You should read the following selected consolidated financial data in conjunction with “Item 5. Operating and Financial Review and Prospects” and our audited consolidated financial statements and the related notes included elsewhere in this annual report. The following tables set forth our selected consolidated financial information as of and for the years ended December 31, 2018, 2017 and 2016, derived from our audited consolidated financial statements included elsewhere in this annual report. We have prepared our audited consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS, as issued by the IASB. The consolidated income statement data for the years ended December 31, 2018, 2017 and 2016 and the consolidated balance sheet data as of December 31, 2018 and 2017 are derived from our audited consolidated financial statements included in “Item 18. Financial Statements.”

Our audited consolidated financial statements for the year ended as of December 31, 2018 and 2017 comprehensively recognize the effects of variations in the purchasing power of currency through the application of the method to restate financial statements in constant currency established by the International Accounting Standard 29, or IAS 29. For comparative purposes, such audited consolidated financial statements include figures and other details corresponding to the fiscal year ended on December 31, 2017, which are presented in order for them to be solely interpreted in conformity with the figures and other details corresponding to the fiscal year ended on December 31, 2018. These figures have been restated in the last fiscal year’s end-of-period currency in the manner described below in order to permit comparability and without such restatement modifying the decisions made on the basis of the financial information for the previous fiscal year. See “Presentation of Financial and Other Information.”

The results of operations for the years ended December 31, 2018, 2017 and 2016 are not necessarily indicative of our future performance.

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Exchange Rates

With the tightening of exchange controls beginning in late 2011, in particular with the introduction of measures that allowed limited access to foreign currency by private companies and individuals (such as requiring an authorization of tax authorities to access the foreign currency exchange market), the implied exchange rate, as reflected in the quotations for Argentine securities that trade in foreign markets, compared to the corresponding quotations in the local market, increased significantly over the official exchange rate. Most of the foreign exchange restrictions were gradually lifted as from December 2015. Among others, on August 9, 2016 the Argentine Central Bank issued Communication “A” 6037, which substantially modified the applicable foreign exchange regulations and eliminated many of the restrictions for accessing the MULC. As a result of the elimination of the limit amount for the purchase of foreign currency without specific allocation or need of prior approval the substantial spread between the official exchange rate and the implicit exchange rate derived from securities transactions has substantially decreased.

Since December 2015, the Argentine Central Bank liberalized the foreign exchange rate. Effective as of July 1, 2017, through Communication “A” 6244, the Central Bank liberalized the foreign exchange market by

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eliminating substantially all foreign exchange restrictions in Argentina, except for the obligation of Argentine residents to (a) comply with the reporting regimes set forth by Communication “A” 3602 and Communication “A” 4237 of the Central Bank (which were replaced by a single reporting regime with statistical purposes only pursuant to Communication “A” 6401), and (b) transfer to Argentina and sell in the FX Market the proceeds of their exports of goods within the applicable deadline (which was lifted by Communication “A” 6363 of the Central Bank as of November 10, 2017).

After several years of moderate variations in the official nominal exchange rate, in 2012 the Argentine peso lost approximately 14% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar. This was followed in 2013 and 2014 by a devaluation of the Argentine peso with respect to the U.S. dollar that exceeded 33% in 2013 and 31% in 2014, including a loss of approximately 23% in January 2014. In 2015, the Argentine peso lost approximately 52% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar, including a 10% devaluation from January 1, 2015 to September 30, 2015 and a 38% devaluation during the last quarter of the year, mainly concentrated after December 16, 2015 when certain exchange controls were lifted. As of December 31, 2017, the official nominal exchange rate for Argentine pesos into U.S. dollars fell to Ps.18.7742 per US$1.00, a devaluation of approximately 18% as compared to the official exchange rate of Ps.15.8502 per US$1.00 as of December 31, 2016. As of December 31, 2018, the official nominal exchange rate for Argentine pesos into U.S. dollars fell to Ps.37.8083 per US$1.00, a devaluation of approximately 101% as compared to the official exchange rate of Ps.18.7742 per US$1.00 as of December 31, 2017. In the first three months of 2019, the Argentine peso depreciated approximately 14.7% against the U.S. dollar.

The following table sets forth the annual high, low, average and period-end exchange rates for the periods indicated, expressed in pesos per U.S. dollar and not adjusted for inflation. There can be no assurance that the peso will not depreciate or appreciate again in the future. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York does not report a noon buying rate for pesos.

Not applicable.

Not applicable.

Our business faces significant risks. You should consider carefully the risks described below and all other information contained in this annual report. If any of the following risks were to occur, our business, financial condition and results of operations would likely be materially adversely affected. In that event, the trading price of our ordinary shares or ADSs would likely decline and you might lose all or part of your investment. The following

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risks are not the only risks that we face; we are subject to various risks mainly resulting from changing economic, environmental, political, industry, business, financial and climate conditions. Our results could materially differ from those anticipated in these forward-looking statements, as a result of certain factors including the risks described below and elsewhere in this report and our other SEC filings. See also “CAUTIONARY STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS” on page vi of this annual report.

For purposes of this section, the indication that a risk, uncertainty or problem may or will have a “material adverse effect on us” or that we may experience a “material adverse effect” means that the risk, uncertainty or problem could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations and/or the market price of our ordinary shares or ADSs, except as otherwise indicated or as the context may otherwise require. You should view similar expressions in this section as having a similar meaning.

Risks Relating to Argentina

Investing in an emerging economy such as Argentina entails certain inherent risks.

Argentina is an emerging economy and investing in such markets generally carries risks. These risks include political, social and economic instability that may affect Argentina’s economic condition. In the past, instability in Argentina was caused by many different factors, including the following:

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Any of the above factors either individually or taken together, could have material adverse effects on the Argentine economy and on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

Argentina may experience political, social and economic instability, similar to what has been experienced in the recent past.

Most of our operations, property and customers are located in Argentina. As a result, the quality of our assets, our financial condition and the results of our operations are dependent upon the macroeconomic, regulatory, social and political conditions prevailing in Argentina from time to time. These conditions include growth rates, fiscal deficits, inflation rates, monetary policies, foreign exchange rates, taxes, foreign exchange controls, bank system stability, interest rates, unemployment and informal employment and external financing. International demand for Argentine exports, abrupt changes of governmental policies, social instability and other political, economic or international developments and conditions may affect Argentina’s business environment.

Between 2007 and 2015, the Fernández de Kirchner administrations increased direct intervention in the Argentine economy, including the implementation of expropriation measures, price controls, exchange controls and changes in laws and regulations affecting foreign trade and investment. These measures had a material adverse effect on private sector entities, including us. It is possible that similar measures could be adopted by the current or future Argentine government or that economic, social and political changes in Argentina, over which we have no control, could have a material adverse effect on the Argentine economy and, in turn, have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

According to the revised calculation of the GDP published by the INDEC, Argentina’s real GDP decreased 2.5% in 2018, increased by 2.7% in 2017, decreased by 1.8% in 2016.

Mauricio Macri was elected in November 2015 and introduced several structural economic and policy reforms. As a result, the economy has undergone certain fiscal, monetary and currency adjustments. Due to several internal and external factors, including, but not limited to, the raising of the interest rate by the US Federal Reserve, the inability of the government to implement all required structural changes and reduce the fiscal deficit, the increasing need of international financing to finance the fiscal deficit, the increase of the government’s inflation target for 2018, a historical drought that affected the crops production (main export of Argentina) and the Turkish crisis, during the first half of 2018 the peso suffered a new sharp depreciation, which, as of December 31, 2018 accumulated 101% and that fostered the inflation levels again. In order to control the crisis the government adopted a series of measures, including the execution of a financing agreement with the IMF for US$57.1 billion, and the BCRA defined foreign exchange intervention and non-intervention zones for the U.S. dollar exchange rate and increased the amount of Leliq ( Letras de Liquidez ) (BCRA peso debt instruments), which by the end of 2019 will represent about 4% of the GDP, with interest rates of more than 65%. As of the date of this annual report, these and other measures adopted by the government and the BCRA caused a deepening recession (the IMF projected a GDP decrease of 1.2% for 2019), increasing unemployment and medium and small companies’ failures, while high inflation and foreign exchange instability continues. In addition, in October 2019 there will be presidential elections, and there is a large amount of uncertainty and speculation on the re-election of Mauricio Macri or on who may result elected as his successor, that also contributes to the economic instability. All these factors contribute to increase the uncertainties on Argentina’s capacity to comply with its external debt payments from 2020, what caused a peak of the Argentine country risk to more than 1000 points in April 25, 2019, what also has an impact on the access of the public and private sector to international financing. The impact that the measures currently adopted by the government and the BCRA will have on the Argentine economy as a whole in the medium term cannot be predicted, and we cannot predict what other measures will adopt current administration or the future administration after the elections. Continuing inflation, increase of unemployment, decline in GDP, peso depreciation, and/or other future economic, social and political developments in Argentina, over which we have no control, may adversely affect our financial condition or results of operations.

The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain.

Since taking office in December 2015, the Macri administration has announced several significant structural, economic and policy reforms. These reforms include, but are not limited to, reaching an agreement with

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holdout creditors of Argentina’s outstanding sovereign debt, INDEC reforms, foreign exchange currency reforms, foreign trade reforms, electricity and gas reforms, domestic capital markets reforms, corporate criminal liability law reforms, social security reforms, de-bureaucratization reforms, labor reforms and tax reforms. The most significant changes implemented as of the date of this annual report by such reforms are:

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In the 2017 mid-term elections, Mr. Macri’s governing coalition obtained the largest percentage of votes. However, despite an increase in the number of coalition members in congress, the Macri administration continues to lack a majority in either chamber of the Argentine congress. Consequently, some or all of the proposed policies to the Argentine economy may not be implemented. In addition, there are presidential elections in Argentina in October 2019, and there are uncertainties on whether Macri will run for re-election or will be re-elected, or other candidate from his coalition will be elected, and the coalition majorities at both chambers of congress. Therefore, the continuation of the measures and policies adopted by the Macri administration, or the changes to be adopted by a new administration and their impact on the economy and our business, remain uncertain.

The fiscal, monetary and currency adjustments undertaken by the Macri administration subdued growth in the short-term. Immediately after most of the foreign exchange controls were lifted on December 10, 2015, the dismantling of the multiple exchange regime resulted in the official peso exchange rate (available only for certain

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types of transactions) falling in value by 40.1%, as the peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate reached Ps.13.76 to US$1.00 on December 17, 2015. As of December 2016, the Argentine peso depreciated 22.15% and as of December 2017, the Argentine peso depreciated 18.45%. During 2018, the Argentine peso has depreciated 103.83% (with a peak of Ps.40.8967 to US$1 in September 30, 2018) accumulating a total depreciation of 284.84% since December 16, 2015 (immediately after most of the foreign exchange controls were lifted and dismantling of the multiple exchange regimes). For containing the escalade of the peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate, during 2018 the BCRA sold more than US$14 billion, reducing the BCRA reserves; and increased the peso interest rates to more than 60%, affecting the access to domestic financing. Due to the foreign exchange crisis, in 2018 the inflation soared to 47.6% with an official estimation of 29% for 2019, while private sources predict an inflation of 35% for the same period; and the economic activity is estimated to have contracted about 2.6% in 2018 and is expected to contract 1.6% in 2019.

We have no control over the implementation of the reforms to the regulatory framework that governs our operations and cannot guarantee that these reforms will be implemented or, if implemented, that such implementation will benefit our business. The failure of these measures to achieve their intended goals could adversely affect the Argentine economy, which, in turn, may have an adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

This political uncertainty in respect of economic measures could lead to volatility in the market prices of securities of Argentine companies, and could have a negative impact in domestic consumer markets such as ours, which, in turn, could have a negative effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

If current levels of fiscal deficits are not reduced, the Argentine economy could be adversely affected, negatively impacting our business and results of operation.

In the past, Argentina has had severe macroeconomic imbalances, including frequent and extreme fiscal deficits. Since 1961, the national government has had year-end fiscal deficits in approximately 90% of the years (47 years out of 53 years), resulting in highly vulnerable macroeconomic conditions. The Argentine government has financed its fiscal deficit in two main ways: (i) by relying on external debt issuances, which has historically led to rapid increases in national debt levels; and (ii) by having the BCRA, produce new currency notes, which has led to high inflation periods and, in certain cases, hyperinflation.

The Macri administration took office in December 2015 and inherited a rising fiscal deficit that reached 5.2% of GDP in 2015, 5.8% of GDP in 2016, 6.0% of GDP in 2017 and 5.2% for 2018. For the incoming years, the Argentine government targets a primary fiscal deficit (defined as the difference between current government spending on goods and services and total current revenue from all types of taxes net of transfer payments) of 0% of the GDP for 2019 and a primary fiscal surplus of 1% for 2020. As opposed to Fernández de Kirchner, who financed the deficit by producing new currency, the Macri administration adopted a different financing strategy for the country’s fiscal deficit, favoring the issuance of new debt in the international debt markets. Although the Marci administration intends to reduce Argentina’s primary fiscal deficit, as of today, it is uncertain that the Macri administration will be successful in doing so because of the lack of the adoption of structural changes to reduce government’s spending, increase of inflation, reduction of government’s tax revenue deriving from the economic activity recession, and the deficit of the balance of payments, among others.

Failing to reduce fiscal deficits could lead to growing levels of uncertainty regarding Argentina’s macroeconomic conditions. In particular, it could lead to growing inflation rates and unanticipated foreign exchange depreciation and balance of payments crisis, higher local vulnerability to international credit crisis or geopolitical shocks, higher interest rates and erratic monetary policies, a reduction in real salaries and as a consequence, in private consumption, and a reduction in growth rates. This level of uncertainty, over which we have no control, may adversely affect our financial condition or results of operations.

If the current levels of inflation do not decrease, the Argentine economy could be adversely affected, negatively impacting our results of operations and margins.

Historically, inflation has materially undermined the Argentine economy and the Argentine government’s ability to create conditions for long-term economic growth. In recent years, Argentina has experienced high inflation rates.

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In the past, and particularly in the Fernández de Kirchner administration, the Argentine government has implemented programs to control inflation and monitor prices for essential goods and services, including attempts to freeze the price of certain supermarket products by means of price support arrangements between the government and the private sector. These programs, however, did not address the structural causes for Argentina’s inflation and, consequently, failed to reduce inflation. Again, more recently, in April 2019, the Macri administration adopted similar programs, as further described below

Since 2008, the Argentine economy has been subject to strong inflationary pressures that, according to private sector analysts, reached an average annual rate of 28.2% between 2010 and 2015. Given INDEC’s recent institutional and methodological reforms, controversy has arisen regarding the reliability of the information that it produced since 2007, including inflation estimates. On January 7, 2016, the Macri administration declared a state of administrative emergency with respect to the national statistical system and INDEC, which lasted until December 31, 2016. Since the declaration of the state of emergency, the INDEC ceased publishing certain statistical data and resumed publication of the CPI on June 16, 2016. Based on the new and revised information provided by INDEC, inflation reached an annual rate of 40.9% at the end of fiscal year 2016, an annual rate of 24.8% at the end of fiscal year 2017, and an annual rate of 47.6% at the end of fiscal year 2018. In the first three month of 2019, the accumulated inflation in Argentina was 11.8%.

In 2016, the government reported a primary fiscal deficit of 4.6% of GDP in 2017 reported a primary fiscal deficit of 3.9% of GDP, and in 2018 reported a primary fiscal deficit of 2.4%. Moreover, the primary fiscal balance could be negatively affected in the future if public expenditures continue to grow at a rate higher than revenues. For example, public expenditures grew due to social security benefits, financial assistance to provinces with financial problems and increased spending on public works and subsidies, including subsidies provided to the energy and transportation sectors. A further deterioration in fiscal accounts could negatively affect inflation rates and the government’s ability to access the long-term financial markets, which could, in turn, result in limited access to such markets by Argentine companies.

Due to several internal and external factors, including, but not limited to, the raising of the interest rate by the US Federal Reserve, the inability of the government to implement all required structural changes to reduce the fiscal deficit, the increasing need of international financing to finance the fiscal deficit, the increase of the government’s inflation target for 2018, a historical drought that affected the crops production (main export of Argentina) and the Turkish crisis, during the first half of 2018 the peso suffered a new sharp depreciation, which, as of December 31, 2018 accumulated 103.83% and that fostered the inflation levels again to 47.6% in 2018, with an official estimation of 29% for 2019, while private sources predict an inflation of 35% for the same period. However, in March 2019, the inflation reached a peak of 4.7%, and accumulated an aggregate of 11.8% during the first semester of 2019. On April 17, 2019 the Macri administration announced a series of economic measures to control inflation, including the freezing of prices of 60 basic products for ‘at least’ six months, the commitment to avoid tariffs increases above those already announced during 2019 and the freezing of the US Dollar intervention zones fixed as of April 16, 2019, equal to Ps.39.755 per U.S. dollar in the lower bound and Ps.51.448 per U.S. dollar in the upper bound. Nonetheless, in April 29, 2019, the committee of monetary policy (COPOM) of the BCRA announced that the BCRA will be able to sell foreign currency even if the exchange rate is within $51,448, the amount and frequency will depend on the market dynamics, and if the exchange rate is above $51,448, the BCRA will increase from USD 150 to USD 250 million the amount of the daily sale stipulated so far. Likewise, it may determine the performance of additional interventions to counteract episodes of excessive volatility if deemed necessary. Finally, the COPOM confirms its decision not to buy foreign currency until June 2019 if the exchange rate is below $39,755.

Inflation remains a challenge for Argentina and the Argentine government has announced its intention to reduce the primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP over time and to reduce the Argentine government’s reliance on BCRA financing. If these measures fail to address Argentina’s structural inflationary imbalance, the current levels of inflation may continue to rise, which may have an adverse effect on Argentina’s economy, while also leading to an increase in Argentina’s debt levels.

High inflate rates affect Argentina’s foreign competitiveness, increase social and economic inequality, negatively impacts employment, consumption and the level of economic activity, and undermines confidence in Argentina’s banking system, which could further limit the availability of and access by local companies to domestic and international credit.

Inflation in Argentina has contributed to a material increase in our costs of operation, in particular labor costs; it also enables a reduction in the purchasing power of the population, thus increasing the risk of a lower level of service consumption from our customers in Argentina, which could negatively impact our financial condition and results of operations. Inflation rates could continue to grow in the future, and there is uncertainty regarding the effects that any measures adopted by the government could have to control inflation.

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As of July 1, 2018, the Argentine peso qualifies as a currency of a hyperinflationary economy under IAS 29, and we are required to apply inflationary adjustments to our financial statements for the periods ending on and after December 31, 2018.

IAS 29 (Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies) requires that financial statements of any entity whose functional currency is the currency of a hyperinflationary economy, whether based on the historical cost method or on the current cost method, be stated in terms of the measuring unit current at the end of the reporting period. IAS 29 does not establish an absolute rate at which hyperinflation is deemed to arise, but includes several characteristics of hyperinflation. The International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) does not identify specific hyperinflationary jurisdictions. However, in June 2018, the International Practices Task Force of the Centre for Quality, which monitors “highly inflationary countries” categorized Argentina as a country with projected three-year cumulative inflation rate greater than 100%. Additionally, some of the other qualitative factors of IAS 29 were present, providing prima facie evidence that the Argentine economy is hyperinflationary for purposes of IAS 29. Therefore, Argentine companies using International Financial Reporting Standard as adopted by the IASB (“IFRS”) are required to apply IAS 29 to their financial statements for periods ending on and after July 1, 2018.

Similarly, Argentine Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“Argentine GAAP”) (Technical Resolutions No. 17, 39 and 41 (“TR 17”)) also requires the adjustment of financial statements to reflect the changes in general price index in the context of hyperinflation. The Argentine Federation of Economic Sciences Professionals Bodies ( Federación Argentina de Consejos Profesionales de Ciencias Económicas ), after finding the presence of the qualitative requirements of Argentine GAAP for the adjustment, stated that the adjustment should be applied to all Argentine companies’ financial statements for periods ending on or after July 1, 2018; provided that for all financial statements ending between July 1, 2018 and September 30, 2018, the adjustment is optional.

Adjustments to reflect inflation, such as those required by IAS 29 and TR 17, were prohibited by law No. 23,928 (the “Law 23,928”). Additionally, Decree No. 664/03, issued by the Argentine government (the “Decree”), instructed regulatory authorities, such as the CNV, to accept only financial statements that comply with the prohibition set forth by the Law 23,928. However, on December 4, 2018, Law 27,468 abrogated Decree No. 664/03 and amended Law 23,928 indicating that the prohibition of indexation no longer applies to the financial statements. According to the foregoing, on December 26, 2018, the CNV amended its rules to adopt the adjustments to reflect inflation under IAS 29 for the periods ending on and after December 31, 2018, and on February 4, 2019, extended the term for the filing of the interim unaudited financial statements ended on December 31, 2018 until March 6, 2019. For purposes of the determination of the indexation for tax purposes, Law 27,468 substituted the Wholesale Price Index for the CPI, and modified the standards for triggering the tax indexation procedure. During the first three years as from January 1, 2018, the tax indexation will be applicable if the variation of the CPI exceeds 55% in 2018, 30% in 2019 and 15% in 2020. From January 1, 2021, the tax indexation procedure will be triggered under similar standards as those set forth by IAS 29 and TR 17. To the extent that the CPI increased by 47.6% in 2018 (below the statutory threshold for this year), the tax indexation procedure was not triggered for 2018.

As a result, beginning with the period ending on December 31, 2018, we and our Argentine subsidiaries prepare financial statements in compliance with IFRS or Argentine GAAP, adopting IAS 29 and TR 17 for regulatory purposes in Argentina. However, our and our Argentine subsidiaries’ interim financial statements as of September 30, 2018 were prepared, for regulatory purposes, to comply with IFRS or Argentina GAAP without adopting IAS 29 or TR 17, and will differ from our and our Argentine subsidiaries’ financial statements prepared in connection with IFRS or Argentine GAAP adopting IAS 29 and TR 17.

We cannot predict the full future impact that the application of IAS 29 and TR 17 and the eventual application of the tax indexation procedure and related adjustments will have on our and our Argentine subsidiaries’ financial statements or the effects on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

Devaluation of the peso may adversely affect our results of operations, our capital expenditure program and the ability to service our liabilities and transfers of funds abroad.

Argentina has a history of high volatility in its foreign exchange markets, including sharp and unanticipated devaluations, tight foreign exchange controls and severe restrictions on foreign trade. The devaluation of the peso may have a negative impact on the ability of certain Argentine businesses to service their foreign currency denominated debt. It could also lead to higher inflation rates, significantly reduce real wages and jeopardize our business, which depends on domestic market demand.

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After several years of moderate variations in the nominal exchange rate, the peso depreciated 32.6% and 31.2% in 2013 and 2014, respectively, with respect to the U.S. dollar. In 2015, the peso lost 51.3% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar, including a 10.1% devaluation from January 1, 2015 to September 30, 2015 and a 38.1% devaluation during the last quarter of the year ended December 31, 2015. This devaluation occurred mainly in the period after December 16, 2015 and before fiscal year end, which was when the Macri administration eliminated exchange controls imposed by the prior administration. In 2016, the peso lost 22.15% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar and in 2017, the peso lost approximately 18.45% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar.

Due to several factors, including but not limited to the raising of the interest rate by the US Federal Reserve, the inability of the Argentine government to perform structural changes and reduce the fiscal deficit, the Argentine government’s increasing need for international financing, the increase of the Argentine government’s inflation goals for 2018, a historical drought that affected the crops production (main export of Argentina) and the Turkish crisis, during the first half of 2018 the Argentine peso suffered a new sharp depreciation, which accumulated 103.83% in 2018.

On September 28, 2018, the U.S. dollar exchange rate reached a peak of Ps.40.8967 per U.S. dollar. Effective October 1, 2018, the BCRA defined foreign exchange intervention and non-intervention zones for the U.S. dollar exchange rate until the end of 2018, at Ps.34 per U.S. dollar in the lower bound and Ps.44 per U.S. dollar in the upper bound. Such rates are adjusted daily, provided that if the exchange rate is beyond the upper bound, the BCRA may sell foreign currency for a daily amount of up to US$150 million, and beyond the lower bound, the BCRA may increase the monetary base backed with the increase of the Argentine federal reserves. As of the date of this annual report, the exchange rate was equal to Ps.44.6733 per U.S. dollar (accumulating a devaluation of 18% since January 1, 2019), while the non-intervention zones were fixed at Ps.39.755 per U.S. dollar in the lower bound and Ps.51.448 per U.S. dollar in the upper bound. However, on April 16, 2019, the BCRA froze these non-intervention zones levels until December 31, 2019, and announced that until June 30, 2019 will abstain from purchasing United States Dollars below the lower bound. As of the date of this annual report, the non-intervention zones were fixed at Ps.39.755 per U.S. dollar in the lower bound and Ps.51.448 per U.S. dollar in the upper bound. In addition, from April 15, 2019 the BCRA will offer to sell up to US$60 million on two daily auctions up to an aggregate of US$9,600 from the funds disbursed by the IMF. See “Item 3.D Key Information—Risk Factors—Fluctuations in the value of the peso could adversely affect the Argentine economy, and consequently our results of operations or financial condition” and “Additional Information—Exchange Controls”. Nonetheless, in April 29, 2019, the committee of monetary policy (COPOM) of the BCRA announced that the BCRA will be able to sell foreign currency even if the exchange rate is within $51,448, the amount and frequency will depend on the market dynamics, and if the exchange rate is above $51,448, the BCRA will increase from USD 150 to USD 250 million the amount of the daily sale stipulated so far. Likewise, it may determine the performance of additional interventions to counteract episodes of excessive volatility if deemed necessary. Finally, the COPOM confirms its decision not to buy foreign currency until June 2019 if the exchange rate is below $39,755. During the first quarter of 2019 the Argetine peso depreciated approximately 14.5% against the U.S. dollar.

The measures adopted by the government to control the depreciation caused a deepening recession, increasing unemployment and medium and small companies’ failures, while high inflation and foreign exchange instability continues. In addition, the publication during 2018 of a description of the alleged bribes paid by Argentine businessmen to the Kirchner administration (known as the notebooks or graft scandal ( “Escándalo de los Cuadernos ”)), in connection with the adjudication of the public works by the Argentine government during the Kirchner administration has also contributed to the deepening of the recession, affecting (i) the access of the private and public sector to finance, and (ii) the new adjudication of public works, and the performance of the public works already adjudicated, which have been suspended or reduced to a large extent.

Additional volatility, appreciation or depreciation of the peso, or reduction in the BCRA’s international reserves due to currency interventions could adversely affect the Argentine economy, which in turn may have an adverse effect on our financial conditions and results of operations. Any further devaluation of the Argentine peso could have material adverse effects on the Argentine economy, which could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.

Given the economic and political conditions in Argentina, we cannot predict whether, and to what extent, the value of the peso may depreciate or appreciate against the U.S. dollar, the euro or other foreign currencies. We cannot predict how these conditions will affect our capital expenditure program, the consumption of services we provide to local costumers or our ability to meet our liabilities denominated in currencies other than the peso. Furthermore, our ability to transfer funds abroad and our ability to pay dividends to shareholders located abroad may be jeopardized if high exchange rate volatility and exchange controls are once again introduced in Argentina. Finally, we cannot predict whether the Argentine government will further modify its monetary, fiscal or exchange rate policy in the future.

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Government measures, as well as pressure from labor unions, could require private companies to implement salary increases or provide workers with additional benefits, all of which could increase our operating costs.

In the past, the Argentine government has enacted laws and regulations requiring private companies to maintain certain wage levels and provide added benefits to their employees. Additionally, both public and private sector employers have been subject to strong pressure from the workforce and trade unions to grant salary increases and certain additional benefits.

Labor relations in Argentina are governed by specific legislation, such as Labor Law No. 20,744 and Collective Bargaining Law No. 14,250, which, among other things, dictate how salary and other labor negotiations are to be conducted. Every industrial or commercial activity in Argentina is regulated by a specific collective bargaining agreement, or CBA, that groups companies together according to industry sector and trade union. Although the process of negotiation is standardized, each chamber of industrial or commercial activity separately negotiates the increases of salaries and labor benefits with the relevant trade union covering such commercial or industrial activity. In the cement industry, salaries are established on an annual basis through negotiations between the chambers that represent the cement producers and the cement industry employees’ trade union. The National Labor Ministry mediates between the parties and ultimately approves the annual salary increase to be applied in the cement industry. Parties are bound by the final decision once it is approved by the labor authority and must observe the established salary increases for all employees that are represented by the cement union and to whom the collective bargaining agreement applies.

In addition, each company is entitled, regardless of union-negotiated mandatory salary increases, to give its employees additional merit increase or variable compensation scheme.

Argentine employers, in both the public and private sectors, have experienced significant pressure from their employees and labor organizations to increase wages and to provide additional benefits. In June 2017, the Ministry of Labor raised the minimum salary to Ps.10,000, effective in three tranches: Ps.8,860 as of July 2017, Ps.9,500 as of January 2018, Ps.10,000 as of July 2018, Ps. 10,700 as of September 2018 and Ps. 11,300 as of December 2018. The Argentine government has also approved additional increases of the minimum salary to Ps.11,900 as of March 2019 and to Ps.12,500 as of June 2019. Due to high levels of inflation, both public and private sector employers are experiencing significant pressure from unions and their employees to further increase salaries. In 2015, the INDEC published the Coeficiente de Variación Salarial (Salary Variation Index), an index that shows the evolution of salaries. The Salaries Index showed an increase of approximately 33.0% and 27.3% in registered private sector salaries in 2016 and 2017, respectively, and of 30.4% in 2018. During this period, the average wages in the cement industry increased in line with the average of private sector salaries, according to the Argentine Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security. However, recently, commercial pilots’ of Aerolíneas Argentinas S.A. (the state-owned airline) obtained a salary increase of 40.5%, and workers in the oil industry obtained a salary increase of 25.0% and have demanded additional increases. In addition, on November 12, 2018, the Argentine government issued a decree imposing the payment of an extraordinary non-remuneratory bonus of Ps.5,000 to all workers in the private sector, payable in two installments in December 2018 and February 2019. This bonus and similar salary increases and additional payments could also have an effect on inflation, and, if, as a result of such measures salaries exceed local inflation and/or devaluation of the Argentine peso, whatever is higher, this could have a material and adverse effect on our costs and business, results of operations and financial condition. High inflation rates could continue to increase demand for wage increases. In the future, the Argentine government could take new measures requiring salary increases or additional benefits for workers, and the labor force and labor unions may apply pressure for such measures. Any such increase in wage or worker benefit could result in added costs and reduced results of operations for Argentine companies, including us. Such added costs could adversely affect our business, financial condition and result of operations.

Argentina’s economy has undergone a significant slowdown, and any further decline in Argentina’s rate of economic growth could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

After recovering from the 2001-2002 crisis, the pace of growth of Argentina’s economy diminished, suggesting uncertainty as to whether the growth experienced between 2003 and 2011 was sustainable. Economic growth was initially fueled by a significant devaluation of the peso, the availability of excess production capacity resulting from a long period of deep recession and high commodity prices. In spite of the growth following the

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2001-2002 crisis, the economy has suffered a sustained erosion of direct investment and capital investment. The global economic crisis of 2008 led to a sudden economic decline in Argentina during 2009, accompanied by inflationary pressures, depreciation of the peso and a drop in consumer and investor confidence.

Economic conditions in Argentina from 2012 to 2015 included increased inflation, continued demand for wage increases, a rising fiscal deficit and limitations on Argentina’s ability to service its restructured debt in accordance with its terms due to its ongoing litigation with holdout creditors. In addition, beginning in the second half of 2011, an increase in local demand for foreign currency caused the Argentine government to strengthen its foreign exchange controls. During 2013, 2014 and 2015, the government implemented price controls on certain goods and services to curb inflation. Starting in December 2015, the Macri administration has maintained certain price controls for necessary goods, such as foods, cleaning products and toiletries. According to the revised calculation of the GDP published by the INDEC, Argentina’s real GDP decreased by 2.1% in 2016 and increased by 2.7% in 2017. However, due to the foreign exchange crisis suffered during the first semester of 2018, and the measures adopted by the Argentine government to control such crisis, according to the INDEC, Argentina’s real GDP decreased by 2.5% in 2018, while the IMF projected a total decrease of GDP 1,2% for 2019.

More recently, on April 17, 2019 the Macri administration announced a series of economic measures to control inflation and foster consumption, including the freezing of prices of 60 basic products for ‘at least’ six months, the commitment to avoid tariffs increases above those already announced during 2019, the freezing of the US Dollar intervention zones fixed as of April 16, 2019, equal to Ps.39.755 per U.S. dollar in the lower bound and Ps.51.448 per U.S. dollar in the upper bound. Nonetheless, in April 29, 2019, the committee of monetary policy (COPOM) of the BCRA announced that the BCRA will be able to sell foreign currency even if the exchange rate is within $51,448, the amount and frequency will depend on the market dynamics, and if the exchange rate is above $51,448, the BCRA will increase from USD 150 to USD 250 million the amount of the daily sale stipulated so far. Likewise, it may determine the performance of additional interventions to counteract episodes of excessive volatility if deemed necessary. Finally, the COPOM confirms its decision not to buy foreign currency until June 2019 if the exchange rate is below $39,755.

Despite the measures adopted, we cannot assure you that the Macri administration will successfully control inflation.

A decline in international demand for Argentine products, a lack of stability and competitiveness of the peso against other currencies, a decline in confidence among consumers and foreign and domestic investors, a higher rate of inflation and future political uncertainties, among other factors, may affect the development of the Argentine economy, which could lead to reduced demand for our services and adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

The implementation of new exchange controls and restrictions on capital inflows and outflows could limit the availability of international credit and could threaten the financial system, adversely affecting the Argentine economy and, as a result, our business.

From 2011 and until President Macri assumed office, the Argentine government increased controls on the sale of foreign currencies and the acquisition of foreign assets by local residents, limiting the possibility of transferring funds abroad. Through a combination of foreign exchange and tax regulations, the Fernández de Kirchner administration significantly curtailed access to the MULC by individuals and private-sector entities. In addition, during the last few years under the Fernández de Kirchner administration, the BCRA exercised a de facto prior approval power for certain foreign exchange transactions otherwise authorized to be carried out under the applicable regulations, such as dividend payments or repayment of principal of intercompany loans as well as the import of goods, by means of regulating the amount of foreign currency available to companies to conduct such transactions. The number of exchange controls introduced in the past and in particular after 2011 during the Fernández de Kirchner administration gave rise to an unofficial U.S. dollar trading market, and the unofficial peso to U.S. dollar exchange rate in such market differed substantially from the official peso to U.S. dollar exchange rate. See “Item 10.D Additional Information—Exchange Controls.”

In the past, the Argentine government also imposed informal restrictions, such as limitations on the ability of certain local companies and individuals to purchase foreign currency. These restrictions on foreign currency purchases started in October 2011 and tightened during 2012 through 2014 and the end of 2015. Informal restrictions may consist of de facto measures restricting local residents and companies from purchasing foreign currency through the foreign exchange market to make payments abroad, such as dividends, capital reductions, and payment for importation of goods and services. For example, local banks may request, even when not expressly required by any regulation, the prior opinion of the BCRA before executing any specific foreign exchange transaction.

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Additionally, the level of international reserves deposited with the BCRA significantly decreased from US$47.4 billion (Ps.723.5 billion) as of November 1, 2011 to US$25.6 billion (Ps.332.9 billion) as of December 31, 2015, resulting in a reduced capacity of the Argentine government to intervene in the MULC and to provide access to such markets to private sector companies such as us. The Macri administration announced a program intended to increase the level of international reserves deposited with the BCRA through the execution of certain agreements with several Argentine and foreign entities. Because of the measures taken the level of international reserves increased by US$12.7 billion to US$38.3 billion as of December 31, 2016 and by US$16.3 billion to US$55.1 billion as of December 31, 2017. As a consequence of the disbursements of the IMF under the technical agreement entered in 2018, as of December 31, 2018 the level of international reserves increased to US$65.7 billion. Despite these measures, the level of international reserves deposited with the BCRA could be reduced in the future, which could lead to political and social tensions and undermine the Argentine government’s public finances, as has occurred in the past, which could adversely affect Argentina’s economy and prospects for economic growth.

Since assuming office, the Macri administration gradually implemented a series of reforms related to the foreign exchange restrictions, including certain currency controls, which had been imposed under the Fernández de Kirchner administration, in order to provide greater flexibility and access to the MULC. On August 8, 2016 the BCRA issued Communication “A” 6037, which substantially modified the applicable foreign exchange regulations and eliminated the set of restrictions for accessing the MULC. Effective as of July 1, 2017, pursuant to Communication “A” 6244, all regulations that restricted access to the MULC were repealed, leaving in place only the obligation to comply with a reporting regime and the transfer and sell in the MULC of the proceeds of the export of goods. Pursuant to Communication “A” 6401, dated December 26, 2017, a new reporting regime was created, pursuant to which the “Survey on the issuance of foreign notes and liabilities by the financial and private non-financial sector,” established by Communication “A” 3602, and the “Survey on direct investments,” established by Communication “A” 4237, were replaced by a unified report on direct investments and debt. All Argentine residents must comply with the reporting regime. Finally, pursuant to Communication “A” 6363 of the BCRA, dated November 10, 2017, the obligation to transfer and sell in the MULC the proceeds of the export of goods was also lifted. Due to the foreign exchange crisis during the first half of 2018, on November 8, 2018 the Central Bank issued Communication “A” 6595 imposing on financial entities a minimum cash requirement equal to 23% up to 29 days; 17% between 30 and 59 days; 11% between 60 and 89 days; 5% between 90 and 179 days; 2% between 180 and 365 days; and 0% for more than 365 days on obligations with international financial facilities; which, however, was repealed on January 1, 2019.

Notwithstanding the measures adopted by the Argentine government in the recent months, in the future the Argentine government could reinstate or impose further exchange controls, transfer restrictions or restrictions on the free movement of capital, and/or take other measures in response to capital flight or a significant depreciation of the peso, which could limit our ability to access the international capital markets and impair our ability to make interest, principal or dividend payments abroad. Such measures could lead to renewed political and social tensions, and could undermine the Argentine government’s public finances, which could adversely affect Argentina’s economy and prospects for economic growth and, consequently, adversely affect our business and results of operations, and could impair our ability to make dividend payments to holders of the ADSs, which may adversely affect the market value of the ADSs.

The Argentine government’s ability to obtain financing from international markets may be limited, which may negatively impact our financial condition and our ability to grow.

The Argentine government’s ability to obtain financing from international markets has been limited:

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Future access to debt and equity financings in international markets may be limited as litigation with holdout bondholders as well as ICSID and other claims against the Argentine government continues, which in turn could limit economic growth, adversely affecting our business, results of operations and financial condition.

The actions taken by the Argentine Government to reduce imports may affect our ability to purchase significant capital goods.

In 2012, the Argentine government adopted an import procedure pursuant to which local authorities must pre-approve any import of products and services to Argentina as a precondition to allow importers access to the foreign exchange market for the payment of such imported products and services. In 2012, the European Union, the United States of America and Japan filed claims with the World Trade Organization, or the WTO, against certain import-related requirements maintained by Argentina. On December 22, 2015, through Resolution No. 3,823, the AFIP removed the import authorization system in place since 2012 denominated Affidavit Advance Import and replaced it with the new Comprehensive Import Monitoring System. Among other changes, local authorities must now reply to any request for approval within a ten-day period from the date in which the request is filed.

We cannot assure that the Argentine government will modify or maintain current export tax rates and import regulations. We cannot predict the impact that any changes may have on our results of operations and financial condition.

A decline in international prices for Argentina’s main commodity exports could have an adverse effect on Argentina’s economic growth, which could have a material adverse effect on our business and results of operations.

Argentina’s financial recovery from the 2001-2002 crisis occurred in large part due to price increases for the country’s commodity exports. High commodity prices contributed to the increase in Argentine exports since the third quarter of 2002 and to high government taxes on revenues from exports. The national reliance on revenues from exports of certain commodities has caused the Argentine economy to be more vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices.

Commodity prices, including the price of soy, have declined significantly during the last years due in large part to slower growth in China. A persistent decline in the prices of Argentina’s main commodity exports could have a negative impact on government revenues from taxes it collects on exports, which, in turn, could have a negative impact on the government’s ability to service its existing debt obligations. This, in turn, could generate recessionary or inflationary pressures, depending on the government’s reaction, which could adversely affect Argentina’s economy and, therefore, our results of operations and financial condition.

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Argentina’s current account and balance of payment imbalances could lead to a depreciation of the Argentine peso, and as a result, affect our results of operations, our capital expenditure program and our ability to service our foreign currency liabilities.

According to INDEC, Argentina has a structural current account deficit that reached US$2.3 billion by the end of 2018, and reached US$30.8 billion in 2017, US$14.7 billion in 2016 and US$17.6 billion in 2015, representing 4.8%, 2.7% and 2.8% of GDP, respectively. The account deficit between 2015 and 2017 originates in the stagnation of exports of goods, which have only increased by 1.4%, taking into account the compounded average growth rate, CAGR, between 2015 and 2017; in contrast, imports of goods have been increasing at a much faster speed, reaching a CAGR of 5.8% in the same period.

The current account deficit was financed in recent years with external debt issuances in the international debt markets by the Macri administration. According to BCRA statistics, net external debt issued and/or incurred by Argentina consisted of approximately US$28.3 billion, US$26.6 billion and US$25.5 billion in 2018, 2017 and 2016, respectively. In addition, the settlement of the disputes over the 2001 defaulted debt crisis has allowed several provinces of Argentina and certain Argentine private companies to issue new debt securities in foreign markets. This has contributed to offset the current account deficit and has allowed the BCRA to accumulate international reserves of US$10.7, US$16.3 billion and US$12.7 billion in 2018, 2017 and 2016, respectively.

Because foreign direct investment remains stagnant in Argentina, amounting to only US$3.2 billion, US$2.3 billion, US$2.5 billion and US$1.3 billion in 2018, 2017, 2016 and 2015, respectively, it may become impossible for Argentina and its provinces to meet their debts obligations in the future, since Argentina’s foreign currency needs would severely overcome its foreign currency sources. If this level of uncertainty prevails on international investors, Argentina may suffer a “ sudden stop ” event, where investors stop lending money to Argentinean institutions. This, in turn, may result in large capital outflows that could not only force the Argentine government to default on its debt, but also generate a rapid and unanticipated depreciation of the argentine peso, a hike in local interest rates and a probable banking system crisis if bank deposits are largely withdrawn following social unrest.

The events described above have already taken place in recent decades in Argentina, and although the actual administrations intends to address the situation, as of the date of this annual report, the impact that the measures taken by the Macri administration will have on the Argentine economy as a whole cannot be predicted. If a balance of payments crisis were to occur, a large depreciation of the Argentine peso against the U.S. dollar could adversely affect our ability to meet our foreign currency obligations. Furthermore, the negative effect such a crisis could have on the growth rates of the Argentine economy and its consumption patterns could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and result of operations.

Government intervention may adversely affect Argentine economy, Argentine companies and, as a result, our business and results of operations.

During recent years, the federal government has exercised substantial control over the Argentine economy. The two administrations of President Fernández de Kirchner, who governed from 2007 through December 9, 2015, increased state intervention in the Argentine economy, including through expropriation and nationalization measures, price controls and pervasive exchange controls.

In 2008, the Fernández de Kirchner administration absorbed and replaced the former private pension system for a public “pay-as-you-go” pension system. As a result, all resources administered by the private pension funds, including significant equity interests in a wide range of listed companies, were transferred to a separate fund ( Fondo de Garantía de Sustentabilidad ) , or the FGS, to be administered by the National Social Security Administration ( Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social ) , or the ANSES. The dissolution of the private pension funds and the transfer of their financial assets to the FGS have had important repercussions on the financing of private sector companies. Debt and equity instruments that previously could be placed with pension fund administrators are now entirely subject to the discretion of the ANSES. Since acquiring equity interests in privately owned companies, through the process of replacing the pension system, the ANSES is entitled to designate representatives of the Argentine government to the boards of directors of those entities. Pursuant to Decree No.

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1,278/12, issued by the executive branch on July 25, 2012, the ANSES’s representatives must report directly to the Ministry of Economy and are subject to a mandatory information-sharing regime, under which, among other obligations, the representatives must immediately inform the Ministry of Economy of the agenda for each board of directors’ meeting and provide related documentation.

In April 2012, the Fernández de Kirchner administration decreed the removal of directors and senior officers of YPF S.A., or YPF, the country’s largest oil and gas company, which was controlled by the Spanish group Repsol, and submitted a bill to the Argentine Congress to expropriate shares held by Repsol representing 51% of the shares of YPF. The Argentine Congress approved the bill in May 2012 through the passage of Law No. 26,741, which declared the production, industrialization, transportation and marketing of hydrocarbons to be activities of public interest and fundamental policies of Argentina and empowered the Argentine government to adopt any measures necessary to achieve self-sufficiency in hydrocarbon supply. In February 2014, the Argentine government and Repsol announced that they had reached an agreement on the terms of the compensation payable to Repsol for the expropriation of the YPF shares. Such compensation totaled approximately US$5.0 billion payable by delivery of Argentine sovereign bonds with various maturities. The agreement, which the Argentine government ratified pursuant to Law No. 26,932, settled the claim filed by Repsol with the ICSID.

Since assuming office on December 10, 2015, President Macri has announced and has adopted several economic and policy reforms. As of the date of this annual report, the impact that these and any future measures taken by the current administration will have on the Argentine economy as a whole cannot be predicted.

Prior administrations took several steps to nationalize the concessions and utilities that were privatized during the 1990s. We cannot predict whether current or future administrations will take similar or further measures, including nationalization, expropriation and/or increased Argentine governmental intervention in companies.

The matters described above could create uncertainties for some investors in public companies in Argentina, including us.

The Argentine economy could be adversely affected by economic developments in other markets and by more general “contagion” effects.

Weak, flat or negative economic growth in any of Argentina’s major trading partners, such as Brazil, could adversely affect Argentina’s balance of payments and, consequently, economic growth.

The economy of Brazil, Argentina’s largest export market and the principal source of imports, is currently experiencing heightened negative pressure due to the uncertainties stemming from ongoing political crisis, including the impeachment of Brazil’s former president, Ms. Dilma Rousseff, the corruption allegations against Brazil’s former president, Mr. Michel Temer and the imprisonment of former president Mr. Luiz Inácio da Silva. The Brazilian economy contracted by 6.4% between 2014 and 2016, mainly due to a 7.4% decrease in household consumption and a 22.8% decrease in gross fixed capital formation. In 2017, the economy recovered at a very slow pace, as GDP increased by 1.9% and in 2018 the economy further expanded by 1.1%. In January 1, 2019, Jair Bolsonaro was elected as the 38 ^th President of Brasil.    A further deterioration of economic conditions in Brazil may reduce demand for Argentine exports and create advantages for Brazilian imports. While the impact of Brazil’s downturn on Argentina cannot be predicted, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Brazilian political and economic crisis could have a further negative impact on the Argentine economy.

“Contagion” effects may also affect the Argentine economy. International investors’ reactions to events occurring in one developing country sometimes appear to follow a “contagion” pattern, in which an entire region or investment class is disfavored by international investors. In the past, the Argentine economy has been adversely affected by such contagion effects on a number of occasions, including the 1994 Mexican financial crisis, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian financial crisis, the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian real, the 2001 collapse of Turkey’s fixed exchange rate regime and the global financial crisis in 2008.

The Argentine economy may also be affected by conditions in developed economies, such as the United States, that are significant trading partners of Argentina or have influence over world economic cycles and over short-term evolution of commodity prices. If interest rates increase significantly in developed economies, including

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the United States, Argentina and its developing economy trading partners, such as Brazil, could find it more difficult and expensive to borrow capital and refinance existing debt, which could adversely affect economic growth in those countries. Decreased growth from Argentina’s trading partners could have a material adverse effect on the markets for Argentina’s exports and, in turn, adversely affect economic growth. Any of these potential risks to the Argentine economy could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and result of operations.

In a referendum on membership of the European Union held on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted in favor of the British government taking the necessary action for the U.K. to leave the European Union (commonly known as “Brexit”). The British government has announced preliminary measures to be implemented in order to facilitate the U.K.’s exit from the European Union and has triggered the formal process to leave the European Union on March 29, 2017. The U.K.’s decision to leave the European Union has caused, and is anticipated to continue to cause, uncertainties and instability in the financial markets, which may affect us and the market value of our ordinary shares and the ADSs. These uncertainties could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

In July 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected president of Mexico and assumed office on December 1, 2018, and in October 2018, Jair Bolsonaro was elected president of Brazil and assumed office on January 1, 2019. We cannot predict the changes that these new administrations may bring and the impact of such changes on the Argentine economy or our business and results of operations.

Since Donald J. Trump took office in January 2017, the policies implemented by the Trump administration have tended to impose greater restrictions on free trade generally and immigration. Changes in social, political, regulatory and economic conditions in the United States, or in laws and policies governing foreign trade, could create uncertainty in the international markets and could have a negative impact on emerging market economies, including the Argentine economy, which in turn could have a negative impact on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

The Argentine may be subject to instability, which may affect our operations.

The Argentine banking system has experienced several crises in the past, and even collapsed in 2001 and 2002. However, in more recent years, the Argentine banking system has shown a recovery in credit activity, driven by increases in loans and deposits. However, most of the deposit growth is in short-term deposits and the sources of medium- and long-term funding for financial institutions are currently limited. As of December 2018, deposits in pesos to the private sector increased 42.4% over the prior year and loans in pesos to the private sector increased 19.0%. In particular, mortgage loans experienced a high growth rate in 2017, rising at an annual rate of 106% year over year and 71.5% in 2018; also expanding rapidly were consumer loans, which increased 60% year over year, according to BCRA. The average interest rate for fixed-term deposits of more than Ps.1,000,000 with maturities between 30 and 35 days paid by private banks in Argentina, as published by the BCRA, averaged 20.64% during 2017 and 48.8% in 2018. Despite improvements in stability, we cannot be certain that another banking system crisis will not occur in the future.

Financial institutions are particularly subject to significant regulation from multiple Regulatory Authorities, all of whom may, among other things, establish limits on commissions and impose sanctions on the financial institutions. The lack of a stable regulatory framework could impose significant limitations on the activities of the financial institutions and could induce uncertainty with respect to the financial system stability.

Despite the strong liquidity currently prevailing in the financial system, a new crisis or the consequent instability of one or more of the larger banks, public or private, could have a material adverse effect on the prospects for economic growth and political stability in Argentina, resulting in a loss of consumer confidence, lower disposable income and fewer financing alternatives for consumers. These conditions would have a material adverse effect on us by resulting in lower usage of our services, lower sales of devices and the possibility of a higher level of uncollectible accounts or increase the credit risk of the counterparties regarding the Company investments in local financial institutions.

Exchange controls and restrictions on transfers abroad and capital inflows have limited, and could continue limiting, the availability of international credit. The continued limitation of international credit could have a material adverse impact on our financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.

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Current investigations with respect to the involvement of politicians and several construction companies in the so-called Notebooks Investigation (Escándalo de los Cuadernos), may have a material adverse effect on construction activity and on the trading price of our ordinary shares and ADSs.

As of the date of this annual report, the Office of the Argentine Federal Prosecutor is conducting several investigations, which are ongoing, into allegations of money laundering and bribery of public officials. The largest of these investigations relates to Los Cuadernos de las Coimas , or the Notebooks Investigation. This investigation relates to notebooks kept by a driver who worked for public officials during the Kirchner Administration. The notebooks allegedly document a widespread corruption scheme involving illegal cash payments by businessmen to government officials in order to win government contracts.

As a result of these investigations, several businessmen (including construction company executives) and former public officials have been detained and prosecuted, including the former president of Argentina, Mrs. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was prosecuted for illicit association.

The Notebooks Investigation and other subsequent investigations may affect: (i) the access of construction companies to local and international financing; and (ii) awards of public works contracts to several construction companies. We cannot predict what impact these investigations might have or what other measures may be adopted by the courts, the current administration or any future administration, each of which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and the results of our operations.

Risks Relating to Our Indirect Controlling Shareholder

Adverse events affecting affiliates of our indirect controlling shareholder, Mover Participações S.A., including with respect to the involvement by a subsidiary of Mover Participações S.A. in the so-called Operation Car Wash investigation in Brazil (Operação Lava Jato), may have a material adverse effect on our reputation and on the trading price of our ordinary shares and ADSs.

Construções e Comércio Camargo Corrêa S.A., or CCCC, a construction and engineering subsidiary of Mover Participações S.A. (formerly named Camargo Corrêa S.A.) and certain of its former senior management and employees have been the subjects of a Brazilian Federal Police investigation referred to as Operation Car Wash, which is an investigation into widespread allegations of corruption, including the Brazilian federal government controlled national oil company Petróleo Brasileiro S.A.—Petrobras, where certain of its employees accepted bribes from a number of construction companies, including CCCC.

In connection with the Operation Car Wash investigation and comprehensive internal investigations undertaken by CCCC with the assistance of external experts, CCCC and certain of its former senior management and employees entered into leniency and plea bargain agreements with the Brazilian authorities pursuant to which they admitted to violations of Brazilian antitrust and anti-corruption laws and agreed to pay compensation totaling more than 800 million Brazilian reais, which included fines and other indemnification, and committed to continue to cooperate with Brazilian authorities. In addition, CCCC continues to conduct internal investigations on an ongoing basis regarding its anti-corruption compliance.

The news of Operation Car Wash also had repercussions in other Latin America countries where CCCC operates besides Brazil, including Peru, Argentina and Venezuela. According to certain media reports, government investigations are underway in those countries for alleged acts of corruption involving Brazilian construction companies. CCCC’s management has conducted internal investigations with the help of external experts and to-date has not identified evidence of any wrongdoing performed by CCCC in these countries.

Any additional violations of anti-corruption and/or antitrust laws involving CCCC may result in additional fines and/or indemnification obligations. In addition, any additional adverse events or developments could have a material adverse impact on CCCC and the Mover group, which may subject us to reputational damage and could materially adversely affect the trading price of our ordinary shares and ADSs. Moreover, although we have been informed by Mover Participações and its counsels that CCCC should be solely liable for any violations by CCCC of antitrust and/or anti-corruption laws, no assurances can be given that affiliates of CCCC will not also be found to be liable for any such violations of law.

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Risks Relating to Our Business and Industry

The cyclical nature of the cement industry may lead to decreases in our revenues and profit margin.

The cement industry is cyclical and sensitive to changes in supply and demand that are, in turn, affected by political and economic conditions in Argentina, Paraguay and elsewhere. This cyclicality may decrease our profit margin. In particular:

The prices we are able to obtain for cement depend in large part on prevailing market prices. Cement is subject to price fluctuations resulting from production capacity, inventories, the availability of substitutes and other factors relating to the market such as the level of activity in residential construction markets, and, in some cases, government intervention. If the price of cement were to decline significantly from current levels, it could have a material adverse effect on us and our profit margin.

We are subject to the possible entry of domestic or international competitors into our market, which could decrease our market share and profitability.

The cement market in Argentina is competitive and is currently served by four principal groups which together supply substantially all of the cement consumed in the country. In the cement industry, the location of a production plant tends to limit the market that a plant can serve because transportation costs are high, reducing profit margins. Historically, we have been the clear leader in Argentina and the only player with a relevant presence across all regions in the country. However, competition could intensify if other players decide to try to enter our market.

We may face increased competition if the other Argentine cement manufacturers, despite incremental freight costs, decide to increase their existing capabilities (whether greenfield or brownfield) in the manufacturing and/or distribution ends of the cement market. Certain of our local competitors have announced potential new discrete investments to increase their production capacity levels.

We also face the possibility of competition in Argentina from the entry into our market of imported clinker, cement or other materials (such as slag) or products from foreign manufacturers, which may have significantly greater financial resources than us, particularly as production capacity continues to exceed depressed demand in other parts of the world and transportation costs decrease.

We face competition in our cement business in Paraguay by Industria Nacional de Cementos, or INC, a Paraguayan state-owned company, which is the largest producer and supplier and the historical market leader in the cement business in Paraguay, with a market share of 47%. We are the second largest producer of cement in Paraguay with a market share of approximately 44%. We may also face additional competition in Paraguay either from imports or from incremental local production capacity.

We may not be able to maintain our market share if we cannot match our competitors’ prices or keep pace with the development of new products. If any of these events were to occur, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be adversely affected.

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Demand for our cement products is highly related to residential and commercial construction in Argentina and Paraguay and is dependent upon public infrastructure developments, which, in turn, is affected by economic conditions in those countries.

Cement consumption is highly correlated to construction levels. Demand for our cement products depends, in large part, on residential and commercial construction and infrastructure developments. Residential and commercial construction, in turn, is highly correlated to prevailing economic conditions in the country. An eventual decline in economic conditions would reduce household disposable income, cause a reduction in residential construction and potentially delay infrastructure projects, leading to a decrease in demand for cement. As a result, a deterioration in the economic conditions would have a material adverse effect on our financial performance. We cannot assure you that growth in Argentina’s and Paraguay’s GDP, or the contribution to GDP growth attributable to the construction and infrastructure sectors, will continue at the recent pace or at all.

A reduction in private or public construction projects in Argentina and/or Paraguay could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Significant interruptions or delays in, or the termination of, private or public construction projects may adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations. Private and public construction levels in our market depend on investments in the region which, in turn, are affected by economic conditions. According to the Argentine government budget law, the allocated infrastructure spending for 2019 was Ps.4,073 million.

We cannot assure you that the Argentine and/or Paraguayan governments will execute the infrastructure plans as communicated. A reduction in public infrastructure spending in the markets in which operate or delay in the execution of these projects could have an adverse effect on the general growth of the economy and, therefore, could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Volatility and uncertainty in fuel prices and availability may affect our operating costs and competitive position, which could materially and adversely affect our results of operations, cash flows and financial condition.

All of the locomotives we operate are diesel-powered, and our fuel expenses are significant. If increases in fuel prices cannot be passed on to our customers through our tariffs, our operating margins could be materially and adversely affected.

Fuel prices have historically been volatile and may continue to be volatile in the future. Fuel prices are subject to a variety of factors that are beyond our control, including, but not limited to, consumer demand for, and the supply of, oil, processing, gathering and transportation availability, price and availability of alternative fuel sources, weather conditions, natural disasters and political conditions.

Changes in the cost or availability of raw materials supplied by third parties may adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

We use certain raw materials in the production of cement, such as slag, iron ore, steel slabs, clay, sand and pozzolana that we obtain from third parties. In 2017, for our main operation in Argentina, our cost of raw materials supplied by third parties as a percentage of our cement production variable costs was 16% and in 2018, was 14%. Should existing suppliers cease operations or reduce or eliminate production of these by-products, sourcing costs for these materials could increase significantly or require us to find alternative sources for these materials, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

Energy accounts for a significant portion of our total cement production variable costs, so higher energy prices or governmental regulations that restrict energy available for our operation could materially adversely affect our operations and financial condition.

We consume substantial amounts of energy in our cement production processes and currently rely on third-party suppliers for a significant portion of our total energy needs. During the year ended December 31, 2018, in Argentina, thermal energy cost and electricity cost represented approximately 30% and 22% of our total cement production variable costs, respectively, and in 2017, thermal energy cost and electricity cost represented approximately 28% and 19% of our total cement production variable costs, respectively. Our results of operations may be adversely affected by higher costs of electricity or unavailability or shortages of electricity, or an interruption in energy supplies.

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Electricity shortages have occurred in Argentina and Paraguay in the past and could occur again in the future, and there can be no assurance that power generation capacity will grow sufficiently to meet our demand. In recent years, the condition of the Argentine electricity market has provided little incentive to generators to further invest in increasing their generation capacity, which would require material long-term financial commitments. As a result, Argentine electricity generators are currently operating at near full capacity and could be required to ration supply in order to meet a national energy demand that exceeds the current generation capacity.

In addition, the 2001 economic crisis and the resulting emergency measures had a material adverse effect on other energy sectors, including oil and gas companies, which led to a significant reduction in natural gas supplies to generation companies that use this commodity in their generation activities. In an attempt to address this situation, in January 2016, the Argentine Government unified and increased wholesale energy prices for all consumption in Argentina. This measure is currently in an early stage of implementation and as of the date of this annual report we cannot predict what effect such measure will have on the sector. Consequently, electricity generators may still not be able to guarantee the supply of electricity to distribution companies, which, in turn, could prevent these companies from experiencing continued growth in their businesses and could lead to failures to provide electricity to customers; and we may not have access to the gas necessary to maintain our cement production processes.

Shortages, and government efforts to respond to or prevent shortages, may materially adversely impact the cost and supply of energy for our operations.

We may be materially adversely affected if our transportation, storage and distribution operations are interrupted or are more costly than anticipated.

Our operations are dependent upon the uninterrupted operation of transportation, storage and distribution of our cement products. Transportation, storage or distribution of our cement products could be partially or completely shut down, temporarily or permanently, as the result of any number of circumstances that are not within our control, such as:

In addition, we rely on third-party services providers for the transportation of our products to our customers. Our ability to service our customers at reasonable costs depends, in many cases, upon our ability to negotiate reasonable terms with carriers, including trucking companies. To the extent that third-party carriers were to increase their rates, we may be forced to pay these higher rates before we are able to pass such increases onto our customers, if at all.

Any significant interruption at these facilities or an inability to transport our products to or from these facilities or to or from our customers for any reason would materially adversely affect us.

Our business strategies require substantial capital and long-term investments, which we may be unable to fund competitively.

Our business strategies to continue to expand our cement production capacity and distribution network will require substantial capital investments, which we may finance through additional debt and/or equity financing. However, adequate financing may not be available or, if available, may not be available on satisfactory terms, including as a result of adverse macroeconomic conditions. We may be unable to obtain sufficient additional capital in the future to fund our capital requirements and our business strategy at acceptable costs. If we are unable to access additional capital on terms that are acceptable to us, we may not be able to fully implement our business

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strategy, which may limit the future growth and development of our business. If our need for capital were to arise due to operating losses, these losses may make it more difficult for us to raise additional capital to fund our expansion projects.

The implementation of our growth strategies depends on certain factors that are beyond our control, including changes in the conditions of the markets in which we operate, actions taken by our competitors and laws and regulations in force in Argentina and Paraguay. Our failure to successfully implement any part of our strategy may have a material adverse impact on us.

Management’s plans to obtain sufficient funds to settle current liabilities may not be accomplished and hence we may continue to have negative working capital in the near future.

Our board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for liquidity risk management and has established an appropriate framework allowing our management to handle financing requirements for the short-, medium-and long-term.

Weaker economic conditions could adversely affect our business, results of operations and financial condition. In addition, if we are unable to access the capital markets to finance our operations in the future, this could adversely affect our ability to obtain additional capital to grow our business.

Delays in the construction of new cement facilities and the expansion of our existing facilities may materially adversely affect our operating results.

As part of our strategy to expand our production capacity and improve our competitiveness through greater economies of scale, we may construct new cement production facilities or expand existing ones. The construction or expansion of a cement production facility involves various risks. These risks include engineering, construction, regulatory and other significant challenges that may delay or prevent the successful operation of a project or significantly increase its cost. Our ability to successfully complete any construction or expansion project on schedule also may be subject to financing and other risks.

The import of the capital goods and machinery to expand our production capacity are exempted from import duties under the Mining Investment Regime pursuant to Law 24, 196 and the Large Investment Projects Regime set forth by Resolution No. 256/2000 of the former Ministry of Economy. The loss of those benefits could significantly increase the project costs.

Our financial condition and results of operations may be adversely affected if:

Governmental agencies or other authorities may adopt new laws or regulations that are more stringent than existing laws or regulations or may seek to more stringently interpret or enforce existing laws and regulations that would require us to expend additional funds on environmental or other regulatory compliance or delay or limit our ability to operate as we intend. In addition, these actions could increase the costs associated with the renewal of our existing licenses and permits or the cost of seeking new licenses or permits. We may also loss import duties’ benefits in connection with our expansion plan. We cannot assure you that these additional costs will not be material or that our existing permits will be renewed.

We are subject to risks related to litigation and administrative proceedings that could adversely affect our business and financial performance in the event of an unfavorable ruling.

The nature of our business exposes us to litigation relating to product liability claims, labor, health and safety matters, environmental matters, regulatory, tax and administrative proceedings, governmental investigations,

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tort claims and contract disputes, among other matters. In the past, we have been subject to antitrust and tax proceedings or investigations including by the Argentine Antitrust Commission, or the CNDC (see “Item 8. Financial Information—Legal Proceedings—Antitrust Proceedings”). While we contest these matters vigorously and make insurance claims when appropriate, litigation is inherently costly and unpredictable, making it difficult to accurately estimate the outcome of actual or potential litigation. Although we establish provisions as we deem necessary, the amounts that we reserve could vary significantly from any amounts we actually pay due to the inherent uncertainties in the estimation process. We cannot assure you that these or other legal proceedings will not materially affect our ability to conduct our business, financial condition and results of operations in the event of an unfavorable ruling.

Environmental, health and safety regulation may adversely affect our business.

The pollutants generated by cement producers are mainly dust and gas emissions from the use of fossil fuels. Our operations often involve the use, handling, disposal and discharge of hazardous materials into the environment and the use of natural resources. Most of our operations are subject to extensive environmental, health and safety regulations.

In Argentina, regulations regarding gas emissions and air quality are enacted at both the national and provincial levels. We are required to obtain permits and licenses from governmental authorities for many aspects of our operations, and we may be required to purchase and install expensive pollution control equipment or to make operational changes to limit the actual or potential environmental, health and safety impacts of our operations to the environment and our employees. The Province of Buenos Aires, where our principal plants are located, requires that all production facilities have an environmental compliance certificate issued by the relevant municipal authority, and similar certifications are required by relevant municipal authorities in the other provinces in which we operate. As part of these requirements, local environmental authorities ordinarily make information requests to each of our plants relating to their compliance with environmental laws and regulations and, in the ordinary course of our business, we collaborate with such national and provincial environmental authorities in the conduct of their regulatory activities.

If we were to violate these laws and regulations or the conditions of our permits and licenses, we may be subject to conditions may result in substantial fines or criminal sanctions, revocations of operating permits and licenses and possible closings of our facilities.

We could be subject to administrative and criminal sanctions, including warnings, fines and closure orders for our failure to comply with these environmental regulations, which, among other things, limit or prohibit emissions or spills of toxic substances that we emit in connection with our operations. We also may be required to modify or retrofit our facilities at substantial cost in order to comply with waste disposal and emissions regulations. We are subject to inspection by environmental agencies in the various jurisdictions that we operate, which may impose fines, restrictions on our operations or other sanctions. In addition, we are subject to environmental laws that may require us to incur significant costs to mitigate any damage that a project may cause to the environment, which costs may adversely impact the viability or projected profitability of the projects that we intend to implement.

In addition, as a result of possible changes to environmental regulations, the amount and timing of our future environmental compliance expenditures may vary substantially from those we currently anticipate. Certain environmental laws impose liability on us for any and all consequences arising out of exposure to hazardous substances or other environmental damage. We cannot assure you that the costs we incur to comply with existing current and future environmental, health and safety laws, and liabilities that we may incur from past or future releases of, or exposure to, hazardous substances will not materially and adversely affect us.

Compliance with mining regulations or the revocation of our authorizations, licenses and concessions could adversely affect our operations and profitability.

We engage in certain mining operations as part of our cement production processes. These activities are dependent on authorizations and concessions granted by the Argentine and Paraguayan governmental authorities or regulatory agencies. The extraction, mining and mineral processing activities are also subject to applicable laws and regulations, which change from time to time. Although we believe that we are in substantial compliance with applicable laws relating to these activities as well as the terms of our current authorizations and concessions, the

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effect of any future applicable regulatory changes regarding such matters on our mining activities or mining rights cannot presently be determined. In addition, if our authorizations and licenses are revoked, we may be unable to maintain or improve our cement production levels, which could adversely impact our results of operation and financial condition.

Our railway concession operates in a regulated environment, and measures taken by public authorities may impact our activities.

Our operations take place in a regulated environment. The Argentine federal government has the legal authority to regulate rail activities in the country (by means of the enactment of applicable laws and regulations). Therefore, actions taken by the public administration in general may affect the services rendered by us.

In May 20, 2015, during the previous Argentine administration, Law No. 27,132 was sanctioned. Law No. 27,132 provides for important changes in the regulatory framework of the railway system and empowered Argentina’s federal government to renegotiate and, if necessary, terminate concessions currently in force. The reforms contemplated in Law No. 27,132 have yet to be implemented. Accordingly, the process of renegotiating the current concessions has not begun.

Ferrosur Roca is currently working alongside with government authorities in order to develop a new system which further enhances the sector’s capacity; however, we cannot assure that the competent authorities of the federal government may issue changes to the current regulatory framework which could affect the terms of our concession and may adversely affect our results of operations.

The early termination of our railway concession may have a material adverse effect on our business.

Ferrosur Roca’s concession expires in 2023. The Argentine government may, upon our request (which must be presented at least five years prior to the expiration of the concession), choose to extend this term once for an additional 10 years (based on the fulfillment of obligations related to the concession, such as investments, maintenance and fines imposed, among others). Ferrosur Roca is obliged to invest the equivalent to 10.7% of its gross revenues every year.

On March 8, 2018, Ferrosur Roca duly filed before the Ministry of Transport a request for an extension of the term of validity of the concession for ten more years. On March 20, 2019, the Ministry answered to Ferrosur Roca informing that the renegotiation of the concession agreement would be in charge of the Special Commission created by the Decree 1027/2018 and that such process will include the analysis of the extension of the term of the concession until a maximum term of 10 years in order to enable the implementation of the open access scheme (as explained below).

Argentina’s railway concessions are subject to early termination in certain circumstances, including the competent authorities’ decision to reassume control of the service or to terminate the concession for breach of contract. Upon termination of a concession, the leased or operated assets must revert to the federal government. The amount of the compensation may not be sufficient to cover all the losses suffered by us as a result of such early termination. In addition, certain creditors may have priority with regards to such compensation.

In addition, Railroads Law No. 27,132 (passed in April in 2015), inter alia, established that the Federal Executive Branch must adopt all necessary measures to recover the administration of railways infrastructure, provides for open access for the Freight Railroad Transportation system and empowers the Ministry of Transport to terminate and to renegotiate the railways concession contracts.

On November 2018, Decree No. 1027/2018 was enacted. Decree 1027/2018 regulates several provisions of Law 27,132. One the one hand, it establishes that that the renegotiation processes of the current railways concession contracts may allow for an extension of their terms for up to ten years and, inter alia, regulate the investments to be made by the concessionaires. On the other hand, Decree 1027/2018 establishes that the open-access scheme will be fully implemented once all the current railways concession agreements have expired, including, if it were the case, the term of their extension.

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The full implementation of the open access scheme entails the re-assumption by the Government of the administration of the railways infrastructure and, once in place, would be a significant change in the Argentine railway system. This regulatory change may benefit those sectors which are interested in operating railways in Argentina, as well as those that wish to transport commodities and other products through them.

In light of the provisions of Ferrosur’s concession contract and the applicable legislation, we cannot guarantee that the Argentine authorities will not terminate our railway concessions prior to their stated terms in the future. Any such action by the Argentine authorities would have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Our estimates of the volume and grade of our limestone deposits could be overstated, and we may not be able to replenish our reserves.

Our limestone reserves described in this annual report constitute our estimates based on evaluation methods generally used in our industry and on assumptions as to our production. Our proven and probable reserve estimates are based on estimated recoverable tons. We did not employ independent third-parties to review reserves over the fourth-year period ended December 31, 2018. Our mineral reserves data are prepared by our engineers and geologists and are subject to further review by our corporate staff. There are numerous uncertainties inherent in estimating quantities of reserves and in projecting potential future rates of mineral production, including many factors beyond our control. Reserve engineering involves estimating deposits of minerals that cannot be measured precisely, and the accuracy of any reserve estimate is a function of the quality of available data, as well as engineering and geological interpretation and judgment. As a result, we cannot assure investors that our limestone reserves will be recovered or that they will be recovered at the rates we anticipate. We may be required to revise our reserve and mine life estimates based on our actual production and other factors. If our limestone reserves are lower than our estimates, this may have a material adverse effect on us, particularly if as a result we have to purchase limestone from third-party suppliers.

Our business is subject to a number of operational risks, which may adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Our cement business is subject to several industry-specific operational risks, including accidents, natural disasters, labor disputes and equipment failures. Such occurrences could result in damage to our production facilities, and equipment and/or the injury or death of our employees and others involved in our production process. Moreover, such accidents or failures could lead to environmental damage, loss of resources or intermediate goods, delays or the interruption of production activities and monetary losses, as well as damage to our reputation. Any prolonged and/or significant disruption to our production facilities, whether due to repair, maintenance or servicing, industrial accidents, unavailability of raw materials such as energy, mechanical equipment failure, human error or otherwise, will disrupt and adversely affect our operations. Additionally, any major or sustained disruptions in the supply of utilities such as water or electricity or any fire, flood or other natural calamities or communal unrest or acts of terrorism may disrupt our operations or damage our production facilities or inventories and could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations. Our insurance may not be sufficient to cover losses from these events, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Our rail transportation and handling of cargo also exposes us to risks of catastrophes, mechanical and electrical failures, collisions and loss of assets. Fires, explosions, fuel leaks and other flammable products as well as other environmental events, cargo loss or damage, railroad, cargo loading and unloading terminal, accidents, business interruptions due to political events as well as labor claims, strikes, adverse weather conditions and natural disasters, such as floods, may result in the loss of revenues, assumption of liabilities or cost increases. Moreover, our operations may be periodically affected by landslides and other natural disasters.

We typically shut down our facilities to undertake maintenance and repair work at scheduled intervals. Although we schedule shut downs such that not all of our facilities are shut down at the same time, the unexpected shut down of any facility may nevertheless affect our business, financial condition and results of operations from one period to another. In addition, key equipment at our facilities, such as our mills and kilns, may deteriorate

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sooner than we currently estimate. Such deterioration of our assets may result in additional maintenance or capital expenditures, and could cause delays or the interruption of our production activities. If these assets do not generate the cash flows we expect, and we are not able to procure replacement assets in an economically feasible manner, our business, financial condition and results of operations may be materially and adversely affected.

Our insurance coverage may not cover all the risks to which we may be exposed.

We face the risks of loss and damage to our products, property and machinery due to fire, theft and natural disasters such as floods, and also face risks related to cyber security risks. Such events may cause a disruption to or cessation of our operations. Our insurance may not be sufficient to cover losses from these events, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Our success depends on key members of our management.

Our success depends largely on the efforts and strategic vision of our executive management team. The loss of the services of some or all of our executive management could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

The execution of our business plan also depends on our ongoing ability to attract and retain additional qualified employees. For a variety of reasons, particularly with respect to the competitive environment and the availability of skilled labor, we may not be successful in attracting and retaining the personnel we require. If we are unable to hire, train and retain qualified employees at a reasonable cost, we may be unable to successfully operate our business or capitalize on growth opportunities and, as a result, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be adversely affected.

The introduction of substitutes for cement in the markets in which we operate and the development of new construction techniques could have a material adverse effect on us.

Materials such as plastic, aluminum, ceramics, glass, wood and steel can be used in construction to substitute cement. In addition, other construction techniques, such as the use of dry wall, could decrease the demand for cement and concrete. In addition, new construction techniques and modern materials may be introduced in the future. The use of substitutes for cement could cause a significant reduction in the demand and prices for our cement products and have a material adverse effect on us.

We are subject to restrictions due to our non-controlling interests in certain of our consolidated subsidiaries.

We conduct some of our business through subsidiaries. In some cases, other shareholders hold non-controlling interests in these subsidiaries. Non-controlling shareholders’ interests may not always be aligned with our interests and, among other things, could result in our inability to implement organizational efficiencies and transfer cash and assets from one subsidiary to another in order to allocate assets most effectively.

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Failures in our information technology systems and information security (cybersecurity) systems can adversely impact our operations and reputation.

Our operations are to a certain extent dependent on information technology and automated operating systems to manage or support our operations. The proper functioning of these systems is critical to the efficient operation and management of our business. In addition, these systems may require modifications or upgrades as a result of technological changes or growth in our business. These changes may be costly and disruptive to our operations, and could impose substantial demands on outage time. Our systems may be vulnerable to damage, disruption or intrusion caused by circumstances beyond our control, such as physical or electronic break-ins, catastrophic events, power outages, natural disasters, computer system or network failures, viruses or malware, unauthorized access and cyberattacks. We are constantly implementing new technologies and solutions to assist in the prevention of potential and attempted cyber-attacks, as well protective measures and contingency plans in the event of an existing attack. We analyze the risks we face on an ongoing basis and, accordingly, strengthen our information technology infrastructure, update our policies and conduct training for our employees, to enhance our ability to prevent and respond to such risks. Although we take actions to secure our systems and electronic information and also have disaster recovery plans in case of incidents that could cause major disruptions to our business, these measures may not be sufficient.

As of December 31, 2018, we have not detected, and our third-party service providers have not informed us of, any relevant event that has materially damaged, disrupted or resulted in an intrusion of our systems. Any significant information leakages or theft of information could affect our compliance with data privacy laws and damage our relationship with our employees, customers and suppliers, and also adversely impact our business, financial condition and results of operation. As of December 31, 2018, our insurance does not cover any risk associated with any cyber security risks. In addition, any significant disruption to our systems could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations

Risks Relating to Our Ordinary Shares and the ADSs

The market price of our ADSs may fluctuate significantly, and you could lose all or part of your investment.

Volatility in the market price of our ADSs may prevent you from being able to sell your ADSs at or above the price you paid for them. The market price and liquidity of the market for our ADSs may be significantly affected by numerous factors, some of which are beyond our control and may not be directly related to our operating performance. These factors include, among others:

The relative volatility and illiquidity of the Argentine securities markets may substantially limit your ability to sell shares underlying the ADSs at the price and time you desire.

Investing in securities that trade in emerging markets, such as Argentina, often involves greater risk than investing in securities of issuers in the United States. The Argentine securities market is substantially smaller, less liquid, more concentrated and can be more volatile than major securities markets in the United States, and is not as

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highly regulated or supervised as some of these other markets. There is also significantly greater concentration in the Argentine securities market than in major securities markets in the United States. As of December 31, 2018, the ten largest Argentine companies in terms of market capitalization represented approximately 59% of the aggregate market capitalization of the Mercado de Valores de Buenos Aires S.A., or MERVAL, the predecessor market of BYMA. Accordingly, although you are entitled to withdraw the shares underlying the ADSs from the ADR facility, your ability to sell such shares at a price and time at which you wish to do so may be substantially limited. Furthermore, new capital controls imposed by the Central Bank could have the effect of further impairing the liquidity of the BYMA by making it unattractive for non-Argentines to buy shares in the secondary market in Argentina. See “Item 10.D Additional Information—Exchange Controls.”

Interpretation of Argentine tax laws may adversely affect the tax treatment of our ordinary shares and the ADSs.

Argentine income tax law provides that the income resulting from the sale, exchange or other transfer of shares and other securities is subject to tax at a rate of 15% for Argentine resident individuals or 30% (25% as from 2020) for Argentine companies. Argentine residents are exempted from such tax in case of shares issued by Argentine companies which are listed in capital markets authorized by the CNV and have authorization for public offering by the CNV as long as such transactions are carried out through stock exchanges or stock markets authorized by the CNV.

Income obtained by non-Argentine residents is subject to income tax rate of 15% of the net income or 13.5% of the gross income. In case of a sale or other transfer between two non-Argentine residents, the law provided that the buyer was in charge of the payment of the tax but did not provide any payment mechanism. On December 29, 2017 the Law No. 27,430, or the Tax Reform, established: (i) that the income tax derived from transactions occurred between September 2013 and December 29, 2017 will be borne by the buyer through international wire transfer as indicated in General AFIP Resolution 4227/2018; and (ii) that the income tax derived from transactions occurred from December 29, 2017 will be borne by the seller through its legal representative in Argentina, by means of the following two payment mechanisms: (a) if the seller has a legal representative in Argentina, then such representative will pay the tax through the tax authority’s webpage in the terms of General Resolution 3726; and (b) if the seller does not have a legal representative in Argentina, then the seller itself should pay the tax through an international wire transfer as indicated in General AFIP Resolution 4227/2018.

The Tax Reform also exempted non-Argentine residents from the payment of the income tax on the sales, exchanges or other transfers of shares issued by Argentine companies which are listed in capital markets authorized by the CNV and have authorization for public offering by the CNV as long as such transactions are carried out through stock exchanges or stock markets authorized by the CNV. Also non-residents are exempt from the income tax deriving from the sale or other kind of disposition regarding ADSs which underlying security are shares issued by Argentine companies that comply with the requirements described above.

The holders of our ordinary shares and the ADSs are encouraged to consult with their tax advisers as to the particular Argentine income tax consequences of owning our ordinary shares and ADSs. See “Item 8. Financial Information—Dividends and Dividend Policy” and “Item 10.E Additional Information—Taxation—Material Argentine Tax Considerations.”

Restrictions on transfers of foreign exchange and the repatriation of capital from Argentina may impair your ability to receive dividends and distributions on, and the proceeds of any sale of, the shares underlying the ADSs.

Since the beginning of December 2001, the Argentine government implemented monetary and foreign exchange control measures that included restrictions on the withdrawal of funds deposited with banks and on the transfer of funds abroad, including dividends, without prior approval by the Central Bank, some of which are still in effect.

Although the transfer of funds abroad by local companies in order to pay annual dividends only to foreign shareholders and the depositary for the benefit of the ADS holders based on approved audited financial statements no longer requires Central Bank approval, other exchange controls could impair or prevent the conversion of anticipated dividends, distributions, or the proceeds from any sale of shares, as the case may be, from pesos into U.S. dollars and the remittance of the U.S. dollars abroad. In particular, with respect to the proceeds of any sale of

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shares underlying the ADSs, as of the date of this annual report, the conversion from pesos into U.S. dollars and the remittance of such U.S. dollars abroad is not subject to prior Central Bank approval, provided that the foreign beneficiary is either a natural or legal person residing in or incorporated and established in jurisdictions, territories or associated states that are considered “cooperators for the purposes of fiscal transparency.” If such requirements are not met, prior Central Bank approval will be required. The United States is deemed a cooperator by the AFIP for the purposes of fiscal transparency.

Furthermore, during the Fernández de Kirchner administration, the Central Bank exercised a de facto prior approval power for certain foreign exchange transactions otherwise authorized to be carried out under the applicable regulations, such as dividend payments or repayment of principal of intercompany loans as well as the import of goods, by means of regulating the amount of foreign currency available to financial institutions to conduct such transactions.

The Argentine government could reinstate or impose new restrictive measures in the future. In such case, the depositary for the ADSs may be prevented from converting pesos it receives in Argentina into U.S. dollars for the account of the ADS holders. If this conversion is not practicable, the deposit agreement allows the depositary to distribute the foreign currency only to those ADS holders to whom it is practicable to do so. If the exchange rate fluctuates significantly during a time when the depositary cannot convert the foreign currency, you may lose some or all of the value of the dividend distribution. Also, if payments cannot be made in U.S. dollars abroad, the repatriation of any funds collected by foreign investors in pesos in Argentina may be subject to restrictions.

Your voting rights with respect to the shares are limited.

Holders may exercise voting rights with respect to the shares underlying ADSs only in accordance with the provisions of the deposit agreement. There are no provisions under Argentine law or under our by-laws that limit ADS holders’ ability to exercise their voting rights through the depositary with respect to the underlying shares,. However, there are practical limitations upon the ability of ADS holders to exercise their voting rights due to the additional procedural steps involved in communicating with such holders. For example, Law No. 26,831 requires us to notify our shareholders by publications in certain official and private newspapers of at least 20 and no more than 45 days in advance of any shareholders’ meeting. ADS holders will not receive any notice of a shareholders’ meeting directly from us. In accordance with the deposit agreement, we will provide the notice to the depositary, which will in turn, as soon as practicable thereafter and subject to legal limitations, provide to each ADS holder upon the terms of the deposit agreement:

To exercise their voting rights, ADS holders must then provide instructions to the depositary how to vote the shares underlying ADSs. Because of the additional procedural step involving the depositary, the process for exercising voting rights will take longer for ADS holders than for holders of shares.

If we timely request the depositary to distribute voting materials to the ADS holders and the depositary does not receive timely voting instructions from an ADS holder on or before the date established by the depositary for such purpose, the depositary shall deem such ADS holder to have instructed the depositary to give a discretionary proxy to a person designated by our board of directors with respect to the deposited securities represented by the holder’s ADSs. The cutoff time for ADS holders to provide voting instructions to the depositary bank is typically up to two business days prior to the cut-off date to vote shares in Argentina so as to enable the depositary bank to tally the ADS voting instructions received from ADS holders and to provide the corresponding voting instructions at the share level in Argentina through the custodian of the shares represented by ADSs.

Except as described in this annual report, holders will not be able to exercise voting rights attaching to the ADSs.

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Holders of ADSs who wish to propose matters or vote on any matters directly should cancel their ADSs and withdraw their underlying ordinary shares to attend and vote at the shareholders meetings.

If we do not file or maintain a registration statement and no exemption from the Securities Act registration is available, holders of ADSs may be unable to exercise preemptive rights with respect to our ordinary shares.

Under the Argentine General Companies Law, if we issue new shares as part of a capital increase, our shareholders will generally have the right to subscribe for a proportional number of shares to maintain their existing ownership percentage, which is known as preemptive rights. However, pursuant to the Capital Markets Law, our shareholders will not be entitled to the right to subscribe for the unsubscribed shares at the end of a preemptive rights offering, known as accretion rights. We may not be able to offer our ordinary shares to holders of ADSs residing in the U.S., or U.S. holders, pursuant to preemptive rights granted to holders of our ordinary shares in connection with any future issuance of our ordinary shares unless a registration statement under the Securities Act is effective with respect to these shares and preemptive rights, or an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act is available. We are not obligated to file or maintain a registration statement relating to any preemptive rights offerings with respect to our ordinary shares, and we cannot assure you that we will file or maintain any such registration statement. If we do not file and maintain a registration statement and there is no exemption from registration, the depositary for our ADSs, may attempt to sell the preemptive rights and provide holders of our ADSs with their pro rata share of the net proceeds from any such sale. However, these preemptive rights may expire if the depositary does not sell them on a timely basis, and holders of ADSs will not receive any benefit from such preemptive rights. Even if a registration statement were effective, we may decide to not extend any preemptive or subscription rights to U.S. Persons (as defined in Regulation S under the Securities Act) that are holders of our ordinary shares and holders of ADSs. Furthermore, the equity interest of holders of shares or ADSs located in the United States may suffer dilution of their interest in us upon future capital increases.

We are entitled to amend and supplement the deposit agreement and to change the rights of ADS holders under the terms of such agreement, without the prior consent of the ADS holders.

We are entitled to amend and supplement the deposit agreement and to change the rights of the ADS holders under the terms of such agreement, without the prior consent of the ADS holders. Any amendment or supplement that imposes or increases any fees or charges (other than charges in connection with foreign exchange regulations and taxes and other governmental charges, delivery and other expenses) or that otherwise materially prejudice any substantial rights of holders of ADSs will not become effective until the expiration of 30 days after notice of such amendment or supplement has been given to holders of outstanding ADSs. Any other amendments and supplements may be effective prior to the expiration of the 30-day period.

The substantial share ownership position of our controlling shareholder will limit your ability to influence corporate matters.

Our controlling shareholder beneficially owns approximately 51.04% of our outstanding ordinary shares as of the date of this annual report. As such, our controlling shareholder has the ability to determine the outcome of substantially all matters submitted for a vote to our shareholders and thus exercise control over our business policies and affairs, including, among others, the following:

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Furthermore, our controlling shareholder’s interests may conflict with your interests as a holder of ordinary shares or ADSs, and it may take actions that might be desirable to it but not to other shareholders and may be able to prevent other shareholders, including you, from blocking these actions or from causing different actions to be taken. Also, our controlling shareholder may prevent change of control transactions that might otherwise provide you with an opportunity to dispose of or realize a premium on your investment in our ADSs. We cannot assure you that our controlling shareholder will act in a manner consistent with your interests.

Our status as a “foreign private issuer” and as a “controlled company” allows us to follow alternate standards to the corporate governance standards of the NYSE, which may limit the protections afforded to investors.

The NYSE’s rules require domestic listed companies that are not “controlled companies” to have, among other requirements, a majority of their board of directors be independent and to have independent director oversight of executive compensation, nomination of directors and corporate governance matters. As a “foreign private issuer,” we are permitted to, and we will, follow home country practice in lieu of the above requirements.

Argentine law, the law of our home country, does not require that a majority of our board consist of independent directors or the implementation of a compensation committee or nominating/corporate governance committee. In addition, under the NYSE rules, a “controlled company” in which over 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another company is also not required to have a majority of its board of directors be independent directors and to have a compensation committee or a nominating/corporate governance committee, or to have such committees be composed entirely of independent directors.

We currently follow certain Argentine practices concerning corporate governance and intend to continue to do so. As a “controlled company,” we are eligible to, and, in the event we no longer qualify as a “foreign private issuer,” we intend to, elect not to comply with certain of the NYSE corporate governance standards, including the requirement that a majority of directors on our board of directors are independent directors and the requirement to maintain a compensation and a nominating/corporate governance committee consisting entirely of independent directors. Accordingly, holders of our ADSs will not have the same protections afforded to shareholders of companies that are subject to all NYSE corporate governance requirements and our status as a “foreign private issuer” and a “controlled company” may adversely affect the trading price for our ADSs. For more information, see “Item 16G. Corporate Governance.”

We are an “emerging growth company” and we cannot be certain whether the reduced requirements applicable to emerging growth companies will make our ADSs less attractive to investors.

We are an “emerging growth company,” as defined in the JOBS Act, and we may take advantage of certain exemptions from various requirements that are applicable to other publicly-listed companies that are not “emerging growth companies.” For so long as we remain an “emerging growth company,” we will not be subject to the provision of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that requires our independent registered public accounting firm to provide an attestation report on the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting. This may increase the risk that we fail to be aware of and remedy any material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in our internal control over financial reporting. We have irrevocably elected not to avail ourselves of the election to delay adopting new or revised accounting standards until such time as those standards apply to private companies.

Nevertheless, as a foreign private issuer that is an emerging growth company, we are not required to comply with the auditor attestation requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for up to five fiscal years after the date of completion of the offering on October 31, 2017. We will remain an emerging growth company until the earliest of: (a) the last day of our fiscal year during which we have total annual gross revenues of at least US$1.0 billion; (b) the last day of our fiscal year following the fifth anniversary of the completion of the offering on

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October 31, 2017; (c) the date on which we have, during the previous three-year period, issued more than US$1.0 billion in non-convertible debt; or (d) the date on which we are deemed to be a “large accelerated filer” under the Exchange Act, with at least US$700 million of equity securities held by non-affiliates. When we are no longer deemed to be an emerging growth company, we will not be entitled to the exemptions provided in the JOBS Act.

We cannot predict if investors will find our ADSs less attractive as a result of our reliance on exemptions under the JOBS Act. If some investors find our ADSs less attractive as a result, there may be a less active trading market for our ADSs and our ordinary share price may be more volatile.

Under Argentine corporate law, shareholder rights and obligations may be fewer or less well defined than in other jurisdictions.

Our corporate affairs are governed by our by-laws and by the Argentine corporate law, as amended, which differ from the legal principles that would apply if we were incorporated in a jurisdiction in the United States (such as Delaware or New York), or in other jurisdictions outside Argentina. Thus, your rights or the rights of holders of our ordinary shares or ADSs under the Argentine corporate law to protect your or their interests relative to actions by our board of directors may be fewer and less well defined under Argentine corporate law than under the laws of those other jurisdictions. Although insider trading and price manipulation are illegal under Argentine law, the Argentine securities markets are not as highly regulated or supervised as the U.S. securities markets or markets in some other jurisdictions. In addition, rules and policies against self-dealing and regarding the preservation of shareholder interests may be less well defined and enforced in Argentina than in the United States, or other jurisdictions outside Argentina, putting holders of our ordinary shares and the ADSs at a potential disadvantage.

The protections afforded to minority shareholders in Argentina are different from and more limited than those in the United States and may be more difficult to enforce.

Under Argentine law, the protections afforded to minority shareholders are different from, and much more limited than, those in the United States. For example, the legal framework with respect to shareholder disputes, such as derivative lawsuits and class actions, is less developed under Argentine law than under U.S. law as a result of Argentina’s short history with these types of claims and few successful cases. In addition, there are different procedural requirements for bringing these types of shareholder lawsuits. As a result, it may be more difficult for our minority shareholders to enforce their rights against us or our directors or controlling shareholder than it would be for shareholders of a U.S. company.

Investors may not be able to effect service of process within the United States limiting their recovery of any foreign judgment.

We are a publicly held corporation ( sociedad anónima ) organized under the laws of Argentina. Most of our directors and our executive officers, and a significant part of our assets are located in Argentina. As a result, it may not be possible for investors to effect service of process within the United States upon us or such persons or to enforce against us or them in United States courts judgments obtained in such courts predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the United States federal securities laws. There is doubt whether the Argentine courts will enforce, to the same extent and in as timely a manner as a U.S. or foreign court, an action predicated solely upon the civil liability provisions of the United States federal securities laws or other foreign regulations brought against such persons or against us. In addition, the enforceability in Argentine courts of judgments of U.S. or non-Argentine courts with respect to matters arising under U.S. federal securities laws or other non-Argentine regulations will be subject to compliance with certain requirements under Argentine law, including the condition that any such judgment does not violate Argentine public policy ( orden público ).

Our shareholders may be subject to liability for certain votes of their securities.

Our shareholders are not liable for our obligations. Instead, shareholders are generally liable only for the purchase price of the shares they subscribe. However, shareholders who have a conflict of interest with us and who do not abstain from voting may be held liable for damages to us, but only if the transaction would not have been approved without such shareholders’ votes. Furthermore, shareholders who willfully or negligently vote in favor of a resolution that is subsequently declared void by a court as contrary to Argentine General Companies Law or our bylaws may be held jointly and severally liable for damages to us or to other third parties, including other shareholders. As a result, we cannot assure you that some shareholders may not be held liable for damages or other expenses under the Argentine General Companies Law.

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