubman filing persons, the purpose of the Transactions is to allow the Simon parties and the Taubman family members to form the Joint Venture and enter into the JV agreement. Through their ownership interest in the Joint Venture, the Taubman filing persons will bear the rewards and risks of such ownership after the Transactions are completed and the Taubman common stock ceases to be publicly traded. Additionally, pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement and the JV agreement, the Transactions will allow the Taubman filing persons to realize value for a portion of their investment in Taubman and the Taubman operating partnership while providing an opportunity to form a partnership with an experienced market participant. The Taubman filing persons believe that a partnership between the Taubman family members and the Simon parties in the Joint Venture presents an outstanding fit in terms of corporate culture and maintains the Taubman operating partnership’s unique brand, while also providing the Taubman filing persons access to future liquidity for their holdings in the Joint Venture pursuant to the terms of the JV agreement. Additionally, the Taubman filing persons believe that the Joint Venture will provide beneficial opportunities to Taubman’s employees, and allow, in a more efficient and flexible manner, the Joint Venture to invest in innovative retail environments that create exciting shopping and entertainment experiences for consumers, immersive opportunities for retailers, and substantial new job prospects for the local communities served by the Joint Venture.

Each of the Taubman filing persons believes that it is in the best interests of Taubman and the Taubman operating partnership for Taubman and the Joint Venture to operate with no publicly traded equity. The Taubman filing persons believe that without publicly traded equity, Taubman and the Joint Venture could have greater operational flexibility than it would have had as an independent public company.

An additional purpose of the Transactions is to enable Taubman shareholders to immediately realize the value of their investment in Taubman through their receipt of the common stock merger consideration of $43.00 in cash.

Additionally, the Transactions will allow all unaffiliated holders of Taubman OP units to elect to receive, at their election, (i) the same common stock merger consideration of $43.00 to be received by Taubman shareholders, or (ii) 0.5703 Simon OP units per Taubman OP unit, and all unaffiliated holders of Taubman Series B preferred stock to receive the Series B preferred stock merger consideration.

Accordingly, the Taubman filing persons have decided to undertake the going-private transaction at this time for the reasons described above.

Other than the transactions contemplated by the original merger agreement, the Taubman filing persons did not consider any form of transaction other than the Transactions because the Taubman filing persons believe that the Transactions are the most direct, efficient and effective way for Simon to acquire all of the outstanding shares of Taubman and indirectly, an 80% ownership interest in the Joint Venture, while allowing the Taubman family members to own a 20% interest in the Joint Venture (assuming, for purposes of this calculation, that Taubman OP units issuable under the Option Deferral Agreement are outstanding interests of the Joint Venture). The Taubman filing persons did not consider any other alternative transaction structure based on their determination that no other alternatives available would (i) provide the Taubman operating partnership both with the perspective of an experienced sector participant that would bring resources to the Taubman operating partnership with a party willing to pay a fair price for an investment in an entity in which the Taubman family members maintained meaningful governance rights and R. Taubman and W. Taubman remained executive officers, (ii) not result in the cessation of the Taubman operating partnership’s existence as an autonomous entity, (iii) provide Taubman shareholders the opportunity to realize value at a significant premium to the trading price of the Taubman common stock, (iv) provide the Taubman family members with an opportunity to realize immediate value for their shares of Taubman common stock and for approximately one-third of their Taubman OP units, and (v) provide the Taubman family members with access to future liquidity pursuant to the terms of the JV agreement.

Under the SEC rules governing “going private” transactions, each of the Simon parties is an affiliate of Taubman for purposes of the proposed transaction under such rules and, therefore, is required to express its beliefs as to the fairness of the REIT Merger to Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders. Each of the Simon parties is making the statements included in this section solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements of Rule 13e-3 and related rules and regulations under the Exchange Act. The views of each of the Simon parties should not be construed as a recommendation to any Taubman shareholder as to how that shareholder should vote on the merger proposal.

Simon negotiated with the Special Committee and Taubman with the intent to achieve the terms of a transaction that would be most favorable to Simon, and not necessarily to Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders, and, accordingly, did not negotiate the merger agreement with the goal of obtaining terms that were fair to the Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders. The Special Committee is comprised entirely of non-management independent directors who are not affiliated with Taubman, and the members of the Special Committee have no financial interest in the Transactions different from, or in addition to, the interests of Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders other than their interests described under “—Interests of Taubman’s Directors and Executive Officers in the Transactions.”

None of the Simon parties participated in the deliberations of the Special Committee or the Taubman Board regarding, or received advice from Taubman’s or the Special Committee’s legal advisors or financial advisors as to, the substantive or procedural fairness of the Transactions to Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders. None of the Simon parties has performed, or engaged a financial advisor to perform, any valuation or other analysis for the purposes of assessing the fairness of the Transactions to unaffiliated Taubman shareholders.

At the time the merger agreement was executed, each of the Simon parties believed that the Transactions are substantively and procedurally fair to Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders based on its understanding that:

At the time the merger agreement was executed, the Simon parties also considered a variety of risks and other countervailing factors related to the merger agreement and REIT Merger, including the following:

The Simon parties did not conduct a going-concern valuation of Taubman common stock or consider the prices paid by Taubman or certain of the Taubman family for past purchases of Taubman common stock for the purposes of determining the fairness of the common stock merger consideration to Taubman’s unaffiliated security holders.

The foregoing discussion of the information and factors considered and given weight by the Simon parties in connection with the fairness of the REIT Merger is not intended to be exhaustive but includes all material factors considered by the Simon parties. The Simon parties did not find it practicable to, and did not, quantify or otherwise assign relative weights to the individual factors considered in reaching their conclusions as to the fairness of the REIT Merger.

Under the SEC rules governing “going private” transactions, each of the Taubman filing persons is an affiliate of the Company for purposes of the proposed transaction under such rules and, therefore, is required to express its beliefs as to the fairness of the REIT Merger to the Company’s unaffiliated security holders. Each Taubman filing person is making the statements included in this section solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements of Rule 13e-3 and related rules under the Exchange Act. The views of each Taubman filing persons should not be construed as a recommendation to any Taubman shareholder as to how that shareholder should vote on the Merger Agreement Proposal.

The Taubman filing persons may have interests in the Transactions that may be different from, or in addition to, those of the other Taubman shareholders. These interests are described under “—Interests of Taubman’s Directors and Executive Officers in the Transactions,” “—The Taubman Filing Persons’ Purposes and Reasons for the Transactions,” and “The JV Agreement.” In light of these different interests, the Taubman Board established the Special Committee, which consists solely of individuals (i) not directly or indirectly affiliated with Taubman or the Taubman family members, or their respective affiliates (other than an affiliation with Taubman by virtue of serving as a director of Taubman), (ii) not members of Taubman’s management, and (iii) who are independent and disinterested (other than their interests described under “—Interests of Taubman’s Directors and Executive Officers in the Transactions”) and delegated to it the Taubman Board’s power and authority to, among other things: (a) review and evaluate the possible sale of Taubman, (b) identify, review and evaluate alternatives to the possible sale of Taubman that may be available to Taubman, including remaining an independent company, (c) if the Special Committee considers it advisable or appropriate, negotiate the price, structure, form, terms and conditions of a sale of Taubman or any alternative thereto and the form, terms and conditions of any definitive agreements in connection therewith, (d) determine whether a sale of Taubman or any alternative thereto is fair to, advisable and in the best interests of Taubman and its shareholders, (e) engage, and obtain any necessary or desirable advice, assistance and opinions from, financial advisors or other advisors, consultants and agents, and (f) recommend to the full Taubman Board what action, if any, should be taken by Taubman with respect to a sale of Taubman or any alternative thereto. Additionally, the Special Committee took part in the negotiation of the terms of the settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement and the Transactions were approved unanimously by (i) members of the Taubman Board, including all of independent directors, and (ii) all of the members of the Special Committee.

None of the Taubman filing persons or the other Taubman family members participated in the deliberations of the Special Committee as to the substantive or procedural fairness of the REIT Merger to the Taubman shareholders or in the deliberations of the Special Committee with respect to the settlement agreement. For these reasons, the Taubman filing persons do not believe that their interests in the Transactions influenced the decision of the Special Committee with respect to the settlement agreement, the merger agreement or the Transactions.

Based on the knowledge and analysis of each of the Taubman filing persons of available information regarding Taubman, as well as discussions with Taubman’s senior management regarding Taubman and its business and factors considered by, and the analysis and resulting conclusions of, the Taubman Board and the Special Committee discussed under “—Reasons for the Transactions and Recommendation of the Special Committee and the Taubman Board” (which analysis and resulting conclusions each of the Taubman filing persons adopt as their own), each of the Taubman filing persons believe that the REIT Merger is substantively and procedurally fair to the Taubman unaffiliated shareholders based on the following factors, among others:

None of the Taubman filing persons has performed, or engaged a financial advisor to perform, any valuation or other analyses for the purposes of assessing the fairness of the mergers to the Taubman shareholders.

In their consideration of the fairness of the REIT Merger, the Taubman filing persons did not find it practicable to, and did not, appraise Taubman’s assets to determine the liquidation value for Taubman’s shareholders (i) because of their belief that liquidation sales generally result in proceeds that are substantially less than the proceeds of a sale of a going concern, (ii) because of the impracticability of determining a liquidation value given the significant execution risk involved in any breakup, and (iii) because a liquidation-based valuation does not appropriately take into account overhead and other potentially significant costs of a liquidation. None of the Taubman filing persons considered net book value, which is an accounting concept, for purposes of determining the fairness of the common stock merger consideration to the Taubman shareholders because, in their view, net book value is not indicative of Taubman’s market value but rather an indicator of historical costs. Each of the Taubman filing persons note, however, that the common stock merger consideration of $43.00 in cash per share is higher than the net book value of Taubman per share of $(4.83) as of September 30, 2020. As of September 30, 2020, Taubman’s net book value was approximately $(297,951,000). None of the Taubman filing persons sought to establish a pre-Transactions going concern value for the Taubman common stock to determine the fairness of the common stock merger consideration to the Taubman shareholders because following the Transactions Taubman and the Taubman operating partnership will have a significantly different capital structure. However, to the extent the pre-Transactions going concern value was reflected in the share price of the Taubman common stock on November 13, 2020, the last completed trading day before the public announcement of the settlement agreement and the merger agreement, the common stock merger consideration of $43.00 per share represented an implied premium of 8.9% to the closing share price for Taubman common stock of $39.48 on November 13, 2020. The common stock merger consideration of $43.00 per share also represents an implied premium of 62.8%, to the closing share price for Taubman common stock of $26.42 on January 31, 2020, the last trading day prior to market rumors emerging that Simon was engaging in discussions to acquire Taubman.

The foregoing discussion of the information and factors considered and given weight by the Taubman filing persons in connection with the fairness of the REIT Merger is not intended to be exhaustive but includes the material factors considered by the Taubman filing persons. The Taubman filing persons did not find it practicable to, and did not, quantify or otherwise assign relative weights to the individual factors considered in reaching their conclusions as to the fairness of the REIT Merger. Rather, the fairness determinations were made after consideration of the foregoing factors as a whole.

Following completion of the Transactions, Taubman will have been merged with and into Merger Sub 1 and Taubman will cease to exist as a separate corporate entity. The shares of Taubman common stock, Taubman Series J Preferred Stock and Taubman Series K Preferred Stock are currently registered under the Exchange Act. Following the consummation of the Transactions, it is expected that all stock of Taubman will be delisted from the NYSE.

Pursuant to the terms of the JV agreement it is expected that Taubman’s operations will be conducted after the Mergers through the Joint Venture. Prior to the occurrence of certain specified termination events (including, but not limited to, the ownership of the Taubman family members falling below a specified threshold) (the “Taubman Period”), the operations of the Joint Venture and its subsidiaries will be managed by the Chief Executive Officer and President, R. Taubman (or, if R. Taubman ceases to be Chief Executive Officer and President, W. Taubman or another appointee of the Taubman family members reasonably acceptable to Surviving TCO), subject to approval rights held by Surviving TCO over certain matters, including, but not limited to, equity issuances, debt incurrences beyond certain agreed-upon exceptions, the annual budget (subject to certain procedures and exceptions), certain litigation, affiliate transactions and certain contracts.

Following the end of the Taubman Period, the operations of the Joint Venture and its subsidiaries will be managed by a board of directors appointed by Surviving TCO, subject to a more limited set of approval rights held by the Taubman family members and the Taubman family members maintaining certain minimum ownership thresholds.

For two years after the effective date of the JV Agreement, the directors appointed by representatives of the Taubman family (and only such directors) may submit a request to Surviving TCO for an additional investment in the Joint Venture of up to an aggregate of $250 million. Subject to certain terms and conditions being satisfied, upon the request by the directors appointed by the representative of the Taubman family, Surviving TCO will invest the

requested amount in the Joint Venture in exchange for Series B Preferred Units. If, during the Taubman Period, (i) there are Series B Preferred Units issued and outstanding, and (ii)(A) the distributions on any Series B Preferred Units have not been timely paid for 18 monthly distribution periods, whether or not consecutive, or (B) the Joint Venture shall have failed to pay the redemption price for any Series B Preferred Unit on the applicable redemption date, the holders of the Series B Preferred Units will immediately be entitled to appoint an additional director to the board of directors of the Joint Venture.

As of the date of this proxy statement, other than the Mergers, the Simon parties have no current plans, proposals or negotiations which would relate to or result in an extraordinary transaction involving Taubman’s business or management, such as a merger, reorganization, liquidation, relocation of any operations, or sale or transfer of a material amount of assets, or the incurrence of any indebtedness (other than the debt financing described herein).

If the merger agreement is approved by the Taubman shareholder approval and the other conditions to closing of the Mergers are either satisfied or waived, the following will occur.

At the effective time of the Partnership Merger, (i) each Taubman OP unit issued and outstanding immediately prior to the effective time of the Partnership Merger held by a minority partner will be converted into the right to receive, at the election of such minority partner, the common stock merger consideration or 0.5703 Simon OP units; (ii) certain Taubman OP units issued and outstanding immediately prior to the effective time of the Partnership Merger held by the Taubman family members will remain outstanding as units of partnership interest in the Surviving Taubman operating partnership; and (iii) all other Taubman OP units issued and outstanding immediately prior to the effective time of the Partnership Merger held by the Taubman family members will be converted into the right to receive the common stock merger consideration. In addition, at the effective time of the Partnership Merger, each Taubman Incentive Unit will vest and be converted into a Taubman OP unit, to be treated in the Partnership Merger in the same manner as the Taubman OP units held by the minority partners. The membership interests of Merger Sub 2 issued and outstanding immediately prior to the effective time of the Partnership Merger will automatically be converted into a number of units of partnership interest in Surviving Taubman operating partnership such that following the Partnership Merger, Merger Sub 1 and Taubman will collectively own 80% (assuming, for purposes of this calculation, that the Taubman OP units issuable under the Option Deferral Agreement are outstanding interests of Surviving Taubman operating partnership) of the outstanding interests of Surviving Taubman operating partnership.

Immediately following the effective time of the Partnership Merger, at the effective time of the LLC Conversion, the Surviving Taubman operating partnership will be converted into a Delaware limited liability company pursuant to the LLC Conversion, in which each unit of partnership interest in the Surviving Taubman operating partnership that is owned by the Taubman family members, Merger Sub 1 or by Taubman immediately prior to the effective time of the LLC Conversion will be converted into one Joint Venture unit, and each Option Deferred unit will be converted into the right to receive one Joint Venture unit.

On the closing date and prior to the effective time of the Partnership Merger, the Taubman operating partnership will redeem any “preferred equity” of the Taubman operating partnership held by Taubman for an amount equal to the sum of the Taubman Series J and Series K Preferred Stock Redemption Amount, which will be paid by the Taubman operating partnership to Taubman on the closing date. Immediately following the effective time of the LLC Conversion, the Simon operating partnership will contribute to the capital of the Joint Venture an amount equal to the aggregate Taubman Series J and Series K Preferred Stock liquidation preference in exchange for a certain number of Series A Preferred Units (as defined in the JV agreement). Immediately after the Simon operating partnership preferred contribution, the Joint Venture will pay to Taubman an amount equal to the aggregate Taubman Series J and Series K Preferred Stock liquidation preference. Immediately after the Taubman OP payment and prior to the effective time of the REIT Merger, Taubman will issue a redemption notice and cause funds to be set aside to pay the redemption price for each share of the Taubman Series J Preferred Stock and each share of the Taubman Series K Preferred Stock, at their respective liquidation preference of $25.00 plus all accumulated and unpaid dividends to, but not including, the redemption date of such share.

Immediately following the Redemption, at the effective time of the REIT Merger, (i) each share of Taubman common stock (other than excluded Taubman common stock, as set forth in the merger agreement) issued and outstanding immediately prior to the REIT Merger Effective Time will be converted into the right to receive the common stock merger consideration; and (ii) each share of Taubman Series B preferred stock will be converted into the right to receive an amount in cash equal to the common stock merger consideration, divided by 14,000.

Upon the effective time of the REIT Merger: (1) each outstanding TCO RSU and each outstanding TCO PSU that vests in accordance with its terms in connection with the closing of the REIT Merger will automatically convert into the right to receive the common stock merger consideration (with such TCO PSUs vesting based on the greater of the average of actual performance achievement, as of the closing, of the two performance metrics applicable to such grants, and target performance); (2) each outstanding TCO RSU and TCO PSU that is not eligible to vest in accordance with its terms in connection with the closing of the REIT Merger will be converted into a cash substitute award to be paid (A) with respect to any such award granted prior to 2020, in accordance with the same service-vesting schedule that applied to the original TCO RSU or TCO PSU award and (B) with respect to any such award granted in 2020, in accordance with the same vesting schedule (including performance-vesting conditions) that applied to the original TCO RSU or TCO PSU award; (3) each outstanding time-vesting and performance-vesting Taubman Incentive Unit will vest and be converted into a Taubman OP unit (with such Taubman Incentive Units vesting based on the greater of the average of actual performance achievement, as of the closing, of the two performance metrics applicable to such grants, and target performance), which shall then be treated in the same manner (and having the right to the same election) as all other Taubman OP units held by the minority partners; (4) each TCO DER granted in tandem with any TCO RSU or TCO PSU will be treated in the same manner as the outstanding TCO RSU or TCO PSU to which such TCO DER relates; and (5) each outstanding TCO DSU will be converted into the right to receive the common stock merger consideration. Finally, at the effective time of the LLC Conversion, the Option Deferral Agreement will be deemed to be amended so that each Option Deferred unit will represent the right to receive, following the LLC Conversion, one Joint Venture unit, and will remain subject to all other terms and conditions of the Option Deferral Agreement.

Following the Mergers and the LLC Conversion, the Simon operating partnership will own 100% of the outstanding equity of Surviving TCO, Surviving TCO will directly or indirectly own 80% of the limited liability company interests of the Joint Venture, and the Taubman family members will collectively own the remaining 20% of the limited liability company interests of the Joint Venture. Surviving TCO and the Taubman family members will enter into the JV agreement with respect to the Joint Venture at the time of the LLC Conversion in the form attached as Exhibit B to the merger agreement, which is attached to this proxy statement as Annex A.

The Taubman common stock is currently registered under the Exchange Act and is quoted on the NYSE under the symbol “TCO.” As a result of the Transactions, Taubman will become privately held and there will be no public market for the Taubman common stock. After the Transactions, the Taubman common stock will cease to be quoted on the NYSE and price quotations with respect to sales of Taubman common stock in the public market will no longer be available. In addition, the registration of the Taubman common stock under the Exchange Act will be terminated and Taubman will no longer file periodic reports with the SEC with respect to the Taubman common stock. Termination of registration of the Taubman common stock under the Exchange Act will reduce the information required to be furnished by Taubman to its shareholders and the SEC, and would make certain provisions of the Exchange Act, such as the short-swing trading provisions of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act and the requirement to furnish a proxy statement in connection with shareholders’ meetings pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, no longer applicable to Taubman.

The directors of Merger Sub 1 immediately prior to the effective time of the REIT Merger will be the directors of Surviving TCO and the officers of Merger Sub 1 immediately prior to the effective time of the REIT Merger will be the officers of Surviving TCO. The limited liability company agreement of Surviving TCO will be in the form of the limited liability company agreement attached as Exhibit A to the merger agreement.

Simon does not currently own any interest in Taubman. Following the Transactions, the Simon operating partnership will own 100% of the equity interests in Surviving TCO and will have a corresponding interest in Taubman’s net book value and net earnings. Each partner of the Simon operating partnership will have an indirect interest in our net book value and net earnings in proportion to such partner’s ownership interest in the Simon operating partnership. Taubman’s net income attributable to the holders of the Taubman common stock for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019 was $203,925,000 and Taubman’s net book value as of December 31, 2019 was approximately $(177,406,000).

The primary benefit of the Transactions to the Taubman unaffiliated shareholders will be their right to receive the common stock merger consideration of $43.00 per share, which represents an implied premium of 8.9% to the closing share price for Taubman common stock of $39.48 on November 13, 2020, the last trading day before the announcement of the merger agreement and an implied premium of 62.8% to the closing share price for Taubman common stock of $26.42 on January 31, 2020, the last trading day prior to market rumors emerging that Simon was engaging in discussions to acquire Taubman. Additionally, the Taubman unaffiliated shareholders will avoid the risk after the Transactions of any possible decrease in Taubman’s future earnings, potential growth or value as well as any risk posed by the merger litigation.

The primary detriment of the Transactions to Taubman’s unaffiliated shareholders is the lack of an interest of such shareholders in the potential future earnings, growth or value realized by Taubman or the Joint Venture after the REIT Merger.

In connection with the Transactions, the Taubman filing persons will receive benefits and be subject to obligations that are different from, or in addition to, the benefits received by the Taubman shareholders generally. The primary benefits of the Transactions to the Taubman filing persons will be to retain a 20% ownership interest in, and certain management and governance rights in, the Joint Venture (subject to certain ownership requirements; see “The JV Agreement”), continuing to receive cash distributions from the Joint Venture and having the option of obtaining liquidity for their Joint Venture units as described under “The JV Agreement.”

The primary detriments of the Transactions to the Taubman filing persons include the fact that the Taubman filing persons will only be able to obtain liquidity for their Joint Venture units after a certain period of time and subject to certain limitations, with such liquidity calculated through a mechanism that may result in a purchase price per Joint Venture unit that is lower than the price that would have been received had such Taubman filing persons received the common stock merger consideration in return for such Joint Venture unit. The liquidity rights pursuant to the JV agreement are described in more detail under the section entitled “The JV Agreement.” Additionally, the Taubman filing persons will bear the risk of any potential decrease in the Joint Venture’s earnings, potential growth or value.

While Taubman has from time to time provided limited financial guidance to investors, Taubman has not, as a matter of course, otherwise publicly disclosed internal projections as to future performance, earnings or other results beyond the upcoming annual period due to, among other reasons, the uncertainty, unpredictability and subjectivity of the underlying assumptions and estimates. However, in connection with the original merger agreement, prior to the execution of the original merger agreement, at the direction of the Special Committee, in January 2020 Taubman’s management prepared certain non-public financial projections as to the potential future performance of Taubman for the years ended December 31, 2020 through December 31, 2024 (referred to as the “January 2020 Projections”), which were provided to the Special Committee in connection with its evaluation of the original merger agreement. At the direction of the Special Committee, the January 2020 Projections were provided to Lazard in connection with its financial analyses, including Lazard’s financial analyses for the purposes of its opinion with respect to the original

merger agreement. Portions of the January 2020 Projections with respect to 2020 were also provided to Simon prior to the execution of the original merger agreement for its use in connection with its evaluation of the original merger agreement. For more information, see “—Background of the Transactions.”

In addition, prior to the execution of the merger agreement, at the direction of the Special Committee, in November 2020, Taubman’s management prepared certain updated non-public financial projections as to the potential future performance of Taubman for the years ended December 31, 2020 through December 31, 2025 (referred to as the “November 2020 Projections” and referred to collectively with the January 2020 Projections as the “Projections”), which were provided to the Special Committee in connection with its evaluation of the merger agreement. At the direction of the Special Committee, the November 2020 Projections were provided to Lazard in connection with its financial analyses, including Lazard’s financial analyses described under “—Opinion of Financial Advisor to the Special Committee.”

The following summary of the Projections is included for the purpose of providing Taubman shareholders access to certain non-public information that was furnished to certain parties in connection with the Transactions. This information may not be appropriate for other purposes and is not included to influence the voting decision of any shareholder. The inclusion of this summary should not be regarded as an indication that Taubman’s management or anyone who received the Projections then considered, or now considers, them to be a reliable prediction of future events, and the Projections should not be relied upon as such.

The Projections were not prepared with a view toward public disclosure or with a view toward complying with the published guidelines of the SEC regarding projections or GAAP, or the guidelines established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants with respect to prospective financial information. Neither Taubman’s independent auditor nor any other independent accountant has compiled, examined, or performed any procedures with respect to the Projections, nor have they expressed any opinion or any other form of assurance on such information or its achievability. Beneficial interest in Property NOI, Beneficial interest in EBITDA, Adjusted FFO, Adjusted FFO per Diluted Share, Unlevered Free Cash Flow, Funds Available for Distribution and Funds Available for Distribution per Diluted Share contained in the summary set forth below are non-GAAP financial measures within the meaning of the applicable rules and regulations of the SEC, which are financial measures that are not calculated in accordance with GAAP. These non-GAAP financial measures should not be viewed as a substitute for GAAP financial measures and may be different from non-GAAP financial measures used by other companies. Accordingly, these non-GAAP financial measures should be considered together with, and not as an alternative to, financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP. SEC rules that may otherwise require a reconciliation of a non-GAAP financial measure to a GAAP financial measure do not apply to non-GAAP financial measures provided to directors or a financial advisor (like the Projections) in connection with a proposed transaction like the Transactions when the disclosure is included in a document like this proxy statement. In addition, reconciliations of non-GAAP financial measures to GAAP financial measures were not relied upon by Lazard for purposes of its opinion or by the Special Committee or the Taubman Board in connection with their consideration of the Transactions. Accordingly, Taubman has not provided a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures included in the Projections to the relevant GAAP financial measures.

Although the Projections are presented with numerical specificity, they reflect numerous estimates and assumptions made by Taubman’s management with respect to industry performance, general business, economic, regulatory, market and financial conditions and other future events, as well as matters specific to Taubman’s business, all of which are difficult or impossible to predict accurately and many of which are beyond Taubman’s control. The Projections reflect subjective judgment in many respects and thus are susceptible to multiple interpretations and periodic revisions based on actual experience and business developments. As such, the Projections constitute forward-looking information and are subject to many risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from the results forecasted in the Projections, including, but not limited to, general economic conditions, changes in market rental rates, unscheduled closings or bankruptcies of tenants, relationships with tenants, trends in the retail industry, changes in consumer shopping behavior, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic or any other related global or regional health event or circumstance and other factors discussed in this proxy statement and in other reports filed with or furnished to the SEC by Taubman. There can be no assurance that the Projections will be realized or that actual results will not be significantly higher or lower than those forecasted. The Projections cover several years and such information by its nature becomes less reliable with each successive year.

The Projections were developed by Taubman’s management without giving effect to the Transactions, including, but not limited to, any costs incurred in connection with the Transactions. In addition, the Projections will be affected

by Taubman’s ability to achieve strategic goals, objectives and targets over the applicable periods. The January 2020 Projections do not take into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the November 2020 Projections remains highly uncertain. The Projections reflect assumptions as to certain business decisions that are subject to change. The Projections cannot, therefore, be considered a guarantee of future operating results, and should not be relied on as such.

In addition, other than to the extent the November 2020 Projections reflect updates to the January 2020 Projections, each set of Projections have not been updated or revised to reflect information, circumstances, events or results after the applicable date on which they were prepared or as of the date of this proxy statement, and except as required by applicable securities laws, Taubman does not intend to update or otherwise revise either set of Projections or the specific portions presented to reflect circumstances existing after the applicable date the Projections were prepared or to reflect the occurrence of future events, even in the event that any or all of the underlying assumptions are shown to be in error.

The inclusion of the following summary of the Projections should not be deemed an admission or representation by Taubman or any other person that Taubman or any other person views such Projections as material information, particularly in light of the inherent risks and uncertainties associated with such long-range forecasts. No representation is made by Taubman or any other person regarding the Projections or Taubman’s ultimate performance compared to such information. In light of the foregoing factors, and the uncertainties inherent in the Projections, shareholders are cautioned not to place undue, if any, reliance on the Projections or the following summary. The Projections and the following summary should be evaluated, if at all, in conjunction with the historical consolidated financial statements and other information contained in Taubman’s public filings with the SEC.

The following is a summary of the January 2020 Projections, which are presented for the Taubman operating partnership, and reflect its beneficial interest in the underlying properties, primarily in respect of NOI, capital expenditures and interest expense. The January 2020 Projections are applicable to Taubman at its pro rata interest in the Taubman operating partnership. The January 2020 Projections were based on numerous variables and assumptions, including the following key assumptions:

The following is a summary of the November 2020 Projections, which are presented for the Taubman operating partnership, and reflect its beneficial interest in the underlying properties, primarily in respect of NOI, capital expenditures and interest expense. The November 2020 Projections are applicable to Taubman at its pro rata interest in the Taubman operating partnership. Assumptions included in the November 2020 projections were developed prior to Taubman’s 2021 annual budgeting process and may not reflect the full effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, which include but are not limited to potential declines in occupancy, negative releasing spreads, bankruptcies, or other forms of ongoing relief as a result of the pandemic. The November 2020 Projections were based on numerous variables and assumptions, including the following key assumptions: