REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 |
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☐
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Pre-Effective Amendment No.
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☐
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Post-Effective Amendment No.
76
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☒
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and/or
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REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 |
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☐
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Amendment No.
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☒
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333 West Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois
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60606
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(Address of Principal Executive Offices)
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(Zip Code)
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Mark J. Czarniecki
Vice President and Secretary
901 Marquette Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(Name and Address of Agent for Service)
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Copies to:
Eric F. Fess
Chapman and Cutler LLP
111 West Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
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☒
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immediately upon filing pursuant to paragraph (b)
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☐
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on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)
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☐
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on (date) pursuant to paragraph (b)
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☐
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75 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)
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☐
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60 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)
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☐
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on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 485.
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☐
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This post-effective amendment designates a new effective date for a previously filed post-effective amendment.
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Mutual Funds
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30 April
2021 |
Fund Name
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
FGIAX
|
FGNCX
|
FGNRX
|
FGIWX
|
FGIYX
|
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
|
NGJAX
|
NGJCX
|
—
|
NGJFX
|
NGJIX
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
NRIAX
|
NRICX
|
—
|
NRIFX
|
NRIIX
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
FREAX
|
FRLCX
|
FRSSX
|
FREGX
|
FARCX
|
The Securities and Exchange Commission has not approved or disapproved these securities or passed upon the adequacy of this prospectus. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offense.
|
As permitted by regulations adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, paper copies of the Funds’ annual and semi-annual shareholder reports will not be sent to you by mail unless you specifically request paper copies of the reports. Instead, the reports will be made available on the Funds’ website (www.nuveen.com), and you will be notified by mail each time a report is posted and provided with a website link to access the report.
You may elect to receive shareholder reports and other communications from the Funds electronically at any time by contacting the financial intermediary (such as a broker-dealer or bank) through which you hold your Fund shares or, if you are a direct investor, by enrolling at www.nuveen.com/e-reports.
You may elect to receive all future shareholder reports in paper free of charge at any time by contacting your financial intermediary or, if you are a direct investor, by calling 800-257-8787 and selecting option #1. Your election to receive reports in paper will apply to all funds held in your account with your financial intermediary or, if you are a direct investor, to all your directly held Nuveen Funds and any other directly held funds within the same group of related investment companies.
|
Prospectus
|
Table of Contents
|
|
Section 1
Fund Summaries
Section 2
How We Manage Your Money
Section 3
How
You Can Buy and Sell Shares
Section 4
General Information
Section 5
Financial Highlights
Appendix—Variations in Sales Charge Reductions and
Waivers Available Through Certain Intermediaries |
|
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases
(as a percentage of offering price) |
5.75%
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Maximum Deferred Sales Charge (Load)
(as a percentage of the lesser of purchase price or redemption proceeds)
1
|
None
|
1.00%
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Exchange Fee
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Annual Low Balance Account Fee (for accounts under $1,000)
2
|
$15
|
$15
|
None
|
None
|
$15
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||||||||||||
Management Fees
|
0.90
|
%
|
0.90
|
%
|
0.90
|
%
|
0.90
|
%
|
0.90
|
%
|
||||||||||
Distribution and/or Service (12b-1) Fees
|
0.25
|
%
|
1.00
|
%
|
0.50
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
||||||||||
Other Expenses
|
0.20
|
%
|
0.20
|
%
|
0.20
|
%
|
0.11
|
%
|
0.20
|
%
|
||||||||||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses
|
1.35
|
%
|
2.10
|
%
|
1.60
|
%
|
1.01
|
%
|
1.10
|
%
|
||||||||||
Fee Waivers and/or Expense Reimbursements
3
|
(0.13
|
)%
|
(0.13
|
)%
|
(0.13
|
)%
|
(0.13
|
)%
|
(0.13
|
)%
|
||||||||||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waivers and/or Expense Reimbursements
|
1.22
|
%
|
1.97
|
%
|
1.47
|
%
|
0.88
|
%
|
0.97
|
%
|
2
|
Section 1
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||||||||||
1 Year
|
$
|
692
|
$
|
200
|
$
|
150
|
$
|
90
|
$
|
99
|
||||||||
3 Years
|
$
|
963
|
$
|
642
|
$
|
489
|
$
|
305
|
$
|
334
|
||||||||
5 Years
|
$
|
1,257
|
$
|
1,114
|
$
|
855
|
$
|
542
|
$
|
590
|
||||||||
10 Years
|
$
|
2,092
|
$
|
2,418
|
$
|
1,886
|
$
|
1,221
|
$
|
1,326
|
Section 1
|
3
|
4
|
Section 1
|
Section 1
|
5
|
Class A Annual Total Return*
|
6
|
Section 1
|
Name
|
Title
|
Portfolio Manager of Fund Since
|
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Senior Managing Director
|
December 2007
|
Tryg T. Sarsland
|
Managing Director
|
December 2012
|
Jagdeep S. Ghuman
|
Managing Director
|
October 2019
|
Section 1
|
7
|
Class A and Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|
Eligibility and Minimum Initial Investment
|
$3,000 for all accounts except:
•
Roth IRA accounts.
•
Education Savings Accounts.
•
•
|
Available only through certain retirement plans.
No minimum.
|
Available only to certain qualified retirement plans and other investors as described in the prospectus and through fee-based programs.
$1 million for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Available only through fee-based programs and certain retirement plans, and to other limited categories of investors as described in the prospectus.
$100,000 for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Minimum
Additional Investment |
$100
|
No minimum.
|
No minimum.
|
No minimum.
|
8
|
Section 1
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases
(as a percentage of offering price) |
5.75%
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Maximum Deferred Sales Charge (Load)
(as a percentage of the lesser of purchase price or redemption proceeds)
1
|
None
|
1.00%
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Exchange Fee
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Annual Low Balance Account Fee (for accounts under $1,000)
2
|
$15
|
$15
|
None
|
$15
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|||||||||||||
Management Fees
|
0.91
|
%
|
0.91
|
%
|
0.91
|
%
|
0.91
|
%
|
||||||||
Distribution and/or Service (12b-1) Fees
|
0.25
|
%
|
1.00
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
||||||||
Other Expenses
|
1.29
|
%
|
1.29
|
%
|
1.24
|
%
|
1.29
|
%
|
||||||||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses
|
2.45
|
%
|
3.20
|
%
|
2.15
|
%
|
2.20
|
%
|
||||||||
Fee Waivers and/or Expense Reimbursements
3
|
(1.15
|
)%
|
(1.15
|
)%
|
(1.15
|
)%
|
(1.15
|
)%
|
||||||||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waivers and/or Expense Reimbursements
|
1.30
|
%
|
2.05
|
%
|
1.00
|
%
|
1.05
|
%
|
Section 1
|
9
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||||||
1 Year
|
$
|
700
|
$
|
208
|
$
|
102
|
$
|
107
|
|||||
3 Years
|
$
|
1,164
|
$
|
851
|
$
|
533
|
$
|
549
|
|||||
5 Years
|
$
|
1,682
|
$
|
1,548
|
$
|
1,021
|
$
|
1,047
|
|||||
10 Years
|
$
|
3,097
|
$
|
3,404
|
$
|
2,368
|
$
|
2,420
|
10
|
Section 1
|
Section 1
|
11
|
12
|
Section 1
|
Class A Annual Total Return*
|
Section 1
|
13
|
Name
|
Title
|
Portfolio Manager of Fund Since
|
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Senior Managing Director
|
March 2018
|
Scott C. Sedlak
|
Managing Director
|
March 2018
|
Benjamin T. Kerl
|
Managing Director
|
January 2019
|
Jagdeep S. Ghuman
|
Managing Director
|
October 2019
|
Class A and Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|
Eligibility and Minimum Initial Investment
|
$3,000 for all accounts except:
•
Roth IRA accounts.
•
Education Savings Accounts.
•
•
|
Available only to certain qualified retirement plans and other investors as described in the prospectus and through fee-based programs.
$1 million for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Available only through fee-based programs and certain retirement plans, and to other limited categories of investors as described in the prospectus.
$100,000 for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Minimum
Additional Investment |
$100
|
No minimum.
|
No minimum.
|
14
|
Section 1
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases
(as a percentage of offering price) |
5.75%
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Maximum Deferred Sales Charge (Load)
(as a percentage of the lesser of purchase price or redemption proceeds)
1
|
None
|
1.00%
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Exchange Fee
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
||||
Annual Low Balance Account Fee (for accounts under $1,000)
2
|
$15
|
$15
|
None
|
$15
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|||||||||||||
Management Fees
|
0.72
|
%
|
0.72
|
%
|
0.72
|
%
|
0.72
|
%
|
||||||||
Distribution and/or Service (12b-1) Fees
|
0.25
|
%
|
1.00
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
||||||||
Other Expenses
|
0.19
|
%
|
0.19
|
%
|
0.10
|
%
|
0.19
|
%
|
||||||||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses
|
1.16
|
%
|
1.91
|
%
|
0.82
|
%
|
0.91
|
%
|
||||||||
Fee Waivers and/or Expense Reimbursements
3
|
0.00
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
(0.01
|
)%
|
0.00
|
%
|
||||||||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waivers and/or Expense Reimbursements
|
1.16
|
%
|
1.91
|
%
|
0.81
|
%
|
0.91
|
%
|
Section 1
|
15
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||||||
1 Year
|
$
|
686
|
$
|
194
|
$
|
83
|
$
|
93
|
|||||
3 Years
|
$
|
922
|
$
|
600
|
$
|
261
|
$
|
290
|
|||||
5 Years
|
$
|
1,177
|
$
|
1,032
|
$
|
454
|
$
|
504
|
|||||
10 Years
|
$
|
1,903
|
$
|
2,233
|
$
|
1,012
|
$
|
1,120
|
16
|
Section 1
|
Section 1
|
17
|
18
|
Section 1
|
Section 1
|
19
|
Class A Annual Total Return*
|
20
|
Section 1
|
Name
|
Title
|
Portfolio Manager of Fund Since
|
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Senior Managing Director
|
September 2011
|
Brenda A. Langenfeld, CFA
|
Managing Director
|
April 2015
|
Tryg T. Sarsland
|
Managing Director
|
April 2015
|
Jean C. Lin, CFA
|
Managing Director
|
January 2019
|
Section 1
|
21
|
Class A and Class C
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|
Eligibility and Minimum Initial Investment
|
$3,000 for all accounts except:
•
Roth IRA accounts.
•
Education Savings Accounts.
•
•
|
Available only to certain qualified retirement plans and other investors as described in the prospectus and through fee-based programs.
$1 million for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Available only through fee-based programs and certain retirement plans, and to other limited categories of investors as described in the prospectus.
$100,000 for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Minimum
Additional Investment |
$100
|
No minimum.
|
No minimum.
|
22
|
Section 1
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases
(as a percentage of offering price) |
5.75%
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Maximum Deferred Sales Charge (Load)
(as a percentage of the lesser of purchase price or redemption proceeds)
1
|
None
|
1.00%
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Maximum Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Exchange Fee
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
None
|
|||||
Annual Low Balance Account Fee (for accounts under $1,000)
2
|
$15
|
$15
|
None
|
None
|
$15
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||||||||||||
Management Fees
|
0.85
|
%
|
0.85
|
%
|
0.85
|
%
|
0.85
|
%
|
0.85
|
%
|
||||||||||
Distribution and/or Service (12b-1) Fees
|
0.25
|
%
|
1.00
|
%
|
0.50
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
0.00
|
%
|
||||||||||
Other Expenses
|
0.20
|
%
|
0.20
|
%
|
0.20
|
%
|
0.05
|
%
|
0.20
|
%
|
||||||||||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses
|
1.30
|
%
|
2.05
|
%
|
1.55
|
%
|
0.90
|
%
|
1.05
|
%
|
Section 1
|
23
|
Class A
|
Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
||||||||||||||
1 Year
|
$
|
700
|
$
|
208
|
$
|
158
|
$
|
92
|
$
|
107
|
||||||||
3 Years
|
$
|
963
|
$
|
643
|
$
|
490
|
$
|
287
|
$
|
334
|
||||||||
5 Years
|
$
|
1,247
|
$
|
1,103
|
$
|
845
|
$
|
498
|
$
|
579
|
||||||||
10 Years
|
$
|
2,053
|
$
|
2,379
|
$
|
1,845
|
$
|
1,108
|
$
|
1,283
|
24
|
Section 1
|
Section 1
|
25
|
Class A Annual Total Return*
|
26
|
Section 1
|
Name
|
Title
|
Portfolio Manager of Fund Since
|
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Senior Managing Director
|
May 2005
|
Scott C. Sedlak
|
Managing Director
|
March 2011
|
Sarah J. Wade
|
Managing Director
|
June 2017
|
Benjamin T. Kerl
|
Managing Director
|
April 2021
|
Section 1
|
27
|
Class A and Class C
|
Class R3
|
Class R6
|
Class I
|
|
Eligibility and Minimum Initial Investment
|
$3,000 for all accounts except:
•
Roth IRA accounts.
•
Education Savings Accounts.
•
•
|
Available only through certain retirement plans.
No minimum.
|
Available only to certain qualified retirement plans and other investors as described in the prospectus and through fee-based programs.
$1 million for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Available only through fee-based programs and certain retirement plans, and to other limited categories of investors as described in the prospectus.
$100,000 for all accounts except:
•
•
|
Minimum
Additional Investment |
$100
|
No minimum.
|
No minimum.
|
No minimum.
|
28
|
Section 1
|
Who Manages the Funds
|
Section 2
|
29
|
30
|
Section 2
|
Average Daily Net Assets
|
Nuveen Global
Infrastructure Fund
|
Nuveen Global
Real Estate Securities Fund
|
Nuveen
Real Estate Securities Fund |
For the first $125 million
|
0.7500%
|
0.7500%
|
0.7000%
|
For the next $125 million
|
0.7375%
|
0.7375%
|
0.6875%
|
For the next $250 million
|
0.7250%
|
0.7250%
|
0.6750%
|
For the next $500 million
|
0.7125%
|
0.7125%
|
0.6625%
|
For the next $1 billion
|
0.7000%
|
0.7000%
|
0.6500%
|
For the next $3 billion
|
0.6750%
|
0.6750%
|
0.6250%
|
For the next $2.5 billion
|
0.6500%
|
0.6500%
|
0.6000%
|
For the next $2.5 billion
|
0.6375%
|
0.6375%
|
0.5875%
|
For net assets over $10 billion
|
0.6250%
|
0.6250%
|
0.5750%
|
Average Daily Net Assets
|
Nuveen
Real Asset Income Fund |
|
For the first $125 million
|
0.6000%
|
|
For the next $125 million
|
0.5875%
|
|
For the next $250 million
|
0.5750%
|
|
For the next $500 million
|
0.5625%
|
|
For the next $1 billion
|
0.5500%
|
|
For the next $3 billion
|
0.5250%
|
|
For the next $5 billion
|
0.5000%
|
|
For net assets over $10 billion
|
0.4875%
|
Complex-Level
Fee Rate |
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
0.1658%
|
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
|
0.1555%
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
0.1555%
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
0.1994%
|
Section 2
|
31
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
0.77%
|
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
|
—
*
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
0.71%
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
0.85%
|
|
32
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
33
|
34
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
35
|
36
|
Section 2
|
|
Section 2
How We Manage Your Money
|
37
|
|
38
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
39
|
40
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
41
|
42
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
43
|
44
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
45
|
46
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
47
|
48
|
Section 2
|
Section 2
|
49
|
|
Amount of Purchase
|
Sales Charge as
% of Public Offering Price |
Sales Charge as
% of Net Amount Invested |
Maximum Financial Intermediary Commission as % of Public Offering Price
|
|||||
Less than $50,000
|
5.75
|
%
|
6.10
|
%
|
5.00
|
%
|
||
$50,000 but less than $100,000
|
4.50
|
4.71
|
4.00
|
|||||
$100,000 but less than $250,000
|
3.75
|
3.90
|
3.25
|
|||||
$250,000 but less than $500,000
|
2.75
|
2.83
|
2.50
|
|||||
$500,000 but less than $1,000,000
|
2.00
|
2.04
|
1.75
|
|||||
$1,000,000 and over*
|
—
|
—
|
1.00
|
50
|
51
|
52
|
53
|
|
54
|
55
|
56
|
|
57
|
|
58
|
59
|
|
60
|
61
|
An Important Note About Telephone Transactions
Although Nuveen Funds has certain safeguards and procedures to confirm the identity of callers, it will not be liable for losses resulting from following telephone instructions it reasonably believes to be genuine.
Also, you should verify your trade confirmations immediately upon receipt.
|
62
|
Dividends, Distributions and Taxes
|
Section 4
|
63
|
64
|
Section 4
|
|
Section 4
|
65
|
|
66
|
Section 4
|
Section 4
|
67
|
Frequent Trading
|
68
|
Section 4
|
|
Section 4
|
69
|
Class (Commencement Date)
|
|
Investment Operations
|
|
Less Distributions
|
|
|
Ratios/Supplemental Data
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
Investment
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Net
|
Net
|
|
|
From
|
From
|
|
|
|
|
Ending
|
Expenses
|
Income (Loss)
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Investment
|
Realized/
|
|
|
Net
|
Accumulated
|
Return
|
|
|
|
Net
|
to Average
|
to Average
|
Portfolio
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Year Ended
|
Beginning
|
Income
|
Unrealized
|
|
|
Investment
|
Net Realized
|
of
|
|
Ending
|
Total
|
Assets
|
Net
|
Net
|
Turnover
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
December 31:
|
NAV
|
(Loss)(a)
|
Gain (Loss)
|
Total
|
|
Income
|
Gains
|
Capital
|
Total
|
NAV
|
Return(b)
|
(000)
|
Assets(c)
|
Assets(c)
|
Rate(d)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Class A (12/07)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
$
|
11.45
|
|
$
|
0.13
|
|
$
|
(0.46
|
)
|
$
|
(0.33
|
)
|
|
$
|
(0.11
|
)
|
$
|
(0.04
|
)
|
$
|
—
|
|
$
|
(0.15
|
)
|
$
|
10.97
|
|
(2.76
|
)%
|
$
|
44,235
|
1.22
|
%
|
1.24
|
%
|
181
|
%
|
2019
|
|
9.48
|
|
|
0.22
|
|
|
2.56
|
|
|
2.78
|
|
|
|
(0.20
|
)
|
|
(0.61
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.81
|
)
|
|
11.45
|
|
29.27
|
|
|
57,379
|
1.22
|
|
1.99
|
|
144
|
|
2018
|
|
10.93
|
|
|
0.20
|
|
|
(1.05
|
)
|
|
(0.85
|
)
|
|
|
(0.22
|
)
|
|
(0.36
|
)
|
|
(0.02
|
)
|
|
(0.60
|
)
|
|
9.48
|
|
(7.88
|
)
|
|
55,856
|
1.22
|
|
1.87
|
|
174
|
|
2017
|
|
9.69
|
|
|
0.22
|
|
|
1.66
|
|
|
1.88
|
|
|
|
(0.23
|
)
|
|
(0.41
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.64
|
)
|
|
10.93
|
|
19.38
|
|
|
87,876
|
1.22
|
|
2.05
|
|
161
|
|
2016
|
|
9.75
|
|
|
0.25
|
|
|
0.49
|
|
|
0.74
|
|
|
|
(0.30
|
)
|
|
(0.50
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.80
|
)
|
|
9.69
|
|
7.61
|
|
|
70,173
|
1.22
|
|
2.42
|
|
149
|
|
Class C (11/08)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
11.35
|
|
|
0.05
|
|
|
(0.46
|
)
|
|
(0.41
|
)
|
|
|
(0.03
|
)
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.07
|
)
|
|
10.87
|
|
(3.56
|
)
|
|
18,465
|
1.97
|
|
0.49
|
|
181
|
|
2019
|
|
9.41
|
|
|
0.14
|
|
|
2.52
|
|
|
2.66
|
|
|
|
(0.11
|
)
|
|
(0.61
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.72
|
)
|
|
11.35
|
|
28.37
|
|
|
24,640
|
1.97
|
|
1.26
|
|
144
|
|
2018
|
|
10.85
|
|
|
0.12
|
|
|
(1.04
|
)
|
|
(0.92
|
)
|
|
|
(0.14
|
)
|
|
(0.36
|
)
|
|
(0.02
|
)
|
|
(0.52
|
)
|
|
9.41
|
|
(8.60
|
)
|
|
24,556
|
1.97
|
|
1.13
|
|
174
|
|
2017
|
|
9.62
|
|
|
0.14
|
|
|
1.65
|
|
|
1.79
|
|
|
|
(0.15
|
)
|
|
(0.41
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.56
|
)
|
|
10.85
|
|
18.55
|
|
|
29,227
|
1.97
|
|
1.31
|
|
161
|
|
2016
|
|
9.69
|
|
|
0.16
|
|
|
0.49
|
|
|
0.65
|
|
|
|
(0.22
|
)
|
|
(0.50
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.72
|
)
|
|
9.62
|
|
6.71
|
|
|
22,868
|
1.97
|
|
1.53
|
|
149
|
|
Class R3 (11/08)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
11.64
|
|
|
0.11
|
|
|
(0.46
|
)
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
|
(0.09
|
)
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.13
|
)
|
|
11.16
|
|
(3.10
|
)
|
|
238
|
1.47
|
|
1.01
|
|
181
|
|
2019
|
|
9.64
|
|
|
0.19
|
|
|
2.59
|
|
|
2.78
|
|
|
|
(0.17
|
)
|
|
(0.61
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.78
|
)
|
|
11.64
|
|
29.06
|
|
|
358
|
1.47
|
|
1.69
|
|
144
|
|
2018
|
|
11.11
|
|
|
0.18
|
|
|
(1.07
|
)
|
|
(0.89
|
)
|
|
|
(0.20
|
)
|
|
(0.36
|
)
|
|
(0.02
|
)
|
|
(0.58
|
)
|
|
9.64
|
|
(8.14
|
)
|
|
239
|
1.47
|
|
1.68
|
|
174
|
|
2017
|
|
9.85
|
|
|
0.20
|
|
|
1.68
|
|
|
1.88
|
|
|
|
(0.21
|
)
|
|
(0.41
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.62
|
)
|
|
11.11
|
|
19.03
|
|
|
337
|
1.47
|
|
1.83
|
|
161
|
|
2016
|
|
9.90
|
|
|
0.22
|
|
|
0.51
|
|
|
0.73
|
|
|
|
(0.28
|
)
|
|
(0.50
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.78
|
)
|
|
9.85
|
|
7.37
|
|
|
730
|
1.47
|
|
2.04
|
|
149
|
|
Class R6 (6/16)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
11.42
|
|
|
0.16
|
|
|
(0.44
|
)
|
|
(0.28
|
)
|
|
|
(0.14
|
)
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
10.96
|
|
(2.39
|
)
|
|
107,342
|
0.88
|
|
1.57
|
|
181
|
|
2019
|
|
9.47
|
|
|
0.26
|
|
|
2.54
|
|
|
2.80
|
|
|
|
(0.24
|
)
|
|
(0.61
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.85
|
)
|
|
11.42
|
|
29.70
|
|
|
60,187
|
0.89
|
|
2.26
|
|
144
|
|
2018
|
|
10.91
|
|
|
0.22
|
|
|
(1.03
|
)
|
|
(0.81
|
)
|
|
|
(0.25
|
)
|
|
(0.36
|
)
|
|
(0.02
|
)
|
|
(0.63
|
)
|
|
9.47
|
|
(7.56
|
)
|
|
11,520
|
0.89
|
|
2.06
|
|
174
|
|
2017
|
|
9.65
|
|
|
0.27
|
|
|
1.66
|
|
|
1.93
|
|
|
|
(0.26
|
)
|
|
(0.41
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.67
|
)
|
|
10.91
|
|
19.95
|
|
|
19,575
|
0.80
|
|
2.46
|
|
161
|
|
2016(e)
|
|
11.06
|
|
|
0.11
|
|
|
(0.67
|
)
|
|
(0.56
|
)
|
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
(0.50
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.85
|
)
|
|
9.65
|
|
(5.08
|
)
|
|
7,627
|
0.86
|
*
|
2.02
|
*
|
149
|
|
Class I (12/07)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
11.40
|
|
|
0.15
|
|
|
(0.44
|
)
|
|
(0.29
|
)
|
|
|
(0.14
|
)
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
10.93
|
|
(2.55
|
)
|
|
439,399
|
0.97
|
|
1.50
|
|
181
|
|
2019
|
|
9.44
|
|
|
0.25
|
|
|
2.54
|
|
|
2.79
|
|
|
|
(0.22
|
)
|
|
(0.61
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.83
|
)
|
|
11.40
|
|
29.69
|
|
|
477,180
|
0.97
|
|
2.24
|
|
144
|
|
2018
|
|
10.89
|
|
|
0.22
|
|
|
(1.04
|
)
|
|
(0.82
|
)
|
|
|
(0.25
|
)
|
|
(0.36
|
)
|
|
(0.02
|
)
|
|
(0.63
|
)
|
|
9.44
|
|
(7.67
|
)
|
|
345,782
|
0.97
|
|
2.11
|
|
174
|
|
2017
|
|
9.66
|
|
|
0.26
|
|
|
1.64
|
|
|
1.90
|
|
|
|
(0.26
|
)
|
|
(0.41
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.67
|
)
|
|
10.89
|
|
19.61
|
|
|
472,564
|
0.97
|
|
2.34
|
|
161
|
|
2016
|
|
9.73
|
|
|
0.27
|
|
|
0.50
|
|
|
0.77
|
|
|
|
(0.34
|
)
|
|
(0.50
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.84
|
)
|
|
9.66
|
|
7.91
|
|
|
314,001
|
0.97
|
|
2.54
|
|
149
|
|
(a)
|
Per share Net Investment Income (Loss) is calculated using the average daily shares method.
|
(b)
|
Total return is the combination of changes in NAV without any sales charge, reinvested dividend income at NAV and reinvested capital gains distributions at NAV, if any. Total returns are not annualized.
|
(c)
|
After fee waiver and/or expense reimbursement from Nuveen Fund Advisors, where applicable.
|
(d)
|
Portfolio Turnover Rate is calculated based on the lesser of long-term purchases or sales divided by the average long-term market value during the period.
|
(e)
|
For the period June 30, 2016 (commencement of operations) through December 31, 2016.
|
*
|
Annualized.
|
70
|
Class (Commencement Date)
|
|
Investment Operations
|
|
Less Distributions
|
|
|
Ratios/Supplemental Data
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
Investment
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Net
|
Net
|
|
|
From
|
From
|
|
|
|
Ending
|
Expenses
|
Income (Loss)
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Investment
|
Realized/
|
|
|
Net
|
Accumulated
|
|
|
|
Net
|
to Average
|
to Average
|
Portfolio
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
Year Ended
|
Beginning
|
Income
|
Unrealized
|
|
|
Investment
|
Net Realized
|
|
Ending
|
Total
|
Assets
|
Net
|
Net
|
Turnover
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
December 31:
|
NAV
|
(Loss)(a)
|
Gain (Loss)
|
Total
|
|
Income
|
Gains
|
Total
|
NAV
|
Return(b)
|
(000)
|
Assets(c)
|
Assets(c)
|
Rate(d)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
Class A (3/18)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
$
|
22.22
|
|
$
|
0.30
|
|
$
|
(0.64
|
)
|
$
|
(0.34
|
)
|
|
$
|
(0.45
|
)
|
$
|
(0.18
|
)
|
$
|
(0.63
|
)
|
$
|
21.25
|
|
(1.32
|
)%
|
$
|
37
|
1.30
|
%
|
1.48
|
%
|
159
|
%
|
2019
|
|
19.07
|
|
|
0.36
|
|
|
4.84
|
|
|
5.20
|
|
|
|
(1.33
|
)
|
|
(0.72
|
)
|
|
(2.05
|
)
|
|
22.22
|
|
27.55
|
|
|
35
|
1.30
|
|
1.60
|
|
198
|
|
2018(e)
|
|
20.00
|
|
|
0.32
|
|
|
(0.54
|
)
|
|
(0.22
|
)
|
|
|
(0.53
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.71
|
)
|
|
19.07
|
|
(1.21
|
)
|
|
24
|
1.30
|
*
|
2.02
|
*
|
161
|
|
Class C (3/18)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
22.21
|
|
|
0.14
|
|
|
(0.62
|
)
|
|
(0.48
|
)
|
|
|
(0.30
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.48
|
)
|
|
21.25
|
|
(2.04
|
)
|
|
27
|
2.05
|
|
0.71
|
|
159
|
%
|
2019
|
|
19.06
|
|
|
0.19
|
|
|
4.84
|
|
|
5.03
|
|
|
|
(1.16
|
)
|
|
(0.72
|
)
|
|
(1.88
|
)
|
|
22.21
|
|
26.56
|
|
|
33
|
2.05
|
|
0.86
|
|
198
|
|
2018(e)
|
|
20.00
|
|
|
0.20
|
|
|
(0.55
|
)
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
|
(0.41
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.59
|
)
|
|
19.06
|
|
(1.77
|
)
|
|
24
|
2.05
|
*
|
1.27
|
*
|
161
|
|
Class R6 (3/18)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
22.23
|
|
|
0.37
|
|
|
(0.63
|
)
|
|
(0.26
|
)
|
|
|
(0.52
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.70
|
)
|
|
21.27
|
|
(0.95
|
)
|
|
58,480
|
1.00
|
|
1.87
|
|
159
|
%
|
2019
|
|
19.07
|
|
|
0.43
|
|
|
4.85
|
|
|
5.28
|
|
|
|
(1.40
|
)
|
|
(0.72
|
)
|
|
(2.12
|
)
|
|
22.23
|
|
27.91
|
|
|
27,709
|
0.97
|
|
1.93
|
|
198
|
|
2018(e)
|
|
20.00
|
|
|
0.37
|
|
|
(0.55
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
|
(0.57
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.75
|
)
|
|
19.07
|
|
(0.97
|
)
|
|
23,770
|
1.02
|
*
|
2.30
|
*
|
161
|
|
Class I (3/18)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
22.22
|
|
|
0.34
|
|
|
(0.63
|
)
|
|
(0.29
|
)
|
|
|
(0.50
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.68
|
)
|
|
21.25
|
|
(1.02
|
)
|
|
188
|
1.05
|
|
1.71
|
|
159
|
%
|
2019
|
|
19.07
|
|
|
0.47
|
|
|
4.79
|
|
|
5.26
|
|
|
|
(1.39
|
)
|
|
(0.72
|
)
|
|
(2.11
|
)
|
|
22.22
|
|
27.80
|
|
|
190
|
1.05
|
|
2.06
|
|
198
|
|
2018(e)
|
|
20.00
|
|
|
0.36
|
|
|
(0.54
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
|
(0.57
|
)
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.75
|
)
|
|
19.07
|
|
(1.03
|
)
|
|
26
|
1.05
|
*
|
2.24
|
*
|
161
|
|
(a)
|
Per share Net Investment Income (Loss) is calculated using the average daily shares method.
|
(b)
|
Total return is the combination of changes in NAV without any sales charge, reinvested dividend income at NAV and reinvested capital gains distributions at NAV, if any. Total returns are not annualized.
|
(c)
|
After fee waiver and/or expense reimbursement from Nuveen Fund Advisors, where applicable.
|
(d)
|
Portfolio Turnover Rate is calculated based on the lesser of long-term purchases or sales divided by the average long-term market value during the period.
|
(e)
|
For the period March 20, 2018 (commencement of operations) through December 31, 2018.
|
*
|
Annualized.
|
71
|
Class (Commencement Date)
|
|
Investment Operations
|
|
Less Distributions
|
|
|
Ratios/Supplemental Data
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
Investment
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Net
|
Net
|
|
|
From
|
From
|
|
|
|
|
Ending
|
Expenses
|
Income (Loss)
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Investment
|
Realized/
|
|
|
Net
|
Accumulated
|
Return
|
|
|
|
Net
|
to Average
|
to Average
|
Portfolio
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Year Ended
|
Beginning
|
Income
|
Unrealized
|
|
|
Investment
|
Net Realized
|
of
|
|
Ending
|
Total
|
Assets
|
Net
|
Net
|
Turnover
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
December 31:
|
NAV
|
(Loss)(a)
|
Gain (Loss)
|
Total
|
|
Income
|
Gains
|
Capital
|
Total
|
NAV
|
Return(b)
|
(000)
|
Assets(c)
|
Assets(c)
|
Rate(d)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
Class A (9/11)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
$
|
24.76
|
|
$
|
0.90
|
|
$
|
(1.91
|
)
|
$
|
(1.01
|
)
|
|
$
|
(1.00
|
)
|
$
|
—
|
|
$
|
—
|
|
$
|
(1.00
|
)
|
$
|
22.75
|
|
(3.71
|
)%
|
$
|
173,139
|
1.16
|
%
|
4.17
|
%
|
104
|
%
|
2019
|
|
21.46
|
|
|
0.99
|
|
|
3.73
|
|
|
4.72
|
|
|
|
(1.38
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
(1.42
|
)
|
|
24.76
|
|
22.39
|
|
|
220,665
|
1.14
|
|
4.16
|
|
85
|
|
2018
|
|
24.14
|
|
|
1.12
|
|
|
(2.61
|
)
|
|
(1.49
|
)
|
|
|
(1.07
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.12
|
)
|
|
(1.19
|
)
|
|
21.46
|
|
(6.38
|
)
|
|
178,651
|
1.14
|
|
4.85
|
|
94
|
|
2017
|
|
22.76
|
|
|
1.11
|
|
|
1.59
|
|
|
2.70
|
|
|
|
(1.32
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(1.32
|
)
|
|
24.14
|
|
12.07
|
|
|
225,282
|
1.15
|
|
4.64
|
|
84
|
|
2016
|
|
21.87
|
|
|
1.08
|
|
|
1.00
|
|
|
2.08
|
|
|
|
(1.12
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.07
|
)
|
|
(1.19
|
)
|
|
22.76
|
|
9.60
|
|
|
234,495
|
1.16
|
|
4.74
|
|
89
|
|
Class C (9/11)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
24.77
|
|
|
0.73
|
|
|
(1.90
|
)
|
|
(1.17
|
)
|
|
|
(0.84
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.84
|
)
|
|
22.76
|
|
(4.43
|
)
|
|
156,391
|
1.91
|
|
3.41
|
|
104
|
|
2019
|
|
21.47
|
|
|
0.81
|
|
|
3.74
|
|
|
4.55
|
|
|
|
(1.21
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
(1.25
|
)
|
|
24.77
|
|
21.50
|
|
|
217,976
|
1.89
|
|
3.41
|
|
85
|
|
2018
|
|
24.15
|
|
|
0.95
|
|
|
(2.62
|
)
|
|
(1.67
|
)
|
|
|
(0.89
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.12
|
)
|
|
(1.01
|
)
|
|
21.47
|
|
(7.09
|
)
|
|
186,043
|
1.89
|
|
4.11
|
|
94
|
|
2017
|
|
22.77
|
|
|
0.94
|
|
|
1.59
|
|
|
2.53
|
|
|
|
(1.15
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(1.15
|
)
|
|
24.15
|
|
11.25
|
|
|
241,844
|
1.90
|
|
3.94
|
|
84
|
|
2016
|
|
21.89
|
|
|
0.91
|
|
|
0.99
|
|
|
1.90
|
|
|
|
(0.95
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.07
|
)
|
|
(1.02
|
)
|
|
22.77
|
|
8.74
|
|
|
182,744
|
1.91
|
|
3.99
|
|
89
|
|
Class R6 (6/16)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
24.89
|
|
|
1.00
|
|
|
(1.95
|
)
|
|
(0.95
|
)
|
|
|
(1.07
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(1.07
|
)
|
|
22.87
|
|
(3.40
|
)
|
|
223,948
|
0.81
|
|
4.63
|
|
104
|
|
2019
|
|
21.56
|
|
|
1.10
|
|
|
3.73
|
|
|
4.83
|
|
|
|
(1.46
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
(1.50
|
)
|
|
24.89
|
|
22.82
|
|
|
80,903
|
0.80
|
|
4.59
|
|
85
|
|
2018
|
|
24.24
|
|
|
1.20
|
|
|
(2.63
|
)
|
|
(1.43
|
)
|
|
|
(1.13
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.12
|
)
|
|
(1.25
|
)
|
|
21.56
|
|
(6.08
|
)
|
|
27,654
|
0.81
|
|
5.19
|
|
94
|
|
2017
|
|
22.83
|
|
|
1.22
|
|
|
1.58
|
|
|
2.80
|
|
|
|
(1.39
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(1.39
|
)
|
|
24.24
|
|
12.47
|
|
|
29,332
|
0.81
|
|
5.10
|
|
84
|
|
2016(e)
|
|
23.49
|
|
|
0.48
|
|
|
(0.57
|
)
|
|
(0.09
|
)
|
|
|
(0.50
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.07
|
)
|
|
(0.57
|
)
|
|
22.83
|
|
(0.43
|
)
|
|
7,237
|
0.82
|
*
|
4.11
|
*
|
89
|
|
Class I (9/11)
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
24.76
|
|
|
0.94
|
|
|
(1.90
|
)
|
|
(0.96
|
)
|
|
|
(1.05
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(1.05
|
)
|
|
22.75
|
|
(3.47
|
)
|
|
1,055,383
|
0.91
|
|
4.37
|
|
104
|
|
2019
|
|
21.46
|
|
|
1.05
|
|
|
3.73
|
|
|
4.78
|
|
|
|
(1.44
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.04
|
)
|
|
(1.48
|
)
|
|
24.76
|
|
22.69
|
|
|
1,725,703
|
0.89
|
|
4.42
|
|
85
|
|
2018
|
|
24.14
|
|
|
1.18
|
|
|
(2.61
|
)
|
|
(1.43
|
)
|
|
|
(1.13
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.12
|
)
|
|
(1.25
|
)
|
|
21.46
|
|
(6.13
|
)
|
|
1,312,280
|
0.89
|
|
5.11
|
|
94
|
|
2017
|
|
22.76
|
|
|
1.18
|
|
|
1.58
|
|
|
2.76
|
|
|
|
(1.38
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(1.38
|
)
|
|
24.14
|
|
12.35
|
|
|
1,607,267
|
0.90
|
|
4.96
|
|
84
|
|
2016
|
|
21.88
|
|
|
1.14
|
|
|
0.98
|
|
|
2.12
|
|
|
|
(1.17
|
)
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.07
|
)
|
|
(1.24
|
)
|
|
22.76
|
|
9.82
|
|
|
846,584
|
0.91
|
|
5.00
|
|
89
|
|
(a)
|
Per share Net Investment Income (Loss) is calculated using the average daily shares method.
|
(b)
|
Total return is the combination of changes in NAV without any sales charge, reinvested dividend income at NAV and reinvested capital gains distributions at NAV, if any. Total returns are not annualized.
|
(c)
|
After fee waiver and/or expense reimbursement from Nuveen Fund Advisors, where applicable.
|
(d)
|
Portfolio Turnover Rate is calculated based on the lesser of long-term purchases or sales divided by the average long-term market value during the period.
|
(e)
|
For the period June 30, 2016 (commencement of operations) through December 31, 2016.
|
*
|
Annualized.
|
72
|
Class (Commencement Date)
|
|
Investment Operations
|
|
Less Distributions
|
|
|
Ratios/Supplemental Data
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ratios of
|
Investment
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Net
|
Net
|
|
|
From
|
From
|
|
|
|
Ending
|
Expenses
|
Income (Loss)
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Investment
|
Realized/
|
|
|
Net
|
Accumulated
|
|
|
|
Net
|
to Average
|
to Average
|
Portfolio
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
Year Ended
|
Beginning
|
Income
|
Unrealized
|
|
|
Investment
|
Net Realized
|
|
Ending
|
Total
|
Assets
|
Net
|
Net
|
Turnover
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
December 31:
|
NAV
|
(Loss)(a)
|
Gain (Loss)
|
Total
|
|
Income
|
Gains
|
Total
|
NAV
|
Return(b)
|
(000)
|
Assets
|
Assets
|
Rate(c)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
Class A (9/95)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
$
|
20.22
|
|
$
|
0.21
|
|
$
|
(1.54
|
)
|
$
|
(1.33
|
)
|
|
$
|
(0.14
|
)
|
$
|
(0.35
|
)
|
$
|
(0.49
|
)
|
$
|
18.40
|
|
(6.37
|
)%
|
$
|
176,739
|
1.30
|
%
|
1.20
|
%
|
135
|
%
|
2019
|
|
18.03
|
|
|
0.33
|
|
|
4.16
|
|
|
4.49
|
|
|
|
(0.33
|
)
|
|
(1.97
|
)
|
|
(2.30
|
)
|
|
20.22
|
|
25.24
|
|
|
249,172
|
1.30
|
|
1.56
|
|
109
|
|
2018
|
|
20.23
|
|
|
0.31
|
|
|
(1.43
|
)
|
|
(1.12
|
)
|
|
|
(0.34
|
)
|
|
(0.74
|
)
|
|
(1.08
|
)
|
|
18.03
|
|
(5.78
|
)
|
|
264,414
|
1.26
|
|
1.61
|
|
131
|
|
2017
|
|
21.75
|
|
|
0.32
|
|
|
0.85
|
|
|
1.17
|
|
|
|
(0.37
|
)
|
|
(2.32
|
)
|
|
(2.69
|
)
|
|
20.23
|
|
5.34
|
|
|
459,034
|
1.29
|
|
1.47
|
|
131
|
|
2016
|
|
22.66
|
|
|
0.31
|
|
|
1.14
|
|
|
1.45
|
|
|
|
(0.31
|
)
|
|
(2.05
|
)
|
|
(2.36
|
)
|
|
21.75
|
|
6.58
|
|
|
679,318
|
1.30
|
|
1.32
|
|
139
|
|
Class C (2/00)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
19.55
|
|
|
0.06
|
|
|
(1.46
|
)
|
|
(1.40
|
)
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
17.80
|
|
(7.03
|
)
|
|
14,874
|
2.05
|
|
0.32
|
|
135
|
|
2019
|
|
17.49
|
|
|
0.16
|
|
|
4.03
|
|
|
4.19
|
|
|
|
(0.16
|
)
|
|
(1.97
|
)
|
|
(2.13
|
)
|
|
19.55
|
|
24.28
|
|
|
37,352
|
2.06
|
|
0.79
|
|
109
|
|
2018
|
|
19.63
|
|
|
0.17
|
|
|
(1.39
|
)
|
|
(1.22
|
)
|
|
|
(0.18
|
)
|
|
(0.74
|
)
|
|
(0.92
|
)
|
|
17.49
|
|
(6.46
|
)
|
|
43,152
|
2.02
|
|
0.89
|
|
131
|
|
2017
|
|
21.18
|
|
|
0.15
|
|
|
0.82
|
|
|
0.97
|
|
|
|
(0.20
|
)
|
|
(2.32
|
)
|
|
(2.52
|
)
|
|
19.63
|
|
4.59
|
|
|
66,953
|
2.04
|
|
0.71
|
|
131
|
|
2016
|
|
22.11
|
|
|
0.12
|
|
|
1.12
|
|
|
1.24
|
|
|
|
(0.12
|
)
|
|
(2.05
|
)
|
|
(2.17
|
)
|
|
21.18
|
|
5.76
|
|
|
89,123
|
2.05
|
|
0.55
|
|
139
|
|
Class R3 (9/01)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
20.59
|
|
|
0.17
|
|
|
(1.56
|
)
|
|
(1.39
|
)
|
|
|
(0.10
|
)
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
(0.45
|
)
|
|
18.75
|
|
(6.57
|
)
|
|
12,461
|
1.55
|
|
0.93
|
|
135
|
|
2019
|
|
18.34
|
|
|
0.28
|
|
|
4.23
|
|
|
4.51
|
|
|
|
(0.29
|
)
|
|
(1.97
|
)
|
|
(2.26
|
)
|
|
20.59
|
|
24.88
|
|
|
21,227
|
1.55
|
|
1.32
|
|
109
|
|
2018
|
|
20.56
|
|
|
0.28
|
|
|
(1.46
|
)
|
|
(1.18
|
)
|
|
|
(0.30
|
)
|
|
(0.74
|
)
|
|
(1.04
|
)
|
|
18.34
|
|
(5.98
|
)
|
|
22,073
|
1.52
|
|
1.42
|
|
131
|
|
2017
|
|
22.08
|
|
|
0.27
|
|
|
0.85
|
|
|
1.12
|
|
|
|
(0.32
|
)
|
|
(2.32
|
)
|
|
(2.64
|
)
|
|
20.56
|
|
5.08
|
|
|
36,829
|
1.54
|
|
1.23
|
|
131
|
|
2016
|
|
23.00
|
|
|
0.26
|
|
|
1.16
|
|
|
1.42
|
|
|
|
(0.29
|
)
|
|
(2.05
|
)
|
|
(2.34
|
)
|
|
22.08
|
|
6.31
|
|
|
53,413
|
1.55
|
|
1.11
|
|
139
|
|
Class R6 (4/13)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
20.85
|
|
|
0.30
|
|
|
(1.59
|
)
|
|
(1.29
|
)
|
|
|
(0.23
|
)
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
(0.58
|
)
|
|
18.98
|
|
(5.95
|
)
|
|
437,016
|
0.90
|
|
1.66
|
|
135
|
|
2019
|
|
18.54
|
|
|
0.44
|
|
|
4.27
|
|
|
4.71
|
|
|
|
(0.43
|
)
|
|
(1.97
|
)
|
|
(2.40
|
)
|
|
20.85
|
|
25.74
|
|
|
479,973
|
0.88
|
|
2.03
|
|
109
|
|
2018
|
|
20.75
|
|
|
0.44
|
|
|
(1.51
|
)
|
|
(1.07
|
)
|
|
|
(0.40
|
)
|
|
(0.74
|
)
|
|
(1.14
|
)
|
|
18.54
|
|
(5.39
|
)
|
|
346,185
|
0.88
|
|
2.21
|
|
131
|
|
2017
|
|
22.23
|
|
|
0.46
|
|
|
0.82
|
|
|
1.28
|
|
|
|
(0.44
|
)
|
|
(2.32
|
)
|
|
(2.76
|
)
|
|
20.75
|
|
5.78
|
|
|
277,978
|
0.87
|
|
2.04
|
|
131
|
|
2016
|
|
23.07
|
|
|
0.43
|
|
|
1.16
|
|
|
1.59
|
|
|
|
(0.38
|
)
|
|
(2.05
|
)
|
|
(2.43
|
)
|
|
22.23
|
|
7.05
|
|
|
307,921
|
0.87
|
|
1.83
|
|
139
|
|
Class I (6/95)
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2020
|
|
20.59
|
|
|
0.27
|
|
|
(1.58
|
)
|
|
(1.31
|
)
|
|
|
(0.19
|
)
|
|
(0.35
|
)
|
|
(0.54
|
)
|
|
18.74
|
|
(6.12
|
)
|
|
1,604,544
|
1.05
|
|
1.46
|
|
135
|
|
2019
|
|
18.34
|
|
|
0.39
|
|
|
4.22
|
|
|
4.61
|
|
|
|
(0.39
|
)
|
|
(1.97
|
)
|
|
(2.36
|
)
|
|
20.59
|
|
25.56
|
|
|
2,148,012
|
1.06
|
|
1.80
|
|
109
|
|
2018
|
|
20.55
|
|
|
0.39
|
|
|
(1.47
|
)
|
|
(1.08
|
)
|
|
|
(0.39
|
)
|
|
(0.74
|
)
|
|
(1.13
|
)
|
|
18.34
|
|
(5.51
|
)
|
|
2,302,536
|
1.02
|
|
1.96
|
|
131
|
|
2017
|
|
22.07
|
|
|
0.40
|
|
|
0.84
|
|
|
1.24
|
|
|
|
(0.44
|
)
|
|
(2.32
|
)
|
|
(2.76
|
)
|
|
20.55
|
|
5.61
|
|
|
2,945,935
|
1.04
|
|
1.78
|
|
131
|
|
2016
|
|
22.97
|
|
|
0.38
|
|
|
1.15
|
|
|
1.53
|
|
|
|
(0.38
|
)
|
|
(2.05
|
)
|
|
(2.43
|
)
|
|
22.07
|
|
6.79
|
|
|
3,497,055
|
1.05
|
|
1.61
|
|
139
|
|
(a)
|
Per share Net Investment Income (Loss) is calculated using the average daily shares method.
|
(b)
|
Total return is the combination of changes in NAV without any sales charge, reinvested dividend income at NAV and reinvested capital gains distributions at NAV, if any. Total returns are not annualized.
|
(c)
|
Portfolio Turnover Rate is calculated based on the lesser of long-term purchases or sales divided by the average long-term market value during the period.
|
73
|
MPR-FREGIF-0421D
|
April 30, 2021
|
|
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
|
|||
Ticker Symbols: Class A—NGJAX, Class C—NGJCX, Class R6—NGJFX, Class I—NGJIX
|
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
S-
|
||
A-
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with the Trust |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other
Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
Independent Trustees:
|
||||||
|
||||||
Jack B. Evans
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1948 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 1999 |
Chairman (since 2019), formerly, President (1996-2019), The Hall-Perrine Foundation (private philanthropic corporation); Life Trustee of Coe College and the Iowa College Foundation; formerly, Director, Public Member, American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery (2015-2020); formerly, Director (1998-2003), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; formerly, President and Chief Operating Officer (1972-1995), SCI Financial Group, Inc. (regional financial services firm); formerly, Member and President Pro Tem of the Board of Regents for the State of Iowa University System (2000-2004); formerly, Director (1996-2015), The Gazette Company (media and publishing).
|
143
|
Director and Chairman (since 2009), United Fire Group, a publicly held company; formerly, Director (2000-2004), Alliant Energy.
|
|
|
||||||
William C. Hunter
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1948 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2004 |
Dean Emeritus, formerly, Dean (2006-2012), Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa; past Director (2005-2015) and past President (2010-2014) of Beta Gamma Sigma, Inc., The International Business Honor Society; formerly, Director (1997-2007), Credit Research Center at Georgetown University; formerly, Dean and Distinguished Professor of Finance (2003-2006), School of Business at the University of Connecticut; previously, Senior Vice President and Director of Research (1995-2003) at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
|
143
|
Director (since 2009) of Wellmark, Inc.; formerly, Director (2004-2018) of Xerox Corporation.
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with the Trust |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other
Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Albin F. Moschner
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1952 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Northcroft Partners, LLC (management consulting) (since 2012); previously, held positions at Leap Wireless International, Inc. (consumer wireless services), including Consultant (2011-2012), Chief Operating Officer (2008-2011) and Chief Marketing Officer (2004-2008); formerly, President, Verizon Card Services division of Verizon Communications, Inc. (telecommunication services) (2000-2003); formerly, President, One Point Services at One Point Communications (telecommunication services) (1999-2000); formerly, Vice Chairman of the Board, Diba, Incorporated (internet technology provider) (1996-1997); formerly, various executive positions (1991-1996) and Chief Executive Officer (1995-1996) of Zenith Electronics Corporation (consumer electronics).
|
143
|
Formerly, Chairman (2019) and Director (2012-2019), USA Technologies, Inc., a provider of solutions and services to facilitate electronic payment transactions; formerly, Director, Wintrust Financial Corporation (1996-2016).
|
|
|||||
John K. Nelson
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1962 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2013 |
Member of Board of Directors of Core12 LLC (private firm which develops branding, marketing and communications strategies for clients) (since 2008); served The President's Council of Fordham University (2010-2019) and previously a Director of the Curran Center for Catholic American Studies (2009-2018); formerly, senior external advisor to the Financial Services practice of Deloitte Consulting LLP (2012-2014); former Chair of the Board of Trustees of Marian University (2010-2014 as trustee, 2011-2014 as Chair); formerly Chief Executive Officer of ABN AMRO Bank N.V., North America, and Global Head of the Financial Markets Division (2007-2008), with various executive leadership roles in ABN AMRO Bank N.V. between 1996 and 2007.
|
143
|
None
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with the Trust |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other
Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Judith M. Stockdale
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1947 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2003 |
Board Member of the Land Trust Alliance (national public charity addressing natural land and water conservation in the U.S.) (since 2013); formerly, Board Member of the U.S. Endowment for Forestry and Communities (national endowment addressing forest health, sustainable forest production and markets, and economic health of forest-reliant communities in the U.S.) (2013-12/2019); formerly, Executive Director (1994-2012), Gaylord and Dorothy Donnelley Foundation (private foundation endowed to support both natural land conservation and artistic vitality); prior thereto, Executive Director, Great Lakes Protection Fund (endowment created jointly by seven of the eight Great Lake states’ Governors to take a regional approach to improving the health of the Great Lakes) (1990-1994).
|
143
|
None
|
|
|||||
Carole E. Stone
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1947 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2007 |
Former Director, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (2006-2017) and C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated (2009-2017); formerly, Commissioner, New York State Commission on Public Authority Reform (2005-2010).
|
143
|
Formerly, Director (2010-2020), Cboe Global Markets, Inc. (formerly named CBOE Holdings, Inc.).
|
|
|||||
Matthew Thornton III
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1958 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2020 |
Formerly, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (2018-2019), FedEx Freight Corporation, a subsidiary of FedEx Corporation (“
FedEx
®
|
143
|
Member of the Board of Directors (since 2014), The Sherwin-Williams Company (develops, manufactures, distributes and sells paints, coatings and related products); Member of the Board of Directors (since 2020), Crown Castle International (provider of communications infrastructure).
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with the Trust |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other
Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Terence J. Toth
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1959 |
Chair of
the Board and Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2008 |
Formerly, Co-Founding Partner, Promus Capital (investment advisory firm) (2008-2017); Director, Quality Control Corporation (manufacturing) (since 2012); formerly, Director, Fulcrum IT Service LLC (information technology services firm to government entities) (2010-2019); formerly, Director, LogicMark LLC (health services) (2012-2016); formerly, Director, Legal & General Investment Management America, Inc. (asset management) (2008-2013); formerly, CEO and President, Northern Trust Global Investments (financial services) (2004-2007); Executive Vice President, Quantitative Management & Securities Lending (2000-2004); prior thereto, various positions with Northern Trust Company (financial services) (since 1994); Member, Catalyst Schools of Chicago Board (since 2008) and Mather Foundation Board (philanthropy) (since 2012) and is Chair of its Investment Committee; formerly, Member, Chicago Fellowship Board (philanthropy) (2005-2016); formerly, Member, Northern Trust Mutual Funds Board (2005-2007), Northern Trust Global Investments Board (2004-2007), Northern Trust Japan Board (2004-2007), Northern Trust Securities Inc. Board (2003-2007) and Northern Trust Hong Kong Board (1997-2004).
|
143
|
None
|
|
|||||
Margaret L. Wolff
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1955 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Formerly, Of Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Mergers & Acquisitions Group) (legal services) (2005-2014); Member of the Board of Trustees of New York-Presbyterian Hospital (since 2005); Member (since 2004) and Chair (since 2015) of the Board of Trustees of The John A. Hartford Foundation (philanthropy dedicated to improving the care of older adults); formerly, Member (2005-2015) and Vice Chair (2011-2015) of the Board of Trustees of Mt. Holyoke College.
|
143
|
Formerly, Member of the Board of Directors (2013-2017) of Travelers Insurance Company of Canada and The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (each, a part of Travelers Canada, the Canadian operation of The Travelers Companies, Inc.).
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with the Trust |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other
Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Robert L. Young
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1963 |
Trustee
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Formerly, Chief Operating Officer and Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. (financial services) (2010-2016); formerly, President and Principal Executive Officer (2013-2016), and Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (2005-2010), of J.P. Morgan Funds; formerly, Director and various officer positions for J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. (formerly, JPMorgan Funds Management, Inc. and formerly, One Group Administrative Services) and JPMorgan Distribution Services, Inc. (financial services) (formerly, One Group Dealer Services, Inc.) (1999-2017).
|
143
|
None
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time
Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past Five Years
|
Officers of the Trust:
|
|||
Mark J. Czarniecki
901 Marquette Avenue Minneapolis, MN 55402 1979 |
Vice President and Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2013 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2016) and Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2017); Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2018); Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen, LLC (since 2013).
|
Diana R. Gonzalez
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1978 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2017); Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen, LLC (since 2017); Associate General Counsel of Jackson National Asset Management (2012-2017).
|
Nathaniel T. Jones
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1979 |
Vice President and Treasurer
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Managing Director (since 2017), formerly, Senior Vice President (2016-2017), formerly, Vice President (2011-2016) of Nuveen, LLC; Managing Director (since 2015) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Chartered Financial Analyst.
|
Tina M. Lazar
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1961 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2002 |
Managing Director (since 2017), formerly, Senior Vice President (2014-2017) of Nuveen Securities, LLC.
|
Brian J. Lockhart
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1974 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Managing Director (since 2017), formerly, Vice President (2010-2017) of Nuveen, LLC; Head of Investment Oversight (since 2017), formerly, Team Leader of Manager Oversight (2015-2017); Chartered Financial Analyst and Certified Financial Risk Manager.
|
Jacques M. Longerstaey
8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1963 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Senior Managing Director, Chief Risk Officer, Nuveen, LLC (since 2019); Senior Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; formerly, Chief Investment and Model Risk Officer, Wealth & Investment Management Division, Wells Fargo Bank (NA) (2013–2019).
|
Kevin J. McCarthy
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1966 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2007 |
Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Secretary and General Counsel (since 2016) of Nuveen Investments, Inc., formerly, Executive Vice President (2016-2017), Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (2008-2016); Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Assistant Secretary (since 2008) of Nuveen Securities, LLC, formerly, Executive Vice President (2016-2017) and Managing Director (2008-2016); Senior Managing Director (since 2017), Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC, formerly, Co-General Counsel (2011-2020), Executive Vice President (2016-2017), Managing Director (2008-2016) and Assistant Secretary (2007-2016); Senior Managing Director (since 2017), Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC, formerly, Associate General Counsel (2011-2020), Executive Vice President (2016-2017) and Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (2011-2016); Vice President (since 2007) and Secretary (since 2016), formerly, Assistant Secretary, of NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC, Santa Barbara Asset Management, LLC, and Winslow Capital Management, LLC (since 2010); Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Alternative Investments, LLC.
|
Jon Scott Meissner
8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1973 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Managing Director of Mutual Fund Tax and Financial Reporting groups at Nuveen, LLC (since 2017); Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Senior Director of Teachers Advisors, LLC and TIAA-CREF Investment Management, LLC (since 2016); Senior Director (since 2015) Mutual Fund Taxation to the TIAA-CREF Funds, the TIAA-CREF Life Funds, the TIAA Separate Account VA-1 and the CREF Accounts; has held various positions with TIAA since 2004.
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time
Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past Five Years
|
Deann D. Morgan
730 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 1969 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2020 |
President of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2020); Executive Vice President, Global Head of Product at Nuveen, LLC (since November 2019); Co-Chief Executive Officer of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2020); Managing Member of MDR Collaboratory LLC (since 2018); Managing Director, Head of Wealth Management Product Structuring & COO Multi Asset Investing, The Blackstone Group (2013-2017).
|
Christopher M. Rohrbacher
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1971 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2008 |
Managing Director (since 2017), General Counsel (since 2020) and Assistant Secretary (since 2016), formerly, Senior Vice President (2016-2017), of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (since 2017) of Nuveen Securities, LLC; Managing Director, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2020); Managing Director (since 2017), and Associate General Counsel (since 2016), formerly, Senior Vice President (2012-2017) and Assistant General Counsel (2008-2016) of Nuveen, LLC.
|
William A. Siffermann
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1975 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Managing Director (since 2017), formerly Senior Vice President (2016-2017) and Vice President (2011-2016) of Nuveen, LLC.
|
Christopher E. Stickrod
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1976 |
Chief Administrative Officer
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2020 |
Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Head of Advisory Product (since 2020), formerly, Managing Director (2016-2017) and Senior Vice President (2013-2016) of Nuveen, LLC; Senior Managing Director of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2018) and of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2019).
|
E. Scott Wickerham
8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1973 |
Vice President and Controller
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Senior Managing Director, Head of Fund Administration at Nuveen, LLC (since 2019), formerly, Managing Director; Senior Managing Director (since 2019), of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Principal Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer and Treasurer (since 2017) of the TIAA-CREF Funds, the TIAA-CREF Life Funds, the TIAA Separate Account VA-1 and Principal Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer (since 2020) and Treasurer (since 2017) to the CREF Accounts; formerly, Senior Director, TIAA-CREF Fund Administration (2014-2015); has held various positions with TIAA since 2006.
|
Mark L. Winget
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1968 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2008 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2008); Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2019); Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2020); Vice President (since 2010) and Associate General Counsel (since 2019), formerly, Assistant General Counsel (2008-2016) of Nuveen, LLC.
|
Gifford R. Zimmerman
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1956 |
Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 1997 |
Formerly, Managing Director (2004-2020) and Assistant Secretary (1994-2020) of Nuveen Investments, Inc.; formerly, Managing Director (2002-2020) and Assistant Secretary (2002-2020) of Nuveen Securities, LLC; formerly, Managing Director (2002-2020), Assistant Secretary (1997-2020) and Co-General Counsel (2011-2020) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; formerly, Managing Director, Assistant Secretary and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (2011-2020); formerly, Vice President and Assistant Secretary of NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC (2002-2020), Santa Barbara Asset Management, LLC (2006-2020) and Winslow Capital Management, LLC (2010-2020); Chartered Financial Analyst.
|
Name of Trustee
|
Aggregate
Compensation From Fund |
Amount of Total
Compensation that Has Been Deferred |
Total Compensation
From Nuveen Fund Paid to Trustee |
|||||||||||||
Jack B. Evans
|
$
|
94
|
$
|
—
|
$
|
392,652
|
||||||||||
William C. Hunter
|
93
|
—
|
396,750
|
|||||||||||||
Albin F. Moschner
|
90
|
—
|
380,050
|
|||||||||||||
John K. Nelson
|
101
|
—
|
417,500
|
|||||||||||||
Judith M. Stockdale
|
93
|
—
|
400,147
|
|||||||||||||
Carole E. Stone
|
94
|
—
|
404,611
|
|||||||||||||
Matthew Thornton III
1
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
|||||||||||||
Terence J. Toth
|
114
|
—
|
467,300
|
|||||||||||||
Margaret L. Wolff
|
87
|
—
|
385,629
|
|||||||||||||
Robert L. Young
|
91
|
—
|
425,754
|
Name of Trustee
|
Dollar Range of
Equity Securities In the Fund |
Aggregate Dollar Range
of Equity Securities in All Registered Investment Companies Overseen by Trustee in Family of Investment Companies |
||||
Jack B. Evans
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
|||
William C. Hunter
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
|||
Albin F. Moschner
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
|||
John K. Nelson
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
|||
Judith M. Stockdale
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
|||
Carole E. Stone
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
|||
Matthew Thornton III
1
|
$
|
0
|
$0
|
|||
Terence J. Toth
|
Over $100,000
|
Over $100,000
|
||||
Margaret L. Wolff
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
|||
Robert L. Young
|
$
|
0
|
Over $100,000
|
Complex-Level Asset
|
Effective Rate at
|
||
Breakpoint Level*
|
Breakpoint Level
|
||
$55 billion
|
0.2000%
|
||
$56 billion
|
0.1996%
|
||
$57 billion
|
0.1989%
|
||
$60 billion
|
0.1961%
|
||
$63 billion
|
0.1931%
|
||
$66 billion
|
0.1900%
|
||
$71 billion
|
0.1851%
|
||
$76 billion
|
0.1806%
|
||
$80 billion
|
0.1773%
|
||
$91 billion
|
0.1691%
|
||
$125 billion
|
0.1599%
|
||
$200 billion
|
0.1505%
|
||
$250 billion
|
0.1469%
|
||
$300 billion
|
0.1445%
|
Management Fees Paid to the
Adviser Net of Fee Waivers and Expense Reimbursements |
Fee Waivers and Expense
Reimbursements from the Adviser |
|||||||||||||||||||||
3/20/18-
12/31/18 |
1/1/19-
12/31/19 |
1/1/20-
12/31/20 |
3/20/18-
12/31/18 |
1/1/19-
12/31/19 |
1/1/20-
12/31/20 |
|||||||||||||||||
$ —*
|
$ —*
|
$ —*
|
$272,917
|
$535,200
|
$470,653
|
Portfolio Manager
|
Type of Account Managed
|
Number of Accounts
|
Assets
|
Number of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees
|
Assets of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees
|
|||||||
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
4
|
$
|
5.1 billion
|
0
|
$
|
0
|
|||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
7
|
393.7 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
9
|
2.1 billion
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Scott C. Sedlak
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
1
|
2.3 billion
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
2
|
41.2 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
4
|
586.4 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Benjamin T. Kerl
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
2
|
41.2 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Jagdeep S. Ghuman
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
1
|
620.8 million
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
6
|
363.7 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
3
|
513.0 million
|
0
|
0
|
A
|
- $0
|
|||
B
|
- $1 - $10,000
|
|||
C
|
- $10,001 - $50,000
|
|||
D
|
- $50,001 - $100,000
|
|||
E
|
- $100,001 - $500,000
|
|||
F
|
- $500,001 - $1,000,000
|
|||
G
|
- More than $1 million
|
Portfolio Manager
|
Dollar Range of Equity Securities Beneficially Owned in Fund Managed
|
|
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
A
|
|
Scott C. Sedlak
|
A
|
|
Benjamin T. Kerl
|
C
|
|
Jagdeep S. Ghuman
|
A
|
Gross income from securities lending activities
|
$
|
294
|
||
Fees and/or compensation paid by the Fund for securities lending activities and related services:
|
||||
Fees paid to Securities Lending Agent from a revenue split
|
(23
|
)
|
||
Fees paid for any cash collateral management service (including fees deducted from a pooled cash collateral reinvestment vehicle) that are not included in the revenue split
|
(10
|
)
|
||
Administrative fees not included in the revenue split
|
—
|
|||
Indemnification fees not included in the revenue split
|
—
|
|||
Rebate (paid to borrower)
|
(2
|
)
|
||
Other fees not included in the revenue split
|
—
|
|||
Aggregate fees/compensation for securities lending activities
|
(35
|
)
|
||
Net income from securities lending activities
|
$
|
259
|
Aggregate Amount of
Brokerage Commissions |
||||||||
3/20/18-
12/31/18 |
1/1/19-
12/31/19 |
1/1/20-
12/31/20 |
||||||
$
|
108,126
|
$
|
82,714
|
$
|
108,195
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
Class A Shares |
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association Attn Janice Carnicelli Mailstop 730/01/01 730 Third Ave New York NY 10017-3207 |
69.89% |
||||
|
||||||
TD Ameritrade Inc FBO
Our Customers PO Box 2226 Omaha NE 68103-2226 |
19.13%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Bock
51 Nevada Ave Staten Island NY 10306-1307 |
8.39%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
Class C Shares |
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association Attn Janice Carnicelli Mailstop 730/01/01 730 Third Ave New York NY 10017-3207 |
100.00% |
||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
Class R6 Shares |
Northern Tr Co Cust FBO Children’s Medical Center Fnd Tr PO Box 92956 Chicago IL 60675-2956 |
53.99% |
||||
|
||||||
Teachers Insurance & Annuity
Association Attn Janice Carnicelli Mailstop 730/01/01 730 Third Ave New York NY 10017-3207 |
45.20%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
Class I Shares |
RBC Capital Markets LLC Mutual Fund Omnibus Processing Omnibus Attn Mutual Fund Ops Manager 60 South Sixth Street-P08 Minneapolis MN 55402-4413 |
83.42% |
||||
|
||||||
Pershing LLC
1 Pershing Plz Jersey City NJ 07399-0001 |
6.93%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Terence J Toth Ttee
Terence J Toth Trust U/A 01-20-1999 411 N Lincoln St Hinsdale IL 60521-3444 |
5.47%
|
Short-Term
|
Long-Term
|
Total
|
||||||||||
$
|
—
|
$
|
78,398
|
$
|
78,398
|
Net asset value per share
|
$
|
21.25
|
|
Per share sales charge—5.75% of public offering price (6.12% of net asset value per share)
|
1.30
|
||
Per share offering price to the public
|
$
|
22.55
|
Annual Distribution Fee
|
Annual Service Fee
|
Total 12b-1 Fee
|
|||||||
Class A
|
—
|
0.25
|
%
|
0.25
|
%
|
||||
Class C
|
0.75
|
%
|
0.25
|
%
|
1.00
|
%
|
12b-1 Fees
Incurred by the Fund for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020 |
|||
Class A
|
$ 80
|
||
Class C
|
320
|
Total Underwriting Commissions
|
|||||||||||||||||
3/20/18-
12/31/18 |
1/1/19-
12/31/19 |
1/1/20-
12/31/20 |
|||||||||||||||
$
|
—
|
$
|
—
|
$
|
—
|
Underwriting Commissions Retained by Distributor
|
|||||||||||||||||
3/20/18-
12/31/18 |
1/1/19-
12/31/19 |
1/1/20-
12/31/20 |
|||||||||||||||
$
|
—
|
$
|
—
|
$
|
—
|
Compensation on Redemptions and Repurchases
|
|||||||||||||||||
3/20/18-
12/31/18 |
1/1/19-
12/31/19 |
1/1/20-
12/31/20 |
|||||||||||||||
$
|
—
|
$
|
—
|
$
|
—
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7
|
|
|||
1.
|
|
|
|
8
|
|
|
|
|
|
8
|
|
||
|
|
|
8
|
|
||
|
|
|
9
|
|
||
|
|
|
11
|
|
||
|
|
|
12
|
|
||
|
|
|
13
|
|
||
|
|
|
16
|
|
||
|
|
|
16
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
21
|
|
||
2.
|
|
|
|
22
|
|
|
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
3.
|
|
|
|
24
|
|
|
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
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25
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26
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|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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2 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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26
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26
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27
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27
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27
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27
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28
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28
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28
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29
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29
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29
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30
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30
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30
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30
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4.
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31
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31
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31
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31
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32
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32
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32
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32
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32
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33
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33
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33
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33
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34
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34
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34
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34
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34
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34
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35
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35
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35
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35
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36
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36
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36
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37
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38
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38
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39
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39
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39
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5.
|
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41
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41
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I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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3 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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41
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42
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42
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43
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44
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44
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44
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45
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46
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46
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46
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46
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47
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47
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||
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|
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48
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||
|
|
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48
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|
||
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|
48
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|
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|
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48
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48
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48
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|
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48
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48
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49
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49
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49
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|
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50
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50
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50
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51
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51
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51
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51
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51
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52
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52
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52
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52
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53
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53
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53
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54
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54
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54
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54
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55
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55
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||
6.
|
|
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56
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56
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56
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||
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56
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||
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56
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|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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4 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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56
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||
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56
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|
||
7.
|
|
|
|
57
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|
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57
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||
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57
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||
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57
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|
||
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57
|
|
||
|
|
|
58
|
|
||
|
|
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58
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|
||
|
|
|
58
|
|
||
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|
|
58
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58
|
|
||
|
|
|
59
|
|
||
|
|
|
59
|
|
||
|
|
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59
|
|
||
|
|
|
60
|
|
||
|
|
|
60
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
67
|
|
||
|
|
|
67
|
|
||
8.
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
5 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
69
|
|
|
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
6 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
U.S. Domestic Issuers – which have a majority of outstanding shares held in the U.S. and meet other criteria, as determined by the SEC, and are subject to the same disclosure and listing standards as U.S. incorporated companies – are generally covered under standard U.S. policy guidelines.
|
|
◾
|
|
Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) – which do not meet the Domestic Issuer criteria and are exempt from most disclosure requirements (e.g., they do not file DEF14A reports) and listing standards (e.g., for required levels of board and committee independence) – are covered under a combination of policy guidelines:
|
|
◾
|
|
FPI Guidelines (see the
Americas Regional Proxy Voting Guidelines
), which apply certain minimum independence and disclosure standards in the evaluation of key proxy ballot items, such as the election of directors and approval of financial reports; and
|
|
◾
|
|
For other issues, guidelines for the market that is responsible for, or most relevant to, the item on the ballot.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
7 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees
1
considered on case-by-case basis):
|
|
◾
|
|
Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
The
non-independent
director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
8 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.
|
Executive Director
|
|
1.1.
|
Current officer
1
2
|
|
2.
|
Non-Independent
Non-Executive
Director
|
|
Board Identification
|
|
|
2.1.
|
Director identified as not independent by the board.
|
|
Controlling/Significant Shareholder
|
|
|
2.2.
|
Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).
|
|
Current Employment at Company or Related Company
|
|
|
2.3.
|
Non-officer
employee of the firm (including employee representatives).
|
|
2.4.
|
Officer
1
|
|
Former Employment
|
|
|
2.5.
|
Former CEO of the company.
3, 4
|
|
2.6.
|
Former
non-CEO
officer
1
2
|
|
2.7.
|
Former officer
1
4
|
|
2.8.
|
Officer
1
|
|
2.9.
|
Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made.
5
|
|
Family Members
|
|
|
2.10.
|
Immediate family member
6
1
2
|
|
2.11.
|
Immediate family member
6
2
non-Section
16 officer in a key strategic role).
|
|
Professional, Transactional,
|
and Charitable Relationships
|
|
2.12.
|
Director who (or whose immediate family member
6
7
2
6
|
|
2.13.
|
Director who (or whose immediate family member
6
8
2
6
8
|
|
2.14.
|
Director who (or whose immediate family member
6
)
non-profit
organization that receives material grants or endowments
8
2
|
|
Other Relationships
|
|
|
2.15.
|
Party to a voting agreement
9
|
|
2.16.
|
Has (or an immediate family member
6
10
|
|
2.17.
|
Founder
11
|
|
2.18.
|
Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.
|
|
2.19.
|
Any material
12
|
|
3.
|
Independent Director
|
|
3.1.
|
No material
12
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
9 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
10 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Medical issues/illness;
|
|
◾
|
|
Family emergencies; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).
|
|
◾
|
|
Sit on more than five public company boards; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards
4
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
11 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;
|
|
◾
|
|
Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The subject matter of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;
|
|
◾
|
|
The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and
|
|
◾
|
|
Other factors as appropriate.
|
|
◾
|
|
The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;
|
|
◾
|
|
At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s previous
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s response, including:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
12 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.
|
|
◾
|
|
The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has a poison pill that was not approved by shareholders
6
. However, vote
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The pill, whether short-term
7
|
|
◾
|
|
A classified board structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
A supermajority vote requirement;
|
|
◾
|
|
Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority vote standard in contested elections;
|
|
◾
|
|
The inability of shareholders to call special meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
The inability of shareholders to act by written consent;
|
|
◾
|
|
A multi-class capital structure; and/or
|
|
◾
|
|
A
non-shareholder-approved
poison pill.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
13 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing governance provisions;
|
|
◾
|
|
The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.
|
|
◾
|
|
Classified the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws.
|
|
◾
|
|
Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;
|
|
◾
|
|
A classified board structure; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Other egregious provisions.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
14 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;
|
|
◾
|
|
The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule
14a-8.
Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.
|
|
◾
|
|
The
non-audit
fees paid to the auditor are
excessive
;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or
|
|
◾
|
|
There is persuasive evidence that the Audit Committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.
|
|
◾
|
|
Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.
|
|
◾
|
|
There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (
pay for performance
);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company maintains significant
problematic pay practices
; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The board exhibits a significant level of
poor communication and responsiveness
to shareholders.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
15 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;
|
|
◾
|
|
The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other relevant factors.
|
|
◾
|
|
Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight
9
, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
“vote-no”
campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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16 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s track record;
|
|
◾
|
|
Background to the contested election;
|
|
◾
|
|
Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;
|
|
◾
|
|
Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and
|
|
◾
|
|
Stock ownership positions.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;
|
|
◾
|
|
The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to
non-independent
directors; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner.
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of the shareholder proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
17 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The reasonableness/scope of the request; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has proxy access
10
, thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a
carve-out
for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Eliminate entirely directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care.
|
|
◾
|
|
Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.
|
|
◾
|
|
Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (
i.e.
|
|
◾
|
|
If the director was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that s/he reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
18 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
If only the director’s legal expenses would be covered.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and rationale of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current board leadership structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s governance structure and practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company performance; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other relevant factors that may be applicable.
|
|
◾
|
|
A majority
non-independent
board and/or the presence of
non-independent
directors on key board committees;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
19 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
A weak or poorly-defined lead independent director role that fails to serve as an appropriate counterbalance to a combined CEO/chair role;
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of an executive or
non-independent
chair in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chair, and/or departure from a structure with an independent chair;
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence that the board has failed to oversee and address material risks facing the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
A material governance failure, particularly if the board has failed to adequately respond to shareholder concerns or if the board has materially diminished shareholder rights; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence that the board has failed to intervene when management’s interests are contrary to shareholders’ interests.
|
|
General Recommendation:
ISS’ Classification of Directors
.)
|
|
General Recommendation:
carve-out
for a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Ownership threshold:
|
|
◾
|
|
Ownership duration:
|
|
◾
|
|
Aggregation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Cap:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
20 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to I
SS’ definition
. This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
21 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the auditor agreement—the degree to which these agreements impact shareholders’ rights;
|
|
◾
|
|
The motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements;
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of the company’s disclosure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s historical practices in the audit area.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;
|
|
◾
|
|
There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;
|
|
◾
|
|
Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as fraud or misapplication of GAAP; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Fees for
non-audit
services (“Other” fees) are excessive.
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-audit
(“other”) fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-audit
services.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The tenure of the audit firm;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
22 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The length of rotation specified in the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any significant audit-related issues at the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of Audit Committee meetings held each year;
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of financial experts serving on the committee; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
23 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Any impediments to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws (i.e. supermajority voting requirements);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure and historical voting turnout;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the board could amend bylaws adopted by shareholders; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether shareholders would retain the ability to ratify any board-initiated amendments.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
cash-out
statutes.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
24 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
freeze-out
provisions.
Freeze-out
provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
25 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;
|
|
◾
|
|
The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.
|
|
General Recommendation:
fee-shifting
whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new
5-percent
holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing
5-percent
holder);
|
|
◾
|
|
The value of the NOLs;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
26 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors that may be applicable.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
No lower than a 20 percent trigger,
flip-in
or flip-over;
|
|
◾
|
|
A term of no more than three years;
|
|
◾
|
|
No deadhand, slowhand,
no-hand,
or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent);
|
|
◾
|
|
The value of the NOLs;
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
27 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors that may be applicable.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-votes
in the company’s vote-counting methodology.
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies) and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual meeting;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process and maintains the integrity of vote results;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder proposals are consistent and clear;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting mechanics;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors that may be relevant.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;
|
|
◾
|
|
The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
28 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;
|
|
◾
|
|
One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case,
|
|
◾
|
|
Reasons for reincorporation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders’ current right to act by written consent;
|
|
◾
|
|
The consent threshold;
|
|
◾
|
|
The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
|
|
◾
|
|
Investor ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.
|
|
◾
|
|
An unfettered
11
right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;
|
|
◾
|
|
A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;
|
|
◾
|
|
No
non-shareholder-approved
pill; and
|
|
◾
|
|
An annually elected board.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10 percent preferred);
|
|
◾
|
|
The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
29 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Investor ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-shareholder
constituencies or other
non-financial
effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have significant ownership levels, vote
case-by-case,
|
|
◾
|
|
Ownership structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Quorum requirements; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Vote requirements.
|
|
General Recommendation:
in-person
meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only
12
in-person
meeting.
|
|
◾
|
|
Scope and rationale of the proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
30 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Past Board Performance:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s use of authorized shares during the last three years;
|
|
◾
|
|
The Current Request:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes of the proposed increase;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The dilutive impact of the request as determined relative to an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company’s need for shares and total shareholder returns.
|
|
A.
|
Most companies:
100
percent
|
|
B.
|
Companies with less than 50 percent of existing authorized shares either outstanding or reserved for issuance:
50
percent
|
|
C.
|
Companies with
one-
and three-year total shareholder returns (TSRs) in the bottom 10 percent of the U.S. market as of the end of the calendar quarter that is closest to their most recent fiscal year end:
50
percent
|
|
D.
|
Companies at which both conditions (B and C) above are both present:
25
percent
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
31 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, such as:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The new class of shares will be transitory;
|
|
◾
|
|
The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-shareholder-approved
shareholder rights plan (poison pill).
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The size of the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
The shareholder base; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The liquidity of the stock.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Past Board Performance:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s use of authorized preferred shares during the last three years;
|
|
◾
|
|
The Current Request:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes for the proposed increase;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request;
|
|
◾
|
|
In cases where the company has existing authorized preferred stock, the dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company’s need for shares and total shareholder returns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
32 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
More simplified capital structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Enhanced liquidity;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness of conversion terms;
|
|
◾
|
|
Impact on voting power and dividends;
|
|
◾
|
|
Reasons for the reclassification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives considered.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy.
|
|
◾
|
|
Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s rationale; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Other factors as applicable.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Greenmail,
|
|
◾
|
|
The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,
|
|
◾
|
|
Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or
|
|
◾
|
|
Other company-specific factors as warranted.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
33 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Adverse governance changes;
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive increases in authorized capital stock;
|
|
◾
|
|
Unfair method of distribution;
|
|
◾
|
|
Diminution of voting rights;
|
|
◾
|
|
Adverse conversion features;
|
|
◾
|
|
Negative impact on stock option plans; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Alternatives such as
spin-off.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Purchase price;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial and strategic benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
How the deal was negotiated;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives for the business;
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-completion
risk.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Impact on the balance sheet/working capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential elimination of diseconomies;
|
|
◾
|
|
Anticipated financial and operating benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Anticipated use of funds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Value received for the asset;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
How the deal was negotiated;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
34 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Dilution to existing shareholders’ positions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial issues - company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Control issues - change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over certain corporate actions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflict of interest - arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The reasons for the change;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any financial or tax benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulatory benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Increases in capital structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.
|
|
◾
|
|
Increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see discussion under “Capital”); or
|
|
◾
|
|
Adverse changes in shareholder rights.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Offer price/premium;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
How the deal was negotiated;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
35 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives/offers considered; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-completion
risk.
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);
|
|
◾
|
|
Balanced interests of continuing vs.
cashed-out
shareholders, taking into account the following:
|
|
◾
|
|
Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?
|
|
◾
|
|
Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?
|
|
◾
|
|
Does the company have strong corporate governance?
|
|
◾
|
|
Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?
|
|
◾
|
|
Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Percentage of assets/business contributed;
|
|
◾
|
|
Percentage ownership;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial and strategic benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-completion
risk.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Appraisal value of assets; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Valuation
|
|
◾
|
|
Market reaction
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategic rationale
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
36 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Negotiations and process
arm’s-length?
Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest
non-insider
shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the “ISS Transaction Summary” section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt. In these instances from a value standpoint, the negative impact of dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that must occur to trigger the dilutive event.
|
|
◾
|
|
Terms of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit strategy):
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of private placement.
|
|
◾
|
|
When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as, liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital scarcity, information asymmetry, and anticipation of future performance.
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial issues:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s financial condition;
|
|
◾
|
|
Degree of need for capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Use of proceeds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and proposed cash burn rate;
|
|
◾
|
|
Going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger, or sale of part or all of the company.
|
|
◾
|
|
Control issues:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
37 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Change in management;
|
|
◾
|
|
Change in control;
|
|
◾
|
|
Guaranteed board and committee seats;
|
|
◾
|
|
Standstill provisions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Voting agreements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Veto power over certain corporate actions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium.
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest:
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.
|
|
◾
|
|
Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?
|
|
◾
|
|
Market reaction:
|
|
◾
|
|
The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the
one-day
impact on the unaffected stock price.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee);
|
|
◾
|
|
The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);
|
|
◾
|
|
Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance of the reorganized company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Valuation
pre-merger
value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity.
|
|
◾
|
|
Market reaction
one-day
impact on the unaffected stock price.
|
|
◾
|
|
Deal timing
|
|
◾
|
|
Negotiations and process
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
38 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 perecnt of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the
18-24
month timeframe.
|
|
◾
|
|
Voting agreements
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-redeeming
shareholders, and any prior extension requests.
|
|
◾
|
|
Length of request
|
|
◾
|
|
Pending transaction(s)
progression of the acquisition process:
|
|
◾
|
|
Added incentive for
non-redeeming
shareholders
|
|
◾
|
|
Prior extension requests
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Tax and regulatory advantages;
|
|
◾
|
|
Planned use of the sale proceeds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Valuation of spinoff;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
Benefits to the parent company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Managerial incentives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Corporate governance changes;
|
|
◾
|
|
Changes in the capital structure.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Selling the company; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders.
|
|
◾
|
|
Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;
|
|
◾
|
|
Signs of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover defenses);
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
39 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategic plan in place for improving value;
|
|
◾
|
|
Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
40 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.
|
Maintain appropriate
pay-for-performance
|
|
2.
|
Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;
|
|
3.
|
Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (
e.g.
|
|
4.
|
Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;
|
|
5.
|
Avoid inappropriate pay to
non-executive
directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors is reasonable and does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board exhibits a significant level of
poor communication and responsiveness
to shareholders.
|
|
◾
|
|
There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP would otherwise be warranted due to
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The situation is egregious.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
41 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.
|
Peer Group
14
Alignment:
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
|
|
◾
|
|
The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
|
|
◾
|
|
The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.
|
|
2.
|
Absolute Alignment
15
– the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.
|
|
◾
|
|
The ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;
|
|
◾
|
|
The overall ratio of performance-based compensation to fixed or discretionary pay;
|
|
◾
|
|
The rigor of performance goals;
|
|
◾
|
|
The complexity and risks around pay program design;
|
|
◾
|
|
The transparency and clarity of disclosure;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial/operational results, both absolute and relative to peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g.,
bi-annual
awards);
|
|
◾
|
|
Realizable pay
16
compared to grant pay; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors deemed relevant.
|
|
◾
|
|
Problematic practices related to
non-performance-based
compensation elements;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
42 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Pay decisions that circumvent
pay-for-performance,
|
|
◾
|
|
Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);
|
|
◾
|
|
Extraordinary perquisites or tax
gross-ups;
|
|
◾
|
|
New or materially amended agreements that provide for:
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);
|
|
◾
|
|
CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;
|
|
◾
|
|
CIC excise tax
gross-up
entitlements (including “modified”
gross-ups);
|
|
◾
|
|
Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.
|
|
◾
|
|
Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;
|
|
◾
|
|
Duration of options backdating;
|
|
◾
|
|
Size of restatement due to options backdating;
|
|
◾
|
|
Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or
re-pricing
backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.
|
|
◾
|
|
Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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43 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
change-in-control
|
|
◾
|
|
Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;
|
|
◾
|
|
Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;
|
|
◾
|
|
Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control;
|
|
◾
|
|
Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale;
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive cash severance (generally >3x base salary and bonus);
|
|
◾
|
|
Excise tax
gross-ups
triggered and payable;
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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44 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
17
depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “Equity Plan Scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:
|
|
◾
|
|
Plan Cost:
|
|
◾
|
|
SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and
|
|
◾
|
|
SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.
|
|
◾
|
|
Plan Features:
|
|
◾
|
|
Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC);
|
|
◾
|
|
Discretionary vesting authority;
|
|
◾
|
|
Liberal share recycling on various award types;
|
|
◾
|
|
Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Dividends payable prior to award vesting.
|
|
◾
|
|
Grant Practices:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Vesting requirements in CEO’s recent equity grants
(3-year
look-back);
|
|
◾
|
|
The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);
|
|
◾
|
|
The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company maintains sufficient post-exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.
|
|
◾
|
|
Awards may vest in connection with a liberal
change-of-control
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for
non-listed
companies);
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings;
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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45 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;
|
|
◾
|
|
Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs;
|
|
◾
|
|
Cancel underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Provide cash buyouts of underwater options.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
46 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Severity of the
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Addresses administrative features only; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes
only
, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per
ISS’ Classification of Directors
. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time for any reason (including after the company’s initial public offering), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per
ISS’ Classification of Directors.
|
|
◾
|
|
If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.
|
|
◾
|
|
If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
47 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments do not include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown only for informational purposes.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;
|
|
◾
|
|
Offering period is 27 months or less; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the outstanding shares.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Broad-based participation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
48 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Historic trading
patterns--the
stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back
“in-the-money”
|
|
◾
|
|
Rationale for the
re-pricing--was
|
|
◾
|
|
Is this a
value-for-value
|
|
◾
|
|
Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?;
|
|
◾
|
|
Timing--repricing
should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price;
|
|
◾
|
|
Option
vesting--does
the new option vest immediately or is there a
black-out
period?;
|
|
◾
|
|
Term of the
option--the
term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;
|
|
◾
|
|
Exercise
price--should
be set at fair market or a premium to market;
|
|
◾
|
|
Participants--executive
officers and directors must be excluded.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
One-time
Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit
one-time
transfers to shareholders for approval.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
49 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Executive officers and
non-employee
directors are excluded from participating;
|
|
◾
|
|
Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; and
|
|
◾
|
|
There is a
two-year
minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.
|
|
◾
|
|
Eligibility;
|
|
◾
|
|
Vesting;
|
|
◾
|
|
Bid-price;
|
|
◾
|
|
Term of options;
|
|
◾
|
|
Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Option repricing policy.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-employee
director compensation, based on the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
If the equity plan under which
non-employee
director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and
|
|
◾
|
|
An assessment of the following qualitative factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Equity award vesting schedules;
|
|
◾
|
|
The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Meaningful limits on director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-employee
directors, based on:
|
|
◾
|
|
The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers (in certain circumstances); and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
50 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).
|
|
◾
|
|
The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Equity award vesting schedules;
|
|
◾
|
|
The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Meaningful limits on director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-employee
directors. Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for
non-employee
directors.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
51 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;
|
|
◾
|
|
The time period required to retain the shares;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-executive
employees. The following factors will be considered:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of its executive compensation setting process, including how the company considers pay disparity;
|
|
◾
|
|
If any problematic pay practices or
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of shareholder support for the company’s pay programs.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
52 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
pay-for-superior
|
|
◾
|
|
Set compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median;
|
|
◾
|
|
Deliver a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;
|
|
◾
|
|
Provide the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and
non-financial
performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Establish performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies;
|
|
◾
|
|
Limit payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.
|
|
◾
|
|
What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven?
|
|
◾
|
|
If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?
|
|
◾
|
|
Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure?
|
|
◾
|
|
What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?
|
|
General Recommendation:
(10b5-1
plans) for executives. These principles include:
|
|
◾
|
|
Adoption, amendment, or termination of a
10b5-1
Plan must be disclosed within two business days in a
Form 8-K;
|
|
◾
|
|
Amendment or early termination of a
10b5-1
Plan is allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
Ninety days must elapse between adoption or amendment of a
10b5-1
Plan and initial trading under the plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a
10b5-1
Plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
An executive may not trade in company stock outside the
10b5-1
Plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Trades under a
10b5-1
Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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53 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
If the company has adopted a formal recoupment policy;
|
|
◾
|
|
The rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or lack thereof; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other relevant factors.
|
|
General Recommendation:
prior
|
|
◾
|
|
The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;
|
|
◾
|
|
The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable
W-2
compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs);
|
|
◾
|
|
Change-in-control
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks;
|
|
◾
|
|
The use of
per-share
metrics in incentive plans;
|
|
◾
|
|
The effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether there is any indication of metric result manipulation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
54 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
gross-up
payments to executives, except in situations where
gross-ups
are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current treatment of equity upon employment termination and/or in
change-in-control
|
|
◾
|
|
Current employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as
gross-ups
embedded in those agreements.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
55 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
56 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case,
|
|
◾
|
|
If the issues presented in the proposal are more appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
|
|
◾
|
|
If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; and
|
|
◾
|
|
If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has already published a set of animal welfare standards and monitors compliance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s standards are comparable to industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
There are no recent significant fines, litigation, or controversies related to the company’s and/or its suppliers’ treatment of animals.
|
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|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company is conducting animal testing programs that are unnecessary or not required by regulation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company is conducting animal testing when suitable alternatives are commonly accepted and used by industry peers; or
|
|
◾
|
|
There are recent, significant fines or litigation related to the company’s treatment of animals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential impact of such labeling on the company’s business;
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of the company’s disclosure on GE product labeling, related voluntary initiatives, and how this disclosure compares with industry peer disclosure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Company’s current disclosure on the feasibility of GE product labeling.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abuses;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the products/practices in question;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been subject to violations of related laws or serious controversies; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Peer companies’ policies/practices in this area.
|
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|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential for reputational, market, and regulatory risk exposure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Existing disclosure of relevant policies;
|
|
◾
|
|
Deviation from established industry norms;
|
|
◾
|
|
Relevant company initiatives to provide research and/or products to disadvantaged consumers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal focuses on specific products or geographic regions;
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential burden and scope of the requested report;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines at the company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already discloses similar information through existing reports such as a supplier code of conduct and/or a sustainability report;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has formally committed to the implementation of a toxic/hazardous materials and/or product safety and supply chain reporting and monitoring program based on industry norms or similar standards within a specified time frame; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has not been recently involved in relevant significant controversies, fines, or litigation.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its product safety policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current regulations in the markets in which the company operates; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines stemming from toxic/hazardous materials at the company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent related fines, controversies, or significant litigation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company complies with relevant laws and regulations on the marketing of tobacco;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company’s advertising restrictions deviate from those of industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company entered into the Master Settlement Agreement, which restricts marketing of tobacco to youth; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether restrictions on marketing to youth extend to foreign countries.
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company complies with all laws and regulations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree that voluntary restrictions beyond those mandated by law might hurt the company’s competitiveness; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The risk of any health-related liabilities.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company already provides current, publicly-available information on the impact that climate change may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s level of disclosure compared to industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s climate change-related performance.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already discloses current, publicly-available information on the impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
There are no significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s GHG emissions.
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company provides disclosure of year-over-year GHG emissions performance data;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether company disclosure lags behind industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current GHG emission policies, oversight mechanisms, and related initiatives; and
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company complies with applicable energy efficiency regulations and laws, and discloses its participation in energy efficiency policies and programs, including disclosure of benchmark data, targets, and performance measures; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The proponent requests adoption of specific energy efficiency goals within specific timelines.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure on renewable energy use and GHG emissions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure of policies, practices, and oversight implemented to manage GHG emissions and mitigate climate change risks.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company.
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company’s board and among its executive officers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the company’s industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s established process for addressing gender and racial minority board representation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating committee charter language;
|
|
◾
|
|
The independence of the company’s nominating committee;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director nominees; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
EEO-1
data, unless:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company publicly discloses equal opportunity policies and initiatives in a comprehensive manner;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already publicly discloses comprehensive workforce diversity data; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has no recent significant
EEO-related
violations or litigation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy on fair and equitable compensation practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of its workplace health and safety performance data, health and safety management policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature of the company’s business, specifically regarding company and employee exposure to health and safety risks;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or violations related to workplace health and safety; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s workplace health and safety performance relative to industry peers.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s compliance with applicable regulations and guidelines;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its security and safety policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The existence of recent, significant violations, fines, or controversy regarding the safety and security of the company’s operations and/or facilities.
|
|
◾
|
|
Current disclosure of applicable policies and risk assessment report(s) and risk management procedures;
|
|
◾
|
|
The impact of regulatory
non-compliance,
litigation, remediation, or reputational loss that may be associated with failure to manage the company’s operations in question, including the management of relevant community and stakeholder relations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature, purpose, and scope of the company’s operations in the specific region(s);
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which company policies and procedures are consistent with industry norms; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of the resolution.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant policies and oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of such disclosure relative to its industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential relevant local, state, or national regulatory developments; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s hydraulic fracturing operations.
|
|
◾
|
|
Operations in the specified regions are not permitted by current laws or regulations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure of its operations and environmental policies in these regions is comparable to industry peers.
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature of the company’s business;
|
|
◾
|
|
The current level of disclosure of the company’s existing related programs;
|
|
◾
|
|
The timetable and methods of program implementation prescribed by the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ability to address the issues raised in the proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
How the company’s recycling programs compare to similar programs of its industry peers.
|
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|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an environment, health, and safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive code of corporate conduct; and/or a diversity report; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current disclosure of relevant policies, initiatives, oversight mechanisms, and water usage metrics;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether or not the company’s existing water-related policies and practices are consistent with relevant internationally recognized standards and national/local regulations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential financial impact or risk to the company associated with water-related concerns or issues; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding water use by the company and its suppliers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management, and Internet censorship;
|
|
◾
|
|
Engagement in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet;
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications;
|
|
◾
|
|
Applicable market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Controversies, fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, or Internet censorship.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has significant and/or persistent controversies or regulatory violations regarding social and/or environmental issues;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has management systems and oversight mechanisms in place regarding its social and environmental performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which industry peers have incorporated similar
non-financial
performance criteria in their executive compensation practices; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its environmental and social performance.
|
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|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of the request; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices.
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed, including information on the implementation of these policies and any related oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s industry and whether the company or its suppliers operate in countries or areas where there is a history of human rights concerns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights involving the company or its suppliers, and whether the company has taken remedial steps; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal is unduly burdensome or overly prescriptive.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures;
|
|
◾
|
|
Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws;
|
|
◾
|
|
Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been recently involved in recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to its operations in “high-risk” markets.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Controversies surrounding operations in the relevant market(s);
|
|
◾
|
|
The value of the requested report to shareholders;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant information on outsourcing and plant closure procedures; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing human rights standards relative to industry peers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management and board oversight;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s lobbying-related activities.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
There are no recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibit coercion.
|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
closed-end
management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a
case-by-case
opting-in
to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a
by-law
amendment to a shareholder vote.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Past performance as a
closed-end
fund;
|
|
◾
|
|
Market in which the fund invests;
|
|
◾
|
|
Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related praposals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Past performance relative to its peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Market in which the fund invests;
|
|
◾
|
|
Measures taken by the board to address the issues;
|
|
◾
|
|
Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
|
|
◾
|
|
Independence of directors;
|
|
◾
|
|
Experience and skills of director candidates;
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance profile of the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence of management entrenchment.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Proposed and current fee schedules;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fund category/investment objective;
|
|
◾
|
|
Performance benchmarks;
|
|
◾
|
|
Share price performance as compared with peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Resulting fees relative to peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Stated specific financing purpose;
|
|
◾
|
|
Possible dilution for common shares;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential competitiveness;
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulatory developments;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and potential returns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and potential risk.
|
|
Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-fundamental
restriction, considering the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
The fund’s target investments;
|
|
◾
|
|
The reasons given by the fund for the change; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-fundamental.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Political/economic changes in the target market;
|
|
◾
|
|
Consolidation in the target market; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Current asset composition.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
sub-classification,
considering the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential competitiveness;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and potential returns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Risk of concentration;
|
|
◾
|
|
Consolidation in target industry.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;
|
|
◾
|
|
The sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
69 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either:
|
|
◾
|
|
Outperforming peers in its
8-digit
GICS group as measured by
one-
and three-year median TSRs; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing
non-participating
shareholders.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategies employed to salvage the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
The fund’s past performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the liquidation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree of change implied by the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The efficiencies that could result;
|
|
◾
|
|
The state of incorporation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulatory standards and implications.
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust or any of its series;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration of trust;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act;
|
|
◾
|
|
Allow the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory arrangements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
re-incorporations,
considering the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulations of both states;
|
|
◾
|
|
Required fundamental policies of both states;
|
|
◾
|
|
The increased flexibility available.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;
|
|
◾
|
|
The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The competitiveness of the fund in the industry;
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the agreement.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
70 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Resulting fee structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Performance of both funds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Continuity of management personnel;
|
|
◾
|
|
Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Performance of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV);
|
|
◾
|
|
The fund’s history of shareholder relations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The performance of other funds under the advisor’s management.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
71 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
72 of 72
|
|
MAI-GLRES-0421D
|
April 30, 2021
|
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
|||
Ticker Symbols: Class A—FGIAX, Class C—FGNCX, Class R3—FGNRX, Class R6—FGIWX, Class I—FGIYX
|
|||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
|||
Ticker Symbols: Class A—NRIAX, Class C—NRICX, Class R6—NRIFX, Class I—NRIIX
|
|||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
|||
Ticker Symbols: Class A—FREAX, Class C—FRLCX, Class R3—FRSSX, Class R6—FREGX, Class I—FARCX
|
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A-
|
||
B-
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with NIF |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with NIF |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Director |
Other
Directorships Held by Director During Past Five Years |
|
Independent Directors:
|
||||||
|
||||||
Jack B. Evans
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1948 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Chairman (since 2019), formerly, President (1996-2019), The Hall-Perrine Foundation (private philanthropic corporation); Life Trustee of Coe College and the Iowa College Foundation; formerly, Director, Public Member, American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery (2015-2020); formerly, Director (1998-2003), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; formerly, President and Chief Operating Officer (1972-1995), SCI Financial Group, Inc. (regional financial services firm); formerly, Member and President Pro Tem of the Board of Regents for the State of Iowa University System (2000-2004); formerly, Director (1996-2015), The Gazette Company (media and publishing).
|
143
|
Director and Chairman (since 2009), United Fire Group, a publicly held company; formerly, Director (2000-2004), Alliant Energy.
|
|
|
||||||
William C. Hunter
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1948 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Dean Emeritus, formerly, Dean (2006-2012), Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa; past Director (2005-2015) and past President (2010-2014) of Beta Gamma Sigma, Inc., The International Business Honor Society; formerly, Director (1997-2007), Credit Research Center at Georgetown University; formerly, Dean and Distinguished Professor of Finance (2003-2006), School of Business at the University of Connecticut; previously, Senior Vice President and Director of Research (1995-2003) at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
|
143
|
Director (since 2009) of Wellmark, Inc.; formerly, Director (2004-2018) of Xerox Corporation.
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with NIF |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with NIF |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Director |
Other
Directorships Held by Director During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Albin F. Moschner
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1952 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Northcroft Partners, LLC (management consulting) (since 2012); previously, held positions at Leap Wireless International, Inc. (consumer wireless services), including Consultant (2011-2012), Chief Operating Officer (2008-2011) and Chief Marketing Officer (2004-2008); formerly, President, Verizon Card Services division of Verizon Communications, Inc. (telecommunication services) (2000-2003); formerly, President, One Point Services at One Point Communications (telecommunication services) (1999-2000); formerly, Vice Chairman of the Board, Diba, Incorporated (internet technology provider) (1996-1997); formerly, various executive positions (1991-1996) and Chief Executive Officer (1995-1996) of Zenith Electronics Corporation (consumer electronics).
|
143
|
Formerly, Chairman (2019) and Director (2012-2019), USA Technologies, Inc., a provider of solutions and services to facilitate electronic payment transactions; formerly, Director, Wintrust Financial Corporation (1996-2016).
|
|
|||||
John K. Nelson
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1962 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2013 |
Member of Board of Directors of Core12 LLC (private firm which develops branding, marketing and communications strategies for clients) (since 2008); served The President's Council of Fordham University (2010-2019) and previously a Director of the Curran Center for Catholic American Studies (2009-2018); formerly, senior external advisor to the Financial Services practice of Deloitte Consulting LLP (2012-2014); former Chair of the Board of Trustees of Marian University (2010-2014 as trustee, 2011-2014 as Chair); formerly Chief Executive Officer of ABN AMRO Bank N.V., North America, and Global Head of the Financial Markets Division (2007-2008), with various executive leadership roles in ABN AMRO Bank N.V. between 1996 and 2007.
|
143
|
None
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with NIF |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with NIF |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Director |
Other
Directorships Held by Director During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Judith M. Stockdale
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1947 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Board Member of the Land Trust Alliance (national public charity addressing natural land and water conservation in the U.S.) (since 2013); formerly, Board Member of the U.S. Endowment for Forestry and Communities (national endowment addressing forest health, sustainable forest production and markets, and economic health of forest-reliant communities in the U.S.) (2013-12/2019); formerly, Executive Director (1994-2012), Gaylord and Dorothy Donnelley Foundation (private foundation endowed to support both natural land conservation and artistic vitality); prior thereto, Executive Director, Great Lakes Protection Fund (endowment created jointly by seven of the eight Great Lake states’ Governors to take a regional approach to improving the health of the Great Lakes) (1990-1994).
|
143
|
None
|
|
|||||
Carole E. Stone
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1947 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Former Director, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (2006-2017) and C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated (2009-2017); formerly, Commissioner, New York State Commission on Public Authority Reform (2005-2010).
|
143
|
Formerly, Director (2010-2020), Cboe Global Markets, Inc. (formerly named CBOE Holdings, Inc.).
|
|
|||||
Matthew Thornton III
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1958 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2020 |
Formerly, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (2018-2019), FedEx Freight Corporation, a subsidiary of FedEx Corporation (“
FedEx
®
|
143
|
Member of the Board of Directors (since 2014), The Sherwin-Williams Company (develops, manufactures, distributes and sells paints, coatings and related products); Member of the Board of Directors (since 2020), Crown Castle International (provider of communications infrastructure).
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with NIF |
Term of Office
and Length of Time Served with NIF |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Number of
Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Director |
Other
Directorships Held by Director During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Robert L. Young
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1963 |
Director
|
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Formerly, Chief Operating Officer and Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. (financial services) (2010-2016); formerly, President and Principal Executive Officer (2013-2016), and Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (2005-2010), of J.P. Morgan Funds; formerly, Director and various officer positions for J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. (formerly, JPMorgan Funds Management, Inc. and formerly, One Group Administrative Services) and JPMorgan Distribution Services, Inc. (financial services) (formerly, One Group Dealer Services, Inc.) (1999-2017).
|
143
|
None
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with NIF |
Term of Office and Length of Time
Served with NIF |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past Five Years
|
Officers of NIF:
|
|||
Mark J. Czarniecki
901 Marquette Avenue Minneapolis, MN 55402 1979 |
Vice President and Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2013 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2016) and Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2017); Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2018); Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen, LLC (since 2013).
|
Diana R. Gonzalez
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1978 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2017); Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen, LLC (since 2017); Associate General Counsel of Jackson National Asset Management (2012-2017).
|
Nathaniel T. Jones
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1979 |
Vice President and Treasurer
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Managing Director (since 2017), formerly, Senior Vice President (2016-2017), formerly, Vice President (2011-2016) of Nuveen, LLC; Managing Director (since 2015) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Chartered Financial Analyst.
|
Tina M. Lazar
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1961 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Managing Director (since 2017), formerly, Senior Vice President (2014-2017) of Nuveen Securities, LLC.
|
Brian J. Lockhart
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1974 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Managing Director (since 2017), formerly, Vice President (2010-2017) of Nuveen, LLC; Head of Investment Oversight (since 2017), formerly, Team Leader of Manager Oversight (2015-2017); Chartered Financial Analyst and Certified Financial Risk Manager.
|
Jacques M. Longerstaey
8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1963 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Senior Managing Director, Chief Risk Officer, Nuveen, LLC (since 2019); Senior Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; formerly, Chief Investment and Model Risk Officer, Wealth & Investment Management Division, Wells Fargo Bank (NA) (2013–2019).
|
Kevin J. McCarthy
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1966 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Secretary and General Counsel (since 2016) of Nuveen Investments, Inc., formerly, Executive Vice President (2016-2017), Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (2008-2016); Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Assistant Secretary (since 2008) of Nuveen Securities, LLC, formerly, Executive Vice President (2016-2017) and Managing Director (2008-2016); Senior Managing Director (since 2017), Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC, formerly, Co-General Counsel (2011-2020), Executive Vice President (2016-2017), Managing Director (2008-2016) and Assistant Secretary (2007-2016); Senior Managing Director (since 2017), Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC, formerly, Associate General Counsel (2011-2020), Executive Vice President (2016-2017) and Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (2011-2016); Vice President (since 2007) and Secretary (since 2016), formerly, Assistant Secretary, of NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC, Santa Barbara Asset Management, LLC, and Winslow Capital Management, LLC (since 2010); Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Alternative Investments, LLC.
|
Jon Scott Meissner
8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1973 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Managing Director of Mutual Fund Tax and Financial Reporting groups at Nuveen, LLC (since 2017); Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Senior Director of Teachers Advisors, LLC and TIAA-CREF Investment Management, LLC (since 2016); Senior Director (since 2015) Mutual Fund Taxation to the TIAA-CREF Funds, the TIAA-CREF Life Funds, the TIAA Separate Account VA-1 and the CREF Accounts; has held various positions with TIAA since 2004.
|
Name, Business Address
and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held
with NIF |
Term of Office and Length of Time
Served with NIF |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past Five Years
|
Deann D. Morgan
730 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 1969 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2020 |
President of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2020); Executive Vice President, Global Head of Product at Nuveen, LLC (since November 2019); Co-Chief Executive Officer of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2020); Managing Member of MDR Collaboratory LLC (since 2018); Managing Director, Head of Wealth Management Product Structuring & COO Multi Asset Investing, The Blackstone Group (2013-2017).
|
Christopher M. Rohrbacher
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1971 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Managing Director (since 2017), General Counsel (since 2020) and Assistant Secretary (since 2016), formerly, Senior Vice President (2016-2017), of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (since 2017) of Nuveen Securities, LLC; Managing Director, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2020); Managing Director (since 2017), and Associate General Counsel (since 2016), formerly, Senior Vice President (2012-2017) and Assistant General Counsel (2008-2016) of Nuveen, LLC.
|
William A. Siffermann
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1975 |
Vice President
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Managing Director (since 2017), formerly Senior Vice President (2016-2017) and Vice President (2011-2016) of Nuveen, LLC.
|
Christopher E. Stickrod
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1976 |
Chief Administrative Officer
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2020 |
Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Head of Advisory Product (since 2020), formerly, Managing Director (2016-2017) and Senior Vice President (2013-2016) of Nuveen, LLC; Senior Managing Director of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2018) and of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2019).
|
E. Scott Wickerham
8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1973 |
Vice President and Controller
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Senior Managing Director, Head of Fund Administration at Nuveen, LLC (since 2019), formerly, Managing Director; Senior Managing Director (since 2019), of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Principal Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer and Treasurer (since 2017) of the TIAA-CREF Funds, the TIAA-CREF Life Funds, the TIAA Separate Account VA-1 and Principal Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer (since 2020) and Treasurer (since 2017) to the CREF Accounts; formerly, Senior Director, TIAA-CREF Fund Administration (2014-2015); has held various positions with TIAA since 2006.
|
Mark L. Winget
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1968 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2008); Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2019); Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2020); Vice President (since 2010) and Associate General Counsel (since 2019), formerly, Assistant General Counsel (2008-2016) of Nuveen, LLC.
|
Gifford R. Zimmerman
333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1956 |
Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer
|
Term—Until
August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2011 |
Formerly, Managing Director (2004-2020) and Assistant Secretary (1994-2020) of Nuveen Investments, Inc.; formerly, Managing Director (2002-2020) and Assistant Secretary (2002-2020) of Nuveen Securities, LLC; formerly, Managing Director (2002-2020), Assistant Secretary (1997-2020) and Co-General Counsel (2011-2020) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; formerly, Managing Director, Assistant Secretary and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (2011-2020); formerly, Vice President and Assistant Secretary of NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC (2002-2020), Santa Barbara Asset Management, LLC (2006-2020) and Winslow Capital Management, LLC (2010-2020); Chartered Financial Analyst.
|
Name of Director
|
Aggregate
Compensation From Funds |
Amount of Total
Compensation that Has Been Deferred |
Total Compensation
From Nuveen Funds Paid to Director |
|||||||||||||
Jack B. Evans
|
$
|
12,748
|
$
|
960
|
$
|
392,652
|
||||||||||
William C. Hunter
|
12,602
|
—
|
396,750
|
|||||||||||||
Albin F. Moschner
|
12,163
|
—
|
380,050
|
|||||||||||||
John K. Nelson
|
13,558
|
—
|
417,500
|
|||||||||||||
Judith M. Stockdale
|
12,946
|
3,470
|
400,147
|
|||||||||||||
Carole E. Stone
|
13,173
|
4,616
|
404,611
|
|||||||||||||
Matthew Thornton III
1
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
|||||||||||||
Terence J. Toth
|
15,261
|
—
|
467,300
|
|||||||||||||
Margaret L. Wolff
|
12,273
|
4,130
|
385,629
|
|||||||||||||
Robert L. Young
|
13,672
|
13,672
|
425,754
|
Directors
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Evans
|
Hunter
|
Moschner
|
Nelson
|
Stockdale
|
Stone
|
Thornton
1
|
Toth
|
Wolff
|
Young
|
|||||||||||||||||||
Aggregate Holdings –
Fund Complex |
Over
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
$0
|
Over
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
||||||||||||||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
Over
$100,000 |
$0
|
$0
|
||||||||||||||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
Over $100,000
|
Over $100,000
|
$0
|
$0
|
Over $100,000
|
Over $100,000
|
$0
|
Over $100,000
|
Over $100,000
|
Over $100,000
|
||||||||||||||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities
Fund |
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
Over $100,000
|
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
$50,001-$100,000
|
$0
|
$0
|
Complex-Level Asset
|
Effective Rate at
|
|
Breakpoint Level*
|
Breakpoint Level
|
|
$55 billion
|
0.2000%
|
|
$56 billion
|
0.1996%
|
|
$57 billion
|
0.1989%
|
|
$60 billion
|
0.1961%
|
|
$63 billion
|
0.1931%
|
|
$66 billion
|
0.1900%
|
|
$71 billion
|
0.1851%
|
|
$76 billion
|
0.1806%
|
|
$80 billion
|
0.1773%
|
|
$91 billion
|
0.1691%
|
|
$125 billion
|
0.1599%
|
Complex-Level Asset
|
Effective Rate at
|
|
Breakpoint Level*
|
Breakpoint Level
|
|
$200 billion
|
0.1505%
|
|
$250 billion
|
0.1469%
|
|
$300 billion
|
0.1445%
|
Complex-Level
|
||
Fund
|
Fee Rate
|
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
0.1658%
|
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
0.1555%
|
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
0.1994%
|
Management Fees Paid to the
Adviser Net of Fee Waivers and Expense Reimbursements |
Fee Waivers and Expense
Reimbursements from the Adviser |
||||||||||||||||
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2018 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2019 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2020 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2018 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2019 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2020 |
||||||||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
$ 4,151,505
|
$ 3,986,866
|
$ 4,375,347
|
$725,781
|
$750,382
|
$729,920
|
|||||||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
14,257,596
|
14,138,415
|
12,729,708
|
56,016
|
—
|
119,957
|
|||||||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
28,836,115
|
27,061,832
|
20,192,168
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
Name
|
Fund
|
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
|
Scott C. Sedlak
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
Brenda A. Langenfeld, CFA
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
Tryg T. Sarsland
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
|
Sarah J. Wade
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
Jean C. Lin, CFA
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
Jagdeep S. Ghuman
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
Benjamin T. Kerl
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
Portfolio Manager
|
Type of Account Managed
|
Number of Accounts
|
Assets
|
Number of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees
|
Assets of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees
|
|||||||
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
2
|
$
|
663.3 million
|
0
|
$
|
0
|
|||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
7
|
393.7 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
9
|
2.1 billion
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Scott C. Sedlak
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
1
|
59.2 million
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
2
|
41.2 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
4
|
586.4 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Brenda A. Langenfeld
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
7
|
7.8 billion
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
1
|
30.1 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
1,038
|
2.3 billion
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Tryg T. Sarsland
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
1
|
604.0 million
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
5
|
352.6 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
5
|
1.6 billion
|
0
|
0
|
Portfolio Manager
|
Type of Account Managed
|
Number of Accounts
|
Assets
|
Number of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees
|
Assets of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees
|
|||||||
Sarah J. Wade
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
2
|
41.2 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
4
|
586.4 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Jean C. Lin
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
4
|
5.6 billion
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
2
|
79.7 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
6
|
1.2 billion
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Jagdeep S. Ghuman
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
1
|
59.2 million
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
6
|
363.7 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
3
|
513.0 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Benjamin T. Kerl*
|
Registered Investment Companies
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|||||||
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles
|
2
|
41.2 million
|
0
|
0
|
||||||||
Other Accounts
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
A
|
- $0
|
|||
B
|
- $1 - $10,000
|
|||
C
|
- $10,001 - $50,000
|
|||
D
|
- $50,001 - $100,000
|
|||
E
|
- $100,001 - $500,000
|
|||
F
|
- $500,001 - $1,000,000
|
|||
G
|
- More than $1 million
|
Portfolio Manager
|
Fund
|
Dollar Range of Equity Securities Beneficially Owned in Fund Managed
|
||
Jay L. Rosenberg
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
E
|
||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
E
|
|||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
E
|
|||
Scott C. Sedlak
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
D
|
||
Brenda A. Langenfeld
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
C
|
||
Tryg T. Sarsland
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
C
|
||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
C
|
|||
Sarah J. Wade
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
C
|
||
Jean C. Lin
|
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
A
|
||
Jagdeep S. Ghuman
|
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
A
|
||
Benjamin T. Kerl*
|
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
A
|
Nuveen
Global Infrastructure Fund |
Nuveen
Real Asset Income Fund |
Nuveen
Real Estate Securities Fund |
||||||||||
Gross income from securities
lending activities |
$
|
7,233
|
$
|
145,180
|
$
|
21,405
|
||||||
Fees and/or compensation paid by each Fund for securities lending activities and related services:
|
||||||||||||
Fees paid to Securities Lending Agent from a revenue split
|
(546
|
)
|
(11,498
|
)
|
(108
|
)
|
||||||
Fees paid for any cash collateral management service (including fees deducted from a pooled cash collateral reinvestment vehicle) that are not included in the revenue split
|
(379
|
)
|
(1,288
|
)
|
(985
|
)
|
||||||
Administrative fees not included in the revenue split
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
|||||||||
Indemnification fees not included in the revenue split
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
|||||||||
Rebate (paid to borrower)
|
(25
|
)
|
(171
|
)
|
(19,074
|
)
|
||||||
Other fees not included in the revenue split
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
|||||||||
Aggregate fees/compensation for securities lending activities
|
(950
|
)
|
(12,957
|
)
|
(20,167
|
)
|
||||||
Net income from securities lending activities
|
$
|
6,283
|
$
|
132,223
|
$
|
1,238
|
Aggregate Brokerage Commissions Paid by the Funds
|
||||||||||
Fund
|
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2018 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2019 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2020 |
|||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
$
|
1,576,686
|
$
|
829,542
|
$
|
1,020,649
|
||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
3,669,014
|
2,473,366
|
2,578,296
|
|||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
6,185,615
|
4,767,810
|
3,565,118
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
Class A Shares |
National Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
22.99% |
||||
|
||||||
Raymond James
Omnibus for Mutual Funds House Acct Attn: Courtney Waller 880 Carillon Parkway St Petersburg FL 33716-1102 |
13.48%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
LPL Financial
Omnibus Customer Account Attn Mutual Fund Trading 4707 Executive Dr San Diego CA 92121-3091 |
8.62%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main Street San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
8.45%
|
|||||
|
||||||
American Enterprise Investment Serv
707 2
nd
Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
7.79%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC
Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market St Saint Louis MO 63103-2523 |
6.96%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Pershing LLC
1 Pershing Plz Jersey City NJ 07399-0001 |
6.49%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
Class C Shares |
National Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
35.93% |
||||
|
||||||
American Enterprise Investment Serv
707 2
nd
Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
14.36%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner
& Smith Safekeeping Attn Physical Team 4800 Deer Lake Dr E Jacksonville FL 32246-6484 |
6.61%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC
Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market St Saint Louis MO 63103-2523 |
6.29%
|
|||||
|
||||||
LPL Financial
Omnibus Customer Account Attn Mutual Fund Trading 4707 Executive Dr San Diego CA 92121-3091 |
6.06%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Pershing LLC
1 Pershing Plz Jersey City NJ 07399-0001 |
5.22%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
Class R3 Shares |
Mid Atlantic Trust Company FBO Hardin Staffing, Inc. 401(K) Profit 1251 Waterfront Place, Suite 525 Pittsburgh PA 15222-4228 |
39.26% |
||||
|
||||||
FIIOC FBO
Julius Silvert Inc 401K Profit Sharing Plan and Trust 100 Magellan Way Covington KY 41015-1987 |
33.27%
|
|||||
|
||||||
FIIOC
FBO Lawhon & Associates Inc 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan 100 Magellan Way Covington KY 41015-1987 |
16.26%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Mid Atlantic Trust Company FBO
Ays LLC 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan 1251 Waterfront Place, Suite 525 Pittsburgh PA 15222-4228 |
7.91%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
Class R6 Shares |
Northern Tr Co Cust FBO Children’s Medical Center Fnd Tr PO Box 92956 Chicago IL 60675-2956 |
36.05% |
||||
|
||||||
Band & Co
C/O US Bank PO Box 1787 Milwaukee WI 53201-1787 |
25.17%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Northern Tr Co Cust FBO Federated
Mutual Insurance Tr PO Box 92956 Chicago IL 60675-2956 |
17.86%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Capinco
C/O US Bank PO Box 1787 Milwaukee WI 53201-1787 |
10.50%
|
|||||
|
||||||
JP Morgan Securities LLC Omnibus
Account for the Exclusive Benefit Of Customers 4 Chase Metrotech Ctr 3
rd
Mutual Fund Department Brooklyn NY 11245-0003 |
6.74%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
Class I Shares |
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Safekeeping Attn Physical Team 4800 Deer Lake Dr E Jacksonville FL 32246-6484 |
12.84% |
||||
|
||||||
American Enterprise Investment Serv
707 2
nd
Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
11.79%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
SEI Private Trust Company
C/O Washington Trust Bank 1 Freedom Valley Dr Oaks PA 19456-9989 |
9.90%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Band & Co
C/O US Bank PO Box 1787 Milwaukee WI 53201-1787 |
7.63%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody Account For Benefit of Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main St San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
6.37%
|
|||||
|
||||||
RBC Capital Markets LLC
Mutual Fund Omnibus Processing Omnibus Attn Mutual Fund Ops Manager 60 South Sixth Street-P08 Minneapolis MN 55402-4413 |
5.95%
|
|||||
|
||||||
National Financial Services LLC
For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
5.37%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Voya Institutional Trust Co Cust
FBO City and County of San Francisco 30 Braintree Hill Office Park Braintree MA 02184-8747 |
5.13%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
Class A Shares |
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market St Saint Louis MO 63103-2523 |
20.12% |
||||
|
||||||
National Financial Services LLC
For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
12.18%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC
For the Exclusive Bene of its Cust 1 New York Plz Fl 12 New York NY 10004-1932 |
11.90%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main Street San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
11.37%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
American Enterprise Investment Serv
707 2
nd
Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
8.61%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Pershing LLC
1 Pershing Plz Jersey City NJ 07399-0001 |
7.14%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
Class C Shares |
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market Street St Louis MO 63103-2523 |
24.55% |
||||
|
||||||
American Enterprise Investment Serv
707 2
nd
Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
12.10%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC
For the Exclusive Bene of its Cust 1 New York Plz Fl 12 New York NY 10004-1932 |
11.61%
|
|||||
|
||||||
LPL Financial
Omnibus Customer Account Attn Mutual Fund Trading 4707 Executive Dr San Diego CA 92121-3091 |
9.82%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Raymond James
Omnibus for Mutual Funds House Acct Attn: Courtney Waller 880 Carillon Parkway St Petersburg FL 33716-1102 |
8.53%
|
|||||
|
||||||
UBS WM USA
Omni Account M/F Spec Cdy A/C EBOC UBSFSI 1000 Harbor Blvd Weehawken NJ 07086-6761 |
7.88%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main Street San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
6.95%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Pershing LLC
1 Pershing Plz Jersey City NJ 07399-0001 |
5.29%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
Class R6 Shares |
Wells Fargo Bank NA FBO Las Vegas Valley Water Dist Ret Pl PO Box 1533 Minneapolis MN 55480-1533 |
27.63% |
||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
Northern Tr Co Cust FBO Eastman
Chemical Company Tr PO Box 92956 Chicago IL 60675-2956 |
23.06%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Northern Tr Co Cust FBO Fort Worth
Employees Ret Fund Tr PO Box 92956 Chicago IL 60675-2956 |
21.62%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Mac & Co
Attn: Mutual Fund Operations 500 Grant Street Room 151-1010 Pittsburgh PA 15219-2502 |
10.02%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Northern Tr Co Cust FBO Children’s
Medical Center Fnd Tr PO Box 92956 Chicago IL 60675-2956 |
7.79%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Capinco
C/O US Bank PO Box 1787 Milwaukee WI 53201-1787 |
5.83%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
Class I Shares |
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market Street St Louis MO 63103-2523 |
26.82% |
||||
|
||||||
American Enterprise Investment Serv
707 2
nd
Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
10.86%
|
|||||
|
||||||
National Financial Services LLC
For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
10.25%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC
For the Exclusive Bene of its Cust 1 New York Plz Fl 12 New York NY 10004-1932 |
8.52%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main Street San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
7.72%
|
|||||
|
||||||
MLPF&S for the Benefit of its
Customers Attn Fund Admin 4800 Deer Lake Dr E Fl 3 Jacksonville FL 32246-6484 |
6.52%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
UBS WM USA
Omni Account M/F Spec Cdy A/C EBOC UBSFSI 1000 Harbor Blvd Weehawken NJ 07086-6761 |
5.09%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
Class A Shares |
Charles Schwab & Co Inc Special Custody Account For Benefit of Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main St San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
13.00% |
||||
|
||||||
National Financial Services LLC
For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
10.65%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith
Attn Physical Team 4800 Deer Lake Dr E Jacksonville FL 32246-6484 |
10.47%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main Street San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
8.75%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC
Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market St Saint Louis MO 63103-2523 |
7.33%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
Class C Shares |
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market St Saint Louis MO 63103-2523 |
32.70% |
||||
|
||||||
Pershing LLC
1 Pershing Plz Jersey City NJ 07399-0001 |
11.27%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith
Attn Physical Team 4800 Deer Lake Dr E Jacksonville FL 32246-6484 |
7.77%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC
For the Exclusive Bene of its Cust 1 New York Plz Fl 12 New York NY 10004-1932 |
7.50%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
UBS WM USA
Omni Account M/F Spec Cdy A/C EBOC UBSFSI 1000 Harbor Blvd Weehawken NJ 07086-6761 |
7.09%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Raymond James
Omnibus for Mutual Funds House Acct Attn: Courtney Waller 880 Carillon Parkway St Petersburg FL 33716-1102 |
6.59%
|
|||||
|
||||||
American Enterprise Investment Serv
707 2
nd
Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
6.49%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
Class R3 Shares |
National Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
24.00% |
||||
|
||||||
State Street Bank and Trust Company
Trustee and/or Custodian FBO ADP Access Product 1 Lincoln St Boston MA 02111-2901 |
22.74%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Great-West Trust Company LLC FBO
Employee Benefits Clients 401K 8515 E Orchard Rd 2T2 Greenwood Village CO 80111-5002 |
6.05%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
Class R6 Shares |
National Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
12.21% |
||||
|
||||||
Great-West Trust Company LLC Ttee
Employee Benefits Clients 401K 8515 E Orchard Rd 2T2 Greenwood Vlg CO 80111-5002 |
6.66%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main St San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
6.62%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Mac & Co
Attn Mutual Fund Ops 500 Grant Street Room 151-1010 Pittsburgh PA 15219-2502 |
5.23%
|
|||||
|
Name of Fund and Class
|
Name and Address of Owner
|
Percentage of
Ownership |
||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
Class I Shares |
National Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4
th
499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
18.07% |
||||
|
||||||
VantageTrust – Unitized
C/O ICMA Retirement Corporation 777 North Capitol Street, NE Washington DC 20002-4239 |
16.91%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Band & Co
C/O US Bank PO Box 1787 Milwaukee WI 53201-1787 |
10.56%
|
|||||
|
||||||
Charles Schwab & Co Inc
Special Custody Account For Benefit of Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main St San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
6.28%
|
Fund
|
Short-Term
|
Long-Term
|
Total
|
|||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
$
|
8,478,852
|
$
|
—
|
$
|
8,478,852
|
||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
173,421,038
|
93,526,958
|
266,947,996
|
|||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
17,644,686
|
—
|
17,644,686
|
Net asset value per share
|
$
|
10.97
|
|
Per share sales charge—5.75% of public offering price (6.11% of net asset value per share)
|
0.67
|
||
Per share offering price to the public
|
$
|
11.64
|
Annual Distribution Fee
|
Annual Service Fee
|
Total 12b-1 Fee
|
|||||||
Class A
|
—
|
0.25
|
%
|
0.25
|
%
|
||||
Class C
|
0.75
|
%
|
0.25
|
%
|
1.00
|
%
|
|||
Class R3
|
0.25
|
%
|
0.25
|
%
|
0.50
|
%
|
12b-1 Fees Incurred by Each Fund for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020
|
|||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund:
|
|||
Class A
|
|
||
Class C
|
196,726
|
||
Class R3
|
1,408
|
||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund:
|
|||
Class A
|
447,119
|
||
Class C
|
1,733,949
|
||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund:
|
|||
Class A
|
482,056
|
||
Class C
|
237,411
|
||
Class R3
|
74,454
|
Total Underwriting Commissions
|
|||||||||||||
Fund
|
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2018 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2019 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2020 |
||||||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
$
|
159
|
$
|
202
|
$
|
73
|
|||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
709
|
825
|
467
|
||||||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
67
|
67
|
36
|
Underwriting Commissions Retained by
Distributor |
|||||||||||||
Fund
|
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2018 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2019 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2020 |
||||||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
$
|
20
|
$
|
23
|
$
|
8
|
|||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
75
|
88
|
49
|
||||||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
8
|
8
|
3
|
Compensation on Redemptions and
Repurchases |
||||||||||||
Fund
|
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2018 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2019 |
Fiscal Year
Ended December 31, 2020 |
|||||||||
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
|
$
|
5
|
$
|
7
|
$
|
1
|
||||||
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
|
44
|
12
|
20
|
|||||||||
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
|
3
|
—
|
1
|
AAA
|
An obligation rated ‘AAA’ has the highest rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is extremely strong.
|
AA
|
An obligation rated ‘AA’ differs from the highest-rated obligations only to a small degree. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is very strong.
|
A
|
An obligation rated ‘A’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is still strong.
|
BBB
|
An obligation rated ‘BBB’ exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
BB, B, CCC, CC, and C
|
Obligations rated ‘BB’, ‘B’, ‘CCC’, ‘CC’, and ‘C’ are regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. ‘BB’ indicates the least degree of speculation and ‘C’ the highest. While such obligations will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposure to adverse conditions.
|
BB
|
An obligation rated ‘BB’ is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions that could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
B
|
An obligation rated ‘B’ is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations rated ‘BB’, but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor’s capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
CCC
|
An obligation rated ‘CCC’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitments on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
CC
|
An obligation rated ‘CC’ is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment. The ‘CC’ rating is used when a default has not yet occurred but S&P Global Ratings expects default to be a virtual certainty, regardless of the anticipated time to default.
|
C
|
An obligation rated ‘C’ is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment, and the obligation is expected to have lower relative seniority or lower ultimate recovery compared with obligations that are rated higher.
|
D
|
An obligation rated ‘D’ is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For non-hybrid capital instruments, the ‘D’ rating category is used when payments on an obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings believes that such payments will be made within five business days in the absence of a stated grace period or within the earlier of the stated grace period or 30 calendar days. The ‘D’ rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions. A rating on an obligation is lowered to ‘D’ if it is subject to a distressed exchange offer.
|
A-1
|
A short-term obligation rated ‘A-1’ is rated in the highest category by S&P Global Ratings. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is strong. Within this category, certain obligations are designated with a plus sign (+). This indicates that the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on these obligations is extremely strong.
|
A-2
|
A short-term obligation rated ‘A-2’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher rating categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation is satisfactory.
|
A-3
|
A short-term obligation rated ‘A-3’ exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to weaken an obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
B
|
A short-term obligation rated ‘B’ is regarded as vulnerable and has significant speculative characteristics. The obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments; however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties that could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments.
|
C
|
A short-term obligation rated ‘C’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial commitments on the obligation.
|
D
|
A short-term obligation rated ‘D’ is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For non-hybrid capital instruments, the ‘D’ rating category is used when payments on an obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P Global Ratings believes that such payments will be made within any stated grace period. However, any stated grace period longer than five
|
|
business days will be treated as five business days. The ‘D’ rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions. A rating on an obligation is lowered to ‘D’ if it is subject to a distressed exchange offer.
|
Aaa
|
Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, subject to the lowest level of credit risk.
|
Aa
|
Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk.
|
A
|
Obligations rated A are judged to be upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk.
|
Baa
|
Obligations rated Baa are judged to be medium-grade and subject to moderate credit risk and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics.
|
Ba
|
Obligations rated Ba are judged to be speculative and are subject to substantial credit risk.
|
B
|
Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk.
|
Caa
|
Obligations rated Caa are judged to be speculative of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk.
|
Ca
|
Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest.
|
C
|
Obligations rated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest.
|
P-1
|
Ratings of Prime-1 reflect a superior ability to repay short-term obligations.
|
P-2
|
Ratings of Prime-2 reflect a strong ability to repay short-term obligations.
|
P-3
|
Ratings of Prime-3 reflect an acceptable ability to repay short- term obligations.
|
NP
|
Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime rating categories.
|
MIG 1
|
This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by established cash flows, highly reliable liquidity support, or demonstrated broad-based access to the market for refinancing.
|
MIG 2
|
This designation denotes strong credit quality. Margins of protection are ample, although not as large as in the preceding group.
|
MIG 3
|
This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Liquidity and cash-flow protection may be narrow, and market access for refinancing is likely to be less well-established.
|
SG
|
This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Debt instruments in this category may lack sufficient margins of protection.
|
VMIG 1
|
This designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is afforded by the superior short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and legal protections that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
|
VMIG 2
|
This designation denotes strong credit quality. Good protection is afforded by the strong short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and legal protections that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
|
VMIG 3
|
This designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Adequate protection is afforded by the satisfactory short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and structural and legal protections that ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
|
SG
|
This designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Demand features rated in this category may be supported by a liquidity provider that does not have a sufficiently strong short-term rating or may lack the structural and/or legal protections necessary to ensure the timely payment of purchase price upon demand.
|
AAA
|
Highest credit quality. ‘AAA’ ratings denote the lowest expectation of default risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events.
|
AA
|
Very high credit quality. ‘AA’ ratings denote expectations of very low default risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable events.
|
A
|
High credit quality. ‘A’ ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings.
|
BBB
|
Good credit quality. ‘BBB’ ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate, but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity.
|
BB
|
Speculative. ‘BB’ ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time; however, business or financial flexibility exists that supports the servicing of financial commitments.
|
B
|
Highly speculative. ‘B’ ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business and economic environment.
|
CCC
|
Substantial credit risk. Default is a real possibility.
|
CC
|
Very high levels of credit risk. Default of some kind appears probable.
|
C
|
Near default. A default or default-like process has begun, or the issuer is in standstill, or for a closed funding vehicle, payment capacity is irrevocably impaired. Conditions that are indicative of a ‘C’ category rating for an issuer include:
|
RD
|
Restricted default. ‘RD’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch’s opinion has experienced:
|
D
|
Default. ‘D’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch’s opinion has entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, or that has otherwise ceased business.
|
F1
|
Highest short-term credit quality. Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added “+” to denote any exceptionally strong credit feature.
|
F2
|
Good short-term credit quality. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments.
|
F3
|
Fair short-term credit quality. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is adequate.
|
B
|
Speculative short-term credit quality. Minimal capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions.
|
C
|
High short-term default risk. Default is a real possibility.
|
RD
|
Restricted default. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial obligations. Typically applicable to entity ratings only.
|
D
|
Default. Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a short-term obligation.
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7
|
|
|||
1.
|
|
|
|
8
|
|
|
|
|
|
8
|
|
||
|
|
|
8
|
|
||
|
|
|
9
|
|
||
|
|
|
11
|
|
||
|
|
|
12
|
|
||
|
|
|
13
|
|
||
|
|
|
16
|
|
||
|
|
|
16
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
17
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
18
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
19
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
20
|
|
||
|
|
|
21
|
|
||
2.
|
|
|
|
22
|
|
|
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
|
|
|
22
|
|
||
3.
|
|
|
|
24
|
|
|
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
24
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
25
|
|
||
|
|
|
26
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
2 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
26
|
|
||
|
|
|
26
|
|
||
|
|
|
27
|
|
||
|
|
|
27
|
|
||
|
|
|
27
|
|
||
|
|
|
27
|
|
||
|
|
|
28
|
|
||
|
|
|
28
|
|
||
|
|
|
28
|
|
||
|
|
|
29
|
|
||
|
|
|
29
|
|
||
|
|
|
29
|
|
||
|
|
|
30
|
|
||
|
|
|
30
|
|
||
|
|
|
30
|
|
||
|
|
|
30
|
|
||
4.
|
|
|
|
31
|
|
|
|
|
|
31
|
|
||
|
|
|
31
|
|
||
|
|
|
31
|
|
||
|
|
|
32
|
|
||
|
|
|
32
|
|
||
|
|
|
32
|
|
||
|
|
|
32
|
|
||
|
|
|
32
|
|
||
|
|
|
33
|
|
||
|
|
|
33
|
|
||
|
|
|
33
|
|
||
|
|
|
33
|
|
||
|
|
|
34
|
|
||
|
|
|
34
|
|
||
|
|
|
34
|
|
||
|
|
|
34
|
|
||
|
|
|
34
|
|
||
|
|
|
34
|
|
||
|
|
|
35
|
|
||
|
|
|
35
|
|
||
|
|
|
35
|
|
||
|
|
|
35
|
|
||
|
|
|
36
|
|
||
|
|
|
36
|
|
||
|
|
|
36
|
|
||
|
|
|
37
|
|
||
|
|
|
38
|
|
||
|
|
|
38
|
|
||
|
|
|
39
|
|
||
|
|
|
39
|
|
||
|
|
|
39
|
|
||
5.
|
|
|
|
41
|
|
|
|
|
|
41
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
3 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
41
|
|
||
|
|
|
42
|
|
||
|
|
|
42
|
|
||
|
|
|
43
|
|
||
|
|
|
44
|
|
||
|
|
|
44
|
|
||
|
|
|
44
|
|
||
|
|
|
45
|
|
||
|
|
|
46
|
|
||
|
|
|
46
|
|
||
|
|
|
46
|
|
||
|
|
|
46
|
|
||
|
|
|
47
|
|
||
|
|
|
47
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
48
|
|
||
|
|
|
49
|
|
||
|
|
|
49
|
|
||
|
|
|
49
|
|
||
|
|
|
50
|
|
||
|
|
|
50
|
|
||
|
|
|
50
|
|
||
|
|
|
51
|
|
||
|
|
|
51
|
|
||
|
|
|
51
|
|
||
|
|
|
51
|
|
||
|
|
|
51
|
|
||
|
|
|
52
|
|
||
|
|
|
52
|
|
||
|
|
|
52
|
|
||
|
|
|
52
|
|
||
|
|
|
53
|
|
||
|
|
|
53
|
|
||
|
|
|
53
|
|
||
|
|
|
54
|
|
||
|
|
|
54
|
|
||
|
|
|
54
|
|
||
|
|
|
54
|
|
||
|
|
|
55
|
|
||
|
|
|
55
|
|
||
6.
|
|
|
|
56
|
|
|
|
|
|
56
|
|
||
|
|
|
56
|
|
||
|
|
|
56
|
|
||
|
|
|
56
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
4 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
56
|
|
||
|
|
|
56
|
|
||
7.
|
|
|
|
57
|
|
|
|
|
|
57
|
|
||
|
|
|
57
|
|
||
|
|
|
57
|
|
||
|
|
|
57
|
|
||
|
|
|
58
|
|
||
|
|
|
58
|
|
||
|
|
|
58
|
|
||
|
|
|
58
|
|
||
|
|
|
58
|
|
||
|
|
|
59
|
|
||
|
|
|
59
|
|
||
|
|
|
59
|
|
||
|
|
|
60
|
|
||
|
|
|
60
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
61
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
62
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
63
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
64
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
65
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
66
|
|
||
|
|
|
67
|
|
||
|
|
|
67
|
|
||
8.
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
5 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
68
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
69
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
69
|
|
|
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
70
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
||
|
|
|
71
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
6 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
U.S. Domestic Issuers – which have a majority of outstanding shares held in the U.S. and meet other criteria, as determined by the SEC, and are subject to the same disclosure and listing standards as U.S. incorporated companies – are generally covered under standard U.S. policy guidelines.
|
|
◾
|
|
Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) – which do not meet the Domestic Issuer criteria and are exempt from most disclosure requirements (e.g., they do not file DEF14A reports) and listing standards (e.g., for required levels of board and committee independence) – are covered under a combination of policy guidelines:
|
|
◾
|
|
FPI Guidelines (see the
Americas Regional Proxy Voting Guidelines
), which apply certain minimum independence and disclosure standards in the evaluation of key proxy ballot items, such as the election of directors and approval of financial reports; and
|
|
◾
|
|
For other issues, guidelines for the market that is responsible for, or most relevant to, the item on the ballot.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
7 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
1
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
The
non-independent
director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
8 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.
|
Executive Director
|
|
1.1.
|
Current officer
1
2
|
|
2.
|
Non-Independent
Non-Executive
Director
|
|
Board Identification
|
|
|
2.1.
|
Director identified as not independent by the board.
|
|
Controlling/Significant Shareholder
|
|
|
2.2.
|
Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).
|
|
Current Employment at Company or Related Company
|
|
|
2.3.
|
Non-officer
employee of the firm (including employee representatives).
|
|
2.4.
|
Officer
1
|
|
Former Employment
|
|
|
2.5.
|
Former CEO of the company.
3, 4
|
|
2.6.
|
Former
non-CEO
officer
1
2
|
|
2.7.
|
Former officer
1
4
|
|
2.8.
|
Officer
1
|
|
2.9.
|
Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made.
5
|
|
Family Members
|
|
|
2.10.
|
Immediate family member
6
1
2
|
|
2.11.
|
Immediate family member
6
2
non-Section
16 officer in a key strategic role).
|
|
Professional, Transactional,
|
and Charitable Relationships
|
|
2.12.
|
Director who (or whose immediate family member
6
7
2
6
|
|
2.13.
|
Director who (or whose immediate family member
6
8
2
6
8
|
|
2.14.
|
Director who (or whose immediate family member
6
)
non-profit
organization that receives material grants or endowments
8
2
|
|
Other Relationships
|
|
|
2.15.
|
Party to a voting agreement
9
|
|
2.16.
|
Has (or an immediate family member
6
10
|
|
2.17.
|
Founder
11
|
|
2.18.
|
Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.
|
|
2.19.
|
Any material
12
|
|
3.
|
Independent Director
|
|
3.1.
|
No material
12
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
9 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
10 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Medical issues/illness;
|
|
◾
|
|
Family emergencies; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).
|
|
◾
|
|
Sit on more than five public company boards; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards
4
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
11 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;
|
|
◾
|
|
Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The subject matter of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;
|
|
◾
|
|
The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and
|
|
◾
|
|
Other factors as appropriate.
|
|
◾
|
|
The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;
|
|
◾
|
|
At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s previous
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s response, including:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
12 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.
|
|
◾
|
|
The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has a poison pill that was not approved by shareholders
6
. However, vote
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The pill, whether short-term
7
|
|
◾
|
|
A classified board structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
A supermajority vote requirement;
|
|
◾
|
|
Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority vote standard in contested elections;
|
|
◾
|
|
The inability of shareholders to call special meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
The inability of shareholders to act by written consent;
|
|
◾
|
|
A multi-class capital structure; and/or
|
|
◾
|
|
A
non-shareholder-approved
poison pill.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
13 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing governance provisions;
|
|
◾
|
|
The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.
|
|
◾
|
|
Classified the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws.
|
|
◾
|
|
Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;
|
|
◾
|
|
A classified board structure; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Other egregious provisions.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
14 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;
|
|
◾
|
|
The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule
14a-8.
Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.
|
|
◾
|
|
The
non-audit
fees paid to the auditor are
excessive
;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or
|
|
◾
|
|
There is persuasive evidence that the Audit Committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.
|
|
◾
|
|
Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.
|
|
◾
|
|
There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (
pay for performance
);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company maintains significant
problematic pay practices
; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The board exhibits a significant level of
poor communication and responsiveness
to shareholders.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
15 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;
|
|
◾
|
|
The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other relevant factors.
|
|
◾
|
|
Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight
9
, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
“vote-no”
campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
16 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s track record;
|
|
◾
|
|
Background to the contested election;
|
|
◾
|
|
Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;
|
|
◾
|
|
Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and
|
|
◾
|
|
Stock ownership positions.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;
|
|
◾
|
|
The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to
non-independent
directors; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner.
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of the shareholder proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
17 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The reasonableness/scope of the request; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has proxy access
10
, thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a
carve-out
for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Eliminate entirely directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care.
|
|
◾
|
|
Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.
|
|
◾
|
|
Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (
i.e.
|
|
◾
|
|
If the director was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that s/he reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
18 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
If only the director’s legal expenses would be covered.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾
|
|
Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and rationale of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current board leadership structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s governance structure and practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company performance; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other relevant factors that may be applicable.
|
|
◾
|
|
A majority
non-independent
board and/or the presence of
non-independent
directors on key board committees;
|
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19 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
A weak or poorly-defined lead independent director role that fails to serve as an appropriate counterbalance to a combined CEO/chair role;
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of an executive or
non-independent
chair in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chair, and/or departure from a structure with an independent chair;
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence that the board has failed to oversee and address material risks facing the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
A material governance failure, particularly if the board has failed to adequately respond to shareholder concerns or if the board has materially diminished shareholder rights; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence that the board has failed to intervene when management’s interests are contrary to shareholders’ interests.
|
|
General Recommendation:
ISS’ Classification of Directors
.)
|
|
General Recommendation:
carve-out
for a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Ownership threshold:
|
|
◾
|
|
Ownership duration:
|
|
◾
|
|
Aggregation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Cap:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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20 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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|
|
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|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to I
SS’ definition
. This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.
|
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21 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the auditor agreement—the degree to which these agreements impact shareholders’ rights;
|
|
◾
|
|
The motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements;
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of the company’s disclosure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s historical practices in the audit area.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;
|
|
◾
|
|
There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;
|
|
◾
|
|
Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as fraud or misapplication of GAAP; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Fees for
non-audit
services (“Other” fees) are excessive.
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-audit
(“other”) fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-audit
services.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The tenure of the audit firm;
|
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22 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The length of rotation specified in the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any significant audit-related issues at the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of Audit Committee meetings held each year;
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of financial experts serving on the committee; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
23 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Any impediments to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws (i.e. supermajority voting requirements);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure and historical voting turnout;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the board could amend bylaws adopted by shareholders; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether shareholders would retain the ability to ratify any board-initiated amendments.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
cash-out
statutes.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
24 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
freeze-out
provisions.
Freeze-out
provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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25 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;
|
|
◾
|
|
The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.
|
|
General Recommendation:
fee-shifting
whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new
5-percent
holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing
5-percent
holder);
|
|
◾
|
|
The value of the NOLs;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
26 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors that may be applicable.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
No lower than a 20 percent trigger,
flip-in
or flip-over;
|
|
◾
|
|
A term of no more than three years;
|
|
◾
|
|
No deadhand, slowhand,
no-hand,
or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent);
|
|
◾
|
|
The value of the NOLs;
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
27 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors that may be applicable.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-votes
in the company’s vote-counting methodology.
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies) and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual meeting;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process and maintains the integrity of vote results;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder proposals are consistent and clear;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting mechanics;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors that may be relevant.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;
|
|
◾
|
|
The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
28 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;
|
|
◾
|
|
One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case,
|
|
◾
|
|
Reasons for reincorporation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders’ current right to act by written consent;
|
|
◾
|
|
The consent threshold;
|
|
◾
|
|
The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
|
|
◾
|
|
Investor ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.
|
|
◾
|
|
An unfettered
11
right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;
|
|
◾
|
|
A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;
|
|
◾
|
|
No
non-shareholder-approved
pill; and
|
|
◾
|
|
An annually elected board.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings;
|
|
◾
|
|
Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10 percent preferred);
|
|
◾
|
|
The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
29 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Investor ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-shareholder
constituencies or other
non-financial
effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have significant ownership levels, vote
case-by-case,
|
|
◾
|
|
Ownership structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Quorum requirements; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Vote requirements.
|
|
General Recommendation:
in-person
meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only
12
in-person
meeting.
|
|
◾
|
|
Scope and rationale of the proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
30 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Past Board Performance:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s use of authorized shares during the last three years;
|
|
◾
|
|
The Current Request:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes of the proposed increase;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The dilutive impact of the request as determined relative to an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company’s need for shares and total shareholder returns.
|
|
A.
|
Most companies:
100
percent
|
|
B.
|
Companies with less than 50 percent of existing authorized shares either outstanding or reserved for issuance:
50
percent
|
|
C.
|
Companies with
one-
and three-year total shareholder returns (TSRs) in the bottom 10 percent of the U.S. market as of the end of the calendar quarter that is closest to their most recent fiscal year end:
50
percent
|
|
D.
|
Companies at which both conditions (B and C) above are both present:
25
percent
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
31 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, such as:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The new class of shares will be transitory;
|
|
◾
|
|
The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-shareholder-approved
shareholder rights plan (poison pill).
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The size of the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
The shareholder base; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The liquidity of the stock.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Past Board Performance:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s use of authorized preferred shares during the last three years;
|
|
◾
|
|
The Current Request:
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes for the proposed increase;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request;
|
|
◾
|
|
In cases where the company has existing authorized preferred stock, the dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company’s need for shares and total shareholder returns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
32 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
More simplified capital structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Enhanced liquidity;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness of conversion terms;
|
|
◾
|
|
Impact on voting power and dividends;
|
|
◾
|
|
Reasons for the reclassification;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives considered.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy.
|
|
◾
|
|
Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s rationale; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Other factors as applicable.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Greenmail,
|
|
◾
|
|
The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,
|
|
◾
|
|
Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or
|
|
◾
|
|
Other company-specific factors as warranted.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
33 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Adverse governance changes;
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive increases in authorized capital stock;
|
|
◾
|
|
Unfair method of distribution;
|
|
◾
|
|
Diminution of voting rights;
|
|
◾
|
|
Adverse conversion features;
|
|
◾
|
|
Negative impact on stock option plans; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Alternatives such as
spin-off.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Purchase price;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial and strategic benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
How the deal was negotiated;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives for the business;
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-completion
risk.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Impact on the balance sheet/working capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential elimination of diseconomies;
|
|
◾
|
|
Anticipated financial and operating benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Anticipated use of funds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Value received for the asset;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
How the deal was negotiated;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
34 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Dilution to existing shareholders’ positions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial issues - company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Control issues - change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over certain corporate actions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflict of interest - arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The reasons for the change;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any financial or tax benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulatory benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Increases in capital structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.
|
|
◾
|
|
Increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see discussion under “Capital”); or
|
|
◾
|
|
Adverse changes in shareholder rights.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Offer price/premium;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
How the deal was negotiated;
|
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|
|
|
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|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives/offers considered; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-completion
risk.
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);
|
|
◾
|
|
Balanced interests of continuing vs.
cashed-out
shareholders, taking into account the following:
|
|
◾
|
|
Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?
|
|
◾
|
|
Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?
|
|
◾
|
|
Does the company have strong corporate governance?
|
|
◾
|
|
Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?
|
|
◾
|
|
Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Percentage of assets/business contributed;
|
|
◾
|
|
Percentage ownership;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial and strategic benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other alternatives; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Non-completion
risk.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Appraisal value of assets; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Valuation
|
|
◾
|
|
Market reaction
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategic rationale
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Negotiations and process
arm’s-length?
Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest
non-insider
shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the “ISS Transaction Summary” section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt. In these instances from a value standpoint, the negative impact of dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that must occur to trigger the dilutive event.
|
|
◾
|
|
Terms of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit strategy):
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of private placement.
|
|
◾
|
|
When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as, liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital scarcity, information asymmetry, and anticipation of future performance.
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial issues:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s financial condition;
|
|
◾
|
|
Degree of need for capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Use of proceeds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and proposed cash burn rate;
|
|
◾
|
|
Going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.
|
|
◾
|
|
Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger, or sale of part or all of the company.
|
|
◾
|
|
Control issues:
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Change in management;
|
|
◾
|
|
Change in control;
|
|
◾
|
|
Guaranteed board and committee seats;
|
|
◾
|
|
Standstill provisions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Voting agreements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Veto power over certain corporate actions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium.
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest:
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.
|
|
◾
|
|
Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?
|
|
◾
|
|
Market reaction:
|
|
◾
|
|
The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the
one-day
impact on the unaffected stock price.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee);
|
|
◾
|
|
The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);
|
|
◾
|
|
Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance of the reorganized company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Valuation
pre-merger
value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity.
|
|
◾
|
|
Market reaction
one-day
impact on the unaffected stock price.
|
|
◾
|
|
Deal timing
|
|
◾
|
|
Negotiations and process
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest
|
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|
|
|
|
third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 perecnt of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the
18-24
month timeframe.
|
|
◾
|
|
Voting agreements
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-redeeming
shareholders, and any prior extension requests.
|
|
◾
|
|
Length of request
|
|
◾
|
|
Pending transaction(s)
progression of the acquisition process:
|
|
◾
|
|
Added incentive for
non-redeeming
shareholders
|
|
◾
|
|
Prior extension requests
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Tax and regulatory advantages;
|
|
◾
|
|
Planned use of the sale proceeds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Valuation of spinoff;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fairness opinion;
|
|
◾
|
|
Benefits to the parent company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Conflicts of interest;
|
|
◾
|
|
Managerial incentives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Corporate governance changes;
|
|
◾
|
|
Changes in the capital structure.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Selling the company; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders.
|
|
◾
|
|
Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;
|
|
◾
|
|
Signs of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover defenses);
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategic plan in place for improving value;
|
|
◾
|
|
Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.
|
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40 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.
|
Maintain appropriate
pay-for-performance
|
|
2.
|
Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;
|
|
3.
|
Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (
e.g.
|
|
4.
|
Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;
|
|
5.
|
Avoid inappropriate pay to
non-executive
directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors is reasonable and does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
|
|
◾
|
|
The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
The board exhibits a significant level of
poor communication and responsiveness
to shareholders.
|
|
◾
|
|
There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP would otherwise be warranted due to
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The situation is egregious.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1.
|
Peer Group
14
Alignment:
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
|
|
◾
|
|
The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
|
|
◾
|
|
The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.
|
|
2.
|
Absolute Alignment
15
– the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.
|
|
◾
|
|
The ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;
|
|
◾
|
|
The overall ratio of performance-based compensation to fixed or discretionary pay;
|
|
◾
|
|
The rigor of performance goals;
|
|
◾
|
|
The complexity and risks around pay program design;
|
|
◾
|
|
The transparency and clarity of disclosure;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
Financial/operational results, both absolute and relative to peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g.,
bi-annual
awards);
|
|
◾
|
|
Realizable pay
16
compared to grant pay; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other factors deemed relevant.
|
|
◾
|
|
Problematic practices related to
non-performance-based
compensation elements;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Pay decisions that circumvent
pay-for-performance,
|
|
◾
|
|
Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);
|
|
◾
|
|
Extraordinary perquisites or tax
gross-ups;
|
|
◾
|
|
New or materially amended agreements that provide for:
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);
|
|
◾
|
|
CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;
|
|
◾
|
|
CIC excise tax
gross-up
entitlements (including “modified”
gross-ups);
|
|
◾
|
|
Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;
|
|
◾
|
|
Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.
|
|
◾
|
|
Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;
|
|
◾
|
|
Duration of options backdating;
|
|
◾
|
|
Size of restatement due to options backdating;
|
|
◾
|
|
Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or
re-pricing
backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.
|
|
◾
|
|
Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);
|
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43 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the
say-on-pay
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ownership structure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
change-in-control
|
|
◾
|
|
Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;
|
|
◾
|
|
Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;
|
|
◾
|
|
Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control;
|
|
◾
|
|
Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale;
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive cash severance (generally >3x base salary and bonus);
|
|
◾
|
|
Excise tax
gross-ups
triggered and payable;
|
|
◾
|
|
Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
17
depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “Equity Plan Scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:
|
|
◾
|
|
Plan Cost:
|
|
◾
|
|
SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and
|
|
◾
|
|
SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.
|
|
◾
|
|
Plan Features:
|
|
◾
|
|
Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC);
|
|
◾
|
|
Discretionary vesting authority;
|
|
◾
|
|
Liberal share recycling on various award types;
|
|
◾
|
|
Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Dividends payable prior to award vesting.
|
|
◾
|
|
Grant Practices:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Vesting requirements in CEO’s recent equity grants
(3-year
look-back);
|
|
◾
|
|
The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);
|
|
◾
|
|
The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company maintains sufficient post-exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.
|
|
◾
|
|
Awards may vest in connection with a liberal
change-of-control
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for
non-listed
companies);
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings;
|
|
◾
|
|
The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.
|
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;
|
|
◾
|
|
Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs;
|
|
◾
|
|
Cancel underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Provide cash buyouts of underwater options.
|
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|
|
46 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Severity of the
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Addresses administrative features only; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes
only
, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per
ISS’ Classification of Directors
. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time for any reason (including after the company’s initial public offering), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per
ISS’ Classification of Directors.
|
|
◾
|
|
If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.
|
|
◾
|
|
If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments do not include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown only for informational purposes.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;
|
|
◾
|
|
Offering period is 27 months or less; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the outstanding shares.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Broad-based participation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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48 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Historic trading
patterns--the
stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back
“in-the-money”
|
|
◾
|
|
Rationale for the
re-pricing--was
|
|
◾
|
|
Is this a
value-for-value
|
|
◾
|
|
Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?;
|
|
◾
|
|
Timing--repricing
should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price;
|
|
◾
|
|
Option
vesting--does
the new option vest immediately or is there a
black-out
period?;
|
|
◾
|
|
Term of the
option--the
term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;
|
|
◾
|
|
Exercise
price--should
be set at fair market or a premium to market;
|
|
◾
|
|
Participants--executive
officers and directors must be excluded.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
One-time
Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit
one-time
transfers to shareholders for approval.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Executive officers and
non-employee
directors are excluded from participating;
|
|
◾
|
|
Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; and
|
|
◾
|
|
There is a
two-year
minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.
|
|
◾
|
|
Eligibility;
|
|
◾
|
|
Vesting;
|
|
◾
|
|
Bid-price;
|
|
◾
|
|
Term of options;
|
|
◾
|
|
Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Option repricing policy.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-employee
director compensation, based on the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
If the equity plan under which
non-employee
director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and
|
|
◾
|
|
An assessment of the following qualitative factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Equity award vesting schedules;
|
|
◾
|
|
The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Meaningful limits on director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-employee
directors, based on:
|
|
◾
|
|
The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers (in certain circumstances); and
|
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50 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).
|
|
◾
|
|
The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
|
|
◾
|
|
The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Equity award vesting schedules;
|
|
◾
|
|
The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Meaningful limits on director compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-employee
directors. Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for
non-employee
directors.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
51 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;
|
|
◾
|
|
The time period required to retain the shares;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-executive
employees. The following factors will be considered:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of its executive compensation setting process, including how the company considers pay disparity;
|
|
◾
|
|
If any problematic pay practices or
pay-for-performance
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of shareholder support for the company’s pay programs.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards.
|
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52 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
pay-for-superior
|
|
◾
|
|
Set compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median;
|
|
◾
|
|
Deliver a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;
|
|
◾
|
|
Provide the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and
non-financial
performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Establish performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies;
|
|
◾
|
|
Limit payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.
|
|
◾
|
|
What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven?
|
|
◾
|
|
If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?
|
|
◾
|
|
Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure?
|
|
◾
|
|
What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?
|
|
General Recommendation:
(10b5-1
plans) for executives. These principles include:
|
|
◾
|
|
Adoption, amendment, or termination of a
10b5-1
Plan must be disclosed within two business days in a
Form 8-K;
|
|
◾
|
|
Amendment or early termination of a
10b5-1
Plan is allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board;
|
|
◾
|
|
Ninety days must elapse between adoption or amendment of a
10b5-1
Plan and initial trading under the plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a
10b5-1
Plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
An executive may not trade in company stock outside the
10b5-1
Plan;
|
|
◾
|
|
Trades under a
10b5-1
Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
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|
53 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
If the company has adopted a formal recoupment policy;
|
|
◾
|
|
The rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent;
|
|
◾
|
|
Disclosure of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or lack thereof; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Any other relevant factors.
|
|
General Recommendation:
prior
|
|
◾
|
|
The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;
|
|
◾
|
|
The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable
W-2
compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs);
|
|
◾
|
|
Change-in-control
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks;
|
|
◾
|
|
The use of
per-share
metrics in incentive plans;
|
|
◾
|
|
The effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether there is any indication of metric result manipulation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
54 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
gross-up
payments to executives, except in situations where
gross-ups
are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current treatment of equity upon employment termination and/or in
change-in-control
|
|
◾
|
|
Current employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as
gross-ups
embedded in those agreements.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
55 of 72
|
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
56 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case,
|
|
◾
|
|
If the issues presented in the proposal are more appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
|
|
◾
|
|
If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; and
|
|
◾
|
|
If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has already published a set of animal welfare standards and monitors compliance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s standards are comparable to industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
There are no recent significant fines, litigation, or controversies related to the company’s and/or its suppliers’ treatment of animals.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
57 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company is conducting animal testing programs that are unnecessary or not required by regulation;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company is conducting animal testing when suitable alternatives are commonly accepted and used by industry peers; or
|
|
◾
|
|
There are recent, significant fines or litigation related to the company’s treatment of animals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential impact of such labeling on the company’s business;
|
|
◾
|
|
The quality of the company’s disclosure on GE product labeling, related voluntary initiatives, and how this disclosure compares with industry peer disclosure; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Company’s current disclosure on the feasibility of GE product labeling.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abuses;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the products/practices in question;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been subject to violations of related laws or serious controversies; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Peer companies’ policies/practices in this area.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
58 of 72
|
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential for reputational, market, and regulatory risk exposure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Existing disclosure of relevant policies;
|
|
◾
|
|
Deviation from established industry norms;
|
|
◾
|
|
Relevant company initiatives to provide research and/or products to disadvantaged consumers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal focuses on specific products or geographic regions;
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential burden and scope of the requested report;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines at the company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already discloses similar information through existing reports such as a supplier code of conduct and/or a sustainability report;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has formally committed to the implementation of a toxic/hazardous materials and/or product safety and supply chain reporting and monitoring program based on industry norms or similar standards within a specified time frame; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has not been recently involved in relevant significant controversies, fines, or litigation.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its product safety policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current regulations in the markets in which the company operates; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines stemming from toxic/hazardous materials at the company.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent related fines, controversies, or significant litigation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company complies with relevant laws and regulations on the marketing of tobacco;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
59 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company’s advertising restrictions deviate from those of industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company entered into the Master Settlement Agreement, which restricts marketing of tobacco to youth; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether restrictions on marketing to youth extend to foreign countries.
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company complies with all laws and regulations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree that voluntary restrictions beyond those mandated by law might hurt the company’s competitiveness; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The risk of any health-related liabilities.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company already provides current, publicly-available information on the impact that climate change may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s level of disclosure compared to industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s climate change-related performance.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already discloses current, publicly-available information on the impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
There are no significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s GHG emissions.
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company provides disclosure of year-over-year GHG emissions performance data;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether company disclosure lags behind industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current GHG emission policies, oversight mechanisms, and related initiatives; and
|
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|
|
60 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company complies with applicable energy efficiency regulations and laws, and discloses its participation in energy efficiency policies and programs, including disclosure of benchmark data, targets, and performance measures; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The proponent requests adoption of specific energy efficiency goals within specific timelines.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and structure of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure on renewable energy use and GHG emissions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure of policies, practices, and oversight implemented to manage GHG emissions and mitigate climate change risks.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company.
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company’s board and among its executive officers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the company’s industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s established process for addressing gender and racial minority board representation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating committee charter language;
|
|
◾
|
|
The independence of the company’s nominating committee;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director nominees; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
EEO-1
data, unless:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company publicly discloses equal opportunity policies and initiatives in a comprehensive manner;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already publicly discloses comprehensive workforce diversity data; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has no recent significant
EEO-related
violations or litigation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy on fair and equitable compensation practices;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of its workplace health and safety performance data, health and safety management policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature of the company’s business, specifically regarding company and employee exposure to health and safety risks;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or violations related to workplace health and safety; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s workplace health and safety performance relative to industry peers.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s compliance with applicable regulations and guidelines;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
62 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its security and safety policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The existence of recent, significant violations, fines, or controversy regarding the safety and security of the company’s operations and/or facilities.
|
|
◾
|
|
Current disclosure of applicable policies and risk assessment report(s) and risk management procedures;
|
|
◾
|
|
The impact of regulatory
non-compliance,
litigation, remediation, or reputational loss that may be associated with failure to manage the company’s operations in question, including the management of relevant community and stakeholder relations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature, purpose, and scope of the company’s operations in the specific region(s);
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which company policies and procedures are consistent with industry norms; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of the resolution.
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant policies and oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of such disclosure relative to its industry peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential relevant local, state, or national regulatory developments; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s hydraulic fracturing operations.
|
|
◾
|
|
Operations in the specified regions are not permitted by current laws or regulations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure of its operations and environmental policies in these regions is comparable to industry peers.
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature of the company’s business;
|
|
◾
|
|
The current level of disclosure of the company’s existing related programs;
|
|
◾
|
|
The timetable and methods of program implementation prescribed by the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s ability to address the issues raised in the proposal; and
|
|
◾
|
|
How the company’s recycling programs compare to similar programs of its industry peers.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
63 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an environment, health, and safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive code of corporate conduct; and/or a diversity report; or
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current disclosure of relevant policies, initiatives, oversight mechanisms, and water usage metrics;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether or not the company’s existing water-related policies and practices are consistent with relevant internationally recognized standards and national/local regulations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The potential financial impact or risk to the company associated with water-related concerns or issues; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding water use by the company and its suppliers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management, and Internet censorship;
|
|
◾
|
|
Engagement in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet;
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications;
|
|
◾
|
|
Applicable market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Controversies, fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, or Internet censorship.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has significant and/or persistent controversies or regulatory violations regarding social and/or environmental issues;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has management systems and oversight mechanisms in place regarding its social and environmental performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which industry peers have incorporated similar
non-financial
performance criteria in their executive compensation practices; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its environmental and social performance.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
64 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;
|
|
◾
|
|
Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives;
|
|
◾
|
|
Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers;
|
|
◾
|
|
The scope of the request; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices.
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed, including information on the implementation of these policies and any related oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s industry and whether the company or its suppliers operate in countries or areas where there is a history of human rights concerns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights involving the company or its suppliers, and whether the company has taken remedial steps; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the proposal is unduly burdensome or overly prescriptive.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption;
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
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|
|
65 of 72
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures;
|
|
◾
|
|
Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws;
|
|
◾
|
|
Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been recently involved in recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to its operations in “high-risk” markets.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Controversies surrounding operations in the relevant market(s);
|
|
◾
|
|
The value of the requested report to shareholders;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant information on outsourcing and plant closure procedures; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s existing human rights standards relative to industry peers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management and board oversight;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s lobbying-related activities.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
66 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;
|
|
◾
|
|
The company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
There are no recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibit coercion.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
67 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
closed-end
management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a
case-by-case
opting-in
to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a
by-law
amendment to a shareholder vote.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Past performance as a
closed-end
fund;
|
|
◾
|
|
Market in which the fund invests;
|
|
◾
|
|
Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related praposals.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Past performance relative to its peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Market in which the fund invests;
|
|
◾
|
|
Measures taken by the board to address the issues;
|
|
◾
|
|
Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
|
|
◾
|
|
Independence of directors;
|
|
◾
|
|
Experience and skills of director candidates;
|
|
◾
|
|
Governance profile of the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
Evidence of management entrenchment.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Proposed and current fee schedules;
|
|
◾
|
|
Fund category/investment objective;
|
|
◾
|
|
Performance benchmarks;
|
|
◾
|
|
Share price performance as compared with peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Resulting fees relative to peers;
|
|
◾
|
|
Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
68 of 72
|
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
Stated specific financing purpose;
|
|
◾
|
|
Possible dilution for common shares;
|
|
◾
|
|
Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential competitiveness;
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulatory developments;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and potential returns; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and potential risk.
|
|
Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
non-fundamental
restriction, considering the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
The fund’s target investments;
|
|
◾
|
|
The reasons given by the fund for the change; and
|
|
◾
|
|
The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.
|
|
General Recommendation:
non-fundamental.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Political/economic changes in the target market;
|
|
◾
|
|
Consolidation in the target market; and
|
|
◾
|
|
Current asset composition.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
sub-classification,
considering the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
Potential competitiveness;
|
|
◾
|
|
Current and potential returns;
|
|
◾
|
|
Risk of concentration;
|
|
◾
|
|
Consolidation in target industry.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
◾
|
|
The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;
|
|
◾
|
|
The sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance; and
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
69 of 72
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U N I T E D S T A T E S
P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾
|
|
The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either:
|
|
◾
|
|
Outperforming peers in its
8-digit
GICS group as measured by
one-
and three-year median TSRs; or
|
|
◾
|
|
Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing
non-participating
shareholders.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Strategies employed to salvage the company;
|
|
◾
|
|
The fund’s past performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the liquidation.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
The degree of change implied by the proposal;
|
|
◾
|
|
The efficiencies that could result;
|
|
◾
|
|
The state of incorporation;
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulatory standards and implications.
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust or any of its series;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration of trust;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act;
|
|
◾
|
|
Allow the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory arrangements;
|
|
◾
|
|
Removal of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
re-incorporations,
considering the following factors:
|
|
◾
|
|
Regulations of both states;
|
|
◾
|
|
Required fundamental policies of both states;
|
|
◾
|
|
The increased flexibility available.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;
|
|
◾
|
|
The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;
|
|
◾
|
|
The competitiveness of the fund in the industry;
|
|
◾
|
|
The terms of the agreement.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
70 of 72
|
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P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Resulting fee structure;
|
|
◾
|
|
Performance of both funds;
|
|
◾
|
|
Continuity of management personnel;
|
|
◾
|
|
Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.
|
|
General Recommendation:
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case
|
|
◾
|
|
Performance of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV);
|
|
◾
|
|
The fund’s history of shareholder relations;
|
|
◾
|
|
The performance of other funds under the advisor’s management.
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
71 of 72
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|
|
|
|
|
|
I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
|
|
|
72 of 72
|
|
MAI-FREGIF-0421D
|
|
(a
|
)(1)
|
|
|
|
(a
|
)(2)
|
|
|
|
(a
|
)(3)
|
|
|
|
(b
|
)
|
|
|
|
(c
|
)
|
|
Not applicable.
|
|
(d
|
)(1)
|
|
|
|
(d
|
)(2)
|
|
|
|
(d
|
)(3)
|
|
|
|
(d
|
)(4)
|
|
|
|
(d
|
)(5)
|
|
|
|
(d
|
)(6)
|
|
|
|
(d
|
)(7)
|
|
|
|
(e
|
)(1)
|
|
|
|
(e
|
)(2)
|
|
|
|
(e
|
)(3)
|
|
|
(e
|
)(4)
|
|
|
|
(f
|
)
|
|
Not applicable.
|
|
(g
|
)(1)
|
|
|
|
(g
|
)(2)
|
|
|
|
(h
|
)(1)
|
|
|
|
(h
|
)(2)
|
|
|
|
(h
|
)(3)
|
|
|
|
(h
|
)(4)
|
|
|
|
(h
|
)(5)
|
|
|
|
(i
|
)
|
|
Not applicable.
|
|
(j
|
)
|
|
|
|
(k
|
)
|
|
Not applicable.
|
|
(l
|
)
|
|
|
|
(m
|
)
|
|
|
|
(n
|
)
|
|
|
|
(o
|
)
|
|
Not applicable.
|
|
(p
|
)(1)
|
|
|
|
(p
|
)(2)
|
|
|
|
(q
|
)
|
|
Name and Position with Nuveen Fund Advisors
|
|
Other Business, Profession, Vocation or
Employment During Past Two Years |
Oluseun Salami, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|
|
Director (since 2020) NIS/R&T, Inc.; Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Nuveen Alternative Advisors LLC (since 2020), Nuveen, LLC (since 2020), Teachers Advisors, LLC (since 2020), TIAA-CREF Asset Management LLC (since 2020) and TIAA-CREF Investment Management, LLC (since 2020); Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Business Finance and Planning (since 2020) Chief Accounting Officer (2019), Senior Vice President, Corporate Controller (2018-2020), Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, Senior Vice President, Corporate Controller, College Retirement Equities Fund, TIAA Board of Overseers, TIAA Separate Account VA-1, TIAA-CREF Funds, TIAA-CREF Life Funds (2018-2020).
|
Erik Mogavero, Managing Director and Chief Compliance Officer
|
|
Formerly employed by Deutsche Bank (2013-2017) as Managing Director, Head of Asset Management and Wealth Management Compliance for the Americas region and Chief Compliance Officer of Deutsche Investment Management Americas.
|
Michael A. Perry, Executive Vice President
|
|
Co-Chief Executive Officer (since April 2019), formerly, Executive Vice President (2017-2019), formerly, Managing Director (2015-2017) of Nuveen Securities, LLC; and Executive Vice President (since 2017) of Nuveen Alternative Investments, LLC.
|
Megan Sendlak, Managing Director and Controller
|
|
Managing Director and Controller (since 2020) of Nuveen Alternatives Advisors LLC, Nuveen Asset Management, LLC, Nuveen Investments, Inc., Teachers Advisors, LLC, and TIAA-CREF Investment Management, LLC; Managing Director and Controller (since 2020), formerly, Vice President and Corporate Accounting Director (2018-2020) of Nuveen, LLC; Vice President and Assistant Controller (since 2019) of NIS/R&T, INC., NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC and Santa Barbara Asset Management, LLC.
|
Name
|
|
Position and Offices with
Nuveen Asset Management |
|
Other Business, Profession, Vocation or
Employment During Past Two Years |
William T. Huffman
|
|
President
|
|
None
|
Stuart J. Cohen
|
|
Managing Director and Head of Legal
|
|
Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (since 2002) of Nuveen Securities, LLC; Managing Director (since 2007) and Assistant Secretary (since 2003) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC.
|
Travis M. Pauley
|
|
Managing Director and Chief Compliance Officer
|
|
Regional Head of Compliance and Regulatory Legal (2013-2020) of AXA Investment Managers.
|
Megan Sendlak
|
|
Managing Director and Controller
|
|
Managing Director and Controller (since 2020) of Nuveen Alternatives Advisors LLC, Nuveen Investments, Inc., Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC, Teachers Advisors, LLC and TIAA-CREF Investment Management, LLC; Managing Director and Controller (since 2020), formerly, Vice President and Corporate Accounting Director (2018-2020) of Nuveen, LLC; Vice President and Assistant Controller (since 2019) of NIS/R&T, INC., NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC and Santa Barbara Asset Management, LLC.
|
Name and Principal
Business Address
|
|
Positions and Offices
with Nuveen Securities |
|
Positions and Offices
with Registrant |
Deann D. Morgan
730 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017
|
|
Co-Chief Executive Officer
|
|
Vice President
|
Michael A. Perry
333 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
|
|
Co-Chief Executive Officer
|
|
None
|
Name and Principal
Business Address
|
|
Positions and Offices
with Nuveen Securities |
|
Positions and Offices
with Registrant |
William Huffman
333 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
|
|
Executive Vice President
|
|
None
|
Kevin J. McCarthy
333 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
|
|
Senior Managing Director and Assistant Secretary
|
|
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Christopher M. Rohrbacher
333 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
|
|
Managing Director and Assistant Secretary
|
|
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
Lucas A. Satre
333 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
|
|
Managing Director, Secretary and General Counsel
|
|
None
|
Mark J. Czarniecki
901 Marquette Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55402
|
|
Vice President and Assistant Secretary
|
|
Vice President and Secretary
|
NUVEEN INVESTMENT TRUST V
|
||
BY:
|
|
/S/ MARK J. CZARNIECKI
|
|
Mark J. Czarniecki
Vice President and Secretary
|
Signature
|
|
Title
|
|
|
|
|
|
Date
|
/S/ E. SCOTT WICKERHAM
E. SCOTT WICKERHAM
|
|
Vice President and Controller (principal financial and accounting officer)
|
|
|
|
April 30, 2021
|
||
/S/ CHRISTOPHER E. STICKROD
CHRISTOPHER E. STICKROD
|
|
Chief Administrative Officer (principal executive officer)
|
|
|
|
April 30, 2021
|
||
TERENCE J. TOTH*
|
|
Chairman of the Board and Trustee
|
|
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|
|
By:
|
|
/S/ MARK J. CZARNIECKI
MARK J. CZARNIECKI
Attorney-in-Fact
April 30, 2021 |
JACK B. EVANS*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
WILLIAM C. HUNTER*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
ALBIN F. MOSCHNER*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
JOHN K. NELSON*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
JUDITH M. STOCKDALE*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
CAROLE E. STONE*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
MATTHEW THORNTON III*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
MARGARET L. WOLFF*
|
|
Trustee
|
||||||
ROBERT L. YOUNG*
|
|
Trustee
|
*
|
An original power of attorney authorizing, among others, Mark J. Czarniecki and Christopher M. Rohrbacher to execute this registration statement, and amendments thereto, for each of the trustees of the Registrant on whose behalf this registration statement is filed, has been executed and has previously been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is incorporated by reference herein.
|
Exhibit
Number
|
|
Exhibit
|
(h)(4)
|
|
Amendment and Schedule A to Transfer Agency and Service Agreement, effective as of January 20, 2021.
|
(j)
|
|
Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm, dated April 29, 2021.
|
AMENDMENT
To
Transfer Agency and Service Agreement
Between
Each of the Nuveen Open-End Investment Companies
As Listed on Schedule A to the Agreement
And
DST Asset Manager Solutions, Inc.
This Amendment is made as of this 20th day of January, 2021 (Effective Date), between each of the Nuveen Open-End Investment Companies, as listed on Schedule A to the Agreement (collectively, the Funds) and DST Asset Manager Solutions, Inc. (the Transfer Agent). In accordance with Section 16.l (Amendment) and Section 17 (Additional Portfolios/Funds) of the Transfer Agency and Service Agreement dated May 11, 2012, as amended (the Agreement), the parties desire to amend the Agreement as set forth herein.
NOW THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1. |
Schedule A. The current Schedule A to the Agreement is hereby replaced and superseded with the Schedule A attached hereto, effective as of the Effective Date. |
2. |
All defined terms and definitions in the Agreement shall be the same in this Amendment (the January 20, 2021 Amendment) except as specifically revised by this Amendment; and |
3. |
Except as specifically set forth in this January 20, 2021 Amendment, all other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. |
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this January 20, 2021 Amendment to be executed by a duly authorized officer on one or more counterparts as of the latest date of signature provided below.
EACH OF THE NUVEEN FUNDS, | DST ASSET MANAGER | |||||
AS LISTED ON SCHEDULE A | SOLUTIONS, INC. | |||||
By: /s/ Tina M. Lazar |
By: /s/ Michael Sleightholme |
|||||
Print: Tina M. Lazar |
Print: Michael Sleightholme |
|||||
Title: Vice President |
Title: VP |
|||||
Date: January 20, 2021 |
Date: January 22, 2021 |
|||||
As an Authorized Officer on behalf of each | ||||||
Of the Funds indicated on Schedule A |
SCHEDULE A
Nuveen Open-End Funds
Effective January 20, 2021
1. |
NUVEEN MUNICIPAL TRUST |
Nuveen All-American Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Intermediate Duration Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Limited Term Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Short Duration High Yield Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Strategic Municipal Opportunities Fund
2. |
NUVEEN MULTISTATE TRUST I |
Nuveen Arizona Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Colorado Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Maryland Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen New Mexico Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Pennsylvania Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Virginia Municipal Bond Fund
3. |
NUVEEN MULTISTATE TRUST II |
Nuveen California High Yield Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen California Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Connecticut Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Massachusetts Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen New Jersey Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen New York Municipal Bond Fund
4. |
NUVEEN MULTISTATE TRUST III |
Nuveen Georgia Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Louisiana Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen North Carolina Municipal Bond Fund
5. |
NUVEEN MULTISTATE TRUST IV |
Nuveen Kansas Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Kentucky Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Michigan Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Missouri Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Ohio Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Wisconsin Municipal Bond Fund
SCHEDULE A
Nuveen Open-End Funds
Effective January 20, 2021
6. |
NUVEEN INVESTMENT TRUST |
Nuveen Large Core Fund
Nuveen Equity Market Neutral Fund
Nuveen NWQ Global Equity Income Fund
Nuveen NWQ Large-Cap Value Fund
Nuveen NWQ Multi-Cap Value Fund
Nuveen NWQ Small/Mid-Cap Value Fund
Nuveen NWQ Small-Cap Value Fund
7. |
NUVEEN INVESTMENT TRUST II |
Nuveen Emerging Markets Equity Fund
Nuveen Equity Long/Short Fund
Nuveen International Growth Fund
Nuveen NWQ International Value Fund
Nuveen Santa Barbara Dividend Growth Fund
Nuveen Santa Barbara Global Dividend Growth Fund
Nuveen Santa Barbara International Dividend Growth Fund
Nuveen Winslow International Large Cap Fund
Nuveen Winslow International Small Cap Fund
Nuveen Winslow Large-Cap Growth ESG Fund
8. |
NUVEEN INVESTMENT TRUST III |
Nuveen Floating Rate Income Fund
Nuveen High Yield Income Fund
9. |
NUVEEN INVESTMENT TRUST V |
Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Fund
Nuveen NWQ Flexible Income Fund
Nuveen Preferred Securities and Income Fund
10. |
NUVEEN MANAGED ACCOUNTS PORTFOLIOS TRUST |
Municipal Total Return Managed Accounts Portfolio
Nuveen Core Impact Bond Managed Accounts Portfolio
SCHEDULE A
Nuveen Open-End Funds
Effective January 20, 2021
11. |
NUVEEN INVESTMENT FUNDS, INC. |
Nuveen Dividend Value Fund
Nuveen Global Infrastructure Fund
Nuveen Credit Income Fund
Nuveen Large Cap Select Fund
Nuveen Mid Cap Growth Opportunities Fund
Nuveen Mid Cap Value Fund
Nuveen Minnesota Intermediate Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Minnesota Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Nebraska Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Oregon Intermediate Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Real Asset Income Fund
Nuveen Real Estate Securities Fund
Nuveen Short Term Municipal Bond Fund
Nuveen Small Cap Growth Opportunities Fund
Nuveen Small Cap Select Fund
Nuveen Small Cap Value Fund
Nuveen Strategic Income Fund
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this Registration Statement on Form N-1A of Nuveen Investment Trust V of our report dated February 25, 2021, relating to the financial statements and financial highlights, which appears in Nuveen Global Real Estate Securities Funds Annual Report on Form N-CSR for the year ended December 31, 2020. We also consent to the references to us under the headings Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm and Financial Highlights in such Registration Statement.
/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Chicago, Illinois
April 29, 2021