INVESTMENT POLICIES AND LIMITATIONS

The following policies and limitations supplement those set forth in the prospectus. Unless otherwise noted, whenever an investment policy or limitation states a maximum percentage of the fund’s assets that may be invested in any security or other asset, or sets forth a policy regarding quality standards, such standard or percentage limitation will be determined immediately after and as a result of the fund’s acquisition of such security or other asset. Accordingly, any subsequent change in values, net assets, or other circumstances will not be considered when determining whether the investment complies with the fund’s investment policies and limitations.

The fund’s fundamental investment policies and limitations cannot be changed without approval by a “majority of the outstanding voting securities” (as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act)) of the fund. However, except for the fundamental investment limitations listed below, the investment policies and limitations described in this SAI are not fundamental and may be changed without shareholder approval.

The following are the fund’s fundamental investment limitations set forth in their entirety.

Diversification

The fund may not with respect to 75% of the fund’s total assets, purchase the securities of any issuer (other than securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or securities of other investment companies) if, as a result, (a) more than 5% of the fund’s total assets would be invested in the securities of that issuer, or (b) the fund would hold more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of that issuer.

Senior Securities

The fund may not issue senior securities, except in connection with the insurance program established by the fund pursuant to an exemptive order issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission or as otherwise permitted under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Borrowing

The fund may not borrow money, except that the fund may borrow money for temporary or emergency purposes (not for leveraging or investment) in an amount not exceeding 33 1/3% of its total assets (including the amount borrowed) less liabilities (other than borrowings). Any borrowings that come to exceed this amount will be reduced within three days (not including Sundays and holidays) to the extent necessary to comply with the 33 1/3% limitation.

Underwriting

The fund may not underwrite securities issued by others, except to the extent that the fund may be considered an underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 in the disposition of restricted securities or in connection with investments in other investment companies.

Concentration

The fund may not purchase the securities of any issuer (other than securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities) if, as a result, more than 25% of the fund’s total assets would be invested in the securities of companies whose principal business activities are in the same industry (provided that investments in other investment companies shall not be considered an investment in any particular industry for purposes of this investment limitation).

For purposes of the fund’s concentration limitation discussed above, with respect to any investment in repurchase agreements collateralized by U.S. Government securities, Strategic Advisers LLC (Strategic Advisers) looks through to the U.S. Government securities.

For purposes of the fund’s concentration limitation discussed above, Strategic Advisers or an affiliate may analyze the characteristics of a particular issuer and security and assign an industry or sector classification consistent with those characteristics in the event that the third-party classification provider used by Strategic Advisers does not assign a classification.

Real Estate

The fund may not purchase or sell real estate unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other instruments (but this shall not prevent the fund from investing in securities or other instruments backed by real estate or securities of companies engaged in the real estate business).

Commodities

The fund may not purchase or sell physical commodities unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other instruments (but this shall not prevent the fund from purchasing or selling options and futures contracts or from investing in securities or other instruments backed by physical commodities).

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Loans

The fund may not lend any security or make any other loan if, as a result, more than 33 1/3% of its total assets would be lent to other parties, but this limitation does not apply to purchases of debt securities or to repurchase agreements, or to acquisitions of loans, loan participations or other forms of debt instruments.

The following investment limitations are not fundamental and may be changed without shareholder approval.

Short Sales

The fund does not currently intend to sell securities short, unless it owns or has the right to obtain securities equivalent in kind and amount to the securities sold short, and provided that transactions in futures contracts and options are not deemed to constitute selling securities short.

Margin Purchases

The fund does not currently intend to purchase securities on margin, except that the fund may obtain such short-term credits as are necessary for the clearance of transactions, and provided that margin payments in connection with futures contracts and options on futures contracts shall not constitute purchasing securities on margin.

Borrowing

The fund may borrow money only (a) from a bank or from a registered investment company or portfolio for which Strategic Advisers or an affiliate serves as investment adviser or (b) by engaging in reverse repurchase agreements with any party (reverse repurchase agreements are treated as borrowings for purposes of the fundamental borrowing investment limitation).

Illiquid Securities

The fund does not currently intend to purchase any security if, as a result, more than 15% of its net assets would be invested in securities that are deemed to be illiquid because they are subject to legal or contractual restrictions on resale or because they cannot be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of business at approximately the prices at which they are valued.

For purposes of the fund’s illiquid securities limitation discussed above, if through a change in values, net assets, or other circumstances, the fund were in a position where more than 15% of its net assets were invested in illiquid securities, it would consider appropriate steps to protect liquidity.

To the extent that the fund acquires the shares of an underlying fund in accordance with Section 12(d)(1)(F) of the 1940 Act, the underlying fund is not obligated to redeem its shares in an amount exceeding 1% of its shares outstanding during any period of less than 30 days. Those underlying fund shares will not be treated as illiquid securities for purposes of the fund’s illiquid securities limitation described above to the extent that the fund is able to dispose of such securities by distributing them in kind to redeeming shareholders. (See “Investment Policies and Limitations – Securities of Other Investment Companies.”)

Loans

The fund does not currently intend to lend assets other than securities to other parties, except by (a) lending money (up to 15% of the fund’s net assets) to a registered investment company or portfolio for which Strategic Advisers or an affiliate serves as investment adviser or (b) assuming any unfunded commitments in connection with the acquisition of loans, loan participations, or other forms of debt instruments. (This limitation does not apply to purchases of debt securities, to repurchase agreements, or to acquisitions of loans, loan participations or other forms of debt instruments.)

In addition to the fund’s fundamental and non-fundamental investment limitations discussed above:

In order to qualify as a “regulated investment company” under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, the fund currently intends to comply with certain diversification limits imposed by Subchapter M.

For the fund’s policies and limitations on futures and options transactions, see “Investment Policies and Limitations – Futures, Options, and Swaps.”

Notwithstanding the foregoing investment limitations, the underlying funds in which the fund may invest have adopted certain investment limitations that may be more or less restrictive than those listed above, thereby permitting the fund to engage indirectly in investment strategies that are prohibited under the investment limitations listed above. The investment limitations of each underlying fund are set forth in its registration statement.

In accordance with its investment program as set forth in the prospectus, the fund may invest more than 25% of its assets in any one underlying Fidelity ^® fund. Although the fund does not intend to concentrate its investments in a particular industry, the fund may indirectly concentrate in a particular industry or group of industries through its investments in one or more underlying funds.

The following pages contain more detailed information about types of instruments in which the fund may invest, techniques the fund’s adviser (or a sub-adviser) may employ in pursuit of the fund’s investment objective, and a summary of

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related risks. The fund’s adviser (or a sub-adviser) may not buy all of these instruments or use all of these techniques unless it believes that doing so will help the fund achieve its goal. However, the fund’s adviser (or a sub-adviser) is not required to buy any particular instrument or use any particular technique even if to do so might benefit the fund.

Strategic Advisers ^® Fidelity ^® Emerging Markets Fund may have exposure to instruments, techniques, and risks either directly or indirectly through an investment in an underlying fund. An underlying fund may invest in the same or other types of instruments and its adviser may employ the same or other types of techniques. Strategic Advisers ^® Fidelity ^® Emerging Markets Fund’s performance will be affected by the instruments, techniques, and risks associated with an underlying fund, in proportion to the amount of assets that the fund allocates to that underlying fund.

On the following pages in this section titled “Investment Policies and Limitations,” and except as otherwise indicated, references to “a fund” or “the fund” may relate to Strategic Advisers ^® Fidelity ^® Emerging Markets Fund or an underlying fund, and references to “an adviser” or “the adviser” may relate to Strategic Advisers (or its affiliates) or a sub-adviser of Strategic Advisers ^® Fidelity ^® Emerging Markets Fund, or an adviser of an underlying fund.

Borrowing.  If a fund borrows money, its share price may be subject to greater fluctuation until the borrowing is paid off. If a fund makes additional investments while borrowings are outstanding, this may be considered a form of leverage.

Cash Management.  A fund may hold uninvested cash or may invest it in cash equivalents such as money market securities, repurchase agreements, or shares of short-term bond or money market funds, including (for Fidelity ^® funds and other advisory clients only) shares of Fidelity ^® central funds. Generally, these securities offer less potential for gains than other types of securities.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Notice of Exclusion.  The trust, on behalf of the Fidelity ^® fund to which this SAI relates, has filed with the National Futures Association a notice claiming an exclusion from the definition of the term “commodity pool operator” (CPO) under the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, and the rules of the CFTC promulgated thereunder, with respect to the fund’s operation. Accordingly, neither a fund nor its adviser is subject to registration or regulation as a commodity pool or a CPO. However, the CFTC has adopted certain rule amendments that significantly affect the continued availability of this exclusion, and may subject advisers to funds to regulation by the CFTC. As of the date of this SAI, the adviser does not expect to register as a CPO of the fund. However, there is no certainty that a fund or its adviser will be able to rely on an exclusion in the future as the fund’s investments change over time. A fund may determine not to use investment strategies that trigger additional CFTC regulation or may determine to operate subject to CFTC regulation, if applicable. If a fund or its adviser operates subject to CFTC regulation, it may incur additional expenses.

Common Stock  represents an equity or ownership interest in an issuer. In the event an issuer is liquidated or declares bankruptcy, the claims of owners of bonds and preferred stock take precedence over the claims of those who own common stock, although related proceedings can take time to resolve and results can be unpredictable. For purposes of a Fidelity ^® fund’s policies related to investment in common stock Fidelity considers depositary receipts evidencing ownership of common stock to be common stock.

Convertible Securities  are bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities that may be converted or exchanged (by the holder or by the issuer) into shares of the underlying common stock (or cash or securities of equivalent value) at a stated exchange ratio. A convertible security may also be called for redemption or conversion by the issuer after a particular date and under certain circumstances (including a specified price) established upon issue. If a convertible security held by a fund is called for redemption or conversion, the fund could be required to tender it for redemption, convert it into the underlying common stock, or sell it to a third party.

Convertible securities generally have less potential for gain or loss than common stocks. Convertible securities generally provide yields higher than the underlying common stocks, but generally lower than comparable non-convertible securities. Because of this higher yield, convertible securities generally sell at prices above their “conversion value,” which is the current market value of the stock to be received upon conversion. The difference between this conversion value and the price of convertible securities will vary over time depending on changes in the value of the underlying common stocks and interest rates. When the underlying common stocks decline in value, convertible securities will tend not to decline to the same extent because of the interest or dividend payments and the repayment of principal at maturity for certain types of convertible securities. However, securities that are convertible other than at the option of the holder generally do not limit the potential for loss to the same extent as securities convertible at the option of the holder. When the underlying common stocks rise in value, the value of convertible securities may also be expected to increase. At the same time, however, the difference between the market value of convertible securities and their conversion value will narrow, which means that the value of convertible securities will generally not increase to the same extent as the value of the underlying common stocks. Because convertible securities may also be interest-rate sensitive, their value may increase as interest rates fall and decrease as interest rates rise. Convertible securities are also subject to credit risk, and are often lower-quality securities.

Countries and Markets Considered Emerging.  For purposes of a Fidelity ^® fund’s 80% investment policy relating to emerging markets, emerging markets include countries that have an emerging stock market as defined by MSCI, countries or markets with low- to middle-income economies as classified by the World Bank, and other countries or markets with similar emerging characteristics. For example, as of May 31, 2018, countries in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, and Singapore are considered to be emerging.

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Country or Geographic Region.  Various factors may be considered in determining whether an investment is tied economically to a particular country or region, including: whether the investment is issued or guaranteed by a particular government or any of its agencies, political subdivisions, or instrumentalities; whether the investment has its primary trading market in a particular country or region; whether the issuer is organized under the laws of, derives at least 50% of its revenues from, or has at least 50% of its assets in a particular country or region; whether the investment is included in an index representative of a particular country or region; and whether the investment is exposed to the economic fortunes and risks of a particular country or region.

Debt Securities  are used by issuers to borrow money. The issuer usually pays a fixed, variable, or floating rate of interest, and must repay the amount borrowed, usually at the maturity of the security. Some debt securities, such as zero coupon bonds, do not pay interest but are sold at a deep discount from their face values. Debt securities include corporate bonds, government securities, repurchase agreements, and mortgage and other asset-backed securities.

Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)  are shares of other investment companies, commodity pools, or other entities that are traded on an exchange. Typically, assets underlying the ETF shares are stocks, though they may also be commodities or other instruments. An ETF may seek to replicate the performance of a specific index or may be actively managed.

Typically, shares of an ETF that tracks an index are expected to increase in value as the value of the underlying benchmark increases. However, in the case of inverse ETFs (also called “short ETFs” or “bear ETFs”), ETF shares are expected to increase in value as the value of the underlying benchmark decreases. Inverse ETFs seek to deliver the opposite of the performance of the benchmark they track and are often marketed as a way for investors to profit from, or at least hedge their exposure to, downward moving markets. Investments in inverse ETFs are similar to holding short positions in the underlying benchmark.

ETF shares are redeemable only in large blocks (typically, 50,000 shares) often called “creation units” by persons other than a fund, and are redeemed principally in-kind at each day’s next calculated net asset value per share (NAV). ETFs typically incur fees that are separate from those fees incurred directly by a fund. A fund’s purchase of ETFs results in the layering of expenses, such that the fund would indirectly bear a proportionate share of any ETF’s operating expenses. Further, while traditional investment companies are continuously offered at NAV, ETFs are traded in the secondary market ( e.g., on a stock exchange) on an intra-day basis at prices that may be above or below the value of their underlying portfolios.

Some of the risks of investing in an ETF that tracks an index are similar to those of investing in an indexed mutual fund, including tracking error risk (the risk of errors in matching the ETF’s underlying assets to the index or other benchmark); and the risk that because an ETF that tracks an index is not actively managed, it cannot sell stocks or other assets as long as they are represented in the index or other benchmark. Other ETF risks include the risk that ETFs may trade in the secondary market at a discount from their NAV and the risk that the ETFs may not be liquid. ETFs also may be leveraged. Leveraged ETFs seek to deliver multiples of the performance of the index or other benchmark they track and use derivatives in an effort to amplify the returns (or decline, in the case of inverse ETFs) of the underlying index or benchmark. While leveraged ETFs may offer the potential for greater return, the potential for loss and the speed at which losses can be realized also are greater. Most leveraged and inverse ETFs “reset” daily, meaning they are designed to achieve their stated objectives on a daily basis. Leveraged and inverse ETFs can deviate substantially from the performance of their underlying benchmark over longer periods of time, particularly in volatile periods.

Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs)  are a type of senior, unsecured, unsubordinated debt security issued by financial institutions that combines aspects of both bonds and ETFs. An ETN’s returns are based on the performance of a market index or other reference asset minus fees and expenses. Similar to ETFs, ETNs are listed on an exchange and traded in the secondary market. However, unlike an ETF, an ETN can be held until the ETN’s maturity, at which time the issuer will pay a return linked to the performance of the market index or other reference asset to which the ETN is linked minus certain fees. Unlike regular bonds, ETNs typically do not make periodic interest payments and principal typically is not protected.

ETNs also incur certain expenses not incurred by their applicable index. The market value of an ETN is determined by supply and demand, the current performance of the index or other reference asset, and the credit rating of the ETN issuer. The market value of ETN shares may differ from their intraday indicative value. The value of an ETN may also change due to a change in the issuer’s credit rating. As a result, there may be times when an ETN’s share trades at a premium or discount to its NAV. Some ETNs that use leverage in an effort to amplify the returns of an underlying index or other reference asset can, at times, be relatively illiquid and, thus, they may be difficult to purchase or sell at a fair price. Leveraged ETNs may offer the potential for greater return, but the potential for loss and speed at which losses can be realized also are greater.

Exposure to Foreign and Emerging Markets.  Foreign securities, foreign currencies, and securities issued by U.S. entities with substantial foreign operations may involve significant risks in addition to the risks inherent in U.S. investments.

Foreign investments involve risks relating to local political, economic, regulatory, or social instability, military action or unrest, or adverse diplomatic developments, and may be affected by actions of foreign governments adverse to the interests of U.S. investors. Such actions may include expropriation or nationalization of assets, confiscatory taxation, restrictions on U.S. investment or on the ability to repatriate assets or convert currency into U.S. dollars, or other government intervention. From time to time, a fund’s adviser and/or its affiliates may determine that, as a result of regulatory requirements that may apply to the adviser and/or its affiliates due to investments in a particular country, investments in the securities of issuers domiciled or

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listed on trading markets in that country above certain thresholds (which may apply at the account level or in the aggregate across all accounts managed by the adviser and its affiliates) may be impractical or undesirable. In such instances, the adviser may limit or exclude investment in a particular issuer, and investment flexibility may be restricted. Additionally, governmental issuers of foreign debt securities may be unwilling to pay interest and repay principal when due and may require that the conditions for payment be renegotiated. There is no assurance that a fund’s adviser will be able to anticipate these potential events or counter their effects. In addition, the value of securities denominated in foreign currencies and of dividends and interest paid with respect to such securities will fluctuate based on the relative strength of the U.S. dollar. From time to time, a fund may invest a large portion of its assets in the securities of issuers located in a single country or a limited number of countries. If a fund invests in this manner, there is a higher risk that social, political, economic, tax (such as a tax on foreign investments), or regulatory developments in those countries may have a significant impact on the fund’s investment performance.

It is anticipated that in most cases the best available market for foreign securities will be on an exchange or in over-the-counter (OTC) markets located outside of the United States. Foreign stock markets, while growing in volume and sophistication, are generally not as developed as those in the United States, and securities of some foreign issuers may be less liquid and more volatile than securities of comparable U.S. issuers. Foreign security trading, settlement and custodial practices (including those involving securities settlement where fund assets may be released prior to receipt of payment) are often less developed than those in U.S. markets, and may result in increased investment or valuation risk or substantial delays in the event of a failed trade or the insolvency of, or breach of duty by, a foreign broker-dealer, securities depository, or foreign subcustodian. In addition, the costs associated with foreign investments, including withholding taxes, brokerage commissions, and custodial costs, are generally higher than with U.S. investments.

Foreign markets may offer less protection to investors than U.S. markets. Foreign issuers are generally not bound by uniform accounting, auditing, and financial reporting requirements and standards of practice comparable to those applicable to U.S. issuers. Adequate public information on foreign issuers may not be available, and it may be difficult to secure dividends and information regarding corporate actions on a timely basis. In general, there is less overall governmental supervision and regulation of securities exchanges, brokers, and listed companies than in the United States. OTC markets tend to be less regulated than stock exchange markets and, in certain countries, may be totally unregulated. Regulatory enforcement may be influenced by economic or political concerns, and investors may have difficulty enforcing their legal rights in foreign countries.

Some foreign securities impose restrictions on transfer within the United States or to U.S. persons. Although securities subject to such transfer restrictions may be marketable abroad, they may be less liquid than foreign securities of the same class that are not subject to such restrictions.

American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) as well as other “hybrid” forms of ADRs, including European Depositary Receipts (EDRs) and Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs), are certificates evidencing ownership of shares of a foreign issuer. These certificates are issued by depository banks and generally trade on an established market in the United States or elsewhere. The underlying shares are held in trust by a custodian bank or similar financial institution in the issuer’s home country. The depository bank may not have physical custody of the underlying securities at all times and may charge fees for various services, including forwarding dividends and interest and corporate actions. ADRs are alternatives to directly purchasing the underlying foreign securities in their national markets and currencies. However, ADRs continue to be subject to many of the risks associated with investing directly in foreign securities. These risks include foreign exchange risk as well as the political and economic risks of the underlying issuer’s country.

The risks of foreign investing may be magnified for investments in emerging markets. Security prices in emerging markets can be significantly more volatile than those in more developed markets, reflecting the greater uncertainties of investing in less established markets and economies. In particular, countries with emerging markets may have relatively unstable governments, may present the risks of nationalization of businesses, restrictions on foreign ownership and prohibitions on the repatriation of assets, and may have less protection of property rights than more developed countries. The economies of countries with emerging markets may be based on only a few industries, may be highly vulnerable to changes in local or global trade conditions, and may suffer from extreme and volatile debt burdens or inflation rates. Local securities markets may trade a small number of securities and may be unable to respond effectively to increases in trading volume, potentially making prompt liquidation of holdings difficult or impossible at times.

Foreign Currency Transactions.  A fund may conduct foreign currency transactions on a spot ( i.e., cash) or forward basis ( i.e., by entering into forward contracts to purchase or sell foreign currencies). Although foreign exchange dealers generally do not charge a fee for such conversions, they do realize a profit based on the difference between the prices at which they are buying and selling various currencies. Thus, a dealer may offer to sell a foreign currency at one rate, while offering a lesser rate of exchange should the counterparty desire to resell that currency to the dealer. Forward contracts are customized transactions that require a specific amount of a currency to be delivered at a specific exchange rate on a specific date or range of dates in the future. Forward contracts are generally traded in an interbank market directly between currency traders (usually large commercial banks) and their customers. The parties to a forward contract may agree to offset or terminate the contract before its maturity, or may hold the contract to maturity and complete the contemplated currency exchange.

The following discussion summarizes the principal currency management strategies involving forward contracts that could be used by a fund. A fund may also use swap agreements, indexed securities, and options and futures contracts relating to

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foreign currencies for the same purposes. Forward contracts not calling for physical delivery of the underlying instrument will be settled through cash payments rather than through delivery of the underlying currency. All of these instruments and transactions are subject to the risk that the counterparty will default.

A “settlement hedge” or “transaction hedge” is designed to protect a fund against an adverse change in foreign currency values between the date a security denominated in a foreign currency is purchased or sold and the date on which payment is made or received. Entering into a forward contract for the purchase or sale of the amount of foreign currency involved in an underlying security transaction for a fixed amount of U.S. dollars “locks in” the U.S. dollar price of the security. Forward contracts to purchase or sell a foreign currency may also be used to protect a fund in anticipation of future purchases or sales of securities denominated in foreign currency, even if the specific investments have not yet been selected.

A fund may also use forward contracts to hedge against a decline in the value of existing investments denominated in a foreign currency. For example, if a fund owned securities denominated in pounds sterling, it could enter into a forward contract to sell pounds sterling in return for U.S. dollars to hedge against possible declines in the pound’s value. Such a hedge, sometimes referred to as a “position hedge,” would tend to offset both positive and negative currency fluctuations, but would not offset changes in security values caused by other factors. A fund could also attempt to hedge the position by selling another currency expected to perform similarly to the pound sterling. This type of hedge, sometimes referred to as a “proxy hedge,” could offer advantages in terms of cost, yield, or efficiency, but generally would not hedge currency exposure as effectively as a direct hedge into U.S. dollars. Proxy hedges may result in losses if the currency used to hedge does not perform similarly to the currency in which the hedged securities are denominated.

A fund may enter into forward contracts to shift its investment exposure from one currency into another. This may include shifting exposure from U.S. dollars to a foreign currency, or from one foreign currency to another foreign currency. This type of strategy, sometimes known as a “cross-hedge,” will tend to reduce or eliminate exposure to the currency that is sold, and increase exposure to the currency that is purchased, much as if a fund had sold a security denominated in one currency and purchased an equivalent security denominated in another. A fund may cross-hedge its U.S. dollar exposure in order to achieve a representative weighted mix of the major currencies in its benchmark index and/or to cover an underweight country or region exposure in its portfolio. Cross-hedges protect against losses resulting from a decline in the hedged currency, but will cause a fund to assume the risk of fluctuations in the value of the currency it purchases.

Successful use of currency management strategies will depend on an adviser’s skill in analyzing currency values. Currency management strategies may substantially change a fund’s investment exposure to changes in currency exchange rates and could result in losses to a fund if currencies do not perform as an adviser anticipates. For example, if a currency’s value rose at a time when a fund had hedged its position by selling that currency in exchange for dollars, the fund would not participate in the currency’s appreciation. If a fund hedges currency exposure through proxy hedges, the fund could realize currency losses from both the hedge and the security position if the two currencies do not move in tandem. Similarly, if a fund increases its exposure to a foreign currency and that currency’s value declines, the fund will realize a loss. Foreign currency transactions involve the risk that anticipated currency movements will not be accurately predicted and that a fund’s hedging strategies will be ineffective. Moreover, it is impossible to precisely forecast the market value of portfolio securities at the expiration of a foreign currency forward contract. Accordingly, a fund may be required to buy or sell additional currency on the spot market (and bear the expenses of such transaction), if an adviser’s predictions regarding the movement of foreign currency or securities markets prove inaccurate.

A fund may be required to limit its hedging transactions in foreign currency forwards, futures, and options in order to maintain its classification as a “regulated investment company” under the Internal Revenue Code (Code). Hedging transactions could result in the application of the mark-to-market provisions of the Code, which may cause an increase (or decrease) in the amount of taxable dividends paid by a fund and could affect whether dividends paid by a fund are classified as capital gains or ordinary income. A fund will cover its exposure to foreign currency transactions with liquid assets in compliance with applicable requirements. There is no assurance that an adviser’s use of currency management strategies will be advantageous to a fund or that it will employ currency management strategies at appropriate times.

Options and Futures Relating to Foreign Currencies. Currency futures contracts are similar to forward currency exchange contracts, except that they are traded on exchanges (and have margin requirements) and are standardized as to contract size and delivery date. Most currency futures contracts call for payment or delivery in U.S. dollars. The underlying instrument of a currency option may be a foreign currency, which generally is purchased or delivered in exchange for U.S. dollars, or may be a futures contract. The purchaser of a currency call obtains the right to purchase the underlying currency, and the purchaser of a currency put obtains the right to sell the underlying currency.

The uses and risks of currency options and futures are similar to options and futures relating to securities or indexes, as discussed below. A fund may purchase and sell currency futures and may purchase and write currency options to increase or decrease its exposure to different foreign currencies. Currency options may also be purchased or written in conjunction with each other or with currency futures or forward contracts. Currency futures and options values can be expected to correlate with exchange rates, but may not reflect other factors that affect the value of a fund’s investments. A currency hedge, for example, should protect a Yen-denominated security from a decline in the Yen, but will not protect a fund against a price decline resulting from deterioration in the issuer’s creditworthiness. Because the value of a fund’s foreign-denominated investments changes in response to many factors other than exchange rates, it may not be possible to match the amount of currency options and futures to the value of the fund’s investments exactly over time.

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Currency options traded on U.S. or other exchanges may be subject to position limits which may limit the ability of the fund to reduce foreign currency risk using such options.

Foreign Repurchase Agreements.  Foreign repurchase agreements involve an agreement to purchase a foreign security and to sell that security back to the original seller at an agreed-upon price in either U.S. dollars or foreign currency. Unlike typical U.S. repurchase agreements, foreign repurchase agreements may not be fully collateralized at all times. The value of a security purchased by a fund may be more or less than the price at which the counterparty has agreed to repurchase the security. In the event of default by the counterparty, a fund may suffer a loss if the value of the security purchased is less than the agreed-upon repurchase price, or if the fund is unable to successfully assert a claim to the collateral under foreign laws. As a result, foreign repurchase agreements may involve higher credit risks than repurchase agreements in U.S. markets, as well as risks associated with currency fluctuations. In addition, as with other emerging market investments, repurchase agreements with counterparties located in emerging markets or relating to emerging markets may involve issuers or counterparties with lower credit ratings than typical U.S. repurchase agreements.

Funds of Funds and Other Large Shareholders.  Certain Fidelity ^® funds and accounts (including funds of funds) invest in other funds (“underlying funds”) and, as a result, may at times have substantial investments in one or more underlying funds.

An underlying fund may experience large redemptions or investments due to transactions in its shares by funds of funds, other large shareholders, or similarly managed accounts. While it is impossible to predict the overall effect of these transactions over time, there could be an adverse impact on an underlying fund’s performance. In the event of such redemptions or investments, an underlying fund could be required to sell securities or to invest cash at a time when it may not otherwise desire to do so. Such transactions may increase an underlying fund’s brokerage and/or other transaction costs and affect the liquidity of a fund’s portfolio. In addition, when funds of funds or other investors own a substantial portion of an underlying fund’s shares, a large redemption by such an investor could cause actual expenses to increase, or could result in the underlying fund’s current expenses being allocated over a smaller asset base, leading to an increase in the underlying fund’s expense ratio. Redemptions of underlying fund shares could also accelerate the realization of taxable capital gains in the fund if sales of securities result in capital gains. The impact of these transactions is likely to be greater when a fund of funds or other significant investor purchases, redeems, or owns a substantial portion of the underlying fund’s shares.

When possible, Fidelity will consider how to minimize these potential adverse effects, and may take such actions as it deems appropriate to address potential adverse effects, including redemption of shares in-kind rather than in cash or carrying out the transactions over a period of time, although there can be no assurance that such actions will be successful. A high volume of redemption requests can impact an underlying fund the same way as the transactions of a single shareholder with substantial investments. As an additional safeguard, Fidelity ^® fund of funds may manage the placement of their redemption requests in a manner designed to minimize the impact of such requests on the day-to-day operations of the underlying funds in which they invest. This may involve, for example, redeeming its shares of an underlying fund gradually over time.

Fund’s Rights as an Investor.  Fidelity ^® funds do not intend to direct or administer the day-to-day operations of any company. A fund may, however, exercise its rights as a shareholder or lender and may communicate its views on important matters of policy to a company’s management, board of directors, and shareholders, and holders of a company’s other securities when such matters could have a significant effect on the value of the fund’s investment in the company. The activities in which a fund may engage, either individually or in conjunction with others, may include, among others, supporting or opposing proposed changes in a company’s corporate structure or business activities; seeking changes in a company’s directors or management; seeking changes in a company’s direction or policies; seeking the sale or reorganization of the company or a portion of its assets; supporting or opposing third-party takeover efforts; supporting the filing of a bankruptcy petition; or foreclosing on collateral securing a security. This area of corporate activity is increasingly prone to litigation and it is possible that a fund could be involved in lawsuits related to such activities. Such activities will be monitored with a view to mitigating, to the extent possible, the risk of litigation against a fund and the risk of actual liability if a fund is involved in litigation. No guarantee can be made, however, that litigation against a fund will not be undertaken or liabilities incurred. A fund’s proxy voting guidelines are included in its SAI.

Futures, Options, and Swaps.  The success of any strategy involving futures, options, and swaps depends on an adviser’s analysis of many economic and mathematical factors and a fund’s return may be higher if it never invested in such instruments. Additionally, some of the contracts discussed below are new instruments without a trading history and there can be no assurance that a market for the instruments will continue to exist. Government legislation or regulation could affect the use of such instruments and could limit a fund’s ability to pursue its investment strategies. If a fund invests a significant portion of its assets in derivatives, its investment exposure could far exceed the value of its portfolio securities and its investment performance could be primarily dependent upon securities it does not own.

Strategic Advisers ^® Fidelity ^® Emerging Markets Fund will not: (a) sell futures contracts, purchase put options, or write call options if, as a result, more than 25% of the fund’s total assets would be hedged with futures and options under normal conditions; (b) purchase futures contracts or write put options if, as a result, the fund’s total obligations upon settlement or exercise of purchased futures contracts and written put options would exceed 25% of its total assets under normal conditions; or (c) purchase call options if, as a result, the current value of option premiums for call options purchased by the fund would exceed 5% of the fund’s total assets. These limitations do not apply to options attached to or acquired or traded together with their underlying securities, and do not apply to structured notes.

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The policies and limitations regarding the fund’s investments in futures contracts, options, and swaps may be changed as regulatory agencies permit.

The requirements for qualification as a regulated investment company may limit the extent to which a fund may enter into futures, options on futures, and forward contracts.

Futures Contracts. In purchasing a futures contract, the buyer agrees to purchase a specified underlying instrument at a specified future date. In selling a futures contract, the seller agrees to sell a specified underlying instrument at a specified date. Futures contracts are standardized, exchange-traded contracts and the price at which the purchase and sale will take place is fixed when the buyer and seller enter into the contract. Some currently available futures contracts are based on specific securities or baskets of securities, some are based on commodities or commodities indexes (for funds that seek commodities exposure), and some are based on indexes of securities prices (including foreign indexes for funds that seek foreign exposure). Futures on indexes and futures not calling for physical delivery of the underlying instrument will be settled through cash payments rather than through delivery of the underlying instrument. Futures can be held until their delivery dates, or can be closed out by offsetting purchases or sales of futures contracts before then if a liquid market is available. A fund may realize a gain or loss by closing out its futures contracts.

The value of a futures contract tends to increase and decrease in tandem with the value of its underlying instrument. Therefore, purchasing futures contracts will tend to increase a fund’s exposure to positive and negative price fluctuations in the underlying instrument, much as if it had purchased the underlying instrument directly. When a fund sells a futures contract, by contrast, the value of its futures position will tend to move in a direction contrary to the market for the underlying instrument. Selling futures contracts, therefore, will tend to offset both positive and negative market price changes, much as if the underlying instrument had been sold.

The purchaser or seller of a futures contract or an option for a futures contract is not required to deliver or pay for the underlying instrument or the final cash settlement price, as applicable, unless the contract is held until the delivery date. However, both the purchaser and seller are required to deposit “initial margin” with a futures broker, known as a futures commission merchant (FCM), when the contract is entered into. If the value of either party’s position declines, that party will be required to make additional “variation margin” payments to settle the change in value on a daily basis. This process of “marking to market” will be reflected in the daily calculation of open positions computed in a fund’s NAV. The party that has a gain is entitled to receive all or a portion of this amount. Initial and variation margin payments do not constitute purchasing securities on margin for purposes of a fund’s investment limitations. Variation margin does not represent a borrowing or loan by a fund, but is instead a settlement between a fund and the FCM of the amount one would owe the other if the fund’s contract expired. In the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of an FCM that holds margin on behalf of a fund, the fund may be entitled to return of margin owed to it only in proportion to the amount received by the FCM’s other customers, potentially resulting in losses to the fund. A fund is also required to segregate liquid assets equivalent to the fund’s outstanding obligations under the contract in excess of the initial margin and variation margin, if any.

Although futures exchanges generally operate similarly in the United States and abroad, foreign futures exchanges may follow trading, settlement, and margin procedures that are different from those for U.S. exchanges. Futures contracts traded outside the United States may not involve a clearing mechanism or related guarantees and may involve greater risk of loss than U.S.-traded contracts, including potentially greater risk of losses due to insolvency of a futures broker, exchange member, or other party that may owe initial or variation margin to a fund. Because initial and variation margin payments may be measured in foreign currency, a futures contract traded outside the United States may also involve the risk of foreign currency fluctuation.

There is no assurance a liquid market will exist for any particular futures contract at any particular time. Exchanges may establish daily price fluctuation limits for futures contracts, and may halt trading if a contract’s price moves upward or downward more than the limit in a given day. On volatile trading days when the price fluctuation limit is reached or a trading halt is imposed, it may be impossible to enter into new positions or close out existing positions. The daily limit governs only price movements during a particular trading day and therefore does not limit potential losses because the limit may work to prevent the liquidation of unfavorable positions. For example, futures prices have occasionally moved to the daily limit for several consecutive trading days with little or no trading, thereby preventing prompt liquidation of positions and subjecting some holders of futures contracts to substantial losses.

If the market for a contract is not liquid because of price fluctuation limits or other market conditions, it could prevent prompt liquidation of unfavorable positions, and potentially could require a fund to continue to hold a position until delivery or expiration regardless of changes in its value. As a result, a fund’s access to other assets held to cover its futures positions could also be impaired. These risks may be heightened for commodity futures contracts, which have historically been subject to greater price volatility than exists for instruments such as stocks and bonds.

Because there are a limited number of types of exchange-traded futures contracts, it is likely that the standardized contracts available will not match a fund’s current or anticipated investments exactly. A fund may invest in futures contracts based on securities with different issuers, maturities, or other characteristics from the securities in which the fund typically invests, which involves a risk that the futures position will not track the performance of the fund’s other investments.

Futures prices can also diverge from the prices of their underlying instruments, even if the underlying instruments match a fund’s investments well. Futures prices are affected by such factors as current and anticipated short-term interest rates,

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changes in volatility of the underlying instrument, and the time remaining until expiration of the contract, which may not affect security prices the same way. Imperfect correlation may also result from differing levels of demand in the futures markets and the securities markets, from structural differences in how futures and securities are traded, or from imposition of daily price fluctuation limits or trading halts. A fund may purchase or sell futures contracts with a greater or lesser value than the securities it wishes to hedge or intends to purchase in order to attempt to compensate for differences in volatility between the contract and the securities, although this may not be successful in all cases. If price changes in a fund’s futures positions are poorly correlated with its other investments, the positions may fail to produce anticipated gains or result in losses that are not offset by gains in other investments. In addition, the price of a commodity futures contract can reflect the storage costs associated with the purchase of the physical commodity.

Futures contracts on U.S. Government securities historically have reacted to an increase or decrease in interest rates in a manner similar to the manner in which the underlying U.S. Government securities reacted. To the extent, however, that a fund enters into such futures contracts, the value of these futures contracts will not vary in direct proportion to the value of the fund’s holdings of U.S. Government securities. Thus, the anticipated spread between the price of the futures contract and the hedged security may be distorted due to differences in the nature of the markets. The spread also may be distorted by differences in initial and variation margin requirements, the liquidity of such markets and the participation of speculators in such markets.

Options. By purchasing a put option, the purchaser obtains the right (but not the obligation) to sell the option’s underlying instrument at a fixed strike price. In return for this right, the purchaser pays the current market price for the option (known as the option premium). Options have various types of underlying instruments, including specific assets or securities, baskets of assets or securities, indexes of securities or commodities prices, and futures contracts (including commodity futures contracts). Options may be traded on an exchange or OTC. The purchaser may terminate its position in a put option by allowing it to expire or by exercising the option. If the option is allowed to expire, the purchaser will lose the entire premium. If the option is exercised, the purchaser completes the sale of the underlying instrument at the strike price. Depending on the terms of the contract, upon exercise, an option may require physical delivery of the underlying instrument or may be settled through cash payments. A purchaser may also terminate a put option position by closing it out in the secondary market at its current price, if a liquid secondary market exists.

The buyer of a typical put option can expect to realize a gain if the underlying instrument’s price falls substantially. However, if the underlying instrument’s price does not fall enough to offset the cost of purchasing the option, a put buyer can expect to suffer a loss (limited to the amount of the premium, plus related transaction costs).

The features of call options are essentially the same as those of put options, except that the purchaser of a call option obtains the right (but not the obligation) to purchase, rather than sell, the underlying instrument at the option’s strike price. A call buyer typically attempts to participate in potential price increases of the underlying instrument with risk limited to the cost of the option if the underlying instrument’s price falls. At the same time, the buyer can expect to suffer a loss if the underlying instrument’s price does not rise sufficiently to offset the cost of the option.

The writer of a put or call option takes the opposite side of the transaction from the option’s purchaser. In return for receipt of the premium, the writer assumes the obligation to pay or receive the strike price for the option’s underlying instrument if the other party to the option chooses to exercise it. The writer may seek to terminate a position in a put option before exercise by closing out the option in the secondary market at its current price. If the secondary market is not liquid for a put option, however, the writer must continue to be prepared to pay the strike price while the option is outstanding, regardless of price changes. When writing an option on a futures contract, a fund will be required to make margin payments to an FCM as described above for futures contracts.

If the underlying instrument’s price rises, a put writer would generally expect to profit, although its gain would be limited to the amount of the premium it received. If the underlying instrument’s price remains the same over time, it is likely that the writer will also profit, because it should be able to close out the option at a lower price. If the underlying instrument’s price falls, the put writer would expect to suffer a loss. This loss should be less than the loss from purchasing the underlying instrument directly, however, because the premium received for writing the option should mitigate the effects of the decline.

Writing a call option obligates the writer to sell or deliver the option’s underlying instrument or make a net cash settlement payment, as applicable, in return for the strike price, upon exercise of the option. The characteristics of writing call options are similar to those of writing put options, except that writing calls generally is a profitable strategy if prices remain the same or fall. Through receipt of the option premium, a call writer should mitigate the effects of a price increase. At the same time, because a call writer must be prepared to deliver the underlying instrument or make a net cash settlement payment, as applicable, in return for the strike price, even if its current value is greater, a call writer gives up some ability to participate in security price increases.

Where a put or call option on a particular security is purchased to hedge against price movements in a related security, the price to close out the put or call option on the secondary market may move more or less than the price of the related security.

There is no assurance a liquid market will exist for any particular options contract at any particular time. Options may have relatively low trading volume and liquidity if their strike prices are not close to the underlying instrument’s current price. In addition, exchanges may establish daily price fluctuation limits for exchange-traded options contracts, and may halt trading if

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a contract’s price moves upward or downward more than the limit in a given day. On volatile trading days when the price fluctuation limit is reached or a trading halt is imposed, it may be impossible to enter into new positions or close out existing positions. If the market for a contract is not liquid because of price fluctuation limits or otherwise, it could prevent prompt liquidation of unfavorable positions, and potentially could require a fund to continue to hold a position until delivery or expiration regardless of changes in its value. As a result, a fund’s access to other assets held to cover its options positions could also be impaired.

Unlike exchange-traded options, which are standardized with respect to the underlying instrument, expiration date, contract size, and strike price, the terms of OTC options (options not traded on exchanges) generally are established through negotiation with the other party to the option contract. While this type of arrangement allows the purchaser or writer greater flexibility to tailor an option to its needs, OTC options generally are less liquid and involve greater credit risk than exchange-traded options, which are backed by the clearing organization of the exchanges where they are traded.

Combined positions involve purchasing and writing options in combination with each other, or in combination with futures or forward contracts, to adjust the risk and return characteristics of the overall position. For example, purchasing a put option and writing a call option on the same underlying instrument would construct a combined position whose risk and return characteristics are similar to selling a futures contract. Another possible combined position would involve writing a call option at one strike price and buying a call option at a lower price, to reduce the risk of the written call option in the event of a substantial price increase. Because combined options positions involve multiple trades, they result in higher transaction costs and may be more difficult to open and close out.

A fund may also buy and sell options on swaps (swaptions), which are generally options on interest rate swaps. An option on a swap gives a party the right (but not the obligation) to enter into a new swap agreement or to extend, shorten, cancel or modify an existing contract at a specific date in the future in exchange for a premium. Depending on the terms of the particular option agreement, a fund will generally incur a greater degree of risk when it writes (sells) an option on a swap than it will incur when it purchases an option on a swap. When a fund purchases an option on a swap, it risks losing only the amount of the premium it has paid should it decide to let the option expire unexercised. However, when a fund writes an option on a swap, upon exercise of the option the fund will become obligated according to the terms of the underlying agreement. A fund that writes an option on a swap receives the premium and bears the risk of unfavorable changes in the preset rate on the underlying interest rate swap. Whether a fund’s use of options on swaps will be successful in furthering its investment objective will depend on the adviser’s ability to predict correctly whether certain types of investments are likely to produce greater returns than other investments. Options on swaps may involve risks similar to those discussed below in “Swap Agreements.”

Because there are a limited number of types of exchange-traded options contracts, it is likely that the standardized contracts available will not match a fund’s current or anticipated investments exactly. A fund may invest in options contracts based on securities with different issuers, maturities, or other characteristics from the securities in which the fund typically invests, which involves a risk that the options position will not track the performance of the fund’s other investments.

Options prices can also diverge from the prices of their underlying instruments, even if the underlying instruments match a fund’s investments well. Options prices are affected by such factors as current and anticipated short-term interest rates, changes in volatility of the underlying instrument, and the time remaining until expiration of the contract, which may not affect security prices the same way. Imperfect correlation may also result from differing levels of demand in the options and futures markets and the securities markets, from structural differences in how options and futures and securities are traded, or from imposition of daily price fluctuation limits or trading halts. A fund may purchase or sell options contracts with a greater or lesser value than the securities it wishes to hedge or intends to purchase in order to attempt to compensate for differences in volatility between the contract and the securities, although this may not be successful in all cases. If price changes in a fund’s options positions are poorly correlated with its other investments, the positions may fail to produce anticipated gains or result in losses that are not offset by gains in other investments.

Swap Agreements. Swap agreements are two-party contracts entered into primarily by institutional investors. Cleared swaps are transacted through FCMs that are members of central clearinghouses with the clearinghouse serving as a central counterparty similar to transactions in futures contracts. In a standard “swap” transaction, two parties agree to exchange one or more payments based, for example, on the returns (or differentials in rates of return) earned or realized on particular predetermined investments or instruments (such as securities, commodities, indexes, or other financial or economic interests). The gross payments to be exchanged between the parties are calculated with respect to a notional amount, which is the predetermined dollar principal of the trade representing the hypothetical underlying quantity upon which payment obligations are computed.

Swap agreements can take many different forms and are known by a variety of names. Depending on how they are used, swap agreements may increase or decrease the overall volatility of a fund’s investments and its share price and, if applicable, its yield. Swap agreements are subject to liquidity risk, meaning that a fund may be unable to sell a swap contract to a third party at a favorable price. Certain standardized swap transactions are currently subject to mandatory central clearing or may be eligible for voluntary central clearing. Central clearing is expected to decrease counterparty risk and increase liquidity compared to uncleared swaps because central clearing interposes the central clearinghouse as the counterpart to each participant’s swap. However, central clearing does not eliminate counterparty risk or illiquidity risk entirely. In addition depending on the size of a fund and other factors, the margin required under the rules of a clearinghouse and by a clearing member FCM may be

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in excess of the collateral required to be posted by a fund to support its obligations under a similar uncleared swap. It is expected, however, that regulators will adopt rules imposing certain margin requirements, including minimums, on uncleared swaps in the near future, which could reduce the distinction.

A total return swap is a contract whereby one party agrees to make a series of payments to another party based on the change in the market value of the assets underlying such contract (which can include a security or other instrument, commodity, index or baskets thereof) during the specified period. In exchange, the other party to the contract agrees to make a series of payments calculated by reference to an interest rate and/or some other agreed-upon amount (including the change in market value of other underlying assets). A fund may use total return swaps to gain exposure to an asset without owning it or taking physical custody of it. For example, a fund investing in total return commodity swaps will receive the price appreciation of a commodity, commodity index or portion thereof in exchange for payment of an agreed-upon fee.

In a credit default swap, the credit default protection buyer makes periodic payments, known as premiums, to the credit default protection seller. In return the credit default protection seller will make a payment to the credit default protection buyer upon the occurrence of a specified credit event. A credit default swap can refer to a single issuer or asset, a basket of issuers or assets or index of assets, each known as the reference entity or underlying asset. A fund may act as either the buyer or the seller of a credit default swap. A fund may buy or sell credit default protection on a basket of issuers or assets, even if a number of the underlying assets referenced in the basket are lower-quality debt securities. In an unhedged credit default swap, a fund buys credit default protection on a single issuer or asset, a basket of issuers or assets or index of assets without owning the underlying asset or debt issued by the reference entity. Credit default swaps involve greater and different risks than investing directly in the referenced asset, because, in addition to market risk, credit default swaps include liquidity, counterparty and operational risk.

Credit default swaps allow a fund to acquire or reduce credit exposure to a particular issuer, asset or basket of assets. If a swap agreement calls for payments by a fund, the fund must be prepared to make such payments when due. If a fund is the credit default protection seller, the fund will experience a loss if a credit event occurs and the credit of the reference entity or underlying asset has deteriorated. If a fund is the credit default protection buyer, the fund will be required to pay premiums to the credit default protection seller.

If the creditworthiness of a fund’s swap counterparty declines, the risk that the counterparty may not perform could increase, potentially resulting in a loss to the fund. To limit the counterparty risk involved in swap agreements, a Fidelity ^® fund will enter into swap agreements only with counterparties that meet certain standards of creditworthiness.

A fund bears the risk of loss of the amount expected to be received under a swap agreement in the event of the default or bankruptcy of a swap agreement counterparty. In order to cover its outstanding obligations to a swap counterparty, a fund would generally be required to provide margin or collateral for the benefit of that counterparty. If a counterparty to a swap transaction becomes insolvent, the fund may be limited temporarily or permanently in exercising its right to the return of related fund assets designated as margin or collateral in an action against the counterparty.

Swap agreements are subject to the risk that the market value of the instrument will change in a way detrimental to a fund’s interest. A fund bears the risk that an adviser will not accurately forecast market trends or the values of assets, reference rates, indexes, or other economic factors in establishing swap positions for a fund. If an adviser attempts to use a swap as a hedge against, or as a substitute for, a portfolio investment, a fund may be exposed to the risk that the swap will have or will develop imperfect or no correlation with the portfolio investment, which could cause substantial losses for a fund. While hedging strategies involving swap instruments can reduce the risk of loss, they can also reduce the opportunity for gain or even result in losses by offsetting favorable price movements in other fund investments. Swaps are complex and often valued subjectively.

Hybrid and Preferred Securities.  A hybrid security may be a debt security, warrant, convertible security, certificate of deposit or other evidence of indebtedness on which the value of the interest on or principal of which is determined by reference to changes in the value of a reference instrument or financial strength of a reference entity ( e.g., a security or other financial instrument, asset, currency, interest rate, commodity, index, or business entity such as a financial institution). Another example is contingent convertible securities, which are fixed income securities that, under certain circumstances, either convert into common stock of the issuer or undergo a principal write-down by a predetermined percentage if the issuer’s capital ratio falls below a predetermined trigger level. The liquidation value of such a security may be reduced upon a regulatory action and without the need for a bankruptcy proceeding. Preferred securities may take the form of preferred stock and represent an equity or ownership interest in an issuer that pays dividends at a specified rate and that has precedence over common stock in the payment of dividends. In the event an issuer is liquidated or declares bankruptcy, the claims of owners of bonds generally take precedence over the claims of those who own preferred and common stock.

The risks of investing in hybrid and preferred securities reflect a combination of the risks of investing in securities, options, futures and currencies. An investment in a hybrid or preferred security may entail significant risks that are not associated with a similar investment in a traditional debt or equity security. The risks of a particular hybrid or preferred security will depend upon the terms of the instrument, but may include the possibility of significant changes in the value of any applicable reference instrument. Such risks may depend upon factors unrelated to the operations or credit quality of the issuer of the hybrid or preferred security. Hybrid and preferred securities are potentially more volatile and carry greater market and liquidity risks than traditional debt or equity securities. Also, the price of the hybrid or preferred security and any applicable reference instrument may not move in the same direction or at the same time. In addition, because hybrid and preferred securities may

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be traded over-the-counter or in bilateral transactions with the issuer of the security, hybrid and preferred securities may be subject to the creditworthiness of the counterparty of the security and their values may decline substantially if the counterparty’s creditworthiness deteriorates. In addition, uncertainty regarding the tax and regulatory treatment of hybrid and preferred securities may reduce demand for such securities and tax and regulatory considerations may limit the extent of a fund’s investments in certain hybrid and preferred securities.

Illiquid Securities  cannot be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of business at approximately the prices at which they are valued. Difficulty in selling securities may result in a loss or may be costly to a fund.

Under the supervision of the Board of Trustees, a Fidelity ^® fund’s adviser determines the liquidity of the fund’s investments and, through reports from the fund’s adviser, the Board monitors investments in illiquid securities.

Various factors may be considered in determining the liquidity of a fund’s investments, including (1) the frequency and volume of trades and quotations, (2) the number of dealers and prospective purchasers in the marketplace, (3) dealer undertakings to make a market, and (4) the nature of the security and the market in which it trades (including any demand, put or tender features, the mechanics and other requirements for transfer, any letters of credit or other credit enhancement features, any ratings, the number of holders, the method of soliciting offers, the time required to dispose of the security, and the ability to assign or offset the rights and obligations of the security).

Increasing Government Debt.  The total public debt of the United States and other countries around the globe as a percent of gross domestic product has grown rapidly since the beginning of the 2008 financial downturn. Although high debt levels do not necessarily indicate or cause economic problems, they may create certain systemic risks if sound debt management practices are not implemented.

A high national debt level may increase market pressures to meet government funding needs, which may drive debt cost higher and cause a country to sell additional debt, thereby increasing refinancing risk. A high national debt also raises concerns that a government will not be able to make principal or interest payments when they are due. In the worst case, unsustainable debt levels can decline the valuation of currencies, and can prevent a government from implementing effective counter-cyclical fiscal policy in economic downturns.

On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services lowered its long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States one level to “AA+” from “AAA.” While Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services affirmed the United States’ short-term sovereign credit rating as “A-1+,” there is no guarantee that Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services will not decide to lower this rating in the future. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services stated that its decision was prompted by its view on the rising public debt burden and its perception of greater policymaking uncertainty. The market prices and yields of securities supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government may be adversely affected by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services decisions to downgrade the long-term sovereign credit rating of the United States.

Indexed Securities  are instruments whose prices are indexed to the prices of other securities, securities indexes, or other financial indicators. Indexed securities typically, but not always, are debt securities or deposits whose values at maturity or coupon rates are determined by reference to a specific instrument, statistic, or measure.

Indexed securities also include commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and other fixed-income securities whose values at maturity or coupon interest rates are determined by reference to the returns of particular stock indexes. Indexed securities can be affected by stock prices as well as changes in interest rates and the creditworthiness of their issuers and may not track the indexes as accurately as direct investments in the indexes.

Indexed securities may have principal payments as well as coupon payments that depend on the performance of one or more interest rates. Their coupon rates or principal payments may change by several percentage points for every 1% interest rate change.

Mortgage-indexed securities, for example, could be structured to replicate the performance of mortgage securities and the characteristics of direct ownership.

Inflation-protected securities, for example, can be indexed to a measure of inflation, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

Commodity-indexed securities, for example, can be indexed to a commodities index such as the Bloomberg Commodity Index Total Return ^SM .

Gold-indexed securities typically provide for a maturity value that depends on the price of gold, resulting in a security whose price tends to rise and fall together with gold prices.

Currency-indexed securities typically are short-term to intermediate-term debt securities whose maturity values or interest rates are determined by reference to the values of one or more specified foreign currencies, and may offer higher yields than U.S. dollar-denominated securities. Currency-indexed securities may be positively or negatively indexed; that is, their maturity value may increase when the specified currency value increases, resulting in a security that performs similarly to a foreign-denominated instrument, or their maturity value may decline when foreign currencies increase, resulting in a security whose price characteristics are similar to a put on the underlying currency. Currency-indexed securities may also have prices that depend on the values of a number of different foreign currencies relative to each other.

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The performance of indexed securities depends to a great extent on the performance of the instrument or measure to which they are indexed, and may also be influenced by interest rate changes in the United States and abroad. Indexed securities may be more volatile than the underlying instruments or measures. Indexed securities are also subject to the credit risks associated with the issuer of the security, and their values may decline substantially if the issuer’s creditworthiness deteriorates. Recent issuers of indexed securities have included banks, corporations, and certain U.S. Government agencies.

Insolvency of Issuers, Counterparties, and Intermediaries.  Issuers of fund portfolio securities or counterparties to fund transactions that become insolvent or declare bankruptcy can pose special investment risks. In each circumstance, risk of loss, valuation uncertainty, increased illiquidity, and other unpredictable occurrences may negatively impact an investment. Each of these risks may be amplified in foreign markets, where security trading, settlement, and custodial practices can be less developed than those in the U.S. markets, and bankruptcy laws differ from those of the U.S.

As a general matter, if the issuer of a fund portfolio security is liquidated or declares bankruptcy, the claims of owners of bonds and preferred stock have priority over the claims of common stock owners. These events can negatively impact the value of the issuer’s securities and the results of related proceedings can be unpredictable.

If a counterparty to a fund transaction, such as a swap transaction, a short sale, a borrowing, or other complex transaction becomes insolvent, the fund may be limited in its ability to exercise rights to obtain the return of related fund assets or in exercising other rights against the counterparty. In addition, insolvency and liquidation proceedings take time to resolve, which can limit or preclude a fund’s ability to terminate a transaction or obtain related assets or collateral in a timely fashion. Uncertainty may also arise upon the insolvency of a securities or commodities intermediary such as a broker-dealer or futures commission merchant with which a fund has pending transactions. If an intermediary becomes insolvent, while securities positions and other holdings may be protected by U.S. or foreign laws, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether these protections are available to specific trades based on the circumstances. Receiving the benefit of these protections can also take time to resolve, which may result in illiquid positions.

Interfund Borrowing and Lending Program.  Pursuant to an exemptive order issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a Fidelity ^® fund may lend money to, and borrow money from, other funds advised by Fidelity Management & Research Company (FMR) or its affiliates. A Fidelity ^® fund will borrow through the program only when the costs are equal to or lower than the costs of bank loans. A Fidelity ^® fund will lend through the program only when the returns are higher than those available from an investment in repurchase agreements. Interfund loans and borrowings normally extend overnight, but can have a maximum duration of seven days. Loans may be called on one day’s notice. A Fidelity ^® fund may have to borrow from a bank at a higher interest rate if an interfund loan is called or not renewed. Any delay in repayment to a lending fund could result in a lost investment opportunity or additional borrowing costs.

Investment-Grade Debt Securities.  Investment-grade debt securities include all types of debt instruments that are of medium and high-quality. Investment-grade debt securities include repurchase agreements collateralized by U.S. Government securities as well as repurchase agreements collateralized by equity securities, non-investment-grade debt, and all other instruments in which a fund can perfect a security interest, provided the repurchase agreement counterparty has an investment-grade rating. Some investment-grade debt securities may possess speculative characteristics and may be more sensitive to economic changes and to changes in the financial conditions of issuers. An investment-grade rating means the security or issuer is rated investment-grade by a credit rating agency registered as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO) with the SEC (for example, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.), or is unrated but considered to be of equivalent quality by a fund’s adviser. For purposes of determining the maximum maturity of an investment-grade debt security, an adviser may take into account normal settlement periods.

Loans and Other Direct Debt Instruments.  Direct debt instruments are interests in amounts owed by a corporate, governmental, or other borrower to lenders or lending syndicates (loans and loan participations), to suppliers of goods or services (trade claims or other receivables), or to other parties. Direct debt instruments involve a risk of loss in case of default or insolvency of the borrower and may offer less legal protection to the purchaser in the event of fraud or misrepresentation, or there may be a requirement that a fund supply additional cash to a borrower on demand. A fund may acquire loans by buying an assignment of all or a portion of the loan from a lender or by purchasing a loan participation from a lender or other purchaser of a participation.

Lenders and purchasers of loans and other forms of direct indebtedness depend primarily upon the creditworthiness of the borrower for payment of interest and repayment of principal. If scheduled interest or principal payments are not made, the value of the instrument may be adversely affected. Loans that are fully secured provide more protections than an unsecured loan in the event of failure to make scheduled interest or principal payments. However, there is no assurance that the liquidation of collateral from a secured loan would satisfy the borrower’s obligation, or that the collateral could be liquidated. Indebtedness of borrowers whose creditworthiness is poor involves substantially greater risks and may be highly speculative. Borrowers that are in bankruptcy or restructuring may never pay off their indebtedness, or may pay only a small fraction of the amount owed. Direct indebtedness of foreign countries also involves a risk that the governmental entities responsible for the repayment of the debt may be unable, or unwilling, to pay interest and repay principal when due.

Direct lending and investments in loans through direct assignment of a financial institution’s interests with respect to a loan may involve additional risks. For example, if a loan is foreclosed, the lender/purchaser could become part owner of any collateral, and would bear the costs and liabilities associated with owning and disposing of the collateral. In addition, it is

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conceivable that under emerging legal theories of lender liability, a purchaser could be held liable as a co-lender. Direct debt instruments may also involve a risk of insolvency of the lending bank or other intermediary.

A loan is often administered by a bank or other financial institution that acts as agent for all holders. The agent administers the terms of the loan, as specified in the loan agreement. Unless, under the terms of the loan or other indebtedness, the purchaser has direct recourse against the borrower, the purchaser may have to rely on the agent to apply appropriate credit remedies against a borrower. If assets held by the agent for the benefit of a purchaser were determined to be subject to the claims of the agent’s general creditors, the purchaser might incur certain costs and delays in realizing payment on the loan or loan participation and could suffer a loss of principal or interest.

Direct indebtedness may include letters of credit, revolving credit facilities, or other standby financing commitments that obligate lenders/purchasers to make additional cash payments on demand. These commitments may have the effect of requiring a lender/purchaser to increase its investment in a borrower at a time when it would not otherwise have done so, even if the borrower’s condition makes it unlikely that the amount will ever be repaid.

For a Fidelity ^® fund that limits the amount of total assets that it will invest in any one issuer or in issuers within the same industry, the fund generally will treat the borrower as the “issuer” of indebtedness held by the fund. In the case of loan participations where a bank or other lending institution serves as financial intermediary between a fund and the borrower, if the participation does not shift to the fund the direct debtor-creditor relationship with the borrower, SEC interpretations require a fund, in appropriate circumstances, to treat both the lending bank or other lending institution and the borrower as “issuers” for these purposes. Treating a financial intermediary as an issuer of indebtedness may restrict a fund’s ability to invest in indebtedness related to a single financial intermediary, or a group of intermediaries engaged in the same industry, even if the underlying borrowers represent many different companies and industries.

Lower-Quality Debt Securities.  Lower-quality debt securities include all types of debt instruments that have poor protection with respect to the payment of interest and repayment of principal, or may be in default. These securities are often considered to be speculative and involve greater risk of loss or price changes due to changes in the issuer’s capacity to pay. The market prices of lower-quality debt securities may fluctuate more than those of higher-quality debt securities and may decline significantly in periods of general economic difficulty, which may follow periods of rising interest rates.

The market for lower-quality debt securities may be thinner and less active than that for higher-quality debt securities, which can adversely affect the prices at which the former are sold. Adverse publicity and changing investor perceptions may affect the liquidity of lower-quality debt securities and the ability of outside pricing services to value lower-quality debt securities.

Because the risk of default is higher for lower-quality debt securities, research and credit analysis are an especially important part of managing securities of this type. Such analysis may focus on relative values based on factors such as interest or dividend coverage, asset coverage, earnings prospects, and the experience and managerial strength of the issuer, in an attempt to identify those issuers of high-yielding securities whose financial condition is adequate to meet future obligations, has improved, or is expected to improve in the future.

A fund may choose, at its expense or in conjunction with others, to pursue litigation or otherwise to exercise its rights as a security holder to seek to protect the interests of security holders if it determines this to be in the best interest of the fund’s shareholders.

Precious Metals.  Precious metals, such as gold, silver, platinum, and palladium, at times have been subject to substantial price fluctuations over short periods of time and may be affected by unpredictable monetary and political policies such as currency devaluations or revaluations, economic and social conditions within a country, trade imbalances, or trade or currency restrictions between countries. The prices of gold and other precious metals, however, are less subject to local and company-specific factors than securities of individual companies. As a result, precious metals may be more or less volatile in price than securities of companies engaged in precious metals-related businesses. Investments in precious metals can present concerns such as delivery, storage and maintenance, possible illiquidity, and the unavailability of accurate market valuations. Although precious metals can be purchased in any form, including bullion and coins, a Fidelity ^® fund intends to purchase only those forms of precious metals that are readily marketable and that can be stored in accordance with custody regulations applicable to mutual funds. A fund may incur higher custody and transaction costs for precious metals than for securities. Also, precious metals investments do not pay income.

For a fund to qualify as a regulated investment company under current federal tax law, gains from selling precious metals may not exceed 10% of the fund’s gross income for its taxable year. This tax requirement could cause a fund to hold or sell precious metals or securities when it would not otherwise do so.

Real Estate Investment Trusts.  Equity real estate investment trusts own real estate properties, while mortgage real estate investment trusts make construction, development, and long-term mortgage loans. Their value may be affected by changes in the value of the underlying property of the trusts, the creditworthiness of the issuer, property taxes, interest rates, and tax and regulatory requirements, such as those relating to the environment. Both types of trusts are dependent upon management skill, are not diversified, and are subject to heavy cash flow dependency, defaults by borrowers, self-liquidation, and the possibility of failing to qualify for tax-free status of income under the Internal Revenue Code and failing to maintain exemption from the 1940 Act.

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Reforms and Government Intervention in the Financial Markets.  Economic downturns can trigger various economic, legal, budgetary, tax, and regulatory reforms across the globe. Instability in the financial markets in the wake of the 2008 economic downturn led the U.S. Government and other governments to take a number of unprecedented actions designed to support certain financial institutions and segments of the financial markets that experienced extreme volatility, and in some cases, a lack of liquidity. Reforms are ongoing and their effects are uncertain. Federal, state, local, foreign, and other governments, their regulatory agencies, or self-regulatory organizations may take actions that affect the regulation of the instruments in which a fund invests, or the issuers of such instruments, in ways that are unforeseeable. Reforms may also change the way in which a fund is regulated and could limit or preclude a fund’s ability to achieve its investment objective or engage in certain strategies. Also, while reforms generally are intended to strengthen markets, systems, and public finances, they could affect fund expenses and the value of fund investments.

The value of a fund’s holdings is also generally subject to the risk of future local, national, or global economic disturbances based on unknown weaknesses in the markets in which a fund invests. In the event of such a disturbance, the issuers of securities held by a fund may experience significant declines in the value of their assets and even cease operations, or may receive government assistance accompanied by increased restrictions on their business operations or other government intervention. In addition, it is not certain that the U.S. Government or foreign governments will intervene in response to a future market disturbance and the effect of any such future intervention cannot be predicted.

Repurchase Agreements  involve an agreement to purchase a security and to sell that security back to the original seller at an agreed-upon price. The resale price reflects the purchase price plus an agreed-upon incremental amount which is unrelated to the coupon rate or maturity of the purchased security. As protection against the risk that the original seller will not fulfill its obligation, the securities are held in a separate account at a bank, marked-to-market daily, and maintained at a value at least equal to the sale price plus the accrued incremental amount. The value of the security purchased may be more or less than the price at which the counterparty has agreed to purchase the security. In addition, delays or losses could result if the other party to the agreement defaults or becomes insolvent. A fund may be limited in its ability to exercise its right to liquidate assets related to a repurchase agreement with an insolvent counterparty. A Fidelity ^® fund may engage in repurchase agreement transactions with parties whose creditworthiness has been reviewed and found satisfactory by the fund’s adviser.

Restricted Securities  are subject to legal restrictions on their sale. Difficulty in selling securities may result in a loss or be costly to a fund. Restricted securities generally can be sold in privately negotiated transactions, pursuant to an exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), or in a registered public offering. Where registration is required, the holder of a registered security may be obligated to pay all or part of the registration expense and a considerable period may elapse between the time it decides to seek registration and the time it may be permitted to sell a security under an effective registration statement. If, during such a period, adverse market conditions were to develop, the holder might obtain a less favorable price than prevailed when it decided to seek registration of the security.

Reverse Repurchase Agreements.  In a reverse repurchase agreement, a fund sells a security to another party, such as a bank or broker-dealer, in return for cash and agrees to repurchase that security at an agreed-upon price and time. A Fidelity ^® fund may enter into reverse repurchase agreements with parties whose creditworthiness has been reviewed and found satisfactory by the fund’s adviser. Such transactions may increase fluctuations in the market value of a fund’s assets and, if applicable, a fund’s yield, and may be viewed as a form of leverage.

Securities Lending.  A Fidelity ^® fund may lend securities to parties such as broker-dealers or other institutions, including an affiliate. Fidelity ^® funds for which Geode Capital Management, LLC (Geode) serves as sub-adviser will not lend securities to Geode or its affiliate. Securities lending allows a fund to retain ownership of the securities loaned and, at the same time, earn additional income. The borrower provides the fund with collateral in an amount at least equal to the value of the securities loaned. The fund seeks to maintain the ability to obtain the right to vote or consent on proxy proposals involving material events affecting securities loaned. If the borrower defaults on its obligation to return the securities loaned because of insolvency or other reasons, a fund could experience delays and costs in recovering the securities loaned or in gaining access to the collateral. These delays and costs could be greater for foreign securities. If a fund is not able to recover the securities loaned, the fund may sell the collateral and purchase a replacement investment in the market. The value of the collateral could decrease below the value of the replacement investment by the time the replacement investment is purchased. For a Fidelity ^® fund, loans will be made only to parties deemed by the fund’s adviser to be in good standing and when, in the adviser’s judgment, the income earned would justify the risks.

Cash received as collateral through loan transactions may be invested in other eligible securities, including shares of a money market fund. Investing this cash subjects that investment, as well as the securities loaned, to market appreciation or depreciation.

Securities of Other Investment Companies,  including shares of closed-end investment companies (which include business development companies (BDCs)), unit investment trusts, and open-end investment companies, represent interests in professionally managed portfolios that may invest in any type of instrument. Investing in other investment companies involves substantially the same risks as investing directly in the underlying instruments, but may involve additional expenses at the underlying investment company-level, such as portfolio management fees and operating expenses. Fees and expenses incurred indirectly by a fund as a result of its investment in shares of one or more other investment companies generally are referred to as “acquired fund fees and expenses” and may appear as a separate line item in a fund’s prospectus fee table. For certain

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investment companies, such as BDCs, these expenses may be significant. Certain types of investment companies, such as closed-end investment companies, issue a fixed number of shares that trade on a stock exchange or over-the-counter at a premium or a discount to their NAV. Others are continuously offered at NAV, but may also be traded in the secondary market.

The securities of closed-end funds may be leveraged. As a result, a fund may be indirectly exposed to leverage through an investment in such securities. An investment in securities of closed-end funds that use leverage may expose a fund to higher volatility in the market value of such securities and the possibility that the fund’s long-term returns on such securities will be diminished.

The extent to which a fund can invest in securities of other investment companies may be limited by federal securities laws.

Short Sales.  Short sales involve the market sale of a security a fund has borrowed from a prime broker with which it has a contractual relationship, with the expectation that the security will underperform either the market or the securities that the fund holds long. A fund closes a short sale by purchasing the same security at the current market price and delivering it to the prime broker.

Until a fund closes out a short position, the fund is obligated to pay the prime broker (from which it borrowed the security sold short) interest as well as any dividends that accrue during the period of the loan. While a short position is outstanding, a fund must also pledge a portion of its assets to the prime broker as collateral for the borrowed security. The collateral will be marked to market daily.

Short positions create a risk that a fund will be required to cover them by buying the security at a time when the security has appreciated in value, thus resulting in a loss to the fund. A short position in a security poses more risk than holding the same security long. Because a short position loses value as the security’s price increases, the loss on a short sale is theoretically unlimited. The loss on a long position is limited to what a fund originally paid for the security together with any transaction costs. A fund may not always be able to borrow a security the fund seeks to sell short at a particular time or at an acceptable price. As a result, a fund may be unable to fully implement its investment strategy due to a lack of available stocks or for other reasons. It is possible that the market value of the securities a fund holds in long positions will decline at the same time that the market value of the securities the fund has sold short increases, thereby increasing the fund’s potential volatility. Because a fund may be required to pay dividends, interest, premiums and other expenses in connection with a short sale, any benefit for the fund resulting from the short sale will be decreased, and the amount of any ultimate gain will be decreased or of any loss will be increased, by the amount of such expenses.

A fund may also enter into short sales against the box. Short sales “against the box” are short sales of securities that a fund owns or has the right to obtain (equivalent in kind or amount to the securities sold short). If a fund enters into a short sale against the box, it will be required to set aside securities equivalent in kind and amount to the securities sold short (or securities convertible or exchangeable into such securities) and will be required to hold such securities while the short sale is outstanding. A fund will incur transaction costs, including interest expenses, in connection with opening, maintaining, and closing short sales against the box.

Sources of Liquidity or Credit Support.  Issuers may employ various forms of credit and liquidity enhancements, including letters of credit, guarantees, swaps, puts, and demand features, and insurance provided by domestic or foreign entities such as banks and other financial institutions. An adviser and its affiliates may rely on their evaluation of the credit of the issuer or the credit of the liquidity or credit enhancement provider in determining whether to purchase or hold a security supported by such enhancement. In evaluating the credit of a foreign bank or other foreign entities, factors considered may include whether adequate public information about the entity is available and whether the entity may be subject to unfavorable political or economic developments, currency controls, or other government restrictions that might affect its ability to honor its commitment. Changes in the credit quality of the issuer and/or entity providing the enhancement could affect the value of the security or a fund’s share price.

Sovereign Debt Obligations  are issued or guaranteed by foreign governments or their agencies, including debt of Latin American nations or other developing countries. Sovereign debt may be in the form of conventional securities or other types of debt instruments such as loans or loan participations. Sovereign debt of developing countries may involve a high degree of risk, and may be in default or present the risk of default. Governmental entities responsible for repayment of the debt may be unable or unwilling to repay principal and pay interest when due, and may require renegotiation or rescheduling of debt payments. In addition, prospects for repayment of principal and payment of interest may depend on political as well as economic factors. Although some sovereign debt, such as Brady Bonds, is collateralized by U.S. Government securities, repayment of principal and payment of interest is not guaranteed by the U.S. Government.

Structured Securities  (also called “structured notes”) are derivative debt securities, the interest rate on or principal of which is determined by an unrelated indicator. The value of the interest rate on and/or the principal of structured securities is determined by reference to changes in the value of a reference instrument ( e.g., a security or other financial instrument, asset, currency, interest rate, commodity, or index) or the relative change in two or more reference instruments. A structured security may be positively, negatively, or both positively and negatively indexed; that is, its value or interest rate may increase or decrease if the value of the reference instrument increases. Similarly, its value or interest rate may increase or decrease if the value of the reference instrument decreases. Further, the change in the principal amount payable with respect to, or the interest

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rate of, a structured security may be calculated as a multiple of the percentage change (positive or negative) in the value of the underlying reference instrument(s); therefore, the value of such structured security may be very volatile. Structured securities may entail a greater degree of market risk than other types of debt securities because the investor bears the risk of the reference instrument. Structured securities may also be more volatile, less liquid, and more difficult to accurately price than less complex securities or more traditional debt securities. In addition, because structured securities generally are traded over-the-counter, structured securities are subject to the creditworthiness of the counterparty of the structured security, and their values may decline substantially if the counterparty’s creditworthiness deteriorates.

Temporary Defensive Policies.  In response to market, economic, political, or other conditions, a fund may temporarily use a different investment strategy for defensive purposes. If a fund does so, different factors could affect the fund’s performance and the fund may not achieve its investment objective. Strategic Advisers ^® Fidelity ^® Emerging Markets Fund reserves the right to invest without limitation in preferred stocks and investment-grade debt instruments for temporary, defensive purposes.

Transfer Agent Bank Accounts.  Proceeds from shareholder purchases of a Fidelity ^® fund may pass through a series of demand deposit bank accounts before being held at the fund’s custodian. Redemption proceeds may pass from the custodian to the shareholder through a similar series of bank accounts.

If a bank account is registered to the transfer agent or an affiliate, who acts as an agent for the fund when opening, closing, and conducting business in the bank account, the transfer agent or an affiliate may invest overnight balances in the account in repurchase agreements. Any balances that are not invested in repurchase agreements remain in the bank account overnight. Any risks associated with such an account are investment risks of the fund. The fund faces the risk of loss of these balances if the bank becomes insolvent.

Warrants.  Warrants are instruments which entitle the holder to buy an equity security at a specific price for a specific period of time. Changes in the value of a warrant do not necessarily correspond to changes in the value of its underlying security. The price of a warrant may be more volatile than the price of its underlying security, and a warrant may offer greater potential for capital appreciation as well as capital loss.

Warrants do not entitle a holder to dividends or voting rights with respect to the underlying security and do not represent any rights in the assets of the issuing company. A warrant ceases to have value if it is not exercised prior to its expiration date. These factors can make warrants more speculative than other types of investments.

Zero Coupon Bonds  do not make interest payments; instead, they are sold at a discount from their face value and are redeemed at face value when they mature. Because zero coupon bonds do not pay current income, their prices can be more volatile than other types of fixed-income securities when interest rates change. In calculating a fund’s dividend, a portion of the difference between a zero coupon bond’s purchase price and its face value is considered income.

In addition to the investment policies and limitations discussed above, a fund is subject to the additional operational risk discussed below.

Considerations Regarding Cybersecurity. With the increased use of technologies such as the Internet to conduct business, a fund’s service providers are susceptible to operational, information security and related risks. In general, cyber incidents can result from deliberate attacks or unintentional events and may arise from external or internal sources. Cyber attacks include, but are not limited to, gaining unauthorized access to digital systems (e.g., through “hacking” or malicious software coding) for purposes of misappropriating assets or sensitive information; corrupting data, equipment or systems; or causing operational disruption. Cyber attacks may also be carried out in a manner that does not require gaining unauthorized access, such as causing denial-of-service attacks on websites (i.e., efforts to make network services unavailable to intended users). Cyber incidents affecting a fund’s manager, any sub-adviser and other service providers (including, but not limited to, fund accountants, custodians, transfer agents and financial intermediaries) have the ability to cause disruptions and impact business operations, potentially resulting in financial losses, interference with a fund’s ability to calculate its NAV, impediments to trading, the inability of fund shareholders to transact business, destruction to equipment and systems, violations of applicable privacy and other laws, regulatory fines, penalties, reputational damage, reimbursement or other compensation costs, or additional compliance costs. Similar adverse consequences could result from cyber incidents affecting issuers of securities in which a fund invests, counterparties with which a fund engages in transactions, governmental and other regulatory authorities, exchange and other financial market operators, banks, brokers, dealers, insurance companies and other financial institutions (including financial intermediaries and service providers for fund shareholders) and other parties. In addition, substantial costs may be incurred in order to prevent any cyber incidents in the future.

While a fund’s service providers have established business continuity plans in the event of, and risk management systems to prevent, such cyber incidents, there are inherent limitations in such plans and systems including the possibility that certain risks have not been identified. Furthermore, a fund cannot control the cyber security plans and systems put in place by its service providers or any other third parties whose operations may affect a fund or its shareholders. A fund and its shareholders could be negatively impacted as a result.

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SPECIAL GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS

Emerging Markets. Investments in companies domiciled in emerging market countries may be subject to potentially higher risks than investments in developed countries. These risks include: (i) less social, political, and economic stability; (ii) greater illiquidity and price volatility due to smaller or limited local capital markets for such securities, or low or non-existent trading volumes; (iii) foreign exchanges and broker-dealers may be subject to less oversight and regulation by local authorities; (iv) local governments may decide to seize or confiscate securities held by foreign investors, restrict an investor’s ability to sell or redeem securities, decide to suspend or limit an issuer’s ability to make dividend or interest payments; and/or may limit or entirely restrict repatriation of invested capital, profits, and dividends; (v) capital gains may be subject to local taxation, including on a retroactive basis; (vi) issuers facing restrictions on dollar or euro payments imposed by local governments may attempt to make dividend or interest payments to foreign investors in the local currency; (vii) investors may experience difficulty in enforcing legal claims related to the securities and/or local judges may favor the interests of the issuer over those of foreign investors; (viii) bankruptcy judgments may only be permitted to be paid in the local currency; (ix) limited public information regarding the issuer may result in greater difficulty in determining market valuations of the securities; and (x) infrequent financial reporting, substandard disclosure, and differences in accounting standards may make it difficult to ascertain the financial health of an issuer. In addition, unlike developed countries, many emerging countries’ economic growth highly depends on exports and inflows of external capital, making them more vulnerable to the downturns of the world economy. The enduring low growth in the global economy has weakened the global demand for emerging market exports and tightened international credit supplies, highlighting the sensitivity of emerging economies to the performance of their trading partners. As the pace of economic growth in China declines and commodities continue to experience price volatility, emerging markets may face significant economic difficulties as demand for their exports weakens. Developing countries may also face disproportionately large exposure to the negative effects of climate change, due to both geography and a lack of access to technology to adapt to its effects, which could include increased frequency and severity of natural disasters and extreme weather events such as droughts, rising sea levels, decreased crop yields, and increased spread of disease, all of which could harm performance of affected economies. Given the particular vulnerability of emerging market countries to the effects of climate change, disruptions in international efforts to address climate-related issues may have a disproportionate impact on developing countries.

Many emerging market countries suffer from uncertainty and corruption in their legal frameworks. Legislation may be difficult to interpret and laws may be too new to provide any precedential value. Laws regarding foreign investment and private property may be weak, not enforced consistently, or non-existent. Sudden changes in governments or the transition of regimes may result in policies that are less favorable to investors such as the imposition of price controls or policies designed to expropriate or nationalize “sovereign” assets. Certain emerging market countries in the past have expropriated large amounts of private property, in many cases with little or no compensation, and there can be no assurance that such expropriation will not occur in the future.

The United States may impose economic sanctions against emerging market companies in various sectors in which a fund may invest. These sanctions, if imposed, could have a materially adverse effect on the value of such companies’ securities, delay a fund’s ability to exercise certain rights as security holder, and/or impair a fund’s ability to meet its investment objectives. A fund may be prohibited from investing in securities issued by companies subject to such sanctions and may be required to freeze its existing investments in those companies, prohibiting the fund from selling or otherwise transacting in these investments. Such sanctions, or other intergovernmental actions that may be taken in the future, may result in the devaluation of the country’s currency, a downgrade in the country’s credit rating, and/or a decline in the value and liquidity of impacted company stocks.

Many emerging market countries in which a fund may invest lack the social, political, and economic stability characteristic exhibited by developed countries. Political instability among emerging market countries can be common and may be caused by an uneven distribution of wealth, governmental corruption, social unrest, labor strikes, civil wars, and religious oppression. Economic instability in emerging market countries may take the form of: (i) high interest rates; (ii) high levels of inflation, including hyperinflation; (iii) high levels of unemployment or underemployment; (iv) changes in government economic and tax policies, including confiscatory taxation (or taxes on foreign investments); and (v) imposition of trade barriers.

Currencies of emerging market countries are subject to significantly greater risks than currencies of developed countries. Some emerging market currencies may not be internationally traded or may be subject to strict controls by local governments, resulting in undervalued or overvalued currencies. Some emerging market countries have experienced balance of payment deficits and shortages in foreign exchange reserves, which has resulted in some governments restricting currency conversions. Future restrictive exchange controls could prevent or restrict a company’s ability to make dividend or interest payments in the original currency of the obligation (usually U.S. dollars). In addition, even though the currencies of some emerging market countries may be convertible into U.S. dollars, the conversion rates may be artificial relative to their actual market values.

Governments of many emerging market countries have become overly reliant on the international capital markets and other forms of foreign credit to finance large public spending programs which cause huge budget deficits. Often, interest payments have become too overwhelming for these governments to meet, as these payments may represent a large percentage of a country’s total GDP. Accordingly, these foreign obligations have become the subject of political debate within emerging market countries, which has resulted in internal pressure for such governments to not make payments to foreign creditors, but instead to use these funds for social programs. As a result of either an inability to pay or submission to political pressure, the governments sought to

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restructure their loan and/or bond obligations, have declared a temporary suspension of interest payments, or defaulted (in part or full) on their outstanding debt obligations. These events have adversely affected the values of securities issued by the governments and corporations domiciled in these emerging market countries and have negatively affected not only their cost of borrowing, but their ability to borrow in the future as well. Emerging markets have also benefited from continued monetary policies adopted by the central banks of developed countries. To date, interest rates in the U.S. and certain European countries are at or near historically low levels. The U.S. Federal Reserve, however, ended its quantitative easing program in 2014 and has begun, and may continue to raise interest rates. To the extent the Federal Reserve Board continues to raise interest rates, there is a risk that rates across the global financial system may rise.

In addition to their continued reliance on international capital markets, many emerging economies are also highly dependent on international trade and exports, including exports of oil and other commodities. As a result, these economies are particularly vulnerable to downturns of the world economy. In recent years, emerging market economies have been subject to tightened international credit supplies and weakened global demand for their exports and, as a result, certain of these economies faced significant difficulties and some economies face recessionary concerns. Over the last decade, emerging market countries, and companies domiciled in such countries, have acquired significant debt levels. Any further increase in U.S. interest rates could restrict the access to relatively inexpensive credit supplies and jeopardize the ability of emerging market countries to pay their respective debt service obligations. Although certain emerging market economies have shown signs of growth and recovery, continued growth is dependent on the uncertain economic outlook of China, Japan, the European Union, and the United States. The reduced demand for exports and lack of available capital for investment resulting from the European debt crisis, a slowdown in China, and persistent low growth in the global economy may inhibit growth for emerging market countries.

Canada.

Political. Canada’s parliamentary system of government is, in general, stable. Quebec does have a “separatist” opposition party whose objective is to achieve sovereignty and increased self-governing legal and financial powers for the province. To date, referendums on Quebec sovereignty have not been successful. If a referendum in favor of the independence of Quebec were successful, the Canadian federal government may be obliged to negotiate with Quebec.

Economic. Canada is a major producer of commodities such as forest products, metals, agricultural products, and energy related products like oil, gas, and hydroelectricity. Accordingly, events affecting the supply and demand of base commodity resources and industrial and precious metals and materials, both domestically and internationally, can have a significant effect on Canadian market performance.

The United States is Canada’s largest trading partner and developments in economic policy and U.S. market conditions have a significant impact on the Canadian economy. The expanding economic and financial integration of the United States, Canada, and Mexico through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may make the Canadian economy and securities market more sensitive to North American trade patterns. Any disruption in the continued operation of NAFTA, or any attempts to substantively renegotiate its terms, may have a significant and adverse impact on Canada’s economic outlook and the value of a fund’s investments in Canada.

Growth has continued to slow in recent years for certain sectors of the Canadian economy, particularly energy extraction and manufacturing. Forecasts on growth remain modest, especially as the prices for commodities, in particular oil, have fallen in recent years, adversely affecting the Canadian economy. Furthermore, enduring volatility in the strength of the Canadian dollar may negatively impact Canada’s ability to export, which could limit Canada’s economic growth.

Europe. The European Union (EU) is an intergovernmental and supranational union of European countries spanning the continent, each known as a member state. One of the key activities of the EU is the establishment and administration of a common single market, consisting of, among other things, a common trade policy. In order to further the integration of the economies of member states, member states established, among other things, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a collection of policies that set out different stages and commitments that member states need to follow to achieve greater economic policy coordination and monetary cooperation, including the adoption of a single currency, the euro. While all EU member states participate in the economic union, only certain EU member states have adopted the euro as their currency. When a member state adopts the euro as its currency, the member state no longer controls its own monetary policies. Instead, the authority to direct monetary policy is exercised by the European Central Bank (ECB).

While economic and monetary convergence in the EU may offer opportunities for those investing in the region, investors should be aware that the success of the EU is not wholly assured. European countries can be significantly affected by the tight fiscal and monetary controls that the EU governing institutions may impose on its members or with which candidates for EMU membership are required to comply. Europe must grapple with a number of challenges, any one of which could threaten the sustained economic growth, regulatory efficiency, or political survival of the political and economic union. The countries adopting the euro must adjust to a unified monetary system, which has resulted in the loss of exchange rate flexibility and some degree of economic sovereignty. Europe’s economies are diverse, governance is decentralized, and its cultures differ widely. Unemployment in some European countries has historically been higher than in the United States, and a number of countries continue to face abnormally high unemployment levels, particularly for younger workers, which could pose a political risk. Many EU nations are susceptible to the economic risks associated with high levels of debt, notably due to investments in sovereign debts of European countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Republic of Ireland. Member states

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may seek to exit the EU, encouraging further separatism as well as threatening economic stability and regulatory and business continuity, as exemplified by the United Kingdom’s 2016 vote to leave the EU. The EU continues to face major issues involving its membership, structure, procedures and policies, including the successful political, economic and social integration of new member states, the EU’s resettlement and distribution of refugees, and resolution of the EU’s problematic fiscal and democratic accountability. Efforts of the member states to continue to unify their economic and monetary policies may increase the potential for similarities in the movements of European markets and reduce the benefit of diversification within the region.

Political. Over the last two decades, the EU has extended its membership and influence to the countries of eastern Europe. It has accepted several Eastern European countries as new members, and has engaged with several other countries regarding future enlargement. Membership for these states is intended to, among other things, cement economic and political stability across the region. For these countries, membership serves as a strong political impetus to engage in regulatory and political reforms and to employ tight fiscal and monetary policies. Nevertheless, certain new member states, particularly former satellites of the former Soviet Union, remain burdened to various extents by certain infrastructural, bureaucratic, and business inefficiencies inherited from their history of economic central planning. Further expansion of the EU has long-term economic benefits for both member states and potential expansion candidates. However, certain European countries are not viewed as currently suitable for membership, especially countries further east with less developed economies. Also, as the EU continues to enlarge, the candidate countries’ accessions may grow more controversial. Some member states may reject the accession of certain candidate countries on concerns about the possible economic, immigration, and cultural implications that may result from such enlargement. The current and future status of the EU therefore continues to be the subject of political controversy, with widely differing views both within and between member states. The growth of nationalist and populist parties in both national legislatures and the European Parliament may further threaten enlargement, and impede both national and supranational governance.

The EU also faces a significant threat from member states seeking to leave the EU. Most recently, the United Kingdom held a popular referendum in which it voted to leave the EU. The full effect, and unforeseen collateral consequences, of the so-called “Brexit” vote remain unclear, particularly with respect to the withdrawal process and the outcome of negotiations of a new relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU. Further, the United Kingdom vote to leave the EU signals potential vulnerability of the EU and its component member states that may experience similar separatist movements in the future. The pending exit by the United Kingdom, as well as the possibility of similar initiatives in other EU member states, continue to cause significant uncertainty over the returns of investments in both the United Kingdom and other EU member states.

An increasingly assertive Russia poses its own set of risks for the EU. Opposition to EU expansion to members of the former Soviet bloc may prompt more intervention by Russia in the affairs of its neighbors, as seen in Ukraine since 2014 and Georgia in 2008. This interventionist stance may carry various negative consequences, including direct effects, such as export restrictions on Russia’s natural resources, Russian support for separatist groups or pro-Russian parties located in EU countries, or externalities of ongoing conflict, such as an influx of refugees from Ukraine and Syria, or collateral damage to foreign assets in conflict zones, all of which could negatively impact EU economic activity.

It is possible that, as wealth and income inequality grow both within and between individual member states, socioeconomic and political tensions may be exacerbated. The potential direct and indirect consequences of this growing gap may be substantial.

The transition to a more unified economic system also brings significant uncertainty. Significant political decisions will be made that may affect market regulation, subsidization, and privatization across all industries, from agricultural products to telecommunications, that may have unpredictable effects on member states and companies within those states.

The influx of migrants and asylum seekers, primarily from Africa and the Middle East, also poses certain risks to the EU. Ongoing conflicts around the world, particularly the civil war in Syria, and economic hardship across Africa and the developing world have produced an outflow of refugees and migrants seeking resettlement in the EU. Resettlement itself may be costly for individual member states, particularly those border countries on the periphery of the EU where migrants first enter. In addition, pressing questions over accepting, processing and distributing migrants have been a significant source of intergovernmental disagreements and could pose significant dangers to the integrity of the EU.

Economic. As economic conditions across member states may vary widely, there is continued concern about national-level support for the euro and the accompanying coordination of fiscal and wage policy among EMU member states. Member states must maintain tight control over inflation, public debt, and budget deficits in order to qualify for participation in the euro. These requirements severely limit EMU member states’ ability to implement fiscal policy to address regional economic conditions. Moreover, member states that use the euro cannot devalue their currencies in the face of economic downturn, precluding them from stoking inflation to reduce their real debt burden and potentially rendering their exports less competitive.

As negotiations related to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU are ongoing, there is significant economic and regulatory uncertainty that has resulted in volatile markets for the United Kingdom and broader international financial markets. While the long-term effects of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal remain unclear, in the short term, financial markets may experience, among other things, greater volatility and/or illiquidity, currency fluctuations, and a decline in cross-border investment between the United Kingdom and the EU. The short- and long-term effect of the withdrawal and subsequent relationship re-negotiation may negatively impact a fund’s investment in the region.

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The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 brought several small countries in Europe to the brink of sovereign default. Many other economies fell into recession, decreasing tax receipts and widening budget deficits. In response, many countries of Europe have implemented fiscal austerity, decreasing discretionary spending in an attempt to decrease their budget deficits. However, many European governments continue to face high levels of public debt and substantial budget deficits, some with shrinking government expenditures, which hinder economic growth in the region and may still threaten the continued viability of the EMU. Due to these large public deficits, some European issuers may continue to have difficulty accessing capital and may be dependent on emergency assistance from European governments and institutions to avoid defaulting on their outstanding debt obligations. The availability of such assistance, however, may be contingent on an issuer’s implementation of certain reforms or reaching a required level of performance, which may increase the possibility of default. Such prospects could inject significant volatility into European markets, which may reduce the liquidity or value of a fund’s investments in the region. Likewise, the high levels of public debt raise the possibility that certain European issuers may be forced to restructure their debt obligations, which could cause a fund to lose the value of its investments in any such issuer.

The legacy of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the European sovereign debt crisis, and the ongoing recession in parts of Europe have left the banking and financial sectors of many European countries weakened and, in some cases, fragile. Many institutions remain saddled with high default rates on loans, still hold assets of indeterminate value, and have been forced to maintain higher capital reserves under new regulations. This has led to decreased returns from finance and banking directly, and has constricted the sector’s ability to lend, thus potentially reducing future returns and constricting economic growth. Further reducing the returns to the banking sector have been the historically low interest rates in Europe prompted by the ECB’s expanded asset purchase program. However, the asset purchase program is but one of the ECB’s policy actions in response to the European sovereign debt crisis and persistent economic stagnation. The ECB has sought to spur economic growth and ward off deflation by engaging in quantitative easing, lowering the ECB’s benchmark rate into negative territory, and opening a liquidity channel to encourage bank lending.

Ongoing regulatory uncertainty could have a negative effect on the value of a fund’s investments in the region. A group of EU countries, led by France and Germany, have been trying to enact a financial transactions tax since 2014. Although the passage of the proposal is in doubt, if enacted, the tax as proposed could have broad effects on the financial industry in Europe. Moreover, governments across the EMU are facing increasing opposition to certain measures taken in response to the recent economic crises. For example, efforts to reduce public spending in certain countries have been met with large-scale protests. In light of such uncertainty, the risk that certain member states will abandon the euro persists, and any such occurrence would likely have wide-ranging effects on global markets that are difficult to predict. However, these effects would likely have a negative impact on a fund’s investments in the region.

Although some European economies have begun to show more sustained economic growth, the ongoing debt crisis, political and regulatory responses to the financial crisis and uncertainty over the future of the EMU and the EU itself may continue to limit short-term growth and economic recovery in the region. Some countries have experienced prolonged stagnation or returns to recession, raising the possibility that other European economies could follow suit. Economic challenges facing the region include high levels of public debt, significant rates of unemployment, aging populations, heavy regulation of non-financial businesses, persistent trade deficits, rigid labor markets, and inability to access credit. Although certain of these challenges may weigh more heavily on some European economies than others, the economic integration of the region increases the likelihood that an economic downturn in one country may spread to others. Should Europe fall into another recession, the value of a fund’s investments in the region may be affected.

Currency. Investing in euro-denominated securities (or securities denominated in other European currencies) entails risk of being exposed to a currency that may not fully reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the disparate European economies. In addition, many European countries rely heavily upon export-dependent businesses and significant change in the exchange rate between the euro and the U.S. dollar can have either a positive or a negative effect upon corporate profits and the performance of EU investments. In addition, foreign exchange markets have recently experienced sustained periods of high volatility, subjecting a fund’s foreign investments to additional risks.

Nordic Countries. The Nordic countries – Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden – relate to European integration in different ways. Norway and Iceland are outside the EU, although they are members of the European Economic Area. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are EU members, but only Finland has adopted the euro as its currency, while Denmark has pegged its currency to the euro. Faced with stronger global competition, some Nordic countries have had to scale down their historically generous welfare programs, resulting in drops in domestic demand and increased unemployment. Major industries in the region, such as forestry, agriculture, and oil, face pressure as a result of high labor costs. Economic growth in many Nordic countries continues to be constrained by tight labor markets and adverse European and global economic conditions, particularly the volatility in global commodity demand. The Nordic countries’ once-vital manufacturing sector has experienced continued contraction due to outsourcing and flagging demand, spurring increasing unemployment. Furthermore, the protracted recovery due to the ongoing European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy may limit the growth prospects of the Nordic economies.

Eastern Europe. Investing in the securities of Eastern European issuers is highly speculative and involves risks not usually associated with investing in the more developed markets of Western Europe. Political and economic reforms are too recent to establish a definite trend away from centrally planned economies and state-owned industries. Investments in Eastern European countries may involve risks of nationalization, expropriation, and confiscatory taxation.

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Many Eastern European countries continue to move towards market economies at different paces with varying characteristics. Many Eastern European markets suffer from thin trading activity, dubious investor protections, and often a lack of reliable corporate information. Information and transaction costs, differential taxes, and sometimes political, regulatory, or transfer risk may give a comparative advantage to the domestic investor rather than the foreign investor. In addition, these markets are particularly sensitive to social, political, economic, and currency events in Western Europe and Russia and may suffer heavy losses as a result of their trading and investment links to these economies and their currencies. In particular, the disruption to the Russian economy as a result of sanctions imposed by the United States and EU in connection with Russia’s involvement in Ukraine may hurt Eastern European economies with close trade links to Russia. Russia may also attempt to directly assert its influence in the region through coercive use of its economic, military, and natural resources.

In some of the countries of Eastern Europe, there is no stock exchange or formal market for securities. Such countries may also have government exchange controls, currencies with no recognizable market value relative to the established currencies of Western market economies, little or no experience in trading in securities, weak or nonexistent accounting or financial reporting standards, a lack of banking and securities infrastructure to handle such trading and a legal tradition without strongly defined property rights. Due to the value of trade and investment between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, credit and debt issues and other economic difficulties affecting Western Europe and its financial institutions can negatively affect Eastern European countries.

Eastern European economies may also be particularly susceptible to the volatility of the international credit market due to their reliance on bank related inflows of foreign capital. Although many Eastern European economies have experienced modest growth for several periods due, in part, to external demand, tighter labor markets, and the attraction of foreign investment, major challenges persist as a result of their continued dependence on Western European countries for credit and trade. Accordingly, the European crisis may present serious risks for Eastern European economies, which may have a negative effect on a fund’s investments in the region.

Several Eastern European countries on the periphery of the EU have recently been the destination for a surge of refugees and migrants fleeing global conflict zones, particularly the civil war in Syria and economic hardship across Africa and the developing world. While these countries have borne many of the direct costs of managing the flow of refugees and migrants seeking resettlement in Europe, they have also faced significant international criticism over their treatment of migrants and refugees which may affect foreign investor confidence in the attractiveness of such markets.

Japan. Japan continues to recover from recurring recessionary forces that have negatively impacted Japan’s economic growth over the last decade. Despite signs of economic growth in recent years, Japan is still vulnerable to persistent underlying systemic risks. For instance, Japan continues to face massive government debt, an aging and shrinking of the population, an uncertain financial sector, low domestic consumption, and certain corporate structural weaknesses, which remain some of the major long-term problems of the Japanese economy.

Overseas trade is important to Japan’s economy and its economic growth is significantly driven by its exports. Meanwhile, Japan’s aging and shrinking population increases the cost of the country’s pension and public welfare system and lowers domestic demand, making Japan more dependent on exports to sustain its economy. Therefore, any developments that negatively affect Japan’s exports could present risks to a fund’s investments in Japan. For example, domestic or foreign trade sanctions or other protectionist measures could harm Japan’s economy. In addition, currency fluctuations may also significantly affect Japan’s economy, as a stronger yen would negatively impact Japan’s ability to export. Likewise, any escalation of tensions in the region, including disruptions caused by political tensions with North Korea or territorial disputes with Japan’s major trading partners, may adversely impact Japan’s economic outlook. Japan is also particularly susceptible to the effects of declining growth rates in China, Japan’s largest export market. Given that China is a large importer of Japanese goods and is a significant source of global economic growth, a continued Chinese slowdown may negatively impact Japanese economic growth both directly and indirectly. Similarly, the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy could present additional risks to a fund’s investments in Japan.

Japan’s economic recovery has been affected by economic stress resulting from a number of natural disasters, including disasters that caused damage to nuclear power plants in the region, which have introduced volatility into Japan’s financial markets. In response to these events, the government has injected capital into the economy and reconstruction efforts in disaster-affected areas in order to stimulate economic growth. The risks of natural disasters of varying degrees, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, continue to persist. The full extent of the impact of recurring natural disasters on Japan’s economy and foreign investment in Japan is difficult to estimate.

Although Japanese banks are stable, maintaining large capital bases, they continue to face difficulties generating profits. In recent years, Japan has employed a program of monetary loosening, fiscal stimulus, and growth-oriented structural reform, which has generated limited success in raising growth rates. Although Japan’s central bank has continued its quantitative easing program, there is no guarantee such efforts will be sufficient or that additional stimulus policies will not be necessary in the future. Furthermore, the long term potential of this strategy remains uncertain, as the slow growth following the first of two planned increases in Japan’s consumption tax put the second round of increases in doubt.

Asia Pacific Region (ex Japan). Many countries in the region have historically faced political uncertainty, corruption, military intervention, and social unrest. Examples include military threats on the Korean peninsula and along the Taiwan Strait, the ethnic, sectarian, extremist, and/or separatist violence found in Indonesia and the Philippines, and the nuclear arms

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threats between India and Pakistan. To the extent that such events continue in the future, they can be expected to have a negative effect on economic and securities market conditions in the region. In addition, the Asia Pacific geographic region has historically been prone to natural disasters. The occurrence of a natural disaster in the region could negatively impact the economy of any country in the region.

Economic. The economies of many countries in the region are heavily dependent on international trade and are accordingly affected by protective trade barriers and the economic conditions of their trading partners, principally, the United States, Japan, China, and the European Union. The countries in this region are also heavily dependent on exports and are thus particularly vulnerable to any weakening in global demand for these products. Many countries in the region are economically reliant on a wide range of commodity exports. Consequently, countries in this region have been adversely affected by the persistent volatility in global commodity prices and are particularly susceptible to declines in growth rates in China. Additionally, countries in this region have experienced high debt levels, an issue that is being compounded by weakened local currencies. Although the economies of many countries in the region have exhibited signs of growth, such improvements, if sustained, may be gradual. Furthermore, any such growth may be limited or hindered by the reduced demand for exports due to a continued economic slowdown in China, which could significantly reduce demand for the natural resources many Asia Pacific economies export. Because China has been such a major source of demand for raw materials and a supplier of foreign direct investment to exporting economies, the slowdown of the Chinese economy could significantly affect regional growth. In addition, the trading relationship between China and a number of Asia Pacific countries has been strained by the geopolitical conflict created by competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, which has created diplomatic tension in the region that may adversely impact the economies of the affected countries. Regional growth may also be limited by lack of available capital for investment resulting from the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy, as well as increases in interest rates and the tapering of other monetary policies adopted by the central banks of developed countries.

The Republic of Korea (South Korea). Investing in South Korea involves risks not typically associated with investing in the U.S. securities markets. Investments in South Korea are, in part, dependent on the maintenance of peaceful relations with North Korea, on both a bilateral and global basis. Relations between the two countries remain tense, as exemplified in periodic acts of hostility, and the possibility of serious military engagement still exists. Any escalation in hostility, initiation of military conflict, or collateral consequences of internal instability within North Korea would likely cause a substantial disruption in South Korea’s economy, as well as the region as a whole.

South Korea’s economic reliance on international trade makes it highly sensitive to fluctuations in international commodity prices, currency exchange rates and government regulation, and vulnerable to downturns of the world economy. South Korea has experienced modest economic growth in recent years, such continued growth may slow due, in part, to a continued economic slowdown in China. South Korea is particularly sensitive to the economic volatility of its four largest export markets (the European Union, Japan, United States, and China), which all face varying degrees of economic uncertainty, including persistent low growth rates. The economic weakness of South Korea’s most important trading partners could stifle demand for South Korean exports and damage its own economic growth outlook. In particular, given that China is both a large importer of South Korean goods and a significant source of global demand, a continued Chinese slowdown may, directly or indirectly, negatively impact South Korean economic growth. The South Korean economy’s long-term challenges include a rapidly aging population, inflexible labor market, dominance of large conglomerates, and overdependence on exports to drive economic growth.

China Region. The China Region encompasses the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The region is highly interconnected and interdependent, with relationships and tensions built on trade, finance, culture, and politics. The economic success of China will continue to have an outsized influence on the growth and prosperity of both Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Although the People’s Republic of China has experienced three decades of unprecedented growth, it now faces a slowing economy that is due, in part, to China’s effort to shift away from an export-driven economy. Other contributing factors to the slowdown include lower-than-expected industrial output growth, reductions in consumer spending, and a decline in the real estate market, which many observers believed to be inflated. Further, local governments, which had borrowed heavily to bolster growth, face high debt burdens and limited revenue sources. Demand for Chinese exports by Western countries, including the United States and Europe, may weaken due to the effects of weakened economic growth in those countries resulting from the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy. Additionally, Chinese land reclamation projects, actions to lay claim to disputed islands, and China’s attempt to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea have caused strains in China’s relationship with various regional trading partners, and could cause further disruption to regional trade. In the long term, China’s ability to develop and sustain a credible legal, regulatory, monetary, and socioeconomic system could influence the course of foreign investment in China.

Hong Kong is closely tied to China, economically and politically, following the United Kingdom’s 1997 handover of the former colony to China to be governed as a Special Administrative Region. Changes to Hong Kong’s legal, financial, and monetary system could negatively impact its economic prospects. Hong Kong’s evolving relationship with the central government in Beijing has been a source of political unrest and may result in economic disruption.

Although many Taiwanese companies heavily invest in China, a state of hostility continues to exist between China and Taiwan. Taiwan’s political stability and ability to sustain its economic growth could be significantly affected by its political

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and economic relationship with China. Although economic and political relations have both improved, Taiwan remains vulnerable to both Chinese territorial ambitions and economic downturns.

In addition to the risks inherent in investing in the emerging markets, the risks of investing in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan merit special consideration.

People’s Republic of China. China’s economy has transitioned from a rigidly central-planned state-run economy to one that has been only partially reformed by more market-oriented policies. Although the Chinese government has implemented economic reform measures, reduced state ownership of companies and established better corporate governance practices, a substantial portion of productive assets in China are still owned or controlled by the Chinese government. The government continues to exercise significant control over regulating industrial development and, ultimately, control over China’s economic growth, both through direct involvement in the market through state owned enterprises, and indirectly by allocating resources, controlling access to credit, controlling payment of foreign currency-denominated obligations, setting monetary policy and providing preferential treatment to particular industries or companies.

After many years of steady growth, the growth rate of China’s economy has declined relative to prior years. Although this slowdown may have been influenced by the government’s desire to stop certain sectors from overheating, and to shift the economy from one based on low cost export manufacturing to a model driven more by domestic consumption, it holds significant economic, social and political risks. For one, the real estate market, once rapidly growing in major cities, has slowed down and may prompt government intervention to prevent collapse. Additionally, local government debt is still very high, and local governments have few viable means to raise revenue, especially with continued declines in demand for housing. Moreover, although China has tried to restructure its economy towards consumption, it remains heavily dependent on exports and is, therefore, susceptible to downturns abroad which may weaken demand for its exports and reduced foreign investments in the country. In particular, the economy faces the prospect of prolonged weakness in demand for Chinese exports as its major trading partners, such as the United States, Japan, and Europe, continue to experience economic uncertainty stemming from the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy, among other things. Over the long term, China’s aging infrastructure, worsening environmental conditions, rapid and inequitable urbanization, and quickly widening urban and rural income gap, which all carry political and economic implications, are among the country’s major challenges. China also faces problems of domestic unrest and provincial separatism. Additionally, the Chinese economy may be adversely affected by diplomatic developments, the imposition of economic sanctions, changes in international trading patterns, trade barriers, and other protectionist or retaliatory measures.

Chinese territorial claims are another source of tension and present risks to diplomatic and trade relations with certain of China’s regional trade partners. Actions by the Chinese government, such as its land reclamation projects, assertion of territorial claims in the South China Sea, and the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone over disputed islands, raises the fear of both accidental military conflict, and that Chinese territorial claims may result in international reprisal. Such a reprisal may reduce international demand for Chinese goods and services or cause a decline in foreign direct investment, both of which could have a negative effect on a fund’s investments in the securities of Chinese issuers.

As with all transition economies, China’s ability to develop and sustain a credible legal, regulatory, monetary, and socioeconomic system could influence the course of outside investment. The Chinese legal system, in particular, constitutes a significant risk factor for investors. Since the late 1970s, Chinese legislative bodies have promulgated laws and regulations dealing with various economic matters such as foreign investment, corporate organization and governance, commerce, taxation, and trade. However, despite the expanding body of law in China, legal precedent and published court decisions based on these laws are limited and non-binding. The interpretation and enforcement of these laws and regulations are uncertain, and investments in China may not be subject to the same degree of legal protection as in other developed countries.

China continues to limit direct foreign investments generally in industries deemed important to national interests. Foreign investment in domestic securities is also subject to substantial restrictions, although Chinese regulators have begun to introduce new programs through which foreign investors can gain direct access to certain Chinese securities markets. For instance, Chinese regulators have implemented a program that will permit direct foreign investment in permissible products (which include cash bonds) traded on the China inter-bank bond market (“CIBM”) in compliance with the relevant rules established by applicable Chinese regulators. As the foreign investment on CIBM is very new and has not yet been tested on the market, it is uncertain how this program will impact economic growth within China.

Securities listed on China’s two main stock exchanges are divided into two classes. One of the two classes is limited to domestic investors (and a small group of qualified international investors), while the other is available to both international and domestic investors. Although the Chinese government has announced plans to merge the two markets, it is uncertain whether and to what extent such a merger will take place. The existing bifurcated system raises liquidity and stability concerns. Currency fluctuations could significantly affect China and its trading partners. China continues to exercise control over the value of its currency, rather than allowing the value of the currency to be determined by market forces. This type of currency regime may experience sudden and significant currency adjustments, which may adversely impact investment returns. One such currency adjustment occurred in 2015, in which China purposefully devalued the yuan in an effort to bolster economic growth. However, the government has taken steps to internationalize its currency. This policy change is driven, in part, by the government’s desire for the yuan’s inclusion in the basket of currencies that comprise the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights, which will establish the currency’s status as a reserve currency.

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Additionally, China’s stock market has experienced tumult and high volatility, which has prompted the Chinese government to implement a number of policies and restrictions with regards to the securities market. While China may take actions aimed at maintaining growth and stability in the stock market, investors in Chinese securities may be negatively affected by, among other things, disruptions in the ability to sell securities for compliance with investment objectives or when most advantageous given market conditions. It is not clear what the long-term effect of such policies would be on the securities market in China or whether additional actions by the government will occur in the future.

Hong Kong. In 1997, the United Kingdom handed over control of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. Since that time, Hong Kong has been governed by a quasi-constitution known as the Basic Law, while defense and foreign affairs are the responsibility of the central government in Beijing. The chief executive of Hong Kong is appointed by the Chinese government. However, Hong Kong is able to participate in international organizations and agreements and it continues to function as an international financial center, with no exchange controls, free convertibility of the Hong Kong dollar and free inward and outward movement of capital. The Basic Law also guarantees existing freedoms, including the freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion, as well as the right to strike and travel. Business ownership, private property, the right of inheritance and foreign investment are also protected by law. By treaty, China has committed to preserve Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy in certain matters until 2047. However, as demonstrated by Hong Kong protests in recent years over political, economic, and legal freedoms, and the Chinese government’s response to them, there continues to exist political uncertainty within Hong Kong and there is no guarantee that additional protests will not arise in the future.

Hong Kong has experienced strong economic growth in recent years due, in part, to its close ties with China and a strong service sector, but Hong Kong still faces concerns over overheating in certain sectors of its economy, such as its real estate market, which could limit Hong Kong’s future growth. In addition, due to Hong Kong’s heavy reliance on international trade and global financial markets, Hong Kong remains exposed to significant risks as a result of the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy. Likewise, due to Hong Kong’s close political and economic ties with China, a continued economic slowdown on the mainland could continue to have a negative impact on Hong Kong’s economy.

Taiwan. For decades, a state of hostility has existed between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. China has long deemed Taiwan a part of the “one China” and has made a nationalist cause of reuniting Taiwan with mainland China. In the past, China has staged frequent military provocations off the coast of Taiwan and made threats of full-scale military action. However, tensions have lowered, exemplified by improved relations, including the first official contacts between the governments’ leaders of China and Taiwan in 2015. Despite closer relations in recent years, the relationship with China remains a divisive political issue within Taiwan. Foreign trade has been the engine of rapid growth in Taiwan and has transformed the island into one of Asia’s great exporting nations. As an export-oriented economy, Taiwan depends on a free-trade trade regime and remains vulnerable to downturns in the world economy. Taiwanese companies continue to compete mostly on price, producing generic products or branded merchandise on behalf of multinational companies. Accordingly, these businesses can be particularly vulnerable to currency volatility and increasing competition from neighboring lower-cost countries. Moreover, many Taiwanese companies are heavily invested in mainland China and other countries throughout Southeast Asia, making them susceptible to political events and economic crises in these parts of the region. Significantly, Taiwan and China recently entered into agreements covering banking, securities, and insurance. Closer economic links with the mainland may bring greater opportunities for the Taiwanese economy, but such arrangements also pose new challenges. For example, foreign direct investment in China has resulted in Chinese import substitution away from Taiwan’s exports and a constriction of potential job creation in Taiwan. Likewise, the Taiwanese economy has experienced slow economic growth as demand for Taiwan’s exports has weakened due, in part, to declines in growth rates in China. More recently, Taiwan has sought to diversify its export markets and reduce its dependence on the Chinese market by increasing exports to the United States, Japan, Europe, and other Asian countries by, in part, entering into free-trade agreements. In addition, the lasting effects of the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy may reduce global demand for Taiwan’s exports. The Taiwanese economy’s long-term challenges include a rapidly aging population, low birth rate, and the lingering effects of Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation.

India. The value of a fund’s investments in Indian securities may be affected by, among other things, political developments, rapid changes in government regulation, state intervention in private enterprise, nationalization or expropriation of foreign assets, legal uncertainty, high rates of inflation or interest rates, currency volatility, and civil unrest. Moreover, the Indian economy remains vulnerable to natural disasters, such as droughts and monsoons. In addition, any escalation of tensions with Pakistan may have a negative impact on India’s economy and foreign investments in India. Likewise, political, social and economic disruptions caused by domestic sectarian violence or terrorist attacks may also present risks to a fund’s investments in India.

The Indian economy is heavily dependent on exports and services provided to U.S. and European companies, and is vulnerable to any weakening in global demand for these products and services. In recent years, rising wages have chipped away at India’s competitive advantage in certain service sectors. A large fiscal deficit and persistent inflation have contributed to modest economic growth in India in recent years. While the economic growth rate has risen more recently, the Indian economy continues to be susceptible to a slowdown in the manufacturing sector, and it is uncertain whether higher growth rates are sustainable without more fundamental governance reforms.

Furthermore, restrictions or controls applicable to foreign investment in the securities of issuers in India may also adversely affect a fund’s investments within the country. The availability of financial instruments with exposure to Indian

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financial markets may be substantially limited by restrictions on foreign investors and subject to regulatory authorizations. Foreign investors are required to observe certain investment restrictions, including limits on shareholdings, which may impede a fund’s ability to invest in certain issuers or to fully pursue its investment objective. These restrictions may also have the effect of reducing demand for, or limiting the liquidity of, such investments. There can be no assurance that the Indian government will not impose restrictions on foreign capital remittances abroad or otherwise modify the exchange control regime applicable to foreign investors in such a way that may adversely affect the ability of a fund to repatriate their income and capital.

Shares of many Indian issuers are held by a limited number of persons and financial institutions, which may limit the number of shares available for investment. Sales of securities by such issuer’s major shareholders may also significantly and adversely affect other shareholders. Moreover, a limited number of issuers represent a disproportionately large percentage of market capitalization and trading value in India.

Recently, the Indian government has sought to implement numerous reforms to the economy, including efforts to bolster the Indian manufacturing sector and entice foreign direct investment. However, such reformation efforts have proven difficult and there is no guarantee that such reforms will be implemented or that they will be fully implemented in a manner that benefits investors.

Indonesia. Over the last decade, Indonesia has applied prudent macroeconomic efforts and policy reforms that have led to modest growth in recent years, but many economic development problems remain, including poverty and unemployment, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, a complex regulatory environment, and unequal resource distribution among regions. Although Indonesia’s government has taken steps in recent years to improve the country’s infrastructure and investment climate, these problems may limit the country’s ability to maintain such economic growth as Indonesia has begun to experience slowing growth rates in recent years. In addition, Indonesia continues to be at risk of ethnic, sectarian, and separatist violence.

In recent periods, Indonesia has employed a program of monetary loosening through reductions in interest rates and implemented a number of reforms to encourage investment. Although Indonesia’s central bank has continued to utilize monetary policies to promote growth, there can be no guarantee such efforts will be sufficient or that additional stimulus policies will not be necessary in the future.

Indonesia’s dependence on resource extraction and export leaves it vulnerable to a slowdown of the economies of its trading partners and a decline in commodity prices more generally. Commodity prices have experienced significant volatility in recent years, which has adversely affected the exports of Indonesia’s economy. Indonesia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of a continued slowdown in China, which has been a major source of demand growth for Indonesia’s commodity exports. Indonesia is also vulnerable to further weakness in Japan, which remains one of Indonesia’s largest single export markets. Indonesia has recently reversed several policies that restricted foreign investment by permitting increased foreign ownership in several sectors and opening up sectors previously closed to foreign investors. Failure to pursue internal reform, peacefully resolve internal conflicts, bolster the confidence of international and domestic investors, and weak global economic growth could limit Indonesia’s economic growth in the future.

Thailand. Thailand has well-developed infrastructure and a free-enterprise economy, which is both conducive and enticing to certain foreign investment. While Thailand experienced an increase in exports in recent years, the rate of export growth has since slowed, in part due to domestic political turmoil, weakness in commodity prices and declines in growth rates in China. Moreover, Thailand has pursued preferential trade agreements with a variety of partners in an effort to boost exports and maintain high growth. However, weakening fiscal discipline, separatist violence in the south, the intervention by the military in civilian spheres, and continued political instability may cause additional risks for investments in Thailand. The risk of political instability has proven substantial, as the protests, disputed election, government collapse, and coup of 2014 have led to short term declines in GDP, a collapse of tourism, and a decrease in foreign direct investment. The military junta continues to retain control of the government and has not indicated a willingness to cede power, persistently delaying the return of democratic elections. Such uncertainty regarding the return of democratic governance to Thailand could jeopardize the maintenance of economic growth.

In the long term, Thailand’s economy faces challenges including an aging population, outdated infrastructure, and an inadequate education system. Thailand’s cost of labor has risen rapidly in recent years, threatening its status as a low cost manufacturing hub. In addition, natural disasters may affect economic growth in the country. Thailand continues to be vulnerable to weak economic growth of its major trading partners, particularly China and Japan. Additionally, Thailand’s economy may be limited by lack of available capital for investment resulting from the European debt crisis and persistent slow growth in the global economy, as well as increases in interest rates and the tapering of other monetary policies adopted by the central banks of developed countries.

Philippines. The economy of the Philippines has benefitted from its relatively low dependence on exports and high domestic rates of consumption, as well as substantial remittances received from large overseas populations. Although the economy of the Philippines has grown quickly in recent years, there can be no assurances that such growth will continue. Like other countries in the Asia Pacific region, the Philippines’ growth in recent years has been reliant, in part, on exports to larger economies, notably the United States, Japan and China. Given that China is a large importer and source of global demand, a continued Chinese slowdown may, directly or indirectly, negatively impact Philippine economic growth. Additionally, lower global economic growth may lead to lower remittances from Filipino emigrants abroad, negatively impacting economic growth in the

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Philippines. Furthermore, certain weaknesses in the economy, such as inadequate infrastructure, high poverty rates, uneven wealth distribution, low fiscal revenues, endemic corruption, inconsistent regulation, unpredictable taxation, unreliable judicial processes, and the appropriation of foreign assets may present risks to a fund’s investments in the Philippines. In addition, investments in the Philippines are subject to risks arising from political or social unrest, including governmental actions that strain relations with the country’s major trading partners, threats from military coups, terrorist groups and separatist movements. Likewise, the Philippines is prone to natural disasters such as typhoons, tsunamis, earthquakes and flooding, which may also present risks to a fund’s investments in the Philippines.

Latin America. Latin American countries have historically suffered from social, political, and economic instability. For investors, this has meant additional risk caused by periods of regional conflict, political corruption, totalitarianism, protectionist measures, nationalization, hyperinflation, debt crises, sudden and large currency devaluation, and intervention by the military in civilian and economic spheres. In recent decades, certain Latin American economies have experienced prolonged, significant economic growth, and many countries have developed sustainable democracies and a more mature and accountable political environment. However, in recent periods, many Latin American countries have experienced persistent low growth rates and certain countries have fallen into recessions. While the region is experiencing an economic recovery, there can be no guarantee that such recovery will continue or that Latin American countries will not face further recessionary pressures.

The region’s economies represent a spectrum of different levels of political and economic development. In many Latin American countries, domestic economies have been deregulated, privatization of state-owned companies had been undertaken and foreign trade restrictions have been relaxed. However, there can be no guarantee that such trends in economic liberalization will continue or that the desired outcomes of these developments will be successful. Nonetheless, to the extent that the risks identified above continue or re-emerge in the future, such developments could reverse favorable trends toward market and economic reform, privatization, and removal of trade barriers, and result in significant disruption in securities markets in the region. In addition, recent favorable economic performance in much of the region has led to a concern regarding government overspending in certain Latin American countries. Investors in the region continue to face a number of potential risks. Certain Latin American countries depend heavily on exports to the United States and investments from a small number of countries. Accordingly, these countries may be sensitive to fluctuations in demand, exchange rates and changes in market conditions associated with those countries. The economic growth of most Latin American countries is highly dependent on commodity exports and the economies of certain Latin American countries, particularly Mexico and Venezuela, are highly dependent on oil exports. These economies are particularly susceptible to fluctuations in the price of oil and other commodities and currency fluctuations. The prices of oil and other commodities are in the midst of a period of high volatility driven, in part, by a continued slowdown in growth in China. If growth in China remains slow, or if global economic conditions worsen, Latin American countries may face significant economic difficulties. Although certain Latin American countries have recently shown signs of improved economic growth, such improvements, if sustained, may be gradual. In addition, prolonged economic difficulties may have negative effects on the transition to a more stable democracy in some Latin American countries. Political risks remain prevalent throughout the region, including the risk of nationalization of foreign assets. Certain economies in the region may rely heavily on particular industries or foreign capital and are more vulnerable to diplomatic developments, the imposition of economic sanctions against a particular country or countries, changes in international trading patterns, trade barriers, and other protectionist or retaliatory measures.

For certain countries in Latin America, political risks have created significant uncertainty in financial markets and may further limit the economic recovery in the region. For example, in Mexico, uncertainty regarding the status of NAFTA with the United States and Canada, and any efforts to substantively renegotiate its terms, may have a significant and adverse impact on Mexico’s economic outlook and the value of a fund’s investments in Mexico. Additionally, recent political and social unrest in Venezuela has resulted in a massive disruption in the Venezuelan economy, including a deep recession and near hyperinflation.

A number of Latin American countries are among the largest debtors of developing countries and have a long history of reliance on foreign debt and default. The majority of the region’s economies have become highly dependent upon foreign credit and loans from external sources to fuel their state-sponsored economic plans. Most countries have been forced to restructure their loans or risk default on their debt obligations. In addition, interest on the debt is subject to market conditions and may reach levels that would impair economic activity and create a difficult and costly environment for borrowers. Accordingly, these governments may be forced to reschedule or freeze their debt repayment, which could negatively affect local markets. Most recently, Argentina defaulted on its debt after a U.S. court ruled that payments to a majority of bondholders (who had settled for lower rates of repayment) could not be made so long as holdout bondholders were not paid the full value of their bonds. Although Argentina has since settled with its bondholders, it may continue to experience constraints on its ability to issue new debt, and therefore fund its government. Further, the ruling increases the risk of default on all sovereign debt containing similar clauses.

Because of their dependence on foreign credit and loans, a number of Latin American economies may face significant economic difficulties if the U.S. Federal Reserve continues to raise interest rates, which could potentially jeopardize various countries’ ability to service debt obligations or to service such obligations in a timely manner. While the region has recently had mixed levels of economic growth, recovery from past economic downturns in Latin America has historically been slow, and such growth, if sustained, may be gradual. The ongoing effects of the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy may reduce demand for exports from Latin America and limit the availability of foreign credit for some countries in the region. As a result, a fund’s investments in Latin American securities could be harmed if economic recovery in the region is limited.

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Russia. Investing in Russian securities is highly speculative and involves significant risks and special considerations not typically associated with investing in the securities markets of the United States and most other developed countries.

Political. Over the past century, Russia has experienced political and economic turbulence and has endured decades of communist rule under which tens of millions of its citizens were collectivized into state agricultural and industrial enterprises. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s government has been faced with the daunting task of stabilizing its domestic economy, while transforming it into a modern and efficient structure able to compete in international markets and respond to the needs of its citizens. However, to date, many of the country’s economic reform initiatives have floundered or been retrenched. In this environment, political and economic policies could shift suddenly in ways detrimental to the interest of foreign and private investors.

In the last several years, as significant income from oil and commodity exports boosted Russia’s economic growth, the Russian government began to re-assert its regional geopolitical influence, including most recently its military actions in Ukraine and Syria. The involvement in Ukraine has increased tensions between Russia and its neighbors and the West, resulting in the United States and EU placing sanctions on the Russian financial, energy, and defense sectors, as well as targeting top Russian officials. These sanctions, combined with a collapse in energy and commodity prices, have had the effect of slowing the Russian economy, which has continued to experience recessionary trends. Additionally, the conflict has caused capital flight, loss of confidence in Russian sovereign debt, and a retaliatory import ban by Russia that has helped stoke inflation. Further possible actions by Russia, including restricting gas exports to Ukraine and countries downstream, or provoking another military conflict elsewhere in Eastern Europe could lead to greater consequences for the Russian economy.

Economic. Many Russian businesses are inefficient and uncompetitive by global standards due to systemic corruption, regulatory favoritism for government-affiliated enterprises, or the legacy of old management teams and techniques left over from the command economy of the Soviet Union. Poor accounting standards, inept management, pervasive corruption, insider trading and crime, and inadequate regulatory protection for the rights of investors all pose a significant risk, particularly to foreign investors. In addition, enforcement of the Russian tax system is prone to inconsistent, arbitrary, retroactive, confiscatory, and/or exorbitant taxation.

Compared to most national stock markets, the Russian securities market suffers from a variety of problems not encountered in more developed markets. There is little long-term historical data on the Russian securities market because it is relatively new and a substantial proportion of securities transactions in Russia are privately negotiated outside of stock exchanges. The inexperience of the Russian securities market and the limited volume of trading in securities in the market may make obtaining accurate prices on portfolio securities from independent sources more difficult than in more developed markets. Additionally, there is little solid corporate information available to investors. As a result, it may be difficult to assess the value or prospects of an investment in Russian companies.

Because of the recent formation of the Russian securities market as well as the underdeveloped state of the banking and telecommunications systems, settlement, clearing and registration of securities transactions are subject to significant risks. Ownership of shares (except where shares are held through depositories that meet the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act)) is defined according to entries in the company’s share register and normally evidenced by extracts from the register or by formal share certificates. However, these services are carried out by the companies themselves or by registrars located throughout Russia. These registrars are not necessarily subject to effective state supervision nor are they licensed with any governmental entity and it is possible for a fund to lose its registration through fraud, negligence, or even mere oversight. While a fund will endeavor to ensure that its interest continues to be appropriately recorded either itself or through a custodian or other agent inspecting the share register and by obtaining extracts of share registers through regular confirmations, these extracts have no legal enforceability and it is possible that subsequent illegal amendment or other fraudulent act may deprive a fund of its ownership rights or improperly dilute its interests. In addition, while applicable Russian regulations impose liability on registrars for losses resulting from their errors, it may be difficult for a fund to enforce any rights it may have against the registrar or issuer of the securities in the event of loss of share registration. Furthermore, significant delays or problems may occur in registering the transfer of securities, which could cause a fund to incur losses due to either a counterparty’s failure to pay for securities the fund has delivered or the fund’s inability to complete its contractual obligations. The designation of the National Settlement Depository (NSD) as the exclusive settlement organization for all publicly traded Russian companies and investment funds has enhanced the efficiency and transparency of the Russian securities market. Additionally, recent agreements between the NSD and foreign central securities depositories and settlement organizations have allowed for simpler and more secure access for foreign investors as well.

The Russian economy is heavily dependent upon the export of a range of commodities including industrial metals, forestry products, oil, and gas. Accordingly, it is strongly affected by international commodity prices and is particularly vulnerable to any weakening in global demand for these products. Furthermore, the sale and use of certain strategically important commodities, such as gas, may be dictated by political, rather than economic, considerations.

The recent fall in the price of commodities has demonstrated the sensitivity of the Russian economy to such price volatility, especially in oil and gas markets. During this time, many sectors in the Russian economy fell into turmoil, pushing the whole economy into recession. In addition, prior to the global financial crisis, Russia’s economic policy encouraged excessive foreign currency borrowing as high oil prices increased investor appetite for Russian financial assets. As a result of this credit boom, Russia reached alarming debt levels and suffered from the effects of tight credit markets. Russia continues to face

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significant economic challenges, including weak levels of investment, falling domestic consumption levels, and low global commodity demand. In the near term, the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis, a continued slowdown in China, and persistent low growth in the global economy may continue to result in low prices for Russian exports such as oil and gas, which could limit Russia’s economic growth. Over the long-term, Russia faces challenges including a shrinking workforce, high levels of corruption, difficulty in accessing capital for smaller, non-energy companies, and poor infrastructure in need of large investments.

Currency. Foreign investors also face a high degree of currency risk when investing in Russian securities and a lack of available currency hedging instruments. The Russian ruble has recently been subject to significant devaluation pressure due to the fall in commodity prices and the collapse in the value of Russian exports. In recent years, the Russian Central Bank has spent significant foreign exchange reserves to maintain the value of the ruble. However, such reserves are finite and, as exemplified by the recent rise in inflation, the Russian Central Bank may be unable to properly manage competing demands of supporting the ruble, managing inflation, and stimulating a struggling Russian economy. Although Russia’s foreign exchange reserves have begun to rebound in the past year, there can be no guarantee that this trend will continue or that the Russian Central Bank will not need to spend these reserves to stabilize Russia’s currency and/or economy in the future. Therefore, any investment denominated in rubles may be subject to significant devaluation in the future. Although official sovereign debt to GDP figures are low for a developed economy, sovereign default remains a risk. Even absent a sovereign default, foreign investors could face the possibility of further devaluations. There is the risk that the government may impose capital controls on foreign portfolio investments in the event of extreme financial or political crisis. Such capital controls could prevent the sale of a portfolio of foreign assets and the repatriation of investment income and capital. Such risks have led to heightened scrutiny of Russian liquidity conditions, which in turn creates a heightened risk of the repatriation of ruble assets by concerned foreign investors. The persistent economic turmoil in Russia caused the Russian ruble to depreciate as unemployment levels increased and global demand for oil exports decreased. In particular, the recent collapse in energy prices has shrunk the value of Russian exports and further weakened both the value of the ruble and the finances of the Russian state. The Russian economy has also suffered following the conflict in Ukraine, as a result of significant capital flight from the country. The pressure put on the ruble caused by this divestment has been compounded by the sanctions from the United States and EU, leading to further depreciation, a limitation of the ruble’s convertibility, and an increase in inflation.

The Middle East and Africa. Investing in Middle Eastern and African securities is highly speculative and involves significant risks and special considerations not typically associated with investing in the securities markets of the United States and most other developed countries.

Political. Many Middle Eastern and African countries historically have suffered from political instability. Despite a growing trend towards democratization, especially in Africa, significant political risks continue to affect some Middle Eastern and African countries. These risks may include substantial government intervention in and control over the private sector, corrupt leaders, civil unrest, suppression of opposition parties that can lead to further dissidence and militancy, fixed elections, terrorism, coups, and war. In recent years, several countries in the Middle East and North Africa have experienced pro-democracy movements that resulted in swift regime changes. In some instances where pro-democracy movements successfully toppled regimes, the stability of successor regimes has proven weak, as evidenced, for example, in Egypt. In other instances, these changes have devolved into armed conflict involving local factions, regional allies or international forces, and even protracted civil wars, such as in Libya and Syria.

The protracted civil war in Syria has given rise to numerous militias, terrorist groups, and most notably, the proto-state of ISIS. The conflict has disrupted oil production across Syria and Iraq, effectively destroying the economic value of large portions of the region, and caused a massive exodus of refugees into neighboring states, which further threatens government infrastructure of the refuge countries. Although the conflict is relatively isolated, there is a significant risk of it metastasizing as the civil war draws in more regional states and ISIS spreads an extremist ideology.

Regional instability has not been confined to Syria and Iraq, however. In Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, radical groups have led to a disruptive insurgency in the country’s north. In addition, Africa has experienced a number of regional health crises in recent years, which has demonstrated the vulnerabilities of political institutions and health care systems in the face of crisis.

Continued instability may slow the adoption of economic and political reforms and could damage trade, investment, and economic growth going forward. Further, because many Middle East and African nations have a history of dictatorship, military intervention, and corruption, any successful reforms may prove impermanent. In addition, there is an increasing risk that historical animosities, border disputes, or defense concerns may lead to further armed conflict in the region. Across the Middle East and Africa, such developments could have a negative effect on economic growth and reverse favorable trends toward economic and market reform, privatization, and the removal of trade barriers. Such developments could also result in significant disruptions in securities markets.

Economic. Middle Eastern and African countries historically have suffered from underdeveloped infrastructure, high unemployment rates, a comparatively unskilled labor force, and inconsistent access to capital, which have contributed to economic instability and stifled economic growth in the region. Furthermore, certain Middle Eastern and African markets may face a higher concentration of market capitalization, greater illiquidity and greater price volatility than that found in more developed markets of Western Europe or the United States. Additionally, certain countries in the region have a history of

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nationalizing or expropriating foreign assets, which could cause a fund to lose the value of its investments in those countries or negatively affect foreign investor confidence in the region. Despite a growing trend towards economic diversification, many Middle Eastern and African economies remain heavily dependent upon a limited range of commodities. These include gold, silver, copper, cocoa, diamonds, natural gas and petroleum. These economies are greatly affected by international commodity prices and are particularly vulnerable to any weakening in global demand for these products. The demand in global commodities continues to decrease, particularly the decline in the price of oil, causing certain countries in the region to face significant economic difficulties. As a result, many countries have been forced to scale down their infrastructure investment and the size of their public welfare systems, which could have long-term economic, social, and political implications.

South Africa, Africa’s second largest economy, is the largest destination for foreign direct investment on the continent. The country has a two-tiered, developing economy with one tier similar to that of a developed country and the second tier having only the most basic infrastructure. Although South Africa has experienced modest economic growth in recent years, such growth has been sluggish, hampered by endemic corruption, ethnic and civil conflicts, labor unrest, the effects of the HIV health crisis, and political instability. In addition, reduced demand for South African exports due to the lasting effects of the European debt crisis and persistent low growth in the global economy may limit any such recovery. These problems have been compounded by worries over South African sovereign debt prompted by an increasing deficit and rising level of sovereign debt. In April 2017, these conditions led Fitch and S&P to downgrade South African debt to “junk” status. Such downgrades in South African sovereign debt could have serious consequences on investments in South Africa.

Currency. Certain Middle Eastern and African countries have currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar or euro, rather than free-floating exchange rates determined by market forces. Although intended to stabilize the currencies, these pegs, if abandoned, may cause sudden and significant currency adjustments, which may adversely impact investment returns.