Summary Section

Investment Objective

 

The Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies Fund (the “Alternative Strategies Fund”) seeks to achieve long-term returns with lower risk and lower volatility than the stock market, and with relatively low correlation to stock and bond market indexes.

Fees and Expenses of the Alternative Strategies Fund

 

This table describes the fees and expenses that you may pay if you buy and hold shares of the Alternative Strategies Fund.

Shareholder Fees (fees paid directly from your investment)

 

		Institutional Class				Investor Class
			None				None

Annual Operating Expenses (expenses that you pay each year as a percentage of the value of your investment)

 

		Institutional Class				Investor Class
Management Fees			1.40%				1.40%
Distribution and or Service (12b-1) Fees			None				0.25%
Other Expenses Not Dividend or Interest Expense			0.22%				0.22%
Dividend and Interest Expense			0.25%				0.25%
Total Other Expenses			0.47%				0.47%
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses			1.87%				2.12%
Fee Waiver and/or Expense Reimbursement (1)			-0.13%				-0.13%
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waiver and/or Expense Reimbursement			1.74%				1.99%

 

(1)

Litman Gregory Fund Advisors, LLC (“Litman Gregory”), the advisor to the Alternative Strategies Fund, has contractually agreed to limit the Alternative Strategies Fund’s operating expenses (including management fees payable to Litman Gregory but excluding any taxes, interest, brokerage commissions, expenses incurred in connection with any merger or reorganization, borrowing costs (including commitment fees), dividend expenses, acquired fund fees and expenses and extraordinary expenses such as but not limited to litigation costs) through April 30, 2016 (unless otherwise sooner terminated) to an annual rate of 1.49% for the Institutional Class and 1.74% for the Investor Class (the “Operating Expense Limitation”). Because operating expenses do not include dividend and interest expense, which fluctuates depending on the portfolio composition, the Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waiver and/or Expense Reimbursement disclosed in this table may exceed the Operating Expense Limitation. This agreement may be renewed for additional periods not exceeding one (1) year and may be terminated by the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of Litman Gregory Funds Trust (the “Trust”) upon sixty (60) days’ written notice to Litman Gregory. Litman Gregory may also decline to renew this agreement by written notice to the Trust at least thirty (30) days before the renewal date. Any fee waiver or expense reimbursement made by Litman Gregory pursuant to this agreement is subject to the repayment by the Alternative Strategies Fund within three (3) years following the fiscal year in which the fee waiver or expense reimbursement occurred but only if the Alternative Strategies Fund is able to make the repayment without exceeding its current expense limitation and the repayment is approved by the Board.

Example

This example is intended to help you compare the cost of investing in the Alternative Strategies Fund with the cost of investing in other mutual funds. The example assumes that you invest $10,000 in the Alternative Strategies Fund for the time periods indicated and then redeem all of your shares at the end of those periods. The example also assumes that your investment has a 5% return each year and that the Alternative

Strategies Fund’s operating expenses remain the same. Although your actual costs may be higher or lower, based on these assumptions your costs would be:

 

		One Year				Three Years				Five Years				Ten Years
Institutional Class		$	177			$	575			$	999			$	2,180
Investor Class		$	202			$	651			$	1,127			$	2,441

Portfolio Turnover

 

The Alternative Strategies Fund pays transaction costs, such as commissions, when it buys and sells securities (or “turns over” its portfolio). A higher portfolio turnover rate may indicate higher transaction costs and may result in higher taxes when shares of the Alternative Strategies Fund are held in a taxable account as compared to shares in investment companies that hold investments for a longer period. These costs, which are not reflected in the annual fund operating expenses or in the example, will affect the Alternative Strategies Fund’s performance. During the most recent fiscal period, the Alternative Strategies Fund’s portfolio turnover rate was 156.88% of the average value of its portfolio.

Principal Strategies

 

Litman Gregory Fund Advisors, LLC, the advisor to the Alternative Strategies Fund, believes that it is possible to identify highly skilled and experienced investment managers who can successfully execute various investment approaches that target materially lower volatility than the stock market or that have a low correlation or low sensitivity to traditional investment strategies, or both, so that the overall performance of the Alternative Strategies Fund is not heavily dependent on steadily rising stock or bond market to earn its return over a market cycle. Furthermore, Litman Gregory believes that by allocating assets among multiple investment managers with different but complementary strategies it can further enhance the risk-adjusted return potential of an overall fund portfolio over a full market cycle.

Based on these beliefs, the Alternative Strategies Fund’s strategy is to engage a number of established investment managers as sub-advisors (each a “sub-advisor” or “manager”) to offer investors a mix of strategies that Litman Gregory believes offer risk-return characteristics that are attractive individually and even more compelling collectively. The Alternative Strategies Fund is intended to be used by investors as a source of diversification for traditional stock and bond portfolios to reduce volatility and potentially enhance returns relative to various measures of risk.

Allocations among sub-advisors are based on a number of factors, including Litman Gregory’s expectation for the risk-adjusted return potential of each sub-advisor’s strategy and the impact on overall portfolio risk, with the objective of maximizing return subject to the goals of low volatility and relatively low correlation with broad financial markets, especially the stock market. Litman Gregory may at times adjust the allocations of

 

capital to sub-advisors if it believes there is a highly compelling tactical opportunity in a particular sub-advisor’s strategy. A tactical opportunity could represent the potential for an exceptional risk-adjusted return opportunity relative to the other strategies, or it may represent a superior risk reduction opportunity that could benefit the Alternative Strategies Fund’s overall portfolio. Portfolio assets will be tactically allocated to the sub-advisors in accordance with the target allocation range for each sub-advisor as measured at the time of allocation. It is possible that additional managers and strategies will be added to the Alternative Strategies Fund in the future.

Sub-advisor strategies may seek to benefit from: opportunities to combine securities with differing risk characteristics; market inefficiencies; arbitrage opportunities; opportunities to provide liquidity; tactical opportunities in asset classes or securities; special situations such as spin offs; as well as other opportunities in areas such as real estate or managed futures. In the aggregate, the managers can invest globally in stocks of companies of any size, domicile or market capitalization, government and corporate bonds and other fixed income securities and currencies, including short positions of any of the foregoing, within their respective segments of the Alternative Strategies Fund. They may also invest in derivatives, including, without limitation, options, futures contracts, participatory notes (“P-Notes”) and swaps, to manage risk or enhance return and can also borrow amounts up to one third of the value of the Fund’s total assets (except that the Fund may exceed this limit to satisfy redemption requests or for other temporary purposes). Each of the managers may invest in illiquid securities; however, the Alternative Strategies Fund as a whole may not hold more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid securities. In some cases, the sub-advisors may seek to replicate strategies they employ in their private (hedge) funds. In other cases, the sub-advisors may seek to enhance strategies they run in other public funds by focusing on their highest conviction ideas to a greater extent or by pursuing certain aspects of their strategies with greater flexibility. However, the Alternative Strategies Fund will only invest directly in portfolio securities selected by the sub-advisors and will not invest in any pooled investment vehicles or accounts managed by the sub-advisors.

Each sub-advisor will have an investment approach that generally focuses on a particular asset class or specific strategies. Currently, the strategies the sub-advisors focus on are as follows: (1) an arbitrage oriented strategy, (2) an opportunistic income strategy which will often focus on mortgage related securities, (3) a contrarian opportunity strategy that allows tactical investments throughout the capital structure (stocks and bonds), asset classes, market capitalization, industries and geographies, (4) a liquid long/short equity strategy, and (5) an absolute return fixed income strategy that focuses on the tactical allocation of long and short global fixed income opportunities and currencies. Litman Gregory may hire sub-advisors that focus on other strategies in the future, and not all strategies that may be appropriate will be represented in the Alternative Strategies Fund’s portfolio at all times.

The sub-advisor that manages the arbitrage strategy seeks to generate long-term returns of at least mid-single-digits with low correlation to the equity and bond markets and may follow merger arbitrage, convertible arbitrage and capital structure arbitrage strategies. This objective is pursued by investing in equity and debt securities of U.S. and non-U.S. companies that are impacted by corporate events such as mergers, acquisitions, restructurings, refinancings, recapitalizations, reorganizations or other special situations.

The sub-advisor that manages the opportunistic income strategy allocates investments to fixed income instruments and other investments with no limit on the duration of the portfolio. The sub-advisor may invest in, without limitation, asset-backed securities; domestic and foreign corporate bonds, including high-yield bonds; municipal bonds; bonds or other obligations issued by domestic or foreign governments, including emerging markets countries; real estate investment trust (“REIT”) debt securities; and mortgage related securities. When investing in mortgage-related securities, the sub-advisor may invest in obligations issued or guaranteed by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. Government; collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”) issued by domestic or foreign private issuers that represent an interest in or are collateralized by mortgage related securities issued by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. Government; commercial mortgage backed securities (“CMBS”); obligations issued by private issuers that represent an interest in or are collateralized by whole mortgage loans or mortgage related securities without a government guarantee but typically with some form of private credit enhancement; “interest only” and “principal only” stripped mortgage securities; inverse floating rate securities; and debt or equity tranches of collateralized debt obligations collateralized by mortgage related securities.

The sub-advisor that manages the contrarian opportunity strategy focuses on investments that offer absolute rather than relative value. The goal is to provide equity-like returns over longer periods ( i.e . , five to seven years) while protecting against the permanent loss of capital. Attention is directed toward those companies offering the best combination of such quality criteria as strong market share, good management, and high normalized return on capital.

The sub-advisor that manages the long/short strategy focuses on identifying durable and investable macroeconomic and industry specific themes that have the potential to drive returns over a longer timeframe than the market’s typical focus. Within these themes, the sub-advisor seeks to find compelling global investment opportunities (both long and short) based on fundamental company- and industry-specific research and analysis. However, investment ideas do not need to be part of a theme, and some of the biggest positions are idiosyncratic and company-specific. In addition to its thematic and bottom-up fundamental research, the sub-advisor also incorporates a variety of risk analytics in constructing and managing the portfolio.

The sub-advisor that manages the absolute return fixed income strategy seeks to achieve positive total returns over a full market cycle with relatively low volatility. The sub-advisor intends to

 

pursue its objective by utilizing a flexible investment approach that allocates investments across a global range of investment opportunities related to credit, currencies and interest rates, while employing risk management strategies designed to mitigate downside risk. Under normal market conditions, the sub-advisor may invest (1) up to 75% of the total assets allocated to it in below investment-grade fixed income securities and related derivatives; (2) up to 75% of the total assets allocated to it in investments denominated in non-U.S. currencies and related derivatives, including up to 50% in investments denominated in emerging market currencies and related derivatives; and (3) up to 20% of the total assets allocated to it in equity related securities and derivatives as measured at time of allocation. A “related derivative” of a financial instrument means any derivative whose value is based upon or derived from that financial instrument or a related derivative of that financial instrument.

Principal Risks

 

As with all mutual funds, it is possible to lose money on an investment in the Alternative Strategies Fund. An investment in the Alternative Strategies Fund is not a deposit of any bank and is not guaranteed, endorsed or insured by any financial institution, government authority or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The principal risks of investing in the Alternative Strategies Fund are:

 

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Equity Securities Risk. This is the risk that the value of equity securities may fluctuate, sometimes rapidly and unpredictably, due to factors affecting the general market, an entire industry or sector, or particular companies. These factors include, without limitation, adverse changes in economic conditions, the general outlook for corporate earnings, interest rates or investor sentiment; increases in production costs; and significant management decisions. This risk is greater for small- and medium-sized companies, which tend to be more vulnerable to adverse developments than larger companies.

 

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Debt Securities Risk. This is the risk that the value and liquidity of debt securities may be reduced under certain circumstances. The value of debt securities can fluctuate in response to issuer activity and changes in general economic and credit market conditions, including changes in interest rates. It is likely there will be less governmental action in the near future to maintain low interest rates. The negative impact on debt securities from the resulting rate increases for that and other reasons could be swift and significant. In recent years, dealer capacity in the debt and fixed income markets appears to have undergone fundamental changes, including a reduction in dealer market-making capacity. These changes have the potential to decrease substantially liquidity and increase volatility in the debt and fixed income markets.

 

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Below Investment-Grade Fixed Income Securities Risk.  This is the risk of investing in below investment-grade fixed income securities (also known as “junk bonds”), which may be greater than that of higher rated fixed income

securities. These securities are rated Ba through C by Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) or BB through D by Standard & Poor’s Rating Group (“S&P”) (or comparably rated by another nationally recognized statistical rating organization), or, if not rated by Moody’s or S&P, are considered by the sub-advisors to be of similar quality. These securities have greater risk of default than higher rated securities. The market value of these securities is more sensitive to corporate developments and economic conditions and can be volatile. Market conditions can diminish liquidity and make accurate valuations difficult to obtain. There is no limit to the Alternative Strategies Fund’s ability to invest in below investment-grade fixed income securities; however, under normal market conditions, it does not expect to invest more than 50% of its total assets in below investment-grade fixed income securities.

 

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Interest Rate Risk.  This is the risk that debt securities will decline in value because of changes in interest rates. A fund with a longer average portfolio duration will be more sensitive to changes in interest rates than a fund with a shorter average portfolio duration.

 

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Credit Risk. This is the risk that the Alternative Strategies Fund could lose money if the issuer or guarantor of a fixed income security, or the counterparty of a derivatives contract or other transaction, is unable or unwilling (or is perceived to be unable or unwilling) to make timely payment of principal and/or interest, or to otherwise honor its obligations.

 

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Convertible Securities Risk.  This is the risk that the market value of convertible securities may fluctuate due to changes in, among other things, interest rates; other general economic conditions; industry fundamentals; market sentiment; the issuer’s operating results, financial statements, and credit ratings; and the market value of the underlying common or preferred stock.

 

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Capital Structure Arbitrage Risk.  The perceived mispricing identified by the sub-advisor may not disappear or may even increase, in which case losses may be realized.

 

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Convertible Arbitrage Risk.  Arbitrage strategies involve engaging in transactions that attempt to exploit price differences of identical, related or similar securities on different markets or in different forms. A Fund may realize losses or reduced rate of return if underlying relationships among securities in which investment positions are taken change in an adverse manner or a transaction is unexpectedly terminated or delayed. Trading to seek short-term capital appreciation can be expected to cause the Fund’s portfolio turnover rate to be substantially higher than that of the average equity-oriented investment company, resulting in higher transaction costs and additional capital gains tax liabilities.

 

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Mortgage-Backed Securities Risk.  This is the risk of investing in mortgaged-backed securities, which includes interest rate risk, prepayment risk and the risk of defaults on the mortgage loans underlying these securities.

 

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Foreign Investment and Emerging Markets Risks. This is the risk that an investment in foreign (non-U.S.) securities may cause the Alternative Strategies Fund to experience more rapid and extreme changes in value than a fund that invests exclusively in securities of U.S. companies, due to factors such as currency conversion rate fluctuations, currency blockages, political and economic instability, differences in financial reporting, accounting and auditing standards, nationalization, expropriation or confiscatory taxation, and smaller and less-strict regulation of securities markets. These risks are greater in emerging markets. There is no limit to the Alternative Strategies Fund’s ability to invest in emerging market securities; however, under normal market conditions, it does not expect to invest more than 50% of its total assets in emerging market securities.

 

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Currency Risk.  This is the risk that investing in foreign currencies may expose the Alternative Strategies Fund to fluctuations in currency exchange rates and that such fluctuations in the exchange rates may negatively affect an investment related to a currency or denominated in a foreign currency. The Alternative Strategies Fund may invest in foreign currencies for investment and hedging purposes.

 

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Leverage Risk.  This is the risk that leverage may cause the effect of an increase or decrease in the value of the Alternative Strategies Fund’s portfolio securities to be magnified and the Alternative Strategies Fund to be more volatile than if leverage was not used. Leverage may result from certain transactions, including the use of derivatives and borrowing.

 

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Derivatives Risk.  This is the risk that an investment in derivatives may not correlate completely to the performance of the underlying securities and may be volatile and that the insolvency of the counterparty to a derivative instrument could cause the Alternative Strategies Fund to lose all or substantially all of its investment in the derivative instrument, as well as the benefits derived therefrom.

 

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Options Risk. This is the risk that an investment in options may be subject to greater fluctuation than an investment in the underlying instruments themselves and may be subject to a complete loss of the amounts paid as premiums to purchase the options.

 

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Futures Contracts Risk.  This is the risk that an investment in futures contracts may be subject to losses that exceed the amount of the premiums paid and may subject the Alternative Strategies Fund’s net asset value to greater volatility.

 

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P-Notes Risk. This is the risk that the performance results of P-Notes will not replicate exactly the performance of the issuers or markets that the P-Notes seek to replicate. Investments in P-Notes involve risks normally associated with a direct investment in the underlying securities as well as additional risks, such as counterparty risk.

 

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Swaps Risk.  Risks inherent in the use of swaps include: (1) swap contracts may not be assigned without the consent of the counterparty; (2) potential default of the counterparty to the swap; (3) absence of a liquid secondary

market for any particular swap at any time; and (4) possible inability of the Alternative Strategies Fund to close out the swap transaction at a time that otherwise would be favorable for it to do so.

 

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Short Sale Risk.  This is the risk that the value of a security the Alternative Strategies Fund sells short does not go down as expected. The risk of loss is theoretically unlimited if the value of the security sold short continues to increase. In addition, short sales may cause the Alternative Strategies Fund to be compelled, at a time disadvantageous to it, to buy the security previously sold short, thus resulting in a loss. To meet current margin requirements, the Alternative Strategies Fund is required to deposit with the broker additional cash or securities so that the total deposit with the broker is maintained daily at 150% of the current market value of the securities sold short.

 

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Merger Arbitrage Risk. This is the risk that a proposed reorganization in which the Alternative Strategies Fund invests may be renegotiated or terminated.

 

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Multi-Style Management Risk.  This is the risk that the Alternative Strategies Fund could experience overlapping security transactions as a result of having different portfolio managers using different strategies to manage the Alternative Strategies Fund’s assets. Certain portfolio managers may be purchasing securities at the same time other portfolio managers may be selling those same securities, which may lead to higher transaction expenses compared to a fund using a single investment strategy.

 

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Portfolio Turnover Risk.  This is the risk that the Alternative Strategies Fund may experience high portfolio turnover rates as a result of its investment strategies. High portfolio turnover rates may indicate higher transaction costs and may result in higher taxes when shares of the Alternative Strategies Fund are held in a taxable account as compared to shares in investment companies that hold investments for a longer period.

 

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Unfavorable Tax Treatment Risk. This is the risk that a material portion of the Alternative Strategies Fund’s return could be in the form of net investment income or short-term capital gains, some of which may be distributed to shareholders and taxed at ordinary income tax rates. Therefore, shareholders may have a greater need to pay regular taxes than compared to other investment strategies that hold investments longer. Due to this investment strategy, it may be preferable for certain shareholders to invest in the Fund through pre-tax or tax-deferred accounts as compared to investment through currently taxable accounts. Potential shareholders are encouraged to consult their tax advisors in this regard.

Performance

 

The following performance information provides some indication of the risks of investing in the Alternative Strategies Fund. The bar chart shows changes in the performance of the Alternative Strategies Fund’s Institutional Class shares from year to year.

 

The table below shows how the Alternative Strategies Fund’s average annual total returns of the Institutional Class and Investor Class for the 1-year and since inception periods compare to those of a broad-based market index and two secondary indexes. Past performance, before and after taxes, does not necessarily indicate how the Alternative Strategies Fund will perform in the future. Updated performance information is available on the Alternative Strategies Fund’s website at www.mastersfunds.com.

Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies Fund - Institutional Class Calendar Year Total Returns as of December 31

 

During the period shown above, the highest and lowest quarterly returns earned by the Alternative Strategies Fund were:

 

Highest:			4.07%			Quarter ended March 31, 2012
Lowest:			-0.37%			Quarter ended September 30, 2014

Average Annual Total Returns (for the periods ended December 31, 2014)
		One Year				Since Fund Inception (9/30/2011)
Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies Fund
Institutional Class
Return Before Taxes			3.58	%			6.99	%
Return After Taxes on Distributions			2.27	%			6.01	%
Return After Taxes on Distributions and Sale of Fund Shares			2.20	%			5.07	%
Investor Class
Return Before Taxes			3.33	%			6.75	%
Barclays Capital U.S. Aggregate Bond Index
(reflects no deduction for fees, expenses or taxes)			5.96	%			2.81	%
Russell 1000 ® Index
(reflects no deduction for fees, expenses or taxes)			13.24	%			23.06	%
40/60 Blend of Russell 1000 ® Index & Barclays Aggregate Bond Index
(reflects no deduction for fees, expenses or taxes)			8.89	%			10.66	%
3-Month LIBOR
(reflects no deduction for fees, expenses or taxes)			0.24	%			0.34	%
Morningstar Multialternative Category
(reflects net performance of funds in this group)			1.64	%			3.05	%

The Alternative Strategies Fund’s after-tax returns as shown in the above table are calculated using the historical highest applicable individual federal marginal income tax rates for the period and do not reflect the impact of state and local taxes. Your actual after-tax returns depend on your tax situation and may differ from those shown. If you own shares of the Alternative Strategies Fund in a tax-deferred account, such as a 401(k) plan or an individual retirement account after-tax returns shown are not relevant to your investment. After-tax returns are shown for only the Alternative Strategies Fund’s Institutional Class, and after-tax returns for the Alternative Strategies Fund’s Investor Class will vary.

 

Litman Gregory Masters Equity Fund Portfolio Managers

 

Christopher C. Davis

Davis Selected Advisers, L.P.

2949 East Elvira Road, Suite 101

Tucson, AZ 85756

Christopher C. Davis is the portfolio managers for the segment of the Equity Fund’s assets managed by Davis Selected Advisers, L.P. (“Davis Advisors”). Davis has served as a Portfolio Manager of Davis New York Venture Fund since October 1995, and also manages other equity funds advised by Davis Advisors. Davis served as Assistant Portfolio Manager and Research Analyst working with Shelby M.C. Davis from September 1989 through September 1995 . Davis Advisors has been a sub-advisor to the Equity Fund since 1996.

Approximately 15% of the Equity Fund’s assets are managed by Davis Advisors. Davis Advisors manages equity funds using the “Davis Investment Discipline.” Davis Advisors conducts extensive research to try to identify businesses that possess characteristics it believes foster the creation of long-term value, such as proven management, a durable franchise and business model, and sustainable competitive advantages. Davis Advisors aims to invest in such businesses when they are trading at a discount to their intrinsic worth. Davis Advisors emphasizes individual stock selection and believes that the ability to evaluate management is critical. Davis Advisors routinely visits management teams at their places of business in order to gain insight into the relative value of different businesses. Such research, however rigorous, involves predictions and forecasts that are inherently uncertain.

Over the years, Davis Advisors has developed a list of characteristics that it believes help companies to create shareholder value over the long term and manage risk. While few companies possess all of these characteristics at any given time, Davis Advisors searches for companies that demonstrate a majority or an appropriate mix of the following characteristics:

First-Class Management

 

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Proven track record

 

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Significant alignment of interests in business

 

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Intelligent application of capital

Strong Financial Condition and Satisfactory Profitability

 

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Strong balance sheet

 

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Low cost structure

 

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High returns on capital

Strong Competitive Positioning

 

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Non-obsolescent products / services

 

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Dominant or growing market share

 

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Global presence and brand names

After determining which companies it wishes to invest in, Davis Advisors then turns its analysis to determining the intrinsic value of those companies’ common stocks. Davis Advisors seeks common stocks that can be purchased at attractive valuations relative to their intrinsic value. Davis Advisors’ goal is to invest in companies for the long term. Davis Advisors considers selling a company if it believes the stock’s market price exceeds Davis Advisors’ estimates of intrinsic value, or if the ratio of the risks and rewards of continuing to invest in the company is no longer attractive.

 

 

Patrick J. English, CFA

Andy P. Ramer, CFA

Fiduciary Management, Inc.

100 E. Wisconsin Avenue

Milwaukee, WI 53202

Patrick J. English and Andy P. Ramer are co-portfolio managers for the segment of the Equity Fund’s assets managed by Fiduciary Management, Inc. (“Fiduciary” or “FMI”). English joined Fiduciary in 1986. He is the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer and a partner of Fiduciary and is a member of the Portfolio Management Committee. English, along with Ramer, serves as the co-head of equity research, and they work with Fiduciary’s analysts in vetting new research ideas. Prior to joining Fiduciary, English was a research analyst with Dodge & Cox from 1985 to 1986. Ramer joined Fiduciary in 2002. He is the Director of Research and a partner of Fiduciary and is a member of Fiduciary’s Portfolio Management Committee. Ramer is also an analyst and covers a number of portfolio companies across a variety of industries. Prior to joining Fiduciary, Ramer was a research analyst with Bufka & Rodgers, LLC from 1998 to 2002. Fiduciary has been a sub-advisor to the Equity Fund since 2013.

Approximately 15% of the Equity Fund’s assets are managed by Fiduciary. Fiduciary seeks to buy companies that have durable franchises ( i.e . , franchises that can survive difficult times) and whose common stock is trading below FMI’s estimated intrinsic value of the company. FMI’s investment process has always focused on evaluating three attributes of a company: the quality of the business model, the valuation, and the quality of management.

Assessing the quality of a business is a primary research focus. Fiduciary defines a good business model as one that has a defensible niche and that can survive the ups and downs of a business cycle. In a defensible niche, FMI looks for companies with a high degree of recurring revenue, a well-established customer base, and/or sustainable competitive advantage. Typically, businesses that meet these characteristics are well-established with modest growth profiles. The FMI investment team will review historical SEC filings and shareholder reports to understand a company’s business model, and, where necessary, adjust a company’s investment capital base for illegitimate write-offs (due to bad acquisitions, for example) to get a reliable picture of a company’s historical return on invested capital (“ROIC”). Then the team will conduct a deeper analysis of the drivers of a company’s ROIC such as revenue

 

growth, margins, capital expenditure etc., going back at least 20 quarters. In addition, they will meet with and/or have conference calls with management of the company, as well as its suppliers, competitors, and customers.

FMI’s work on a company’s business model and quality helps identify which valuation metrics (such as Price/Earnings (“P/E”), Enterprise Value (EV) to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA), Price/Sales (P/S), etc.) should be utilized for estimating a company’s intrinsic value. This work is also valuable in assessing whether or not the business model has changed significantly over time, making historical comparisons irrelevant. If that is the case, FMI will analyze the trading of a stock based on various valuation metrics over a 10- to 20-year time period, relative to the broad market and its peers, across different economic cycles, and with different underlying company fundamentals such as margins, top-line growth, competitive positioning, capital intensity of the business, etc.

This historical valuation analysis may be supplemented by other valuation techniques, such as sum-of-the-parts analysis ( i.e . , valuing different pieces of a business separately) and valuation based on private- and public-market transaction data (for example, valuation multiples used in an acquisition), which may assume greater importance when historical comparisons are less relevant, such as where business models have changed or management strategy has shifted. FMI is not looking for a specific discount to its estimate of intrinsic value, but if its valuation analysis suggests that a stock is undervalued, in absolute terms and/or in relation to its future profitability (ROIC in this case), and downside risks are limited, then the stock is a strong candidate for purchase. In general, FMI does not aim to be precise (just approximately correct) with its valuation analysis and will come up with price-target ranges over three to five years. These price targets are generally within a narrow range, and they guide FMI on when to trim or sell a stock.

FMI also focuses on areas that company management can control. Therefore, FMI will look at the backgrounds of management teams. This may involve: assessing their experience and track record; reviewing proxy statements to assess whether management compensation and incentives are in line with shareholder interests; evaluating past management decisions to assess whether or not those decisions enhanced shareholder value; and discussing with management their strategy and execution plan to assess the likelihood of meeting their stated goals and objectives.

 

 

Clyde S. McGregor, CFA

Harris Associates L.P.

111 S. Wacker Drive

Suite 4600

Chicago, IL 60606

Clyde S. McGregor is the portfolio manager for one of the segments of the Equity Fund’s assets managed by Harris Associates L.P. (“Harris”). McGregor is a Vice President and portfolio manager at Harris and currently manages the Oakmark

Equity and Income Fund and the Oakmark Global Fund. He earned a B.A. degree from Oberlin College and an M.B.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. McGregor joined Harris in 1981 as an analyst with broad industry coverage across the market capitalization spectrum. He has been in the investment business since 1983. McGregor became a portfolio manager at Harris in 1986. Harris has been a sub-advisor to the Equity Fund since 2008.

Approximately 15% of the Equity Fund’s assets are managed by McGregor. McGregor employs Harris’ value investment philosophy and process. This investment philosophy is based upon the belief that, over time, a company’s stock price converges with Harris’ estimate of its intrinsic or true business value. By “true business value,” Harris means an estimate of the price a knowledgeable buyer would pay to acquire the entire business. In making its investment decisions, Harris uses a “bottom-up” approach focused on individual companies, rather than focusing on specific economic factors or specific industries.

The chief consideration in the selection of stocks is the size of the discount of a company’s stock price compared to the company’s perceived true business value. In addition, Harris looks for companies with the following characteristics, although not all companies will have all of these attributes: free cash flows and intelligent investment of excess cash, earnings that are growing and are reasonably predictable, and a high level of management ownership in the company. Once Harris determines that a stock is selling at a significant discount and that the company has some of the aforementioned attributes, Harris generally will consider buying that stock for a strategy. Harris usually sells a stock when the price approaches its estimated worth. This means Harris has “buy” and “sell” targets for each stock held in its clients’ discretionary accounts. Harris also monitors each holding and adjusts those price targets as warranted to reflect changes in a company’s fundamentals. Harris attempts to manage some of the risks of investing in stocks of companies by purchasing stocks whose prices it considers low relative to Harris’ estimate of the companies’ intrinsic value. In addition, Harris seeks companies with solid finances and proven records and continuously monitors each portfolio holding.

 

 

William C. Nygren, CFA

Harris Associates L.P.

111 S. Wacker Drive

Suite 4600

Chicago, IL 60606

William C. Nygren is the portfolio manager for one of the segments of the Equity Fund’s assets managed by Harris. Nygren is a Vice President, portfolio manager and analyst at Harris and has managed the Oakmark Select Fund since its inception in 1996, the Oakmark Fund since April 2000 and the Oakmark Global Select Fund since its inception in 2006. He earned a B.S. degree in Accounting from the University of Minnesota and an M.S. degree in Finance from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has been in the investment business

 

since 1981. Nygren joined Harris in 1983 as an Investment Analyst and later served as Harris’ Director of Research from 1990 through 1998. Harris has been a sub-advisor to the Equity Fund since 2008.

Approximately 15% of the Equity Fund’s assets are managed by Nygren. Nygren employs Harris’ value investment philosophy and process. This investment philosophy is based upon the belief that, over time, a company’s stock price converges with Harris’ estimate of its intrinsic or true business value. By “true business value,” Harris means an estimate of the price a knowledgeable buyer would pay to acquire the entire business. In making its investment decisions, Harris uses a “bottom-up” approach focused on individual companies, rather than focusing on specific economic factors or specific industries.

The chief consideration in the selection of stocks is the size of the discount of a company’s stock price compared to the company’s perceived true business value. In addition, Harris looks for companies with the following characteristics, although not all companies will have all of these attributes: free cash flows and intelligent investment of excess cash, earnings that are growing and are reasonably predictable, and a high level of management ownership in the company. Once Harris determines that a stock is selling at a significant discount and that the company has some of the aforementioned attributes, Harris generally will consider buying that stock for a strategy. Harris usually sells a stock when the price approaches its estimated worth. This means Harris has “buy” and “sell” targets for each stock held in its clients’ discretionary accounts. Harris also monitors each holding and adjusts those price targets as warranted to reflect changes in a company’s fundamentals. Harris attempts to manage some of the risks of investing in stocks of companies by purchasing stocks whose prices it considers low relative to Harris’ estimate of the companies’ intrinsic values. In addition, Harris seeks companies with solid finances and proven records and continuously monitors each portfolio holding.

 

 

Scott Moore, CFA

Nuance Investments, LLC

4900 Main Street, Suite 220

Kansas City, MO 64112

Scott Moore is the lead portfolio manager for the segment of the Equity Fund’s assets managed by Nuance Investments, LLC (“Nuance”). Moore is the President and Chief Investment officer of Nuance. He is also the Lead Portfolio Manager for all products within Nuance. Moore has more than 20 years of value investment experience.

For the decade before co-founding Nuance, Moore managed more than $10 billion in institutional, intermediary and mutual fund assets for American Century Investments (“ACI”). Prior to becoming a Portfolio Manager at ACI, he spent three years as an Investment Analyst at ACI, specializing in the telecommunications, utility and industrial sectors. He also worked as an Investment Analyst at Boatmen’s Trust Company in St. Louis, Missouri, and at ACI as a Fixed Income Investment Analyst.

Moore holds a BS degree in finance from Southern Illinois University, and an MBA with an emphasis in finance from the University of Missouri.

Approximately 10% of the Equity Fund’s assets are managed by Nuance. Nuance’s investment philosophy was formed on the belief that the ability to outperform the broad stock market is predicated on a consistent and disciplined value investing approach. The Nuance investment team’s sole focus is generating investment returns for clients by diligently reviewing one company at a time on its own investment merits. Through long-term study of each company and thorough analysis of financial statements, management strategy and competitive position, the Nuance investment team becomes familiar with each company bought and sold in the portfolios over time. This familiarity allows for consistent and prompt execution with the sole focus being the generation of excess returns over the long-term. Further, Nuance is intensely focused on ensuring that it manages the appropriate amount of assets to allow future performance the opportunity to mirror that of the historical performance.

The Nuance investment team employs a consistent investment process when narrowing its selections for investment. The team initially goes through a quantitative screening process designed to identify potential leading business franchises by grouping all domestic and developed country companies into 68 sub-industries and reviewing returns on capital, balance sheet strength and capital spending habits. Leading business franchises with distinct traits are identified through this process, which allows the Nuance investment team to narrow the universe to those companies that statistically appear to fit Nuance’s criteria. Nuance is ultimately looking for best-in-class businesses with high and sustainable returns on capital, above-average financial strength and reasonable capital spending habits.

A major focus of Nuance’s fundamental analysis is on identifying competitive shifts, or transitions, within an industry that create significant threats to leading businesses. Nuance accepts subtle, transitory market-share shifts that occur between the number one and number two industry players, but Nuance does not invest in companies or industries that are undergoing secular competitive transitions, because Nuance is unwilling to accept the level of uncertainty that results from such transitions. The Nuance investment team is intentional about keeping an eye out for threats to its universe of leading businesses, including technology advancements that can lead to product obsolescence or to secular shifts in how business is conducted. Threats can also include secular shifts in the consumer mindset. Nuance’s focus on competitive position typically leads to minimal, if any, exposure to industries if Nuance does not believe companies in such industries can achieve long-term competitive advantages.

With respect to valuation, Nuance believes good companies are periodically undervalued in the marketplace for transitory reasons. These opportunities are created by investors’ short-term focus on a period of under-earning that is not unusual in the context of the industry’s typical cycles or the specific

 

company’s approach to the competitive landscape. Because these companies are out of favor, the periods of meaningful undervaluation often do not last much longer than a few years, providing Nuance with the opportunity to capitalize on the discount relatively quickly. The goal of this valuation work is to establish estimates of a company’s fair value and trough value, resulting in fair value and downside price targets used for portfolio construction. At the heart of Nuance’s valuation work is a focus on the normalized earnings power of a business based on the company’s current level of tangible assets.

Nuance believes it is important to know who is running the business. The focus is on whether management is going to stick with the core business and how it plans to execute over the long term. These broader strategy-type discussions with management teams include capital-allocation plans, research and development budgets, thoughts on normal earnings and peaks and troughs (usually discussed in the context of margins) to help evaluate the sustainability of leading businesses. Nuance believes that management going outside of its core business speaks volumes about its sustainability and triggers a review of the business and an evaluation of whether the company continues to qualify as an investment candidate. The focus is on the dynamics of the business/industry, and the certainty around the competitive position of that business.

Nuance sells investments when the stock has surpassed the team’s estimate of intrinsic value, when a more attractive investment opportunity becomes available, when the team identifies a legitimate threat to the sustainability of a leading business, or when the team believes they made a misjudgment in their original analysis.

 

 

Frank M. Sands, CFA

A. Michael Sramek, CFA

Sands Capital Management, LLC

1101 Wilson Boulevard

Suite 2300

Arlington, VA 22209

Frank M. Sands is the lead portfolio manager, and A. Michael Sramek is the portfolio manager, for the segment of the Equity Fund’s assets managed by Sands Capital Management, LLC (“Sands Capital”). Sands is the Chief Investment Officer and Chief Executive Officer at Sands Capital. Prior to joining Sands Capital, he was a portfolio manager and research analyst for Fayez, Sarofim and Company. Sramek is a Senior Research Analyst, Senior Portfolio Manager and Managing Director at Sands Capital. He began his investment career as a research analyst at Mastrapasqua & Associates in 2000 prior to joining Sands Capital in 2001. Sands and Sramek are supported by a larger team of research analysts and associates. Sands Capital is independent and 100% staff owned. Sands Capital has been a sub-advisor to the Equity Fund since 2008.

Approximately 17% of the Equity Fund’s assets are managed by Sands Capital. The Sands Capital team believes that over time stock price appreciation follows earnings growth. The investment objective is to identify companies that can sustain

above-average earnings growth relative to the broader market, typically over the next three to five years. The team believes great investment ideas are rare and runs a concentrated portfolio of high-quality, seasoned, growing businesses across an array of attractive and growing business spaces. Independent research – bottom-up and company focused – is the cornerstone of the team’s investment process. All research analyses and conclusions are internally generated using a variety of fundamental techniques and external data sources.

The team seeks to identify leading growth businesses that can withstand the continual scrutiny of following six investment criteria:

 

(1)	Sustainable above-average earnings growth.

 

(2)	Leadership position in a promising business space.

 

(3)	Significant competitive advantage/unique business franchise.

 

(4)	Clear mission and value-added focus.

 

(5)	Financial strength.

 

(6)	Rational valuation relative to market and business prospects.

In collaboration with the whole Sands Capital investment team, Sands and Sramek seek to identify and own the companies that appear to be the strongest fits with the above criteria by doing the following: monitoring status/activity in other portfolios ( e.g. , absolute weights and weight trends); meeting regularly with the various Sands Capital portfolio manager teams, sector teams, and individual analysts/ associates; reading internal and external research and participating in research activities (management meetings, field trips, etc.); holding regular team meetings and soliciting/encouraging recommendations from all Sands Capital team members.

The strongest fits are determined by de-composing each of the six criteria into its sub-components and then evaluating the universe of Sands Capital holdings versus those characteristics. For instance, “leadership in an attractive business space” can be broken into characteristics such as: large/growing market share; innovation; pricing power; strategic position in value chain; and attractive business model (high margins, high/rising ROIC, etc.). Companies are evaluated against these characteristics in a consensus-building process between the portfolio manager team and the rest of the investment team. The companies whose investment cases exhibit in great depth the qualities that Sands Capital values are regarded as the strongest fits and thus included in the Equity Fund.

 

 

Richard T. Weiss, CFA

Wells Capital Management, Inc.

100 Heritage Reserve

Menomonee Falls, WI 53051

Richard T. Weiss is the portfolio manager for the segment of the Equity Fund’s assets managed by Wells Capital Management, Inc. (“WellsCap”). Weiss has been in the investment business

 

for over 30 years and is currently Senior Portfolio Advisor for WellsCap. Previously, he had been the manager or co-manager of the Wells Fargo Advantage Common Stock Fund and the Wells Fargo Advantage Opportunity Fund (previously known as the Strong Common Stock Fund and Strong Opportunity Fund) from March 1991 until March 2008. Prior to this, Weiss was a partner/portfolio manager at Stein Roe & Farnham in Chicago where he began his career, starting as a research analyst, in 1975. Weiss continues an informal relationship with the Wells Capital Management Core Equity team, which manages the Wells Fargo Advantage Common Stock Fund and Wells Fargo Advantage Opportunity Fund. WellsCap has been a sub-advisor to the Equity Fund since the Equity Fund’s inception in 1996.

Approximately 13% of the Equity Fund’s assets are managed by Weiss. He invests in stocks of small- and mid-sized companies that are undervalued either because they are not broadly recognized, are in transition, or are out of favor based on short-term factors. Weiss also has the flexibility to invest in the stocks of larger companies if in his opinion they offer the potential for better returns. In seeking attractively valued companies, Weiss focuses on companies with above-average growth potential that also exhibit some or all of the following:

 

•

Low institutional investor ownership and low analyst coverage

 

•

High-quality management

 

•

Sustainable competitive advantage

Weiss evaluates the degree of under-valuation relative to his estimate of each company’s private market value. This private market value approach is based on an assessment of what a private buyer would be willing to pay for the future cash flow stream of the target company. Based on his experience, Weiss believes that, except for technology and other high-growth stocks, most stocks trade at between 50% and 80% of the private market value. When trading at the low end of this range, companies take steps to prevent takeover, or they are taken over. The private market value estimate is applied flexibly, based on the outlook for the industry and the company’s fundamentals.

The SAI provides additional information about each sub-advisor’s method of compensation for its portfolio managers, other accounts managed by the portfolio managers, and the portfolio managers’ ownership of securities in the Funds.

 

The International Fund’s five sub-advisors pursue the International Fund’s objective primarily through investments in common stocks of issuers located outside of the United States. Under normal market conditions, the International Fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets, plus the amount of any borrowings for investment purposes, in the securities of companies organized or located outside of the United States, including large-, mid-, and small-cap companies and companies located in emerging markets. This investment policy may be changed by the Board without shareholder approval, but shareholders would be given at least 60 days’ notice if any change occurs. Each manager may invest in securities traded in both developed and emerging markets. Though there is no limit on emerging market exposure, it is not expected to be a primary focus, and the majority of the International Fund’s assets is expected to be invested in stocks of companies listed and domiciled in foreign developed countries. There are no limits on the International Fund’s geographic asset distribution but, to provide adequate diversification, the International Fund ordinarily invests in the securities markets of at least five countries outside of the United States. In most periods it is expected that the International Fund will hold securities in more than five countries. Although the International Fund intends to invest substantially all of its assets in issuers located outside of the United States, it may invest in U.S. issues on a limited basis, and at times of abnormal market conditions it may invest all of its assets in fewer than five countries.

The International Fund’s managers emphasize different stock-picking styles and invest in stocks spanning a range of market capitalization. Litman Gregory believes that during any given year certain stock-picking styles will generate higher returns than comparable market indexes, while others will lag. By including a variety of stock-picking styles in this single mutual fund, Litman Gregory believes that the variability and volatility of returns can be lessened. Although each manager has the flexibility to invest on a worldwide basis in non-U.S. companies with market capitalization of any size, it is expected that the International Fund will have significant exposure to large- and mid-sized foreign companies under normal market conditions.

Litman Gregory’s strategy is to allocate the portfolio’s assets among the managers who, based on Litman Gregory’s research, are judged to be among the best relative to their respective peer groups. There is no minimum or maximum allocation of the Fund’s portfolio assets to each sub-advisor. With respect to managers for the International Fund, Litman Gregory has focused exclusively on stock pickers who emphasize bottom-up stock-picking rather than macro-driven, top-down country picking.

Litman Gregory believes that bottom-up stock pickers have an advantage in foreign markets because:

 

•

It is Litman Gregory’s opinion that the dynamics that influence individual countries’ markets, including currencies, inflation, economic growth, political factors, regulation and the like, are much more difficult to assess than the prospects and valuation characteristics of individual companies.

 

•

Litman Gregory believes that some individual stocks in foreign markets are less closely analyzed (the markets are less “efficient”) than those in the United States. Litman Gregory believes that this will result in greater opportunities for skilled stock pickers to add value through pure stock selection.

 

•

Based on Litman Gregory’s observations, bottom-up stock pickers in foreign markets, on average, seem to perform better than top-down-oriented managers.

Though bottom-up stock picking is emphasized, each manager also monitors specific macro-factors that it believes are relevant in specific countries.

The sub-advisors manage their individual portfolio segments by building a focused portfolio representing their highest-confidence stocks. Under normal conditions, each manager’s portfolio segment typically includes a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 15 securities. A manager may occasionally hold more than 15 securities. Though the total number of securities the International Fund may hold at any point in time will vary, it is generally expected that the International Fund will hold between 40 and 75 securities.

 

The following table provides a description of the International Fund’s five sub-advisors and their target levels of assets. Asset levels will fluctuate and it is at the discretion of Litman Gregory to re-balance the asset allocations. A detailed discussion of the management structure of the International Fund follows the table.

 

Litman Gregory Masters International Fund Portfolio Managers

 

David G. Herro, CFA

Harris Associates L.P.

111 S. Wacker Drive

Suite 4600

Chicago, IL 60606

David G. Herro is the portfolio manager for the segment of the International Fund’s assets managed by Harris. Herro is Deputy Chairman, Chief Investment Officer International Equity and a portfolio manager at Harris. He has managed the Oakmark International Fund, the Oakmark International Small Cap Fund and the Oakmark Global Select Fund since their inception in 1992, 1995 and 2006, respectively. Herro earned a B.S. degree in Accounting from the University of Wisconsin-Platteville and an M.A. degree from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He has been in the investment business since 1986. Harris has been a sub-advisor to the International Fund since the International Fund’s inception in 1997.

Approximately 20% of the International Fund’s assets are managed by Herro. Herro employs Harris’ value investment philosophy and process to manage his portion of the International Fund’s assets. This investment philosophy is based upon the belief that, over time, a company’s stock price converges with Harris’ estimate of its intrinsic or true business value. By “true business value,” Harris means an estimate of the price a knowledgeable buyer would pay to acquire the entire business. In making its investment decisions, Harris uses a “bottom-up” approach focused on individual companies, rather than focusing on specific economic factors or specific industries.

The chief consideration in the selection of stocks is the size of the discount of a company’s stock price compared to the company’s perceived true business value. In addition, Harris looks for companies with the following characteristics, although not all companies will have all of these attributes: free cash flows and intelligent investment of excess cash, earnings that are growing and are reasonably predictable, and a high level of management ownership in the company. Once Harris determines that a stock is selling at a significant discount and that the company has some of the aforementioned attributes, Harris generally will consider buying that stock for a strategy. Harris usually sells a stock when the price approaches its estimated worth. This means Harris has “buy” and “sell” targets for each stock held in its clients’ discretionary accounts. Harris also monitors each holding and adjusts those price targets as warranted to reflect changes in a company’s fundamentals. Harris attempts to manage some of the risks of investing in stocks of companies by purchasing stocks whose prices it considers low relative to Harris’ estimate of the companies’ intrinsic values. In addition, Harris seeks companies with solid finances and proven records and continuously monitors each portfolio holding. Harris attempts to manage some of the risks of investing in foreign securities by considering the relative political and economic stability of a company’s home country, the company’s ownership structure, and the company’s accounting practices.

 

 

Mark Little

Lazard Asset Management LLC

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, NY 10112

 

Mark Little is the lead portfolio manager for the segment of the International Fund’s assets managed by Lazard Asset Management LLC (“Lazard”). Little is a managing director, portfolio manager/analyst on the International Strategic Equity portfolio-management team at Lazard. He has been a portfolio manager of the Lazard International Strategic Equity Portfolio since that fund’s inception in October 2005. He began working in the investment field in 1992. Prior to joining Lazard in 1997, he was a manager in the corporate finance practice of Coopers & Lybrand and earned his Associated Chartered Accountant (ACA) qualification with Rees Pollock Chartered Accountants. Little has an MA in Economics from Clare College, Cambridge University. Lazard has been a sub-advisor to the International Fund since 2013.

Approximately 20% of the International Fund’s assets are managed by Little. Little and the portfolio management team at Lazard believe that a company with the ability to improve and/or sustain its profitability at a relatively high level can compound returns at an attractive rate. At the same time, they believe in buying such companies that are trading at discounts relative to their profitability prospects.

Generally, Lazard categorizes any purchased stock into one or more of the following three categories:

 

•

Compounders: These are companies that Little and the team think can sustain relatively high levels of profitability and companies whose management may enhance shareholder returns through share buybacks and dividend payments. Lazard will purchase these companies if Little and the team believe they can compound total return ( i.e. , earnings growth, dividends, and share buybacks) at a relatively high rate over the long term and are reasonably priced in relation to their profitability prospects.

 

•

Mispriced Situations: These are companies that are trading inexpensively relative to what Little and the team think their assets and cash flows should be worth longer term. They may or may not be compounders.

 

•

Restructuring: These are companies whose profitability is depressed relative to their history and companies who are taking steps – such as cutting costs, investing in an underinvested area, selling non-core businesses, etc. – to return to higher profitability. They may or may not become compounders.

Lazard’s analysts are largely responsible for generating ideas. They do so by running valuation screens in their sectors and monitoring developments at companies that fall under their coverage. They do most of the fundamental analysis, though Little and the other portfolio managers at Lazard are also involved. Little and the portfolio management team review and debate the assumptions analysts use in their financial modeling, meet with company management, and lead analysis on some small-cap companies. The goal of the team’s fundamental company analysis is to identify Lazard’s research edge and estimate how much return can be generated from this edge. Lazard’s research edge is generally a function of its analysts having a differentiated view than the market on the profitability a company can generate, the duration of its profitability, and/or what the company should be worth.

Little and the team use several valuation metrics to gauge a company’s worth and set price targets. A company has to be priced in a way that Lazard believes is reasonably valued for the profitability it can generate. This assessment is based upon free-cash-flow yield, valuation relative to peers or relative to businesses with similar profitability and growth characteristics, discounted-cash-flow modeling, and sum of the parts (valuing different segments of a company separately). There is a fair amount of judgment involved in balancing these different approaches to assess a company’s worth and set price targets.

 

 

Howard Appleby, CFA

Jean-Francois Ducrest

James LaTorre, CFA

Northern Cross, LLC

125 Summer Street, Suite 1470

Boston, MA 02110

Howard Appleby, Jean-Francois Ducrest and James LaTorre are the co-portfolio managers for the segment of the International Fund’s assets managed by Northern Cross, LLC (“Northern Cross”). Appleby, Ducrest and LaTorre are the co-founders and principal owners of Northern Cross. Appleby, a British citizen, has been engaged in the investment business since 1982. Having started as an equity analyst for W. Greenwell & Co. covering basic materials and energy, Appleby moved to the U.S. in 1986 to pursue a 16-year sell-side career serving U.S. portfolio managers investing in non-U.S. equities in various research, sales and management roles. This culminated in a senior equity sales/management position with ABN AMRO from 1994 to 2002. In 2003, he became a founding partner and portfolio manager of Northern Cross. Ducrest, a French citizen, has been engaged in the international equity business since 1988. He started his career on the sell-side as an equity analyst at Paris-based European broker Cheuvreux, covering multiple sectors including industrials, consumers and utilities. Between 1995 and 2001, he was a Senior Vice President and Principal of Cheuvreux’ New York-based U.S. operation serving U.S. institutions investing in European equities. Ducrest joined the investment group of Northern Cross as an analyst in 2002, and in 2003, he became a founding partner and portfolio manager of Northern Cross. LaTorre began his career in the investment industry in 1982 with Merrill Lynch in New York. In 1989, he became Vice President of Investments with the Ivy Fund group where he managed the Ivy Growth with Income Fund and co-managed the Ivy Growth Fund. In 1992, LaTorre began working with Hakan Castegren who was managing the Ivy International Fund and the Harbor International Fund. He became Director of Research for Castegren in 1993. From 1996 to 2002, LaTorre also managed the Harbor International Fund II. In 2003, he became a founding partner and portfolio manager of Northern Cross. Northern Cross has been a sub-advisor to the International Fund since 2007.

 

Approximately 20% of the International Fund’s assets are managed by Northern Cross. The Northern Cross team’s investment philosophy and process are characterized by:

 

•

An in-depth understanding of a company and its industry, which leads to a long investment time horizon (3-5+ years) and results in low portfolio turnover

 

•

Analysis of the attractiveness of countries and industries from a top-down perspective, though stocks are selected on a bottom-up basis

 

•

Stock selection, not top-down views, which determines industry and country weightings

 

•

Low portfolio turnover, which minimizes transaction and market-impact costs

 

•

An emphasis on quality “blue chip” companies with long-term catalysts that will lead to expanding profit margins

 

•

A willingness to think independently and deviate significantly from benchmark industry and country weightings

 

•

Concentration in its best ideas with the most attractive risk/reward potential

The investment process encompasses a top-down, thematic approach coupled with intensive, fundamental, bottom-up industry and company analysis. It is not uncommon for an idea to be monitored for years before a position is taken. Research is focused on identifying secular trends (rather than shorter-term cycles) that will drive margin expansion. Patient due diligence of companies, countries and regions are critical to the investment process. Northern Cross believes this due diligence, in combination with a top-down investment theme, provides the best opportunity to invest in truly undervalued companies. Before qualifying a country for investment, Northern Cross analyzes the stability of its currency, political, social, and economic environment and its legal infrastructure. Consequently, the team focuses on companies located in Europe, the Pacific Basin and emerging industrialized countries whose economic and political regimes appear stable and are believed to provide adequate protection to foreign shareholders.

Among the long-term drivers of stock price appreciation the team looks for are the following:

 

•

Margin expansion

 

•

Pricing power driven by industry consolidation

 

•

Franchise value

 

•

Restructuring

 

•

Asset plays

On-site company meetings play an important role in the portfolio construction process, with each company held in the portfolio typically visited at least twice per year. Contact with company management and other key people serve to help the team gain insight and understanding of the business’s operations and judge the strength of company management. The team utilizes a worldwide network of brokers/traders and local contacts for additional insight and trade execution.

Rigid buy/sell price targets are avoided, and the relative attractiveness of a stock or group of similar stocks is continuously evaluated. No single set of metrics is used to value all companies. Typically, the team looks for companies with

strong and sustainable market positions that are selling at low P/E multiples relative to other stocks in the same country and industry. In addition to assessing a company’s relative P/E ratio, other valuation metrics considered include the potential for long-term margin expansion compared to the enterprise value/sales multiple, the long-term sustainable free cash flow yield, and the absolute P/E ratio looking many years out.

Positions are commonly sold when:

 

•

A new idea presents better risk/reward characteristics

 

•

The stock’s price reaches the underlying business value

 

•

There is an adverse change in the economic, political or regulatory environment

 

•

Management fails to execute their business plan

 

•

There is an overwhelming change in the company’s policy of shareholder rights

The team does not plan to hedge currencies. However, in a market where the local currency is expected to be weak, investments are often made in companies with assets or earning streams denominated in U.S. dollars.

 

 

William V. Fries, CFA

W. Vinson Walden, CFA

Thornburg Investment Management, Inc.

2300 North Ridgetop Road

Santa Fe, NM 87506

William V. Fries and W. Vinson Walden are the co-portfolio managers for the segment of the International Fund’s assets managed by Thornburg Investment Management, Inc. (“Thornburg”). Fries joined Thornburg in 1995 as a managing director and founding portfolio manager of the Thornburg Value Fund and US Equity Strategy. He also founded the Thornburg International Value Fund and International Equity Strategy three years later in 1998. Fries began his career as a securities analyst and bank investment officer. His more than 40 years of investment management experience includes an extended tenure as vice president of equities at USAA Investment Management Company. Walden joined Thornburg in 2002 and is portfolio manager and a managing director at Thornburg. He is portfolio manager of Thornburg’s Global Opportunities and Global Equity Income Strategies. Prior to joining Thornburg, Walden served as an associate for Lehman Brothers in New York City. Thornburg has been a sub-advisor to the International Fund since 2003.

Approximately 20% of the International Fund’s assets are managed by Thornburg. Fries and Walden believe that a bottom-up approach to investing in undervalued securities will generate above-average returns with below market risk. The team’s idea of value centers on their assessment of the intrinsic worth of an investment. The goal is to uncover promising companies with sound business fundamentals at a time when their intrinsic value is not fully recognized by the marketplace.

The Fries/Walden team’s initial search for investment ideas involves the use of quantitative screens as well as other sources. Starting with the international equity universe, the team screens Thornburg’s databases for companies that appear attractive across a number of value parameters. The team looks

 

for securities that have low price-to earnings, low price-to-cash flow and low price-to-book ratios. Companies ranging from small-cap to large-cap are considered. Additionally, screens are employed in order to identify stocks where business prospects may be improving. The typical screen generates a list exceeding 50 stocks from which only a few may be selected for further research.

The team will not purchase a security simply because it is priced cheaply relative to the market. The team spends the majority of its time on bottom-up research in its efforts to understand the fundamental merit of each stock that has been identified as promising. These efforts include financial statement analysis, discussions with senior management of the companies, as well as consideration of the company’s competitors, suppliers and clientele. The team seeks to uncover companies with promising prospects that are not yet reflected in the price of the stock. Many of the investments made may be contrary to the popular consensus at the time of purchase. Ultimately, the team attempts to estimate the business value of each company. In addition to estimating the business value for each stock, the analysis also seeks to identify where potential weaknesses may lie in an attempt to minimize downside risk. Each of the researched stocks is classified into a category of value:

 

•

Basic Value – Stocks of financially sound companies with established businesses that are selling at low valuations relative to the company’s net assets or potential earning power

 

•

Consistent Earners – Companies with steady earnings and dividend growth that are selling at attractive values and are priced below historical norms

 

•

Emerging Franchises – Companies in the process of establishing a leading position in a product, service or market that is expected to grow at an above-average rate

The dynamics of the companies in those categories differ and, therefore, merit specific consideration within the context of that category. For example, Basic Value companies are generally more cyclically oriented than Emerging Franchises and require analysis of the companies’ product cycles and the historical and prospective impact of the economy on their business. Within the context of each value category, the team evaluates the most attractive prospects. Generally, the segment of the International Fund’s portfolio allocated to the team is expected to include stocks from each category. Because of the diversification across these categories, the segment of the International Fund’s portfolio managed by the team will typically be eclectic and cannot be easily labeled as “growth” or “value.”

 

 

Jean-Marc Berteaux

Wellington Management Company LLP

280 Congress Street

Boston, MA 02210

Jean-Marc Berteaux is the portfolio manager for the segment of the International Fund’s assets managed by Wellington Management Company LLP (“Wellington Management”). Berteaux is a Senior Managing Director and Equity Portfolio

Manager at Wellington Management. Berteaux has been an investment professional at Wellington Management since 2001. Berteaux received his MBA from INSEAD in 1994, his MA in international relations from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris in 1989, and his BA from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in 1986. Wellington Management has been a sub-advisor to the International Fund since 2013.

Approximately 20% of the International Fund’s assets are managed by Berteaux. Berteaux invests in non-U.S. companies across the capital spectrum where his longer-term earnings growth expectations are significantly above consensus estimates. Berteaux’s investment philosophy is based on his belief that although the market can be overly focused on short-term earnings, inflections in margins are often the more powerful, quantifiable drivers of longer-term earnings growth. Also, companies can be misclassified or difficult to categorize into sectors or industries and may not be well followed or understood. Finally, the size and scope of a company’s growth prospects can be underappreciated when incorrect parallels are drawn among business models, industries, or regions.

Ideas for the portfolio are generated by Berteaux and his team who travel extensively and meet with hundreds of companies. Berteaux also draws ideas from Wellington Management’s broad team of experienced analysts and portfolio managers. This deep analytical resource helps Berteaux supplement his own primary research on companies and allows him to analyze multiple fundamental data points and views on companies and industries.

Once an idea is generated, Berteaux’s primary research focuses on identifying one or more material earnings drivers that may be incorrectly analyzed by others. To do that, he meets with company management, suppliers, customers, competitors, and industry experts to gain an understanding of the company’s business model, key earnings drivers, and competitive advantages. Berteaux and his team build detailed earnings models to assess whether or not their view on earnings is different from that of the consensus and if so by what magnitude. For some companies, typically the more cyclical ones, Berteaux may have a differentiated view on earnings one or two years out and for others over a much longer period. His highest-conviction names are typically those where he has the largest earnings variance relative to consensus expectations. When that earnings variance disappears, due to either fundamentals of the company changing/deteriorating or the market catching up to his earnings numbers, he will sell the company from his portfolio.

While valuation is not the primary consideration at the time of purchase or sale, valuations must be reasonable relative to growth expectations. In addition, Berteaux will look at how a stock is trading relative to its history and industry peers to ensure he is paying in his opinion a reasonable price.

The SAI provides additional information about each sub-advisor’s method of compensation for its portfolio managers, other accounts managed by the portfolio managers, and the portfolio managers’ ownership of securities in the Funds.

 

Litman Gregory’s strategy is to allocate the portfolio’s assets among the Smaller Companies Fund’s three sub-advisors who, based on Litman Gregory’s research, are judged to be among the best in their respective style groups. There is no minimum or maximum allocation of the Fund’s portfolio assets to each sub-advisor. The sub-advisors manage their individual portfolio segments by building a focused portfolio representing their highest-confidence stocks. Under normal market conditions, the Smaller Companies Fund invests at least 80% of the Smaller Companies Fund’s net assets, plus the amount of any borrowings for investment purposes, in securities of small- and mid-sized U.S. companies. This investment policy may be changed by the Board without shareholder approval, but shareholders would be given at least 60 days’ notice if any change occurs. Under normal conditions, each manager’s portfolio segment typically includes a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 15 securities. A manager may occasionally hold more than 15 securities. Though the total number of securities the Smaller Companies Fund may hold at any point in time will vary, it is generally expected that the Smaller Companies Fund will hold between 25 and 50 securities.

As used in this Prospectus, Litman Gregory defines a “Smaller Company” as one whose market capitalization falls within the range of market capitalizations of any company in the Russell 2500 ^® Index, as of the most recent reconstitution. Though the primary capitalization focus of the Smaller Companies Fund is in

the small-cap sector, Litman Gregory does not believe that small-cap investors should be forced to sell a stock that appreciates beyond the upper thresholds of the small-cap range if the stock picker continues to maintain a high level of conviction with respect to the holding. This has been a problem with many small-cap funds, as they have, at times, been forced to sell some of their most compelling holdings. Moreover, occasionally companies in the mid-cap range will be extraordinarily attractive to the Smaller Companies Fund’s portfolio managers. Overall, Litman Gregory expects the majority of the Smaller Companies Fund’s holdings at any point in time to meet the definition of a Smaller Company, but the Smaller Companies Fund has the flexibility to hold mid-sized companies if the managers believe that holding these companies will lead to higher overall returns. The managers have the flexibility to invest up to 50% (measured at the time of original investment) of their respective portfolios in mid-cap companies if these stocks qualify as their “highest conviction” holdings.

The following table provides a description of the Smaller Companies Fund’s three sub-advisors and their target levels of assets. Asset levels will fluctuate and it is at the discretion of Litman Gregory to re-balance the asset allocations. A detailed discussion of the management structure of the Smaller Companies Fund follows the table.

 

Litman Gregory Masters Smaller Companies Fund Portfolio Managers

 

Jeffrey Bronchick, CFA

Cove Street Capital, LLC

2101 East El Segundo, Suite 302

El Segundo, CA 90245

Jeffrey Bronchick is the portfolio manager for the segment of the Smaller Companies Fund’s assets managed by Cove Street Capital, LLC (“Cove Street”). Bronchick is the principal owner of Cove Street, which he founded in 2011, and the portfolio manager for the Cove Street Capital Small Cap Value Fund. Prior to founding Cove Street, Bronchick was a partner at Reed Conner and Birdwell (“RCB”), which he joined in 1989 as a research analyst. He was later promoted to Chief Investment Officer, portfolio manager and equity analyst, and co-portfolio manager for the CNI Charter RCB Small Cap Value Fund and managed RCB’s small-cap value investment strategy. Prior to

joining RCB, Bronchick did equity research and trading at Neuberger Berman, Bankers Trust and First Boston. RCB was a sub-advisor to the Smaller Companies Fund from June 2007 through June 2011, and Bronchick was the co-manager of that segment of the Smaller Companies Fund during RCB’s tenure. Cove Street has been a sub-advisor to the Smaller Companies Fund since 2011.

Approximately 33-1/3% of the Smaller Companies Fund’s assets are managed by Bronchick. The objective of Bronchick’s fundamental research is to identify the best combination of attractive businesses, valuation, and shareholder-oriented management. His small-cap universe consists of companies between $100 million and $3 billion.

Idea generation is driven by both quantitative and qualitative processes. As a value-based, bottom-up manager, Cove Street consistently screens markets for securities that appear statistically inexpensive and allows that pool of ideas to drive its

 

efforts and work rather than begin the day with a preconceived notion of securities it would like to buy. Cove Street also screens for “good businesses” as defined by classic characteristics like consistency of growth and profitability, high returns on invested capital and sustainable competitive advantages and makes the determination whether the valuation is cheap enough to provide a proper margin of safety. Lastly, Cove Street screens on corporate and executive behavior such as share repurchase and insider buying and selling. On a qualitative basis, ideas are produced from the team’s collective experience, Cove Street’s deep contact network, out of office experiences and obvious headline issues.

Once the team has determined that an idea has promise, they begin stage II, which consists of the data download of all relevant company financial information into the Cove Street analytical spreadsheet and the digestion of all public company information. They then ask the question: whether a company appears to be a great business at a reasonable price or an exceedingly cheap security that provides a deeper margin of safety to compensate for potential business issues.

Stage III is the team tackle and deep dive. The research team performs intensive analysis on valuation and business characteristics, with a couple of analysts focused on the stock as a “purchase” and one analyst focused on the stock as a “short-sale,” a version of the so-called Socratic method of reasoning. Key pivot points include:

 

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What is a reasonable estimate of intrinsic value? We incorporate a multivariate approach that utilizes a discounted cashflow analysis, private market values, and a historical calculation of enterprise value to normalized earnings, cashflow and revenue.

 

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Classic Porter value chain analysis of competitors, suppliers, potential entrants, customers and substitutes.

 

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Is there a competitive advantage that can generate sustainably strong returns on invested capital?

 

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Management: friend, neutral or foe?

 

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PEST Control: political, economic, social, technological issues.

 

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What is the team thinking that others are not?

 

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What will it cost Cove Street if things go very wrong?

Stage IV is portfolio consideration. Key considerations include whether there is sufficient risk adjusted upside – on an absolute basis and as compared to other stocks that Cove Street owns and how it fits with the portfolio’s industry concentration.

The final decision is made by Bronchick.

Less is more in regard to portfolio turnover, as experience has proven that the quality of decision-making decreases with frequency. That said, mistakes are inevitable and Cove Street’s concentrated research assists in identifying errors relatively early.

Cove Street’s sell discipline is also based upon a blend of qualitative and quantitative measures:

Business:

 

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Cove Street is incorrect in its expectations about long-term economic margins and earnings power

 

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Actual or likely prospects of balance sheet deterioration

 

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Perceived cyclical industry problems reveal themselves as secular

Value:

 

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A good business is excessively valued or a reasonable business is fairly valued

 

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A better idea is found that materially improves risk/reward

People:

 

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Unexpected/poor decisions are made allocating shareholder capital

 

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Lose confidence that management and the board are best representing shareholders and the cost and effort to influence this process are deemed prohibitive

 

 

Dennis Bryan

Arik Ahitov

First Pacific Advisors, LLC

11601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200

Los Angeles, CA 90025

Dennis Bryan and Arik Ahitov are the portfolio managers for the segment of the Smaller Companies Fund’s assets managed by First Pacific Advisors, LLC (“FPA”). Bryan joined FPA in 1993 and has been a partner in FPA since 2006. Ahitov joined FPA in 2010 and has been a Managing Director since 2013. He was a Vice President of FPA from 2010 to 2012. Bryan and Ahitov manage equity separate accounts and the FPA Capital Fund in FPA’s small-mid cap absolute value style. FPA has been a sub-advisor to the Smaller Companies Fund since the Smaller Companies Fund’s inception in 2003.

Approximately 33-1/3% of the Smaller Companies Fund’s assets are managed by Bryan and Ahitov. The general objective of Bryan’s and Ahitov’s stock research is to identify stocks from a variety of sources that are cheap relative to their peer group and are characterized by strong balance sheets, solid or improving fundamentals and strong competitive positions in their industry. In addition, they focus on companies that exhibit strong free cash flow, quality management and understandable business strategies. Bryan and Ahitov also emphasize above-average return-on-capital though they tend not to focus on rapidly growing companies that generate very high returns on assets because these companies rarely meet their valuation criteria.

Statistical screens that generate research ideas include “new low” lists and various value-oriented measures. In addition to quantitative screens, the team also looks at insider transactions, management changes and spin-offs. Big-picture trends or developments may also lead Bryan and Ahitov to look at certain stocks or industries.

Specific company research is intensive and involves finding as much information as possible from as many sources as

 

possible. The first step is an in-depth look at the financials to gain an understanding of the operating history, trends and the financial health of a company. Following that, research focuses on gaining an understanding of the company’s business model, management quality, growth potential, strengths and weaknesses and competitive position. Because there is a preference for out-of-favor companies there is a particular focus on assessing whether profits are down because of issues that are transitory or permanent. As part of the research process, there is usually contact with management (to assess the quality of the people), competitors, customers and others who are potential sources of information.

The overall assessment of fundamentals is not measured against a standard set of criteria; rather, each is relative to the specific type of business or industry. In general, Bryan and Ahitov are looking for situations where certainty is high; thus, a business that has strong long-term fundamentals but is temporarily out of favor is typical of a new buy. Since there is a preference for companies with strong free cash flow, it is also important to have confidence in management’s ability to add value through the deployment of excess cash.

Valuation is critical to the assessment of each stock-picking opportunity. Valuation assessments usually involve looking at a variety of valuation measures including price-to-earnings, price-to-cash flow, price-to-book value, price-to-sales and enterprise value and market capitalization to total revenue. The valuation measures that are applicable to any particular stock depend on company-specific facts and circumstances as well as broader valuation trends in the industry. In assessing valuations, Bryan and Ahitov are cognizant of factoring in where the company is in its earnings cycle, its normalized earnings, and how the cycle has played out in the past. In assessing multiples the team studies what multiple levels were in past cycles and considers whether this information is relevant to assessing the potential for future multiples. The valuation assessment then often becomes a function of the expected profitability recovery and multiple expansion from current levels.

Bryan and Ahitov usually sell stocks for one of four reasons: (1) the stock reaches full valuation; (2) there has been a full profit recovery; (3) a superior alternative value appears; or (4) the company does not perform as expected.

 

 

Richard T. Weiss, CFA

Wells Capital Management, Inc.

100 Heritage Reserve

Menomonee Falls, WI 53051

Richard T. Weiss is the portfolio manager for the segment of the Smaller Companies Fund’s assets managed by WellsCap. Weiss has been in the investment business for over 30 years and is currently Senior Portfolio Advisor for WellsCap. Previously, he had been the manager or co-manager of the Wells Fargo Advantage Common Stock Fund and the Wells Fargo Advantage Opportunity Fund (previously known as the Strong Common Stock Fund and Strong Opportunity Fund) from March 1991 until March 2008. Prior to this, Weiss was a

partner/portfolio manager at Stein Roe & Farnham in Chicago where he began his career, starting as a research analyst, in 1975. Weiss continues an informal relationship with the Wells Capital Management Core Equity team, which manages the Wells Fargo Advantage Common Stock Fund and Wells Fargo Advantage Opportunity Fund. WellsCap has been a sub-advisor to the Smaller Companies Fund since the Smaller Companies Fund’s inception in 2003.

Approximately 33-1/3% of the Smaller Companies Fund’s assets are managed by Weiss. He invests in stocks of small- and mid-sized companies that are undervalued either because they are not broadly recognized, are in transition, or are out of favor based on short-term factors. Weiss also has the flexibility to invest in the stocks of larger companies if in his opinion they offer the potential for better returns. In seeking attractively valued companies, Weiss focuses on companies with above-average growth potential that also exhibit some or all of the following:

 

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Low institutional investor ownership and low analyst coverage

 

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High-quality management

 

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Sustainable competitive advantage

Weiss evaluates the degree of under-valuation relative to his estimate of each company’s private market value. This private market value approach is based on an assessment of what a private buyer would be willing to pay for the future cash flow stream of the target company. Based on his experience, Weiss believes that, except for technology and other high-growth stocks, most stocks trade at between 50% and 80% of the private market value. When trading at the low end of this range, companies take steps to prevent takeover, or they are taken over. The private market value estimate is applied flexibly, based on the outlook for the industry and the company’s fundamentals.

The SAI provides additional information about each sub-advisor’s method of compensation for its portfolio managers, other accounts managed by the portfolio managers, and the portfolio managers’ ownership of securities in the Funds.

 

Litman Gregory’s strategy is to allocate the portfolio’s assets among the Alternative Strategies Fund’s five sub-advisors to provide investors a mix of strategies that Litman Gregory believes offer risk-return characteristics that are attractive individually and even more compelling collectively. Allocations among sub-advisors are based on a number of factors, including Litman Gregory’s expectation for the risk-adjusted return potential of each sub-advisor’s strategy and the impact on overall portfolio risk, with the objective of maximizing return subject to the goals of low volatility and relatively low correlation with broad financial markets, especially the stock market. Litman Gregory may at times adjust the allocations of capital to sub-advisors if it believes there is a highly compelling tactical opportunity in a particular sub-advisor’s strategy. Portfolio assets will be tactically allocated to the sub-advisors in accordance with the target allocation range for each sub-advisor specified in the table below, as measured at the time of allocation.

Sub-advisor strategies may seek to benefit from: opportunities to combine securities with differing risk characteristics; market inefficiencies; arbitrage opportunities; opportunities to provide liquidity; tactical opportunities in asset classes or securities; special situations such as spin offs; as well as other opportunities in areas such as real estate or managed futures. In the aggregate, the managers can invest globally in stocks of companies of any size, domicile or market capitalization, government and corporate bonds and other fixed income securities and currencies, including short positions of any of the foregoing, within their respective segments of the Alternative Strategies Fund. They may also invest in derivatives, including, without limitation, options, futures contracts, and swaps, to manage risk or enhance return and can also borrow amounts up to one third of the value of the Alternative Strategies Fund’s total

assets (except that the Alternative Strategies Fund may exceed this limit to satisfy redemption requests or for other temporary purposes). Each of the managers may invest in illiquid securities; however, the Alternative Strategies Fund as a whole may not hold more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid securities. In some cases, the sub-advisors may seek to replicate strategies they employ in their private (hedge) funds. In other cases, the sub-advisors may seek to enhance strategies they run in other public funds by focusing on their highest conviction ideas to a greater extent or by pursuing certain aspects of their strategies with greater flexibility. However, the Alternative Strategies Fund will only invest directly in portfolio securities selected by the sub-advisors and will not invest in any pooled investment vehicles or accounts managed by the sub-advisors.

Each sub-advisor will have an investment approach that generally focuses on a particular asset class or specific strategies. Currently, the strategies the sub-advisors focus on are as follows: (1) an arbitrage oriented strategy, (2) an opportunistic income strategy which will often focus on mortgage related securities, (3) a contrarian opportunity strategy that allows tactical investments throughout the capital structure (stocks and bonds), asset classes, market capitalization, industries and geographies, (4) a liquid long/short equity strategy, and (5) an absolute return fixed income strategy that focuses on the tactical allocation of long and short global fixed income opportunities and currencies.

The following table provides a description of the Alternative Strategies Fund’s five sub-advisors and their target levels of assets. Asset levels will fluctuate, and it is at the discretion of Litman Gregory to re-balance the asset allocations. A detailed discussion of the management structure of the Alternative Strategies Fund follows the table.

 

Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies Fund Portfolio Managers

 

Opportunistic Income Strategy

 

Jeffrey Gundlach

DoubleLine Capital LP

333 South Grand Avenue, Suite 1800

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Jeffrey Gundlach is the portfolio manager responsible for the opportunistic income strategy (the “Opportunistic Income Strategy”), which is the segment of the Alternative Strategies Fund’s assets managed by DoubleLine Capital LP (“DoubleLine”). Gundlach is Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of DoubleLine, which he co-founded in 2009. DoubleLine has been a sub-advisor to the Alternative Strategies Fund since the Alternative Strategies Fund’s inception in 2011.

Gundlach and his team at DoubleLine operate under the cardinal mandate of delivering superior risk-adjusted fixed income returns. They seek to deliver positive absolute returns in excess of an appropriate aggregate fixed income index with portfolio volatility that is similar to U.S. long-term treasury securities. Investment ideas employed by Gundlach and his team must offer an asymmetric, positively skewed risk-reward profile. As a result, a great deal of their analysis seeks to identify fixed income securities that they believe offer greater potential payoff than potential loss under multiple scenarios. Ultimately, a combination of risk management, asset allocation and security selection forms Gundlach’s investment process. There can be no assurance that the Fund will achieve its investment objective.

Portfolios are constructed with the intent to outperform under a range of future outcomes. DoubleLine’s risk integration process seeks to combine assets that will perform differently in different scenarios so that the overall portfolio generates acceptable performance. This process includes balancing the strength of cash flows from certain asset classes against various potential economic or market risks.

When considering a specific investment in any sector, Gundlach’s primary focus is on the predictability of the cash flow generated during an entire interest rate or credit cycle. When volatility is low, he emphasizes securities he expects to generate the best overall return over a cycle rather than simply buying the highest yield at a given point in time.

In implementing the Opportunistic Income Strategy, Gundlach allocates investments to fixed income instruments and other investments with no limit on the duration of the portfolio. He may invest in, without limitation, asset-backed securities; domestic and foreign corporate bonds, including high-yield bonds; municipal bonds; bonds or other obligations issued by domestic or foreign governments, including emerging markets countries; REIT debt securities; and mortgage related securities. Gundlach’s investments in mortgage related securities may at times represent a substantial portion (including up to 100%) of the segment allocated to him when certain market conditions exist that Gundlach believes offer potentially attractive risk

adjusted returns. He may, to a limited extent, employ leverage within the Opportunistic Income Strategy, which also is being used for other accounts managed by DoubleLine.

When investing in mortgage related securities, Gundlach may invest in obligations issued or guaranteed by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. Government such as the Government National Mortgage Association, the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; CMOs, including real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICS) issued by domestic or foreign private issuers that represent an interest in or are collateralized by mortgage related securities issued by agencies or instrumentalities of the U.S. Government; CMBS; obligations issued by private issuers that represent an interest in or are collateralized by whole mortgage loans or mortgage related securities without a government guarantee but typically with some form of private credit enhancement; “interest only” and “principal only” stripped mortgage securities; inverse floating rate securities; and debt or equity tranches of collateralized debt obligations collateralized by mortgage related securities. Gundlach compares opportunities in other sectors of the global fixed income market to opportunities available in the mortgage sector with the aim of attempting to construct a portfolio with the most attractive return potential given his risk management objectives.

Contrarian Opportunity Strategy

 

Steven Romick, CFA

Brian Selmo, CFA

Mark Landecker, CFA

First Pacific Advisors, LLC

11601 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 1200

Los Angeles, CA 90025

Steven Romick, Brian Selmo and Mark Landecker are the co-portfolio managers responsible for the contrarian opportunity strategy (the “Contrarian Opportunity Strategy”), which is the segment of the Alternative Strategies Fund’s assets managed by FPA. Romick joined FPA in 1996 and is currently a Managing Partner of the firm. Selmo joined FPA in 2008 and has been a Partner since 2013. He was a Managing Director of FPA from January 2013 to December 2013, and a Vice President of FPA from 2008 to 2012. Landecker joined FPA in 2009 and has been a Partner since 2013. He was a Managing Director of FPA from January 2013 to December 2013, and a Vice President of FPA from 2009 to 2012. Romick, Selmo and Landecker manage the FPA Crescent Fund (Romick has been a portfolio manager since its inception in 1993) and separate accounts, including unregistered funds managed by FPA (commonly known as hedge funds), in FPA’s Contrarian Value style. FPA has been a sub-advisor to the Alternative Strategies Fund since the Alternative Strategies Fund’s inception in 2011.

This segment is managed, to the degree practical, with the intent to replicate elements of private funds and separate accounts also run by FPA. The elements replicated include investment strategies such as hedging, highly concentrated positions, illiquid and restricted securities, international

 

investments, coupled with the potential for maintaining high levels of liquidity. FPA implements these strategies through investing opportunistically in a wide variety of securities as discussed below.

The Contrarian Opportunity Strategy leads to investments that offer absolute rather than relative value with an objective of strong risk-adjusted returns. As absolute return investors, the FPA team seeks genuine bargains rather than relatively attractive securities. The goal is to provide equity-like returns over longer periods ( i.e . , five to seven years) while protecting against the permanent loss of capital. Attention is directed toward those companies offering the best combination of such quality criteria as strong market share, good management, and high normalized return on capital. A company purchased might not look inexpensive, considering current earnings and return on capital; however, its valuation may reflect such conditions as a weak economy, an increase in raw material costs, a management misstep, or any number of other temporary conditions. The FPA team believes that price drops caused by such developments can, and often do, provide buying opportunities. There can be no assurance that the Fund will achieve its investment objective.

The FPA team employs the broad mandate of the FPA contrarian strategy to invest across the capital structure, asset classes, market capitalization, industries and geographies using a wide variety of instruments. The FPA team invests in an opportunistic manner, based on its view of the world and the businesses/situations that it understands. It looks for what is out of favor, taking into account the current landscape and how it might change over time, both organically and through exogenous events. The FPA team emphasizes independent research and spends little time with Wall Street analysts because it prefers to focus its research on interactions with business operators and industry leaders.

The FPA team narrows the universe of potential investments by establishing five categories: Long Equity, Short Equity, Credit, Cash and Equivalents and a smaller “Other” category.

Long Equity: The FPA team may invest in companies with solid balance sheets and unquestionable competitive strength and shareholder-centric management; companies of lesser quality but with strong long-term upside potential; companies with shorter term upside potential driven by identified catalysts that are expected to have a positive impact on the value of the underlying business such as balance sheet optimization, operational turnarounds or corporate actions; and companies whose disparate parts have greater aggregate value than the current stock price and may engage in intra-company arbitrage of such companies by either holding long positions in one share class of such a company and shorting another share class of the same company or longing a parent or holding company and shorting one or several of its underlying companies to create a stub equity position that is valued at a deep discount to intrinsic value.

Short Equity: The FPA team will seek opportunities in deteriorating companies with declining business metrics that are not reflected in the stock price; companies with balance