ITEM 1. REPORTS TO STOCKHOLDERS.

Closed-End Funds

31 July 2020

Nuveen Closed-End Funds

Beginning on January 1, 2021, as permitted by regulations adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, paper copies of the Funds’ annual and semi-annual shareholder reports will no longer be sent by mail, unless you specifically request paper copies of the reports. Instead, the reports will be made available on the Funds’ website (www.nuveen.com), and you will be notified by mail each time a report is posted and provided with a website link to access the report.

If you have already elected to receive shareholder reports electronically, you will not be affected by this change and you need not take any action. You may elect to receive shareholder reports and other communications from the Funds electronically anytime by contacting the financial intermediary (such as a broker-dealer or bank) through which you hold your Fund shares or, if you are a direct investor, by enrolling at www.nuveen.com/e-reports.

You may elect to receive all future shareholder reports in paper free of charge at any time by contacting your financial intermediary or, if you are a direct investor, (i) by calling 800-257-8787 and selecting option #2 or (ii) by logging into your Investor Center account at www.computershare.com/investor and clicking on “Communication Preferences.” Your election to receive reports in paper will apply to all funds held in your account with your financial intermediary or, if you are a direct investor, to all your directly held Nuveen Funds and any other directly held funds within the same group of related investment companies.

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Table of Contents

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Chair’s Letter to Shareholders

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Portfolio Managers’ Comments

Nuveen Preferred & Income Opportunities Fund (JPC)

Nuveen Preferred and Income Term Fund (JPI)

Nuveen Preferred & Income Securities Fund (JPS)

Nuveen Preferred and Income 2022 Term Fund (JPT)

Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (NAM) and NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC (NWQ), both affiliates of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC, the Funds’ investment adviser, are sub-advisers for the Nuveen Preferred & Income Opportunities Fund (JPC). NAM and NWQ each manage approximately half of the Fund’s investment portfolio. Douglas Baker, CFA and Brenda Langenfeld, CFA, are the portfolio managers for the NAM team. The NWQ income-oriented investment team is led by Thomas J. Ray, CFA and Susi Budiman, CFA. The Nuveen Preferred and Income Term Fund (JPI) features management by NAM. Douglas Baker, CFA, and Brenda Langenfeld, CFA, have served as the Fund’s portfolio managers since its inception. The Nuveen Preferred & Income Securities Fund (JPS) is sub-advised by a team of specialists at Spectrum Asset Management, Inc. (Spectrum), a wholly owned subsidiary of Principal Global Investors Holding Company (U.S.), LLC. Mark Lieb and Phil Jacoby lead the team. The Nuveen Preferred and Income 2022 Term Fund (JPT) features management by NAM. Douglas Baker, CFA, and Brenda Langenfeld, CFA, have served as the Fund’s portfolio managers since its inception.

Here the team discusses economic and market conditions, their management strategies and the performance of the Funds for the twelve-month reporting period ended July 31, 2020.

What factors affected the U.S. economy and the markets during the twelve-month annual reporting period ended July 31, 2020?

The longest economic expansion in U.S. history came to an abrupt halt in early 2020 amid the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. To slow the spread of the virus, large portions of the economy were shut down, with companies closing either temporarily or permanently and most of the U.S. population under stay-at-home orders during March and April 2020. A phased reopening began toward the end of May, but the disruption to the economy has been swift and severe. In June 2020, the National Bureau of Economic Research announced that the economic expansion that began in June 2009 officially ended in February 2020, marking the start of a recession (a several months’ long contraction across the broad economy). As expected, the U.S. economy suffered a sharp contraction in the second quarter of 2020, with gross domestic product (GDP) down 32.9% on an annualized basis according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis “advance”

This material is not intended to be a recommendation or investment advice, does not constitute a solicitation to buy, sell or hold a security or an investment strategy and is not provided in a fiduciary capacity. The information provided does not take into account the specific objectives or circumstances of any particular investor, or suggest any specific course of action. Investment decisions should be made based on an investor’s objectives and circumstances and in consultation with his or her advisors.

Certain statements in this report are forward-looking statements. Discussions of specific investments are for illustration only and are not intended as recommendations of individual investments. The forward-looking statements and other views expressed herein are those of the portfolio managers as of the date of this report. Actual future results or occurrences may differ significantly from those anticipated in any forward-looking statements and the views expressed herein are subject to change at any time, due to numerous market and other factors. The Funds disclaim any obligation to update publicly or revise any forward-looking statements or views expressed herein.

For financial reporting purposes, the ratings disclosed are the highest rating given by one of the following national rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (Moody’s) or Fitch, Inc. (Fitch). This treatment of split-rated securities may differ from that used for other purposes, such as for Fund investment policies. Credit ratings are subject to change. AAA, AA, A and BBB are investment grade ratings, while BB, B, CCC, CC, C and D are below investment grade ratings. Holdings designated N/R are not rated by these national rating agencies.

Refer to the Glossary of Terms Used in this Report for further definition of the terms used within this section.

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Portfolio Managers’ Comments (continued)

estimate. GDP measures the value of goods and services produced by the nation’s economy less the value of the goods and services used up in production, adjusted for price changes. In the second quarter, steep declines in consumer spending, business investment and exports weighed on economic activity, offsetting increased government spending. By comparison, the annualized GDP growth rate shrank 5% in the first quarter of 2020, after expanding 2.4% in the fourth quarter of 2019 and 2.2% in 2019 overall.

Consumer spending, the largest driver of the economy, was well supported earlier in this reporting period by low unemployment, wage gains and tax cuts. However, the COVID-19 crisis containment measures drove a significant drop in consumer spending and a sharp rise in unemployment starting in March 2020. The Bureau of Labor Statistics said the unemployment rate rose to 10.2% in July 2020 from 3.7% in July 2019. The economy added 1.8 million jobs in July, but non-farm employment remained 12.9 million below the February 2020 level. The average hourly earnings rate appeared to soar, growing at an annualized rate of 4.8% in July 2020, despite the spike in unemployment. Earnings data were skewed by the concentration of job losses in lower-wage work, which effectively eliminated most of the low-wage data, resulting in an average of mostly higher numbers. The overall trend of inflation weakened considerably, which was attributed to large decreases in gasoline, apparel, air travel and lodging prices offsetting an increase in food prices. The Bureau of Labor Statistics said the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased 1.0% over the twelve-month reporting period ended July 31, 2020 before seasonal adjustment.

Low mortgage rates and low inventory drove home prices moderately higher in this reporting period, although the period measured only partially reflects the shutdown. The S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, which covers all nine U.S. census divisions, was up 4.3% year-over-year in June 2020 (most recent data available at the time this report was prepared). The 10-City and 20-City Composites reported year-over-year increases of 2.8% and 3.5%, respectively.

With economic momentum slowing in 2019 from 2018’s stronger pace, the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) cut its benchmark interest rate by 0.25% at each of the July 2019, September 2019 and October 2019 policy committee meetings. Markets registered disappointment with the Fed’s explanation that the rate cuts were a “mid-cycle adjustment,” rather than a prolonged easing period, and its signal that there would be no additional rate cuts in 2019. Also in the latter half of 2019, the Fed announced it would stop shrinking its bond portfolio sooner than scheduled, as well as began buying short-term Treasury bills to help money markets operate smoothly and maintain short-term borrowing rates at low levels. Fed Chairman Powell emphasized that the Treasury bill purchases were not a form of quantitative easing. The Fed continued its Treasury bill buying in January 2020, as well as left its benchmark interest rate unchanged, while noting the emerging COVID-19 risks.

As the outbreak spread to the U.S. and significant restrictions on social and economic activity were imposed starting in March 2020, the Fed enacted an array of emergency measures to stabilize the financial system and support the markets, including cutting its main interest rate to near zero, offering lending programs to aid small and large companies and allowing unlimited bond purchases, known as quantitative easing. There were no policy changes at the Fed’s April, June and July 2020 meetings, where Chairman Powell reiterated a commitment to keep rates near zero until the economy recovers and continued to issue a cautious outlook for the U.S. economy. Also at the July meeting, the Fed extended some of its pandemic funding facilities by another three months to December 2020.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government approved three aid packages, totaling more than $100 billion in funding to health agencies and employers offering paid leave and $2 trillion allocated across direct payments to Americans, an expansion of unemployment insurance, loans to large and small businesses, funding to hospitals and health agencies and support to state and local governments.

While trade and tariff policy drove market sentiment for most of the twelve-month reporting period, the outbreak of the novel coronavirus and its associated disease COVID-19 rapidly dwarfed all other market concerns starting in late February 2020. Equity and commodity markets sold-off and safe-haven assets rallied in March 2020 as China, other

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countries and then the United States initiated quarantines, restricted travel and shuttered factories and businesses. The potential economic shock was particularly difficult to assess, which amplified market volatility. An ill-timed oil price war between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC member Russia, which caused oil prices to plunge in March 2020, exacerbated the market sell-off.

Outside the U.S., many countries implemented lockdowns and restrictions on business activity to reduce infection rates, with a deep impact to their economies. Pandemic responses included central bank monetary easing and quantitative easing, fiscal relief programs, the loosening of fiscal rules and, in the case of emerging markets, emergency financing and debt relief from bilateral creditors and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The U.K. formally exited the European Union (EU) at the end of January 2020, triggering the one-year transition period, but Brexit talks were temporarily paused during the virus lockdown. When negotiations resumed, the U.K. continued to indicate it would not seek an extension. Italy’s prime minister unexpectedly resigned in August 2019, and the newly formed coalition government appeared to take a less antagonistic stance towards the EU. To help relieve the coronavirus impact on Italy and other more indebted Southern European countries, the European Commission proposed a €750 billion aid program to be funded by all member states, which was unanimously approved in July 2020. In Asia, northern countries were among the first to successfully reduce infection rates and relax coronavirus restrictions, but pockets of the disease re-emerged. The widespread anti-government protests roiling Hong Kong throughout 2019 had dissipated amid the lockdown, but tensions flared in late May 2020 when China unexpectedly announced a national security law perceived as a threat to Hong Kong’s sovereignty. India took stringent lockdown steps in March 2020 but still saw a rapid increase in cases. Latin American countries entered the health crisis in already weakened positions, with high government debt and widespread civil unrest. Venezuela’s economic and political crisis continued to deepen. Argentina surprised the market with the return of a less market-friendly administration but continued to pursue a restructuring of its debt. Brazil’s Bolsonaro administration achieved a legislative win on pension reform but had not fully delivered on reviving economic growth. As the pandemic spread to Latin America, the inconsistent government responses, reduced testing capabilities, weaker health care systems, food shortages and public protests contributed to accelerating infection and death rates.

Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, global markets had become more bullish on the outlook for 2020 as trade policy and Brexit appeared to make progress at the end of 2019. The U.S. and China agreed on a partial trade deal, which included rolling back some tariffs, increasing China’s purchases of U.S. agriculture products and the consideration of intellectual property, technology and financial services rights. The “phase one” deal was signed on January 15, 2020. While much of the focus remained on the U.S.-China relationship, trade spats between the U.S. and Mexico, the EU, Brazil and Argentina also arose throughout the reporting period. In January 2020, the U.S. Congress fully approved the U.S., Mexico and Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement. With more clarity on trade deals, the trade-related deterioration in global manufacturing and export data was expected to improve. However, the COVID-19 crisis has since upended those assumptions. Furthermore, tensions between the U.S. and China escalated amid the pandemic, with both sides stoking resentment about the management of the health crisis, Hong Kong’s sovereignty, trade policy and technology issues.

For the twelve-month reporting period, the Blended Benchmark Index, which represents the combined preferred securities and CoCos universe, returned 5.13%. While the ICE BofA Fixed Rate Preferred Securities Index returned 5.11% and the ICE BofA U.S. All Capital Securities Index retuned 5.29%. All broad sub-categories within the Blended Benchmark Index posted positive returns during the annual reporting period, except for the energy sector. On average, CoCo securities modestly underperformed the Blended Benchmark Index during the reporting period. Within the preferred securities segment, $1,000 par preferred structures outperformed $25 par preferred structures. Interestingly enough, despite the 10-year U.S. treasury rate falling almost 150 basis points during the twelve month reporting period, performance differential between fixed-rate coupon structures and non-fixed-rate coupon structures was almost negligible, with non-fixed-rate coupon structures ironically outperforming fixed-rate coupon securities at the margin.

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Portfolio Managers’ Comments (continued)

What key strategies were used to manage the Funds during this twelve-month reporting period ended July 31, 2020 and how did these strategies influence performance?

Nuveen Preferred & Income Opportunities Fund (JPC)

The table in the Performance Overview and Holding Summaries section of this report provides total return performance for the Fund for the one-year, five-year and ten-year periods ended July 31, 2020. For the twelve-month reporting period ended July 31, 2020, the Fund’s common shares at net asset value (NAV) underperformed the ICE BofA U.S. All Capital Securities Index and the JPC Blended Benchmark.

JPC seeks to provide high current income and secondarily, total return, by investing at least 80% of its managed assets in preferred securities and contingent capital securities (sometimes referred to as “CoCos”), and permitting it to invest up to 20% opportunistically over the market cycle in other types of securities, primarily income oriented securities such as corporate and taxable municipal debt and common equity.

JPC is managed by two experienced portfolio teams with distinctive, complementary approaches to the preferred market, each managing its own “sleeve” of the portfolio. NAM employs a debt-oriented approach that combines top down relative value analysis of industry sectors with fundamental credit analysis. NWQ’s investment process identifies undervalued securities within a company’s capital structure that offer the most attractive risk/reward potential. This multi-team approach gives investors access to a broader investment universe with greater diversification potential.

Nuveen Asset Management (NAM)

For the portion of the Fund managed by NAM, the Fund seeks to achieve its investment objective of providing a high level of current income and total return by investing in preferred securities and other income producing securities, which include, but are not limited to, contingent capital securities (aka, CoCos). The Fund seeks to benefit from strong credit fundamentals across the largest sectors within the issuer base, as well as the category’s healthy yield level. In addition, NAM will actively manage its sleeve to allocate both interest rate and credit risk consistent with its outlook for the broader financial markets, as well as to capitalize on inefficiencies that often arise between the $25 par retail and the $1,000 par institutional sides of the market. The Fund’s strategy has a bias toward highly regulated sectors, such banks, insurance companies and utilities, with the intent to benefit from the added security of regulatory oversight.

NAM employs a credit-based investment approach, using a bottom-up approach that includes fundamental credit research, security structure selection, and option adjusted spread (OAS) analysis, while also incorporating a top-down process to position the portfolio in a manner that reflects the investment team’s overall macro-economic outlook. The process begins with identifying the primary investable universe of $1,000 par preferred, $25 par preferred, and CoCo securities. In an effort to capitalize on the inefficiencies between different investor bases within this universe, NAM tactically and strategically shifts capital between the various segments of the market. Periods of volatility may drive material differences in valuations between the $25 par preferred, $1,000 par preferred, and CoCo markets. This divergence is often related to differences in how retail and institutional investors measure and price risk, as well as differences in retail and institutional investors’ ability to source substitute investments. In addition, technical factors such as new issue supply or redemption activity may also influence the relative valuations between the $25 par preferred, $1,000 par preferred market and CoCo markets.

During the twelve-month reporting period, the Blended Benchmark Index for the sleeve managed by NAM, which represents the combined preferred securities and CoCos markets, returned 5.13%. This figure fell between both comparable financial senior debt and financial equities. NAM typically expects the Blended Benchmark Index to perform between these two categories given the hybrid nature of its constituent securities. During the reporting period, investment performance was positive across all broad categories within the market, except for the energy sector which posted negative returns on average. Fortunately, the energy sector is a relatively small sub-category within the asset class representing approximately 3% exposure within the Blended Benchmark Index, and less than 1.5% exposure in NAM’s sleeve as of the end of the reporting period.

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Taking a closer look at asset class level performance, the positive absolute returns were driven primarily by a combination of lower interest rates and the generous yield of the asset class. These two factors combined to more than offset the impact of wider credit spreads during the reporting period. Credit spreads moved wider reflecting an overall increase in risk premiums, resulting primarily from the COVID-19 crisis, and further exacerbated by geopolitical headlines related to U.S. and China tensions, discord between members of OPEC and lack of any meaningful progress regarding Brexit negotiations. Despite the COVID-19’s extraordinary human toll, ensuing economic damage has been somewhat offset by unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy responses both here in the U.S. and globally. With the Fed aggressively easing monetary policy, and investors seeking safe-haven alternatives, the 10-year US Treasury yield decreased by almost 150 basis points between the beginning and the end of the reporting period. While option adjusted spreads (OAS) were well off the wide levels touched in March 2020, OAS for the Blended Benchmark Index was still over 100 basis points wider as of July 31, 2020 compared to a year earlier. Within the Blended Benchmark Index, on an absolute basis, the average OAS for CoCos stood at 460 basis points as of July 31, 2020, still significantly higher than the average OAS of 228 basis points for the combined $25 par and $1,000 par preferred securities market. Since its inception, the CoCo segment typically has traded at a wider OAS versus the preferred security market. The difference in OAS arguably is due to a combination of both technical and fundamental factors. From a technical perspective, CoCos are excluded from many broad aggregate fixed income indexes, thus limiting the investor base. From a fundamental perspective, the CoCo market is dominated by non-U.S. banks and thus may be perceived as relatively riskier at the margin. In NAM’s opinion, there is another factor. NAM feels that investor’s misconception that CoCos inherently are more risky than preferred securities also contributes to the seemingly persistent higher average OAS levels for CoCos versus preferred securities.

During the twelve-month reporting period, OAS for the preferred securities on average increased more than the CoCo market. In NAM’s opinion, the relative underperformance of preferred securities’ OAS was due primarily to the $25 par preferred market. At the beginning of the reporting period, average OAS for $25 par preferred securities was -65 basis points and was likely due for a correction regardless of the COVID-19 crisis or other headlines during the reporting period. Further, considering the severe deterioration of market conditions and retail investors often react to such developments in a more extreme manner than institutional investors, coupled with the low average OAS for $25 par preferred securities at the onset of the reporting period, it is not a surprise that the $25 par preferred market underperformed.

Despite the rather dire economic backdrop during the latter half of the reporting period, the fundamental credit story of the Fund’s largest sector, the bank sector, remained intact. The regularly scheduled 2020 U.S. bank stress test results released in late June again validated the resiliency of U.S. bank balance sheets. This year, the Fed supplemented the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) with an added sensitivity analysis, the goal of which was to examine the banks’ vulnerabilities under the pall of the COVID-19 crisis. The assumptions and variables used to conduct the sensitivity analysis were significantly more devastating versus those used in the severely adverse scenario of the standard DFAST. For example, the sensitivity analysis included a scenario where GDP contracted 37.5% and another where peak unemployment hit 19.5%. Other calamitous assumptions were ported over from the DFAST such as the 50% drop in equity markets, 28% drop in residential home prices and 35% drop in commercial real estate prices. The sensitivity analysis was run to account for three different recovery scenarios; V-shaped, U-shaped, and W-shaped. Even under the scenario where banks were assumed to incur $700 billion of losses, a staggering number, all 33 banks still were forecast to exceed their minimum regulatory minimum capital requirement. It is important to note that these sensitivity tests did not take into account several mitigating variables such as unemployment insurance, the Paycheck Protection Plan, the CARES Act and various Federal Reserve lending facilities, all of which would directly and indirectly benefit the bank sector. NAM believes if one couples the above stress test results with better than expected second quarter earnings for the U.S. and European bank sectors, and better than expected capital levels, then in NAM’s opinion the fundamental story underlying our largest sector remains intact.

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Portfolio Managers’ Comments (continued)

NAM incorporated several active themes relative to the Blended Benchmark Index during the reporting period, including an underweight to CoCos and a corresponding overweight to domestic issuers, an overweight to the $1,000 par side of the market and an overweight to securities that have coupons with reset features (floating rate, fixed-to-floating rate, and fixed-rate reset).

During the reporting period, the underweight to CoCos contributed to relative performance versus the Blended Benchmark Index, as CoCos underperformed during the reporting period. Also contributing to relative performance within our CoCo allocation was positive selection bias. NAM’s allocation to CoCos is primarily expressed through Additional Tier 1 (AT1) structures, whereas the CoCo component of the Blended Benchmark is comprised of both AT1 and Tier 2 Capital (T2) structures. NAM will typically focus on AT1 CoCo structures for NAM’s strategies as they more closely reflect preferred securities’ positioning within the issuer’s balance sheet. AT1 securities tend to have a higher beta with respect to overall market performance versus T2 securities. During periods where performance is generally positive for the CoCo universe, as was the case for this reporting period, NAM expects AT1 structures to outperform T2, and vice versa. As of July 31, 2020, approximately 12% of the CoCo index consisted of T2 structures.

Within the preferred securities universe, $25 par preferred securities on average underperformed $1,000 par preferred securities. As a result, NAM’s underweight to those structures was accretive to the Fund’s relative performance. As has been the case for some time, NAM has maintained an overweight to $1,000 par securities for two primary reasons, relative value and interest rate risk management. First, with respect to relative value, the $1,000 par side of the market continues to be significantly cheaper than the $25 par side of the market on an OAS basis. At the beginning of the reporting period, the average OAS for the $25 par preferred market was -65 basis points versus average OAS of +235 basis points for the $1,000 par preferred market. At the end of the reporting period, average OAS for the $25 par preferred market was +134 basis points, or almost 200 basis points wider during the twelve-month reporting period. On the other hand, $1,000 par preferreds’ average OAS as of July 31, 2020 stood at +300 basis points, or only about 65 basis points wider over the same period. Despite $25 par preferreds underperformance during the most recent reporting period, they still appear potentially overvalued on an OAS basis versus $1,000 par preferreds. In NAM’s opinion, the relative value thesis for being overweight $1,000 par preferreds remains intact.

In reporting periods that experience significant headline risk or other forms of distress, it is not uncommon for the $25 par preferred market to underperform the $1,000 par preferred market. $25 par preferred valuations are more heavily influenced by retail investors’ behavioral anomalies and ETF flows compared to the $1,000 par side of the market. Historically, the retail investor has exhibited more of an emotional response to distressed markets compared to institutional investors. The extreme market conditions brought about by the COVID-19 crisis coupled with retail investors’ emotional response to aggressively reduce risk and that $25 par preferred securities began the reporting period with average OAS in negative territory, it is not overly surprising that $25 par OAS increased to a level that offset much of the benefit those securities derived from lower interest rates.

During the reporting period, securities with non-fixed-rate coupons marginally outperformed those with fixed-rate coupons. On the surface, this might appear surprising given that the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate decreased by almost 150 basis points between the beginning and the end of the reporting period. All else equal fixed-rate coupon structures should respond more favorably to a drop in interest rates compared to securities with non-fixed-rate coupons. However, it is NAM’s opinion that the previously mentioned relative performance between $25 par preferreds and $1,000 par preferreds had implications for the relative performance between fixed-rate and non-fixed-rate coupon structures. As a reminder, most $25 par preferred securities are fixed-rate coupon structures, while $1,000 par securities are non-fixed-rate securities. Given that $25 par preferreds underperformed during the reporting period, which also played a significant role in fixed-rate coupon structures underperforming as well.

The NAM sleeve underperformed its Blended Benchmark during the reporting period. The primary drivers for the underperformance included and average duration that was modestly shorter than the Blended Benchmark Index during the

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reporting period, as well as selection bias within the $25 par preferred and $1,000 par preferred allocations. With respect to the latter, preferreds issued by General Electric Co, AerCap Global Aviation Trust and Security Benefit Life were the largest detractors to relative performance resulting from selection bias. NAM’s credit research team maintains conviction in the underlying credit fundamentals of all three of these companies and expects all three to navigate successfully through the current crisis. NAM anticipates that over time, the market will adopt a view closer to NAM’s and the security-level valuations will respond accordingly. However, as with any of the credits within the Fund, should a credit research analyst’s opinion change, or should the risk-adjusted relative value proposition of holding a security change, NAM will adjust the exposure accordingly.

With respect to NAM’s effort to manage interest rate risk, NAM’s overweight to $1,000 par preferred securities served to gain greater exposure to non-fixed-rate coupon securities, like floating rate coupons, fixed-to-floating rate coupons, and fixed-to-fixed rate coupons. These structures are more common on the $1,000 par preferred side of the market and historically they have been effective at managing duration and duration extension risk during periods of rising interest rates. While admittedly NAM is not overly concerned about a near-term spike in interest rates, NAM will continue to exercise caution given the (1) current absolute low levels of interest rates, (2) unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy responses globally to the COVID-19 crisis, and (3) the Fed’s recent announcement that it may allow for inflation to run higher in the future to make-up for it running below the Fed’s 2% target for the past few years. As of July 31, 2020, the NAM sleeve had about 90% of its assets invested in securities that have coupons with reset features, compared to approximately 74% within the Blended Benchmark Index.

The Fund used short interest rate futures during the reporting period to manage its exposure to various points along the yield curve, with a net effect of decreasing the Fund’s overall interest rate sensitivity. During the reporting period, the interest rate futures had a negative impact on overall Fund performance.

NWQ

For the portion of the Fund managed by NWQ, the Fund seeks to achieve high income and a measure of capital appreciation. While the Fund’s investments are primarily preferred securities, a portion allows the flexibility to invest across the capital structure in any type of debt, preferred or equity securities offered by a particular company. The portfolio management team then evaluates all available investment choices within a selected company’s capital structure to determine the portfolio investment that may offer the most favorable risk-adjusted return potential. The Fund’s portfolio is constructed with an emphasis on seeking a sustainable level of income and an overall analysis for downside risk management.

The ICE BofA Fixed Rate Preferred Securities Index returned 5.11% for the reporting period. Similar to other risk assets, the preferred market benefited from central bank support and encouraging economic data. While preferred securities trailed investment grade bonds, they outperformed high yield bonds for the reporting period.

During the reporting period, NWQ’s preferred and investment grade bond holdings contributed to absolute performance, while the Fund’s equity and convertible holdings detracted from performance. NWQ’s holdings in insurance and banking contributed to the Fund’s absolute performance, while the Fund’s financials and utilities holdings were detractors.

During the reporting period, several individual holdings contributed to absolute performance, including ViacomCBS Inc. The company reported solid first quarter 2020 results, with strong growth in streaming and film, offset somewhat by a pickup in cord-cutting and pressure in advertising. Management affirmed its commitment to investment grade ratings, as well as its target gross leverage ratio of 2.75 times, noting that it would not repurchase any shares until it reaches the target. It also strengthened its liquidity profile through debt issuance to push out near term maturities and implemented further cost cuts. In addition, the preferred stock of National General Holdings Corp. contributed to performance on better than expected earnings despite the COVID-19 crisis related headwinds. Strong performance was seen across

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Portfolio Managers’ Comments (continued)

both the property & casualty and accident & health segments. The company’s focus on specialty insurance markets has enabled it to effectively operate within niches that allow it to leverage its fully integrated technology platform. Lastly NextEra Energy Capital Holding Inc. contributed to performance. Growth has been strong at its Florida regulated utility as well as its renewable business. NWQ continues to hold the positions.

Several holdings detracted from absolute performance, including the convertible preferred stock of CenterPoint Energy Inc. Shares fell sharply after the Public Utilities Commission of Texas (PUCT) discussed CenterPoint Energy’s outstanding Houston electric rate case that indicated a lower than expected return on equity. Investors expected that there would be potential for significant equity needs if the final decision is in line with what the PUCT discussed. The Fund continues to hold CenterPoint Energy. In addition, General Electric 5% preferred was another detractor to performance. Efforts to delever the industrial balance sheet remain underway but the aviation unit is expected to feel the largest impact from the COVID-19 crisis. Furthermore, downside risks remain as management continued to stem losses in Power and Renewable business under a challenging macro environment and expect free cash flow to remain negative near term. Lastly, CIT Group Inc. preferred stock lagged during the reporting period as CIT continued to face headwinds from credit deterioration and revenue declines due to the COVID-19 crisis. The company posted a loss in first quarter 2020 on a large provision hit to reserve build, although management expected provisions to be lower in second quarter of 2020. The ill-timed acquisition of Mutual of Omaha Bank in February 2020 further eroded CIT’s capital ratios. The path back to a 10.5% CET1 ratio has been pushed further into the future with additional credit cost pressures and margin compression. NWQ continues to hold the position.

Nuveen Preferred and Income Term Fund (JPI)

The table in the Performance Overview and Holding Summaries section of this report provides total return performance for the Fund for the one-year, five-year and since inception periods ended July 31, 2020. For the twelve-month reporting period ended July 31, 2020, the Fund’s common shares at net asset value (NAV) underperformed the ICE BofA U.S. All Capital Securities Index and the JPI Blended Benchmark Index.

The Fund seeks to achieve its investment objective of providing a high level of current income and total return by investing in preferred securities and other income producing securities, which include, but are not limited to, contingent capital securities (CoCos). The Fund seeks to benefit from strong credit fundamentals across the asset class’ largest sectors, as well as the category’s healthy yield. In addition, the management team will actively allocate to both interest rate and credit risk consistent with its outlook for the broader financial markets, while seeking to capitalize on inefficiencies that often arise between the $25 par retail and the $1,000 par institutional sides of the market. The Fund’s strategy has a bias toward highly regulated sectors, such banks, insurance companies and utilities, with the intent to benefit from the added security of regulatory oversight.

NAM employs a credit-based investment approach, using a bottom-up approach that includes fundamental credit research, security structure selection, and option adjusted spread (OAS) analysis, while also incorporating a top-down process to position the portfolio in a manner that reflects the investment team’s overall macro-economic outlook. The process begins with identifying the primary investable universe of $1,000 par preferred, $25 par preferred, and CoCo securities. In an effort to capitalize on the inefficiencies between different investor bases within this universe, NAM tactically and strategically shifts capital between the various segments of the market. Periods of volatility may drive material differences in valuations between the $25 par preferred, $1,000 par preferred, and CoCo markets. This divergence is often related to differences in how retail and institutional investors measure and price risk, as well as differences in retail and institutional investors’ ability to source substitute investments. In addition, technical factors such as new issue supply or redemption activity may also influence the relative valuations between the $25 par preferred, $1,000 par preferred market and CoCo markets.

During the twelve-month reporting period, the Blended Benchmark Index which represents the combined preferred securities and CoCos markets, returned 5.13%. This figure fell between both comparable financial senior debt and

12

financial equities. NAM typically expects the Blended Benchmark Index to perform between these two categories given the hybrid nature of its constituent securities. During the reporting period, investment performance was positive across all broad categories within the market, except for the energy sector which posted negative returns on average. Fortunately, the energy sector is a relatively small sub-category within the asset class representing approximately 3% exposure within the Blended Benchmark Index and less than 1.5% exposure in NAM’s sleeve as of the end of the reporting period.

Taking a closer look at asset class level performance, the positive absolute returns were driven primarily by a combination of lower interest rates and the generous yield of the asset class. These two factors combined to more than offset the impact of wider credit spreads during the reporting period. Credit spreads moved wider reflecting an overall increase in risk premiums, resulting primarily from the COVID-19 crisis and further exacerbated by geopolitical headlines related to U.S. and China tensions, discord between members of OPEC and lack of any meaningful progress regarding Brexit negotiations. Despite the COVID-19’s extraordinary human toll, ensuing economic damage has been somewhat offset by unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy responses both here in the U.S. and globally. With the Fed aggressively easing monetary policy, and investors seeking safe-haven alternatives, the 10-year US Treasury yield decreased by almost 150 basis points between the beginning and the end of the reporting period. While option adjusted spreads (OAS) were well off the wide levels touched in March 2020, OAS for the Blended Benchmark Index was still over 100 basis points wider as of July 31, 2020 compared to a year earlier. Within the Blended Benchmark Index, on an absolute basis, the average OAS for CoCos stood at 460 basis points as of July 31, 2020, still significantly higher than the average OAS of 228 basis points for the combined $25 par and $1,000 par preferred securities market. Since its inception, the CoCo segment typically has traded at a wider OAS versus the preferred security market. The difference in OAS arguably is due to a combination of both technical and fundamental factors. From a technical perspective, CoCos are excluded from many broad aggregate fixed income indices, thus limiting the investor base. From a fundamental perspective, the CoCo market is dominated by non-U.S. banks and thus may be perceived as relatively riskier at the margin. In NAM’s opinion, there is another factor. NAM feels that investor’s misconception that CoCos inherently are more risky than preferred securities also contributes to the seemingly persistent higher average OAS levels for CoCos versus preferred securities.

During the twelve-month reporting period, OAS for the preferred securities on average increased more than the CoCo market. In NAM’s opinion, the relative underperformance of preferred securities’ OAS was due primarily to the $25 par preferred market. At the beginning of the reporting period, average OAS for $25 par preferred securities was -65 basis points and was likely due for a correction regardless of the COVID-19 crisis or other headlines during the reporting period. Further, considering the severe deterioration of market conditions and retail investors often react to such developments in a more extreme manner than institutional investors, coupled with the low average OAS for $25 par preferred securities at the onset of the reporting period, it is not a surprise that the $25 par preferred market underperformed.

Despite the rather dire economic backdrop during the latter half of the reporting period, the fundamental credit story of the Fund’s largest sector, the bank sector, remained intact. The regularly scheduled 2020 U.S. bank stress test results released in late June 2020 again validated the resiliency of U.S. bank balance sheets. This year, the Fed supplemented the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) with an added sensitivity analysis, the goal of which was to examine the banks’ vulnerabilities under the pall of the COVID-19 crisis. The assumptions and variables used to conduct the sensitivity analysis were significantly more devastating versus those used in the severely adverse scenario of the standard DFAST. For example, the sensitivity analysis included a scenario where GDP contracted 37.5% and another where peak unemployment hit 19.5%. Other calamitous assumptions were ported over from the DFAST such as the 50% drop in equity markets, 28% drop in residential home prices and 35% drop in commercial real estate prices. The sensitivity analysis was run to account for three different recovery scenarios; V-shaped, U-shaped, and W-shaped. Under the worst of the scenarios, the 33 banks subject to this year’s exams were forecasted to incur $700 billion in aggregate loan

13

Portfolio Managers’ Comments (continued)

losses. Despite this astonishing number, all 33 banks still were forecast to maintain a common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio above their 4.5% minimum requirement. It is important to note that these sensitivity tests did not take into account several mitigating variables such as unemployment insurance, the Paycheck Protection Plan, the CARES Act and various Federal Reserve lending facilities. NAM believes if one couples the above stress test results with better than expected second quarter earnings for the U.S. and European bank sectors, and better than expected capital levels, then in NAM’s opinion the fundamental story underlying our largest sector remains intact.

NAM incorporated several active themes relative to the Blended Benchmark Index during the reporting period, including an underweight to CoCos and a corresponding overweight to domestic issuers, an overweight to the $1,000 par side of the market and an overweight to securities that have coupons with reset features (floating rate, fixed-to-floating rate, and fixed-rate reset).

During the reporting period, the underweight to CoCos contributed to relative performance versus the Blended Benchmark Index, as CoCos underperformed during the reporting period. Also contributing to relative performance within our CoCo allocation was positive selection bias. NAM’s allocation to CoCos is primarily expressed through Additional Tier 1 (AT1) structures, whereas the CoCo component of the Blended Benchmark is comprised of both AT1 and Tier 2 Capital (T2) structures. NAM will typically focus on AT1 CoCo structures for NAM’s strategies as they more closely reflect preferred securities’ positioning within the issuer’s balance sheet. AT1 securities tend to have a higher beta with respect to overall market performance versus T2 securities. During periods where performance is generally positive for the CoCo universe, as was the case for this reporting period, NAM expects AT1 structures to outperform T2, and vice versa. As of July 31, 2020, approximately 12% of the CoCo index consisted of T2 structures.

Within the preferred securities universe, $25 par preferred securities on average underperformed $1,000 par preferred securities. As a result, NAM’s underweight to those structures was accretive to the Fund’s relative performance. As has been the case for some time, NAM has maintained an overweight to $1,000 par securities for two primary reasons, relative value and interest rate risk management. First, with respect to relative value, the $1,000 par side of the market continues to be significantly cheaper than the $25 par side of the market on an OAS basis. At the beginning of the reporting period, the average OAS for the $25 par preferred market was -65 basis points versus average OAS of +235 basis points for the $1,000 par preferred market. At the end of the reporting period, average OAS for the $25 par preferred market was +134 basis points, or almost 200 basis points wider during the twelve-month reporting period. On the other hand, $1,000 par preferreds’ average OAS as of July 31, 2020 stood at +300 basis points, or only about 65 basis points wider over the same period. Despite $25 par preferreds underperformance during the most recent reporting period, they still appear potentially overvalued on an OAS basis versus $1,000 par preferreds. In NAM’s opinion, the relative value thesis for being overweight $1,000 par preferreds remains intact.

In reporting periods that experience significant headline risk or other forms of distress, it is not uncommon for the $25 par preferred market to underperform the $1,000 par preferred market. $25 par preferred valuations are more heavily influenced by retail investors’ behavioral anomalies and ETF flows compared to the $1,000 par side of the market. Historically, the retail investor has exhibited more of an emotional response to distressed markets compared to institutional investors. The extreme market conditions brought about by COVID-19 coupled with retail investors’ emotional response to aggressively reduce risk and $25 par preferred securities began the reporting period with average OAS in negative territory, it is not overly surprising that $25 par OAS increased to a level that offset much of the benefit those securities derived from lower interest rates.

During the reporting period, securities with non-fixed-rate coupons marginally outperformed those with fixed-rate coupons. On the surface, this might appear surprising given that the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate decreased by almost 150 basis points between the beginning and the end of the reporting period. All else equal fixed-rate coupon structures should respond more favorably to a drop in interest rates compared to securities with non-fixed-rate coupons. However, it is NAM’s opinion that the previously mentioned relative performance between $25 par preferreds and $1,000 par

14

preferreds had implications for the relative performance between fixed-rate and non-fixed-rate coupon structures. As a reminder, most $25 par preferred securities are fixed-rate coupon structures, while $1,000 par securities are non-fixed-rate securities. Given that $25 par preferreds underperformed during the reporting period, which also played a significant role in fixed-rate coupon structures underperforming as well.

JPI underperformed its Blended Benchmark during the reporting period. The primary drivers for the underperformance included and average duration that was modestly shorter than the Blended Benchmark Index during the reporting period, as well as selection bias within the $25 par preferred and $1,000 par preferred allocations. With respect to the latter, preferreds issued by General Electric Co, AerCap Global Aviation Trust and Security Benefit Life were the largest detractors to relative performance resulting from selection bias. NAM’s credit research team maintains conviction in the underlying credit fundamentals of all three of these companies and expects all three to navigate successfully through the current crisis. NAM anticipates that over time, the market will adopt a view closer to NAM’s and the security-level valuations will respond accordingly. However, as with any of the credits within the Fund, should a credit research analyst’s opinion change, or should the risk-adjusted relative value proposition of holding a security change, NAM will adjust the exposure accordingly.

With respect to NAM’s effort to manage interest rate risk, NAM’s overweight to $1,000 par preferred securities served to gain greater exposure to non-fixed-rate coupon securities, like floating rate coupons, fixed-to-floating rate coupons, and fixed-to-fixed rate coupons. These structures are more common on the $1,000 par preferred side of the market and historically they have been effective at managing duration and duration extension risk during periods of rising interest rates. While admittedly NAM is not overly concerned about a near-term spike in interest rates, NAM will continue to exercise caution given the (1) current absolute low levels of interest rates, (2) unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy responses globally to the COVID-19 crisis, and (3) the Fed’s recent announcement that it may allow for inflation to run higher in the future to make-up for it running below the Fed’s 2% target for the past few years. As of July 31, 2020, the Fund had about 90% of its assets invested in securities that have coupons with reset features, compared to approximately 74% within the Blended Benchmark Index.

The Fund used short interest rate futures during the reporting period to manage its exposure to various points along the yield curve, with a net effect of decreasing the Fund’s overall interest rate sensitivity. During the reporting period, the interest rate futures had a negative impact on overall Fund performance.

Nuveen Preferred & Income Securities Fund (JPS)

The table in the Performance Overview and Holding Summaries section of this report provides total return performance for the Fund for the one-year, five-year and ten-year periods ended July 31, 2020. For the twelve-month reporting period ended July 31, 2020, the Fund’s common shares at net asset value (NAV) underperformed the ICE BofA U.S. All Capital Securities Index and the JPS Blended Benchmark.

The investment objective of the Fund is to seek high current income consistent with capital preservation with a secondary objective to enhance portfolio value relative to the broad market for preferred securities. Under normal market conditions, the Fund seeks to invest at least 80% of its net assets in preferred and other income-producing securities, including hybrid securities such as contingent capital securities (CoCos). At least 50% is invested in securities that are rated investment grade.

The basic strategy of the Fund calls for investing in junior subordinated, high income securities of companies with investment grade ratings. Spectrum has tactical exposure to both institutional sectors of the junior subordinated capital securities, which includes both preferred and CoCos.

As of July 31, 2020, the Fund had 47.1% allocation to the $1,000 par institutional sector of the preferred securities market, 11.7% allocation to $25 par retail sector and 36.2% allocation to the CoCos sector, with the remaining in Corporate Bonds, Convertible Preferred Securities, Investment Companies and cash.

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Portfolio Managers’ Comments (continued)

The reporting period began with the Fed announcing additional rate cuts in September and October 2019, which brought the federal funds rate down to 1.5%. During September 2019, the funding markets faced a spike in short-term rates which forced the Fed to intervene in the repurchase (repo) market after two years of automatic balance sheet run offs or reductions. This sent equities soaring and credit spreads tighter. Fed policy combined with already active quantitative easing (QE) in Europe drove performance higher through the second half of 2019 and into February 2020 when credit spreads and yields hit cycle lows. Then, the COVID-19 crisis hit the U.S. economy causing one of the most severe economic contractions since the Great Depression. There was a significant amount of initial deleveraging in markets impelled by the rush to cash by investors and to pull down bank lines by corporations. By the end of March 2020, massive record monetary policy support had been implemented by the Fed and other central banks in coordinated efforts to stem the liquidity squeeze that hit all markets including the U.S. treasury market. From the end of March through July 2020 the Fund almost fully recovered from the COVID-19 crisis losses, ending the reporting down -1.29%.

Credit spreads in the Fund’s sectors closed the period more than one standard deviation wider than more senior financials. The hybrid sectors lagged more than senior corporate credit sectors, but still represent compelling relative value. In addition, junior subordinated capital securities have structures that can reset yields for the Fund even if U.S. Treasury rates do eventually rise.

Factors that contributed to the Fund’s underperformance included the sudden and significant liquidity demands during March 2020, which impelled the most rapid price decline since the 2008 financial crisis, even though the circumstances of the credit crunch were uniquely different. Importantly, global banks were well prepared from a credit perspective and represent part of the solution, yet the shelter in place orders that halted the economy were unprecedented. It repriced every asset class before the Fed stepped in to address liquidity. For preferred securities, generally, the lower the current coupon and the spread between when the security is either called at par or if not called, when the coupon is reset for a further period, the worse the security performed. The $25 par preferred stock sector was the primary detractor from performance, followed by the MLP (energy) sector and utility hybrids. Individual detractors from performance included KeyCorp, TransCanada Trust and Emera Inc. The Fund continues to maintain exposure to each of these holdings.

Contributing to the Fund’s performance during the reporting period was its underweight to the $25 par retail sector. Option adjusted spreads (OAS) tend to be lower in the retail sector, generally less than the $1,000 par institutional sector. The underweight benefited performance during the reporting period as prices in the $25 par sector declined 10 basis points more than the $1,000 par sector during the first quarter of 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis. The new issuance market reopened by the end of April 2020 and helped to drive prices higher as demand for each deal was oversubscribed. The U.S. Bank $1,000 par preferred stock sector benefited the Fund’s performance the most, followed by $1,000 par insurance hybrids and non-U.S. banks additional tier1 (AT1) securities. Top individual contributors to performance during the reporting period included Charles Schwab Corp, MetLife Inc. and Barclays PLC.

Nuveen Preferred and Income 2022 Term Fund (JPT)

The table in the Performance Overview and Holding Summaries section of this report provides total return performance for the Fund for the one-year and since inception periods ended July 31, 2020. For the twelve-month reporting period ended July 31, 2020, the Fund’s common shares at net asset value (NAV) underperformed the ICE BofA U.S. All Capital Securities Index.

The Fund seeks to achieve its investment objective of providing a high level of current income and total return by investing in preferred securities and other income producing securities. The Fund’s portfolio is actively managed, seeking to capitalize on strong credit fundamentals and intense regulatory oversight across our largest sectors, the category’s healthy yield level, and inefficiencies that often evolve between the $25 par retail and the $1,000 par institutional sides of the market. The Fund’s strategy has a bias toward highly regulated industries, like utilities, banks and insurance companies, with a current emphasis broadly on financial services companies. The Fund does not invest in contingent capital securities (otherwise known as CoCos).

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NAM employs a credit-based investment approach, using a bottom-up approach that includes fundamental credit research, security structure selection and option adjusted spread (OAS) analysis, while also incorporating a top-down process to position the portfolio in a manner that reflects the investment team’s overall macro-economic outlook. The process begins with identifying the primary investable universe of $1,000 par preferred and $25 par preferred securities. In an effort to capitalize on the inefficiencies between different investor bases within this universe, NAM tactically and strategically shifts capital between the various segments of the market. Periods of volatility may drive material differences in valuations between the $1,000 par preferred and $25 par preferred markets. This divergence is often related to differences in how retail and institutional investors measure and price risk, as well as differences in retail and institutional investors’ ability to source substitute investments. In addition, technical factors such as new issue supply or redemption activity may also influence the relative valuations between the $1,000 par preferred and the $25 par preferred markets.

During the twelve-month reporting period, the Blended Benchmark Index which represents the $1,000 par preferred and the $25 par preferred markets, returned 5.29%. This figure fell between both comparable financial senior debt and financial equities. NAM typically expects the Blended Benchmark Index to perform between these two categories given the hybrid nature of its constituent securities. During the reporting period, investment performance was positive across all broad categories within the market, except for the energy sector which posted negative returns on average. Fortunately, the energy sector is a relatively small sub-category within the asset class representing approximately 3% exposure within the Blended Benchmark Index, and less than 1.5% exposure in NAM’s sleeve as of the end of the reporting period.

Taking a closer look at asset class level performance, the positive absolute returns were driven primarily by a combination of lower interest rates and the generous yield of the asset class. These two factors combined to more than offset the impact of wider credit spreads during the reporting period. Credit spreads moved wider reflecting an overall increase in risk premiums, resulting primarily from the COVID-19 crisis and further exacerbated by geopolitical headlines related to U.S. and China tensions, discord between members of OPEC and lack of any meaningful progress regarding Brexit negotiations. Despite COVID-19’s extraordinary human toll, ensuing economic damage has been somewhat offset by unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy responses both here in the U.S. and globally. With the Fed aggressively easing monetary policy, and investors seeking safe-haven alternatives, the 10-year US Treasury yield decreased by almost 150 basis points between the beginning and the end of the reporting period. While option adjusted spreads (OAS) were well off the wide levels touched in March 2020, OAS for the Benchmark Index was still about 125 basis points wider as of July 31, 2020 compared to a year earlier.

During the reporting period OAS for $25 par preferred securities on average increased more than $1,000 par preferreds. At the beginning of the reporting period, average OAS for $25 par preferred securities was -65 basis points, while average OAS for $1,000 par securities was +235 basis points. As a result, $25 par preferreds may have been due for a correction regardless of the COVID-19 crisis or other headlines during the reporting period. Considering the severe deterioration of market conditions and retail investors often react to such developments in a more extreme manner than institutional investors, coupled with the low average OAS for $25 par preferred securities at the onset of the reporting period, it is not a surprise that the $25 par preferred market underperformed.

Despite the rather dire economic backdrop during the latter half of the reporting period, the fundamental credit story of the Fund’s largest sector, the bank sector, remained intact. The regularly scheduled 2020 U.S. bank stress test results released in late June again validated the resiliency of U.S. bank balance sheets. This year, the Fed supplemented the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) with an added sensitivity analysis, the goal of which was to examine the banks’ vulnerabilities under the pall of COVID-19. The assumptions and variables used to conduct the sensitivity analysis were significantly more devastating versus those used in the severely adverse scenario of the standard DFAST. For example, the sensitivity analysis included a scenario where GDP contracted 37.5% and another where peak unemployment hit 19.5%. Other calamitous assumptions were ported over from the DFAST such as the 50% drop in equity markets, 28%

17

Portfolio Managers’ Comments (continued)

drop in residential home prices and 35% drop in commercial real estate prices. The sensitivity analysis was run to account for three different recovery scenarios; V-shaped, U-shaped, and W-shaped. Under the worst of the scenarios, the 33 banks subject to this year’s exams were forecasted to incur $700 billion in aggregate loan losses. Despite this astonishing number, all 33 banks still were forecast to maintain a common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio above their 4.5% minimum requirement. It is important to note that these sensitivity tests did not take into account several mitigating variables such as unemployment insurance, the Paycheck Protection Plan, the CARES Act and various Federal Reserve lending facilities. NAM believes if one couples the above stress test results with better than expected second quarter earnings for the U.S. and European bank sectors and better than expected capital levels, in NAM’s opinion the fundamental story underlying our largest sector remains intact.

NAM incorporated several active themes relative to the Benchmark Index during the reporting period, including an overweight to the $1,000 par side of the market and an overweight to securities that have coupons with reset features (floating rate, fixed-to-floating rate, and fixed-rate reset).

Within the preferred securities universe, $25 par preferred securities on average underperformed $1,000 par preferred securities. As a result, NAM’s underweight to those structures was accretive to the Fund’s relative performance. As has been the case for some time, NAM has maintained an overweight to $1,000 par securities for two primary reasons, relative value and interest rate risk management. First, with respect to relative value, the $1,000 par side of the market continues to be significantly cheaper than the $25 par side of the market on an OAS basis. At the beginning of the reporting period, the average OAS for the $25 par preferred market was -65 basis points versus average OAS of +235 basis points for the $1,000 par preferred market. At the end of the reporting period, average OAS for the $25 par preferred market was +134 basis points, or almost 200 basis points wider during the twelve-month period. On the other hand, $1,000 par preferreds’ average OAS as of July 31, 2020 stood at +300 basis points, or only about 65 basis points wider over the same time period. Despite $25 par preferreds underperformance during the most recent reporting period, they still appear potentially overvalued on an OAS basis versus $1,000 par preferreds. In NAM’s opinion, the relative value thesis for being overweight $1,000 par preferreds remains intact.

In reporting periods that experience significant headline risk or other forms of distress, it is not uncommon for the $25 par preferred market to underperform the $1,000 par preferred market. $25 par preferred valuations are more heavily influenced by retail investors’ behavioral anomalies and ETF flows compared to the $1,000 par side of the market. Historically, the retail investor has exhibited more of an emotional response to distressed markets compared to institutional investors. The extreme market conditions brought about by the COVID-19 crisis coupled with retail investors’ emotional response to aggressively reduce risk and $25 par preferred securities began the reporting period with average OAS in negative territory, it is not overly surprising that $25 par OAS increased to a level that offset much of the benefit those securities derived from lower interest rates.

During the reporting period, securities with non-fixed-rate coupons marginally outperformed those with fixed-rate coupons. On the surface, this might appear surprising given that the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate decreased by almost 150 basis points between the beginning and the end of the reporting period. All else equal, fixed-rate coupon structures should respond more favorably to a drop in interest rates compared to securities with non-fixed-rate coupons. However, it is NAM’s opinion that the previously mentioned relative performance between $25 par preferreds and $1,000 par preferreds had implications for the relative performance between fixed-rate and non-fixed-rate coupon structures. As a reminder, most $25 par preferred securities are fixed-rate coupon structures, while $1,000 par securities are non-fixed-rate securities. Given that $25 par preferreds underperformed during the reporting period, which also played a significant role in fixed-rate coupon structures underperforming as well.

JPT underperformed its Benchmark Index during the reporting period. The primary drivers for the underperformance included and average duration that was modestly shorter than the Benchmark Index during the reporting period, as well as selection bias within the $25 par preferred and $1,000 par preferred allocations. With respect to the latter, preferreds

18

issued by General Electric Co, AerCap Global Aviation Trust and Security Benefit Life were the largest detractors to relative performance resulting from selection bias. NAM’s credit research team maintains conviction in the underlying credit fundamentals of all three of these companies and expects all three to navigate successfully through the current crisis. NAM anticipates that over time, the market will adopt a view closer to NAM’s and the security-level valuations will respond accordingly. However, as with any of the credits within the Fund, should a credit research analyst’s opinion change, or should the risk-adjusted relative value proposition of holding a security change, NAM will adjust the exposure accordingly.

With respect to NAM’s effort to manage interest rate risk, NAM’s overweight to $1,000 par preferred securities served to gain greater exposure to non-fixed-rate coupon securities, like floating rate coupons, fixed-to-floating rate coupons, and fixed-to-fixed rate coupons. These structures are more common on the $1,000 par preferred side of the market and historically they have been effective at managing duration and duration extension risk during periods of rising interest rates. While admittedly NAM is not overly concerned about a near-term spike in interest rates, NAM will continue to exercise caution given the (1) current absolute low levels of interest rates, (2) unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy responses globally to the COVID-19 crisis, and (3) the Feds recent announcement that it may allow for inflation to run higher in the future to make-up for it running below the Fed’s 2% target for the past few years. As of July 31, 2020, the Fund had about 90% of its assets invested in securities that have coupons with reset features, compared to approximately 74% within the Benchmark Index.

The Fund used short interest rate futures during the reporting period to manage its exposure to various points along the yield curve, with a net effect of decreasing the Fund’s overall interest rate sensitivity. During the reporting period, the interest rate futures had a negative impact on overall Fund performance.

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Fund Leverage

IMPACT OF THE FUNDS’ LEVERAGE STRATEGIES ON PERFORMANCE

One important factor impacting the returns of the Funds’ common shares relative to their comparative benchmarks was the Funds’ use of leverage through bank borrowings as well as the use of reverse repurchase agreements for JPC, JPI and JPS. The Funds use leverage because our research has shown that, over time, leveraging provides opportunities for additional income. The opportunity arises when short-term rates that a Fund pays on its leveraging instruments are lower than the interest the Fund earns on its portfolio securities that it has bought with the proceeds of that leverage. This has been particularly true in the recent market environment where short-term rates have been low by historical standards.

However, use of leverage can expose Fund common shares to additional price volatility. When a Fund uses leverage, the Fund’s common shares will experience a greater increase in their net asset value if the securities acquired through the use of leverage increase in value, but will also experience a correspondingly larger decline in their net asset value if the securities acquired through leverage decline in value, which will make the shares’ net asset value more volatile, and total return performance more variable, over time.

In addition, common share income in levered funds will typically decrease in comparison to unlevered funds when short-term interest rates increase and increase when short-term interest rates decrease. In recent quarters, fund leverage expenses have generally tracked the overall movement of short-term tax-exempt interest rates. While fund leverage expenses are somewhat higher than their all-time lows, leverage nevertheless continues to provide the opportunity for incremental common share income, particularly over longer-term periods.

The Funds’ use of leverage had a negative impact on total return performance during this reporting period. The negative impact of leverage during the brief but severe COVID-19 induced market downturn in March was greater than the positive impact of leverage during the remainder of the reporting period. More specifically, this net negative contribution of leverage was amplified during the market downturn in part because the Fund used proceeds from portfolio sales to reduce its elevated leverage ratio, which rose as prices of portfolio securities, including those sold for de-levering purposes, declined. Conversely, as financial markets recovered and asset prices steadied, the Fund gradually increased leverage levels, using proceeds to purchase new portfolio securities at generally higher prices. Management believes, however, that the potential benefits from leverage continue to outweigh the associated increase in risk and total return variability previously described.

JPC, JPI and JPS continued to use interest rate swap contracts to partially hedge the interest cost of leverage, which as mentioned previously, is through the use of bank borrowings. During this reporting period, these swap contracts had a negative impact to overall Fund total return performance.

As of July 31, 2020, the Funds’ percentages of leverage are shown in the accompanying table.

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Refer to Notes to Financial Statements, Note 8 – Fund Leverage and Note 10 – Subsequent Events for further details.

Reverse Repurchase Agreements

As noted above, JPC, JPI and JPS used reverse repurchase agreements, in which the Fund sells to a counterparty a security that it holds with a contemporaneous agreement to repurchase the same security at an agreed-upon price and date. The Funds’ transactions in reverse repurchase agreements are as shown in the accompanying table. Sales reflect on-going leverage management activity that seeks to maintain each Fund’s leverage ratio within a specified internal operating range.

Refer to Notes to Financial Statements, Note 8 – Fund Leverage and Note 10 – Subsequent Events for further details.

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Common Share Information

COMMON SHARE DISTRIBUTION INFORMATION

The following information regarding the Funds’ distributions is current as of July 31, 2020. Each Fund’s distribution levels may vary over time based on each Fund’s investment activity and portfolio investment value changes.

During the current reporting period, each Fund’s distributions to common shareholders were as shown in the accompanying table.

Each Fund seeks to pay regular monthly dividends out of its net investment income at a rate that reflects its past and projected net income performance. To permit each Fund to maintain a more stable monthly dividend, the Fund may pay dividends at a rate that may be more or less than the amount of net income actually earned by the Fund during the period. Distributions to common shareholders are determined on a tax basis, which may differ from amounts recorded in the accounting records. In instances where the monthly dividend exceeds the earned net investment income, the Fund would report a negative undistributed net ordinary income. Refer to Note 6 – Income Tax Information for additional information regarding the amounts of undistributed net ordinary income and undistributed net long-term capital gains and the character of the actual distributions paid by the Fund during the period.

All monthly dividends paid by the JPT Fund during the current reporting period were paid from net investment income. If a portion of the Fund’s monthly distributions is sourced or comprised of elements other than net investment income, including capital gains and/or a return of capital, shareholders will be notified of those sources. For financial reporting purposes, the per share amounts of each Fund’s distributions for the reporting period are presented in this report’s Financial Highlights. For income tax purposes, distribution information for each Fund as of its most recent tax year end is presented in Note 6 – Income Tax Information within the Notes to Financial Statements of this report.

JPC, JPI and JPS seek to pay regular monthly distributions at a level rate that reflect past and projected net income of the Funds. The Funds may own certain investments which recognize income for financial reporting in a matter that is different than the tax recognition. During the current fiscal year, the Funds owned certain investments which accrued income for financial reporting purposes but was not recognized as current income for tax purposes. Each Fund’s fiscal year to date

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distribution amount exceeded the actual amount of net income for tax purposes, and as a result, a portion of each Fund’s fiscal year distributions have been deemed to be a return of capital, which are identified in the table below.

NUVEEN CLOSED-END FUND DISTRIBUTION AMOUNTS

The Nuveen Closed-End Funds’ monthly and quarterly periodic distributions to shareholders are posted on www.nuveen.com and can be found on Nuveen’s enhanced closed-end fund resource page, which is at https://www.nuveen.com/resource-center-closed-end-funds, along with other Nuveen closed-end fund product updates. To ensure timely access to the latest information, shareholders may use a subscribe function, which can be activated at this web page (https://www.nuveen.com/subscriptions).

COMMON SHARE REPURCHASES

During August 2020 (subsequent to the close of the reporting period), the Funds’ Board of Trustees reauthorized an open-market share repurchase program, allowing each Fund to repurchase an aggregate of up to approximately 10% of its outstanding shares.

As of July 31, 2020, and since the inception of the Funds’ repurchase programs, the Funds have cumulatively repurchased and retired their outstanding common shares as shown in the accompanying table.

During the current reporting period, the Funds did not repurchase any of their outstanding common shares.

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Refer to the Glossary of Terms Used in this Report for further definition of the terms used within this section.

Past performance is not predictive of future results. Current performance may be higher or lower than the data shown. Returns do not reflect the deduction of taxes that shareholders may have to pay on Fund distributions or upon the sale of Fund shares. Returns at NAV are net of Fund expenses, and assume reinvestment of distributions. Comparative index return information is provided for the Fund’s shares at NAV only. Indexes are not available for direct investment. Performance for indexes that were created after the Fund’s inception are linked to the Fund’s previous benchmark.

Common Share Price Performance — Weekly Closing Price

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This data relates to the securities held in the Fund’s portfolio of investments as of the end of the reporting period. It should not be construed as a measure of performance for the Fund itself. Holdings are subject to change.

For financial reporting purposes, the ratings disclosed are the highest rating given by one of the following national rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s Group, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. or Fitch, Inc. This treatment of split-rated securities may differ from that used for other purposes, such as for Fund investment policies. Credit ratings are subject to change. AAA, AA, A and BBB are investment grade ratings; BB, B, CCC, CC, C and D are below investment grade ratings. Holdings designated N/R are not rated by these national rating agencies.